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ABSTRACT
In this study, I demonstrate how Swinburne develops an aesthetic that involves re
examining the contradictions and ambiguities arising in the tension between the
celebration of the creative power of the·i�agination and the consideration of the material
limitations that constrict the applications of the imagination's power. He finds artistic
integrity and productivity in the failure of the imagination to aUow one to transcend the
material world, because he determines that such failure allows one to discover many
previously undetected possibilities for imaginative expression still inherent in the
material world. Swinburne accomplishes this by privileging the fantasy component of
art while recognizing fantasy as artifice, artifice in which failure is always already
immanent. By emphasizing the artificiality, the fantastic quality, of art, he modifies
conventional perceptions of �rt as well as conventional modes of conveying and
interpreting "meaning" in art. In t�is waY., Swinburne presages the explorations of the
negative dialectic as well as the reconfigurations of material limitations that Theodor
Adorno undertakes in the Aesthetic Theory.
In my first three chapters, I establish how Swinburne's creative reconsideration of
the biography and works of William Blake allows him to explore the qualities of aesthetic
particularity and individualized perspective made possible by the revaluation of artifice.
. Swinburne "misreads" or transforms Blake into an idealized artist who pioneers an
aesthetic that depends on the very failures of actual, complete representatfon to occur
within ideological conventions in order to modify radically, if not exceed, those
conventions. In chapters four and five, I demonstrate how this aesthetic of failure is
manifest in the process of serial identifications Swinburne uses in his depictions of the
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various "Ladies ofPain" in his Poems and Ballads, First Series. Swinburne applies this
process of recasting failure as an ae�thetically productive process of serial identifications
to his explorations ofltalia� revolutionary politics and the carefully crafted images of
Giuseppe Mazzini in Songs before Sunrise, as I demonstrate in chapter six. Finally, in
chapter seven, I investigate Swinburne's use of the polis as a trope exemplifying
constructive struggle within failure through a compa_rison of his two major Greek
tragedies, A ta/anta in Calydon and Erechtheus.
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CHAPTER ONE
Re-Examining Imagination, Reason, Subjectivity:
Introducing Sw_inburne �etween Blake and Adorno
I"

•

•

•

"An enjoyment which wants lpttcia! language t� ckscribe it, being so unlike all others . . .
crams and crowds me with old and new verses, half-remembered and half-m<Jde, which
new ones will �ardly c�me straight afterwards .... "-Algernon Charles Swinburne
This study situates Swinburne, as an artist articulating a complex but critically
important aesthetic theory, as representing a kind of aesthetic median between Blake's
visionary celebration of the Romantic imagination and Adamo's exploration of the
ambiguities and contradictions the imagination simultaneously discovers and constructs
within art. Like Blake before him and Adorno after him, Swinburne realized that the
study of the power as well as the limitations of the imagination necessitates re-evaluation
not only of the problems post-enlightenment reason poses to the creation and
contemplation of art, but also ;to the constructions of selfho�d-the ego, or the subject
position-within an individual artwork, or a body of work by an individual artist.
Swinburne looked to Blake's poetry to find a theory of the imagination that could
overcome the dualisms between the material world and immaterial "spirit," reason and
nature, the human and the divine. However, Swinburne "misread" Blake 1 as defending
the spiritual against the material rather than erasing the divide between the two,
"reserving always the absolute assurance and certain faith that things do exist of which
the flesh"-and all things material-"can take no account, but only the spirit" (Blake 96).
Thus Swinburne reads into Blake's.poetry a perpetuation of the kind of dualism Blake
1

The standard claim in modem Swinburne criticism is that he "creatively misread" Blake's works. See
particularly David Riede, Swinburne: A Study ofRomantic Mythmaking; Ian Fletcher, Swinbume; and
Jerome McGaillly Swinburne: An Experiment in Criticism. Also, Harold Bloom discusses Swinburne's
misreading of "Blake's contraries" in Blake's Apocalypse: A Study in Poetic Argument (Garden City:
Doubleday, 1963).
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purported to transcend. Because he misreads Blake as perpetuating such dualis�
Swinburne questions and, in some instances, rejects altogether the idea of there being a
transcendent immaterial or "spiritual" realm which one could aspire to reach.
Consequently, Swinburne abandons the quest to find an alternative to a materialist world
view and instead dedicates himself to finding new ways to portray and aestheticize the
materialist view. In the prefatory note to his essay on William Blake, Swinburne praises
the Enlightenment philosopher Denis Diderot, a "hard-headed materialist," for being a
fierce and fervent "antagonist of all religions bui1_t on creeds and propped by sacraments"
(Blake viii). What Swinburne cal1s Diderot's "opposition to the God of man's making

and man's worshipping" (Blake vii) informs Swinburne's approach to the aesthetic.
Swinburne begins to consider the transcendent spiritual realm-a mythopoeic place in
which "the whole soul of man [meets] with the whole soul of the cosmos," overcoming
"the utter disjunction between nature and man" (Riede, Study 5-6)-as being of artists'
own making; and he becomes skeptical of those who claim that aesthetic experience can
allow one to validate his/her belief in the objective existence of that "transcendent"
realm. If overcoming or transcending the disjunction between nature and man, material
and "spirit," is no longer an option, then, one is left to explore the creative possibilities of
the unsurpassable disjunction. In this kind of exploration, Swinburne revises the
conventional dualisms of disjunction, presenting them as more dialectical structures in
which the conventions of opposition are cha11enged to expose how those conventions
contain elements of the unconventional, the exceptional-that which exceeds the very
convention.

3
Similar to Adorno in Aesthetic Theory, Swinburne sees in art the necessity of
experimentation which"takes shape as .the testing of possibilities," understanding that
such experimentation takes place at t�e boundaries of convention and must unearth a
"conscious[ness] of something that was always present in it" (Adorno, Theory 37-38).
Furthermore, Swinburne's dialectical structures seem to coptain a strain of what we can
now identify as Adomian negativity, in that Swinburne "highlights unavoidable tensions"
·between conventional oppositions instead of attempting to resolve such tensions, as weU
as"refuses to_ affirm any underlying identity" between or"final synthesis of' disparate
elements to fit.an established convention (Zuidervaart 48). Swinburne's dialectical
structures, like Adorno's, are enacted as "ensemble[s] of analyses of models" or
conventions themselves (Adorno, Negative 29). When Swinburne transforms a
dichotomy into dialectic, he provides various fantasies of synthesizing the two opposing
ideas, ostensibly giving hope for such reconciliation, but always with the awareness that
the reconciliation never happens.
Swinburne is actually more interested in creating multiple fantasies to use as
mediating terms between opposites, knowing that the mediation always fails. The
ensemble of the various analyses of the equally various failures at mediation then allows
· Swinburne to interrogate, via the negative dialectic, the conventional limitations of the
material world. He creates a.plenitude of artifices set up to fail with the distinct intent to
analyze all the reasons that the failure was always already immanent within the artifice
itself. The artifice is consciously con_cocted to (re)produce the failure of fantasy to
implement synthesis, reconciliation, or satisfaction; because fantasy does not have the
kind of"experiential authority" that conventions, with their limitations, produce, it allows
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Swinburne a "radically decentered and mobile experience" of reading, in which
conventional "experiential authority must become shifting, mobile, and decentered"
(Nicholsen 1 3 1). By shifting and decentering conventional limitations, then, Swinburne
aims to produce "inexhaustible aesthetic meaning" (Menke 66) without giving into what
Adorno would call the "transcendental delusion. " 2

Imaginative Vision: More than Meets the Eye
In the August 7, 1 808 issue of The Examiner. a reviewer identified simply as
"R.H." accused Blake of creating "insipid" and "absurd" art which merely reinforced the
"utter impossibility of representing Spirit to the eye," rather than surmounting it.3
Reading this particular review irivoked considerable ire in Swinburne, who believed that
"R.H." overlooked the key to surmounting this "impossibility": the human imagination.
This is not to suggest that Swinburne, like the Blake critics preceding him, thought that
the material could be transcended in order to reach the spiritual. Rather, Swinburne was
frustrated at their. apparent inability to rework or modify the traditional dualism. Through
his reading of Blake, Swinburne became convinced that the imagination did have the
power to transform the material world by reworking the traditionally imposed division
between the material and the immaterial, or the body and the spirit. Yet, despite his scorn
for most of Blake's contemporaneous critics, Swinburne remains just as obstinately
limited by the customary dualisms that Blake wished to traverse. Unlike those critics,
though, Swinburne was able to refocus his perception of the dichotomy between material
2

See Negative Dialectics 180-83.
Quoted by Swinburne, Blake 58-59, italics in original. Swinburne does not identify "R.H.," but the
review was written by Robert Hunt, brother of Leigh Hunt. Leigh Hunt was primary editor and publisher
of The Examiner from 1808-1822.

3

5

and "spirit." Rather than agree with claims that Blake futilely endeavored "by bad
drawings to represent immateriality" in material forms, 4 Swinburne re-reads
"immateriality" as indicating that which exceeds the common comprehension of
materiality. He felt that Blake's peers neglected to imagine themselves able to see that
which is not ordinarily seen, or to look beyond what is immediately, appreciably obvious.
Especially in _the case of the &aminer reviewers Swinburne cites, there lacks the
necessary acknowledgment -of one o(the foremost principles of Blake's aesthetic. To
"see" the world aesthetically is-not the same as "seeing" the world through one' s two
eyes. As Blake says in Milton, "The Eye of Man _[is] a little narrow orb closd up & dark"
(Plate 5: 21); thus one must use his/her imagination to "see."
Blake equates the imagination-the creative impulse-with the divine, albeit not
quite the same version of God or divinity upheld by Judeo-Christian tradition. As Blake
declares in The Ma"iage ofHeaven and Hell, "men forgot that All deities reside in the
human breast" (38), insinuating that "God" is a figurative incarnation of the multiple,
seemingly limitless possibilities of what the individual has yet to realize in the material
world. God also signifies mythic "Poetic Genius," or the ability to perceive what the
ideological screen eclipses· and/or distorts. Such "poetic genius" grants an inexhaustible
vision from which all human perception "merely deriv[es]" (Blake, Marriage 39).
Perhaps the most telling statement about the power and importance of the human
imagination, though, and the one that arguably best figures Blake's influence on
Swinburne, comes from Blake's "Laocoon":
The Eternal Body of Man is The IMAGINATION
4

"Mr. Blake's Exhibition," The Examiner 90 {17 Sep. 1809). Quoted by Swinburne, Blake 60.
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that is

God himself
The Divine Body

It manifests itself in his Works of Art (In Eternity All is Vision)
All that we See is VISION from Generated Organs gone as soon as come
· Permanent in The Imagination; considered as Nothing by the NATIJRAL
MAN
Here Blake separates artistic vision from the ordinary vision while also devising an
interesting pair of paradoxes. The first paradox-imagination as the "eternal body of
man"--explores the imagination's boundaries. The imagination, as a human faculty, is
embodied in the (hu)man who uses it; yet the imagination is simultaneously "eternal," as
it exceeds the boundaries of material shape, thus able _to take one beyond the limits of his
or her "generated organs." Moreover, by its very excessi_ve character, the imagination is
never really limited to being expressed only in specific conventions and tropes. Rather,
the imagination is the means by which old conventions can be dismantled and new tropes
can be devised.
The second, and perhaps more critically important, paradox involves the
relationship of''Natural Man" to the imagination. Swinburne seems to read the "Natura)
Man" as the opposite of socially constructed man, discounting ( considering as "nothing")
that which he perceives with his eyes-though, typically, in Blake, the "Natural Man" is
read as negatively antithetical to the eternal "imaginative" man, as "Natural Man" is fully
enclosed in "the medium of the fallen physical world," thus so "inundated by the 'flood
of the five senses'" (Dimock 163) that he lacks an opportunity to contemplate the limits
of those senses. As Ian Fletcher has noted, though, "failure to grasp that, for Blake,
nature and imagination were antithetical, lies at the heart of Swinburne' s fruitful
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misunderstanding of Blake" ·(Swinburne 49). Swi�bume "misunderst�mds" Blake' s
"Natural Man'' as a man who recognizes that his eyes can deceive hi m, as human vision
comes with inexorable physical limitations. Swinburne' s ''Natural Man" also recognizes
that he employs a different mode of seeing than socially constructed man, because his
imagination, synaesthetically fusing man and nature,5 has no physical restrictions. He is
. able to see imaginatively past material "thingishness," instead perceiving the nothingness
of what any given "thing" represents. In a typical reading of Blake, this "nothingness"
would be "Natural Man' s" failure to recognize imagination. In the Swinbumian reading,
however, this is the nothingness of Desire: Blake's "Natural Man," for Swinburne, uses
the imagination to distinguish how a �aterial thing is really like what Zizek would call
'"the place-holder of the lack,' the point of the signifier' s non-sense" (Lacan 53). The
imagination gives one insight into "non-sense"- meaning, not only that which cannot be
comprehended via empirical sense perception, but also that which exceeds the normal
means of representation. Moreover, with insight into "non-sense," one can apprehend
how material things only temporarily provide the fantasy of satisfying human desire,
rather than providing any actual, definite satisfaction. The imagination does what Zizek
label s "dream-work": it retranslates "things" into "words" (Lacan 5 1 ) and finds new
ways to describe common things, in an attempt to reveal an aspect of a thing that has not
yet been revealed. Yet the final "retranslated" product-the work of art, the product of
the imagination-still "contains at least one ingredient that functions as a stopgap, as a
filler holding the place of what is necessarily lacking in it" (Lacan 52). The lack cannot
be filled, nor can it be transcended.
5

See Riede, Study 35.
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Swinburne was fascinated by this particular problematic element of the Blakean
· imagination. On one hand, Swinburne notes that "Blake himself regarded [his] works . . .
as containing the sum of his achieved ambitions andfulfilled desires: as in effect inspired
matter, of imaginative truth and eternal import" (Blake 1 84, italics mine); on the other, he
was troubled by "the strange diversities and discords which intervene" (Blake 1 94).
Swinburne persistently noticed that the discord of dissatisfaction is always there, as
desire is never really fulfilled, not even imaginatively. Rather than giving into frustration
caused by what he perceived as an apparent failure of the Blakean imagination to act as a
productive aesthetic force, though, Swinburne chose to explore this failure, to generate an
aesthetic that uses such failure as an integral part of aesthetic productivity. Like the later
Romantics who also inspired him, Swinburne chose to create "a re-enactment of . . .
devastating experience, [as]· a means of criticising, [or] of containing" it (Butler 12),6 as
well as a means of manipulating the devastating frustration of unfulfilled desire. In this
way, Swinburne strives to uncover "the aesthetic desirability of an explosion of meaning"
brought about through manipulating one's own frustration, with the intent to process
imaginatively not only human perception and its failures, but also the very modes of
perceiving failure (Buckler 23 5). He realizes that desire cannot be satisfied with material
things and that the imagination cannot really transcend the material world. However, he
also realizes that, by acknowledging and the� stretching the limitations and shortcomings
of the role of imaginative art in the material world, he can reassess the role the

6

The "devastating experience" Marilyn Butler actually refers to is the French Revolutio� an event
Swinburne himself finds very fascinating. However, I feel it applies here as well.
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imagination. plays in what Adorno would later describe as the "unsolved antagonism[s]"
between "art" and "reality" (Theory 6).
Thus Swinburne's complicated study of the imagination and its paradoxical
quality can be read as· a significant precursor to the ideas Theodor Adorno presents in his
Aesthetic Theory. Like Swinburne before him, Adorno recognizes the limitations of the
imagination, stating, "[I]magination is escape, .but not exclusively so," acknowledging
that what appears or professes to transcend material "reality" is actually always still
grounded in it (Theory 9). The antagonism, in part, results from the imagination not
recognizing· its dependence on reality. In this antagonism, there is an aspect of "violence
done to the material'' (Theory 50),.since the material aspect of imaginative art is the
ground from which the imagination can proceed. In other words, .the material world is
always the basis for the art which pretends to transcend or refute it; an artwork may be, as
Adorno indicates, "labor on a reality resisting the artist" (Theory 9), but resistance should
not be read as total separation from reality. In the separation fantasy, "[s]omething is
excised from the living, from the body of language, from tones, from visual experience"
(Theory 50), instead of transcending it. This can be deciphered as an imagined violation
of the principles constituting material reality, but, like all fantasies, it is subject to
revealing its own "radical falsity." 7 As Adorno indicates, the art which advocates such a
fantasy merely reinforces the social, material reality it claims to oppose; it becomes
another "vehicle of ideology'' (Theory 225-26), defining the material world by what it is
not, re-establishing the conventional limits of comprehension. Therefore, the artist must
employ the imagination to enact another kind of violence on the material, one that allows
7

This is Zizek's tenn. See Plague ofFantasies 20.
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for an exploration of ideology from within. S/he must fracture the margins of reality that
s/he cannot escape. As Zizek says, art is fragmentary "since it always relies on the
distance towards fantasy" (Plague 1 9). One retains the fantasy of transcending the
material world, but there is a great (figurative) distance between the artist and the
realization of his/her fantasy, considering that one's fantasy is quite separate from one's
lived experience. Art can try to approximate the ostensible experience of living one's
fantasy, but the approximation can never be complete; thus it is always fragmented.
I believe that Swinburne's tex�s indicate that he, too, viewed the world as a
fragmented arena. He seemed to have become disillusioned by Blake's "almost
overriding attention to and desire for wholeness and unity" (Labbe 35) as figured in
Blake's hope for human reconciliation with the natural world. Swinburne admired
Blake's attempt "to readjust all questions [of faith or principle] by the light of art and law
of imagination" (Blake 94) that would allow the "Natural Man" to re-emerge; yet he was
troubled by how Blake's portrayal of nature, often acting as "an obscure material force"
(Blake 1 1 8) mimicking the activity of human domination and subjugation, did not always

lend itself so easily to his (Swinburne's) rereading of it. At one point, Swinburne laments
that Blake "never found or felt out any way to the debateable [sic] land where simple and
tender pleasures become complex and cruel'' (Blake 145); meaning, he feels that Blake
never found an imaginative way for the "pleasures" associated with an undifferentiated,
enchanted nature to transcend the socially conventional concept of nature in which they
are repressed. ''Nature" always remains disenchanted despite any fantasies of recouping
it. The concept of nature cannot be reformed to exclude the complexities and cruelties of
the violence of human domination. Swinburne, like Adorno, recognizes that art both
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works with and oppresses the fantasy of nature before its disenchantment: as Adorno
would put it, "[t]his is the ritual of domination that lives on in p_lay" (Theory 50). As part
of this aesthetic
"play,". Swinbume, influenced
by the works of the Marquis de Sade,
.
.
presents a version of nature reduced ·simply to the rituals and patterns of domination and
violence. However, Swinburne cannot fully accept Sade's view of debased nature any
more than he c�n fully accept what he sees as Blake's affirmative m�stification of it. The
Sadean view of nature, with its emphases on destruction and degradation, and its reliance
on violent dynamism that in the end proves monotonous rather than invigorating
becoming in itself a static universal concept that subsumes any kind of particularity
imparts only "a dreary beauty, inhuman if not unearthly in its desolation" that leaves one
in a state of "splendid oppression." 8 · Again, this becomes the oppression of the "ritual of
domination." However, Swinburne's manipulation of this "play" through performing
constant, kaleidoscopic, constellative rearrangements of the various fragments or
fractured elements of the ideological constructs of nature and the material world allow
him, as well as his reader, to "see" art-and "see through'' art-in diverse and
unanticipated ways. Swinburne comes quite close to achieving an Adomian "expression
in which what is menacing in the domination of nature is wed with a longing for the
vanquished, a longing stirred by domination" but never satisfied by it (Theory 52). And,
because the expression fails to satisfy, Swinburne's portrayal of nature oscil1ates between
the Blakean and Sadean versions, demonstrating an uneasy ambivalence that he revisits
again and again in his poetry, as the failure of his own ambivalent impasse intrigues him.
8

Tiu s is taken from the "Dedicatory Epistle" tbat prefaces Swinburne's Collected Poems. These
statements appear in Swinburne's self-critical analysis of his presentation of nature throughout his body of
poetry. (See vol. I. xxii-xxiii.)
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Despite all of this, S�inburne is always brought back to Blake' s exhortation in A
Vision of the Last Judgment: "I question not my Corporeal or Vegetative Eye anymore
than I would Question a Window Concerning a Sight I look thro [sic] it & not with it"
(566). The imagination, for Swinburne, allows one to adopt a kaleidoscopic view of the
material world, yet he must be careful to see through the view and not just with it. To see
with this view is to not see beyond the artificiality of this position; it is important to
.recognize this perspective as artifice that cannot be transcended (that is, one cannot see
through it to see a "transcendent reality"). Like Adorno, Swinburne believes·that art "is
not obliged to erase the traces of . . . its artificiality" (Adorno, Theory 1 89); but, more akin
to the spirit of Blake, Swinburne wants to implement �his in an aesthetic that serves a� "a
positive program" that privileges artifice, "not a negative prescription" for quelling it
(McGann, Swinburne 50).

The Importance of the Irrational: No Good Reason

Swinburne's assiduous play with the concept of domination suggests that he held
an attitude toward Enlightenment reason and its detrimental effect on the imagination
similar to that later espoused by Horkheimer and Adorno: "Enlightenment has always
,,
taken the basic principle of myth to be . . . the projection onto nature of the subjective
(6). In his poetry, Swinburne submits his own treatment of mythology, both Judeo
Christian and pagan, as a critique of reason. One .of the best examples of Swinburne
voicing his misgivings about reason in his work can be found in "At El�usis." The
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speaker of this poem, Demeter cast as a version of "Mother Naturet9 sarcastically and
accusatorily dismisses the bourgeois men who "sit in the market-houses" and explain the
world in their own "words I Made: sweet with wisdom as the rare wine is / Thickened
with honey" (2-5), constructing a view of nat�re that reflects their own image(s) rather
than hers. Yet this is obviously meant to be ironic, in that Demeter's credibility as a
speaker is always already undermined. Despite her protestations of transcendent divinity,
Demeter later. admits she is "woman-muffled in wan flesh" (line 1 4 1 ); she reveals that
she is more social (wo)man than natural (wo)man or nature it/her self. In the end,
Swinburne's Demeter is a product of the material world, snared in the iron cage of
reason: she is what Horkheimer an_d Adorno might identify as a "consciously contrived
adaptation to nature [which] brings nature under . . . control," a signifier of society's
.

.

"nagging consciousness of its own impotence against physical nature" and the attempt to
gain power over nature through rationalization (57). Like nearly all of Swinburne's
"natural'' poetic personae, Demeter is a myth reconstructed, cast in the Enlightened
scene, only to be deconstructed. Meanwhile, though, the process of re/deconstructing
myth becomes the process of imagining a variant version of Enlightenment reason.
Swinburne suggests that Blake's texts demonstrate how one can use reason, in
spite of its intent to regard "[t]he world as a gigantic analytic judgment" (Horkheimer and
Adorno 27), to appraise itself critically, including appraising its limitations and faiHngs.
He remarks that Blake purposely created works that one can only "apprehend and enjoy"
by "i"ational perception" (Blake 35, emphasis mine), a perception that one adopts when
one realizes s/he perceives the world according to a false absolute. The kind of
9

In the poem, Demeter calls herself "the mother and the mate of (all) things" (line 27).
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"irrational" perception that is self-aware of the falsity of absolute judgment or knowledge
opposes the "Reason [whic.h] is - the bound or outward circumference ofEnergy" (Blake,
Marriage 34). Still, it depends on reason to give it credence; one must be fully
entrenched in reason before one can imagine him/herself perceiving irrationally, or
perceiving reason negatively. This strange relationship between the rational and the
irrational is well represented in aesthetic experience, in which the ambiguity of the
"nonrational" is "immediately complemented by the rationality contained" in art's
mimetic function; "for without rationality," art "would degenerate into a bearing . . .
comparable to mimicry," an·empty and unperceptive form "which would not be adequate
to·genuine aesthetic experience" (Gebauer and Wulf 290). As Adorno points out, art
represents the dualism of truth: it aims _to liberate itself "from the mythic, cultic,
ritualized context"-or "magic"- "out of which it emerged" (Jay, Adorno 1 57) while
also convicting current social reality "of its [own] irrationality and absurdity" (Adorno,
Theory 54). Art, by questioning and obscuring the boundaries that separate it from

reason, can provide an irrational perception which destroys the totalizing fantasy of the
existence of inherent, summative princip�es upon which conventional aesthetic theory is
founded. Aesthetics may imitate society's adoption of absolute positions or rules, but it
also must accept its own failure to fulfill any such absolutes. In other words, one must
first employ the false claim of"foundations-grounding" reason before one can question
and ultimately refuse to accept "the presumption of satisfying absolute claims to meaning
and grouhding" (Menke 236-37). To perceive irrationally is to perceive the instability of
the position one assumes when s/he is in the act of perceiving at the same time s/he
perceives the world around her/him.
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I believe Swinburne gleaned this idea in .part-from The Book ofLos. Though
,
Swinburne s account ofLos is a mere three pages, consisting mostly paraphrases of the
poem mixed with sparse commentary, the little bit of commentary Swinburne does offer
,
is quite informative, as it is indicative of how he reads Blake s poetry as a whole.
Swinburne begins his discussion of the poem by commenting, somewhat wearily, that in
Los the "old themes of d_elusion and perversion are one� again rehandled" (Blake 256).

,
However, it is Swinburne s specific use of the word perversion that I find remarkable, as
Swinburne is very interested in perversions-as in any kind of diversions from intention
,
or convention-of all kinds. In Swinburne s usage, "perversion" is reason without
motivation; in this case, we.have the blindly, thoughtlessly compulsive repetition, rather
than the inspired or evocative (re)application, of the "gigantic analytic judgment."
Swinburne claims that the poem "celebrates . . . the advent of the iron laws and ages" of
Reason, but only to bring about "the final fruit of reason debased" (Blake 1 57-58).
Swinburne admired Blake's attempt to invalidate the methods that supposedly validate
the world by vitiating those very methods.
Blake's poem imagines the moment in which "contemplative thoughts first arose"
and the "Mind labour'd / Organizing itself' (Los II: 40, 49-50): the moment in which the
subjective is projected onto nature. The creation myth becomes the myth of
Enlightenment; here the "natural" or pre-Enlightenment energy is bound, the "Eternal" is
substantiated only as material form-a kind of material form like that Horkheimer and
Adorno would say is "secularized as the space whose measure the self must take" (46).
At the poem's end, "a Form / Was completed, a Human Illusion / In darkness and deep
clouds involvd" (Los IV: 56-58). All Blake's Prophetic Books treat the project of
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,,
Enlightenment as "human illusion -repeated attempts to shed light into darkness,
unravel mysteries by the power of.the mind. But, as the poetry indicates, the light is
synthetic; moreover, it tries to synthesize disparate elements by offering repetitively the
,,
same explanations for--shedding the · same "light on-everything in the world. Reason
might be every man's "spectrous power,

,, 1 0

but it is a peculiarly singular power, in that

the mind monotonously labors to organize itself in the same patterns. As Swinburne
astutely discerns, Blake's Prophetic Books are various retellings of the same mythology
of the implementation of the iron cage of reason. Swinburne diverges from Blake,
though, in that Swinburne underscores the inevitable failure of fully escaping that cage.

Subjective Differentiation: E(r)go Imagination

As illustrated above, the relationship between nature and reason that Swinburne
reads into Blake's poetry is mediated by the self. In Swinburne's Blakean aesthetic, the
individual ego is prolific, portrayed as an expansive internal force that shapes the external
world. Swinburne employs a process of reading backwards, or reading the Prophetic
Books back into the So ngs ofInnocence and Experience, as part of his exploration of the
Blakean ego. Though he claims to find "relief' in reading the So ngs in that they lack "all
the Titanic apparatus" of Blake's individualized and individualizing "prophecy,"
Swinburne concurrently praises the So ngs as the most lucid presentation of Blake's
personal "mysticism," articulated in "the 'voice of the bard "' invoking "earth and man
[to] obtain deliverance" (Blake 1 1 4, 1 1 6). In this call for the return to innocence, the
individual must (re)construct his/her own innocence at the beckoning of the voice of
10

lbis is from Blake's description of his "Everymant Albion� see the Preface to Jerusalem (line 5).
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experience. Concluding that subjective "experience must do the work of innocence"
(Blake 1 24) and thus concluding that a pure, objective state of innocence cannot exist,
Swinburne achieves a reading of Blake that seems more aligned with modem
interpretations than nineteenth-century ones. Swinburne acknowledges that Blake
intends the reader to believe that "the strong simplicity of eye and hand proper to the pure
and single of heart" in which childlike "inspiration shall do the work of innocence" is
possible (Blake 1 17), but Swinburne doubts this very possibility. Instead, Swinburne
adopts what modem critics like David Wagenknecht recognize as "a peculiarly controlled
and distanced identification" with the concept of innocence, in which the innocence
available to the subject is "almost a parody of the real {platonic)" idea(I) of innocence
Blake attempts to convey (3 1 8). The Songs, read as discourse of and about the "split
subject" revealed as "a 'rem[a]inder' of the organic wholeness" innocence represents
(Wagenknecht 337, brackets in original), become emblems of creative transformations of
notions of nature and seltbood which diverge from Blakean intentions of reclaiming
wholeness. In the Swinburnian and modem readings of Blake, the self becomes a
dynamic principle which, paradoxically, accepts that it is "composed of irreconcilable
bits and pieces" (Punter, "Blake" 228) which statically remain in arrangements of
disunion. These readings identify the kind of passive acceptance of disharmony that
Blake found problematic, yet they also identify the problematic procedures of the subject
willing the irreconcilable into arguably artificial states of harmony.
Swinburne repeatedly compares the Songs ' discourse of split subjectivity to
Urizen's attempt to (re)construct the tacitly innocent pre-Urizenic world by the power of
his own will-all the while knowing that not only did Urizen will the pre-Urizenic world
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away irrevocably, but also that the idea of the pre-Urizenic world exists only i n the
context ofUrizenic will. The idea of a pre-Urizenic world, akin to the Songs ' idea of
innocence, "allows him to protect the image of a consciousness not psychologically
divided against itself because [it is] not constrained by those material divisions" (Guest
and Barrell 257). Blake's-Book of Urizen attests to the performative flat of the individual
(Urizen) which makes a world out of summative nothingness: Urizen "self-balanc'd
stretch'd o'er the void," and a "wide world of solid obstruction" appears (Urizen III: 1 8,
23). Blake describes this newly formed Nature, Urizen' s "vast world" or "dark globe,"
as like "a human heart strugling [sic] and beating" (Urizen III: 36--38). Blake's use of a
simile here is particularly significant, as the simile compares the material world to
something that is already separated from nature as well as the divine or eternal: man. The
human "heart" struggles to establish its identity in difference to all that surrounds it,
expanding to encompass otherness yet always contracting back when the difference or
"contrariety'' cannot be overcome. Similarly, Urizen's identity establishes itself in ·
difference to the eternal void, or Desire. He is recurrently identified as a·contrasting
constituent in the material world of "solid obstruction" to Desire he has created; yet, he
cannot surpass that obstruction to his desire, even though "the universe of the poem is
totally mental'' (Mitchell, "Poetic" 93). The world is his own expanded projection, but he
concurrently withdraws from it, leaving his world and his "self' in disunity with each
other. As W.J.T. Mitchell has noted, this "paradoxical process of contraction and
expansion, unification and fragmentation" is a constant in the Blakean/Urizenic universe,
and "[e]ach re-enactment of this central pattern involves the same impulse to retreat into
the self, or confine the other" ("Poetic" 93).
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However, Blake held fast to the idea that this dualistic process must inevitably
end in a mode of unification, never intending unity to be understood as a fantasy which is
the very "cause of desire and the focus of resistance" to the desired synthesis itself
(Wagenknecht 323). In his preface to Milton, Blake suggests that "if we are but just &
true to our own Imaginations,':' then we will succeed in building "Jerusalem / In Englands
[sic] green & pleasant Land."_ 1 1 Blake's promised land represents a resolution via

imagination of man and nature, se1f and ·other, which never takes place. Imagining
unification is not the same as bringing it to evident fruition. Every process of unification,
even imaginary, leads only to more fragmentation; as Swinburne notes in his reading of
Milton,' the individual always remains like "the Satan of Blake . . . divided, inconsistent, a
mystery and error to himself' (Blake 266). Swinburne recognizes the imaginative
pretense of unity such as Blake's celebrated unified contrarieties, the "Twofold form
Hermaphroditic" ofMilton (I: Plate 19, line 32), as an artificial solution which only
speaks to the impossibility of unifying self and other. Consequently, Swinburne reads the
unification figured in the hermaphroditic form as a "fruitful feud" between contraries
forced to become "the waste wedlock of a sterile kiss." 1 2 Swinburne embraces the
"fruitfu1" feud of the compelling differentiation of the self from all kinds of otherness in
ways that Blake could not, especially as Swinburne found Blake's fantasies of dispelling
otherness frustrating. Therefore, rather than anticipating an impossible unity of self and
other, Swinburne looks at the possible roles the imagination can take in the violence of
disunity-again, the imagination's cruelty-rather than its capabilities for producing

11
12

See Blake, Collected Works 95-96.
"Hermaphroditus,"' lines 18-19.
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assimilation fantasies. Swinburne creates visual images of the anticipated unity like his
hermaphrodite as "a means for that aesthetic dist�ncing that traditional fantasy no longer
achieves" (Adorno, Theory 22), to demonstrate the actual distance between illusory
. fulfillment and actual fulfillment. These images are abstract, existing only in the
imaginative play within language, and are "not offered as an interpretation of experience,
but as a pure state" (Altieri 39) in which that very distance between the iUusory and the
actual is signified as itself aesthetically important.
As Swinburne's work illustrates, the modes by which an individual artist can
portray and negotiate this distanct: are numerous and ever-changing. The kind of "play"
Swinburne advocates requires him to rethink constantly the frustration (or "devastating
experience") of illusory fulfillment, and through this "play" he establishes various fluid,
serialized subject-positions within his poems. As Swinburne notes in the preface to his
Collected Works, "[I]t is unnecessary to emphasize or obtrude the personal note, . . . but it
is necessary to make it felt and keep it perceptible if the poem is to have life in it or even
a right to live" (xx). He wants to create a subject-position while oscillating between the
assertion of an expansive Urizenic ego and the need to negate it as the "selfhood which
must be put off' (Milton II, Plate 40: 36). In Swinburne's works, the subject emerges
repeatedly in/against the "otherness" of the poem itself · The work of art is set up as the
"'absolute non-subject' whose very presence involves aphanisis, the erasure of the
subject"; yet the subject is very much established in this dynamic inasmuch as the "object
which is the subject's absolute otherness . . . is closer to the subject than anything the
subject can set against itself' (Zizek, Metastases 33). This is especialJy complicated in
Swinburne' s dramatic monologues, since Swinburne-as-subject is abstracted not only by
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the otherness of the poem itself but also the otherness of the narrator-especially as he
often chooses a female narrator, further demonstrating the "otherness" of subjectivity.
However, Swinburne walks a fin_e line between positing the subject/ego as the crucial
catalyst for "progressive subjective differentiation" or "the heightening and expansion of
the sphere of aesthetic stimuli" and as a weak entity allowing "the reification of these
[individualized] reactions" (Adorno, Theory 239).
Adorno points out that in such "ego-weakness," the ego resigns itself to the false
conclusion that it is the same as _the object; thus the countermeasure of ego-strength must
be used to confront the subject/object, or self/other, division th�t the false conclusion
represses. 1 3 Furthermore, the false conclusion also represses desire: the selrs desire to
have his/her de_sire recognized by/in the other as well as the reality of that wish never
really being fulfilled. 14 Though he finds aesthetics which sidestep issues of desire and
. thus amount to little more than "castrated hedonism, desire without desire" to be faulty,
Adorno also finds fault with Freud's supposition that artworks are "indeed, even though
sublimated, little more than plenipotentiaries of sensual impulses, which they at best
make unrecognizable through a sort of dreamwork" (Theory 1 1) because he wants to
recoup that longing for a sensual or libidinal plenitude. Adorno winds up proposing the
idea of"aesthetic sublimation" in which the subject creates the artwork as an other from
which s/he receives a limit to that plenitude (Theory 1 7). Rather than the subject
projecting his/her ego to create an artwork, au Urizen, the subject creates a work to which
his/her ego conforms. Ultimately, the ego remains repressed, wounded by the false
13

See Negative Dialectics 150 and Aesthetic Theory 9�
Adorno remarks tltat Freud ts tl1eory of art is merely tl1e fantasy of."wish fulfillmene' See A esthetic
Theory 8-10.
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22
conclusion of dualism, unable to negate fully the false pleasure of illusory wish
fulfillment.
The treatment of the.ego in art reveals where Swinburne' s aesthetic and Adorno's
do not always so easily converge. The Swinburnian ego rails against its own repression.
Swinburne and Adorno both present the ego in a constant dialectical state, but
Swinburne's vested interest in the overtly sexual dimensions of perversity, the "'failures'
of the symbolic" to incorporate desire more fully (Borch-Jacobsen 1 5 1), is not shared by
Adorno. Adorno states in the Aesthetic Theory that art is irrevocably separated from
pornography (12); however, Swinburne recognized that pornographic discourse was an
important aesthetic tool allowing the subject to "lay claim to a pleasure that was never
meant" (Ferguson, "Justine" 1 2 1) to be claimed through fantasy, and yet use that fantasy
to see him/herself as object, consequently revaluating (yet again) the subject/object,
self/other dualism. 1 5 Here, then, Swinburne seems more aligned with the thought of
Herbert Marcuse, particularly Marcuse' s attempt in Eros and Civilization to explain the
ego's role in the libidinal circuit in ways Adorno could not, or refused to do. Like
Marcuse, Swinburne, while maintaining acute awareness of fantasy's fundamental
inability to fulfill desire, finds fantasy an integral part of the "artistic imagination" which
links "perversions with the images of integral freedom" rather than repression and
"gratification" (Marcuse 50). Marcuse believes that fantasy "is 'protected from cultural
alterations "' because ideology never completely limits the pleasure principle (14-1 5).

15 See Ziuk, Lacan l 09-1 l .
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Fantasy brings with it the trace memory 16 of the libidinal plenitude that exceeds
repressive limitation; as a result, with every fantasy, the boundaries or limits separating
self and otherness are shifted. Individual subjects must continually reset and renegotiate
the limits ideology places on them. Swinburne takes advantage of these moments of
eruption of fantasy into reality to create a virtual position-a figurative site representing
the gap or lack left by the eruption-in which he creates a moment in which to untie the
"imaginary structure" of fantasy from the '"repressed' process of its structuration"
(Zizek, Lacan 52) in the material world. Still, as Swinburne so famously and
enigmatically states in "Anactoria," a poem specifically situated in the netherspace of
fantasy erupting into reality, even when �he trace memories of gratification surface, the
subject is left ·only with a series of "metaphors of me," indicating that the self or ego is
always mediated, even in fantas�es of pleasurable immediacy, and even in discourses
which allow the subject to reassess the very processes of mediation.

16 "The memory of gratification is at tbe origin of all thinking, and the impulse to recapture past

gratification is t11e hidden driving power behind the process·of thought" (Marcuse 3 1).
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CHAPTER TWO
Obscuring the Romantic· Vision: Swinburne's William Blake
"A fundamental problem attendant upon Romanticism ... is how to weave the spells of
language without becoming helplessly enchanted hy them, how. to work competently with
the sad incompetence ofhuman speech. " -L.J. Swingle
"Blake would track the human soul hack into c"O:os, and beyond. " -Arthur Symons

Swinburne's essay on William Blake has been called "the greatest manifesto for
aestheticism in English" (McGann, Swinburne 50), as it details Swinburne' s struggle with
the emphases placed on materialism and objectivity in mid-Victorian culture which, he
believed, stifled the creation and practice of specifically aesthetic principles. Swinburne
understands the overarching theme of Blake' s work to be the individual' s "oppress[ion]
by the mystery of material existence" _(Blake 1 9). He read Blake's work to find evidence
that another literary mind shared his belief that the conventional understanding of
material world deems it oppressive, as it upholds the very limited and ossifying
conceptual frameworks upon which comprehension of and interaction with the material
world depends. Because Swinburne is so interested in reviewing and redefining the
processes of conceptualization, he seems to prefigure s�me of the work Theodor Adorno
presents in the Negative Dialectic; specifically, Adamo's contention that an individual
subject interprets the material world via ideological concepts which act as lenses
determining how those moments should be seen and thus comprehended. Yet all
concepts also "refer to non-conceptualities," the promise that, within materiality, one can
still find a way to look at the world without those ossifying lenses; that one may find the
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tools to pry those lenses away and "unseal the nonconceptual" (Negative 1 0-12), or what
Swinburne calls the "mystery of material existence."
The mystery; though, is rendered dormant by a "desperate" ideological need for
"objectivity and conceptuality"; like the individual subject subordinated to society-at
large, the possibilities for rethinking materiality become "unknowable and incapacitated"
(Negative 1 0). These mysterious possibilities resist complete suppression. They always
manage to exceed the ideological limits, and these possibilities, which can never
completely be expunged, haunt conventional methods of comprehending the world. The
nonconceptual becomes a liberating influence because, as it haunts ideological concepts,
it suggests "that there always remains something outside" (Negative 27}-yet that
"something," exasperatingly enough, cannot be "seen" through conventional means.
Thus Swinburne, positioning himself as Blake's rightful successor, expresses within the
essay an aesthetic that aims to explore the mysterious possibilities obscured by the
conventional means of comprehending material existence. As his readings of Blake' s
Prophetic Books indicate, Swinburne admires the "overflow of lyrical invention" that he
finds in Blake's texts, which he calls "the divine babble which sometimes takes the place
of earthly speech or sense," conveying emotion which is "vague" because it has a quality
not "reducible" to ordinary language (Blake 195). Swinburne aspires to employ an
aesthetic language that will display a particularly performative quality, evoking
sensations seemingly irreducible to words as a way of gesturing toward the "mysterious
possibilities" that cannot otherwise be represented. Roger Lewis calls this Swinburne' s
decadent move t o "transform the material world into what it is not, into language " (1 1 1,
emphases mine). But I would amend this, offering that this is Swinburne's aesthetic
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move to transform the representation of the material world to demonstrate what it is not
yet, but couid be, via a careful linguistic performance which attempts �o posit the
supposed antithesis between .the material world and lan�age as a relationship actually
"beyond contradiction" (Adorno, Negative l 46). The mysteries of the material world
might be, as Adorno points out, "congeal� in . . . the words we use [which] re�ain
concepts" (Negative 52); but, in Blake, S�inburne finds a way, if not io retrieve them
fully, at )east to detect them. · While reading Blake, he tells us, we maf find "mere music,
chains of ringing _ names, scattered jewels of sound without a thread, t�rturous networks
· of harmonies without a clue," simultaneously presented with "words that are strained ·
wellnigh in sunder by strong significance and earnest passion . . . deal[ing] greatly with
great things, that strike deep and hold fast" (Swinburne, Blake 194). Moreover, .
Swinburne instructs us to read Blake in the same way he perceives Blake to compose: to
"fall with renewed might of wi11 to [one's]purpose" to exceed ordinary linguistic
boundaries, so that the "grand .lyrical gift becomes an-instrument" for expression that is
"not sonorous merely," but, more importantly, becomes "vocal and articulate" in its very
sonorous boom of multiplicity (1 94). If the reader holds fast to this vociferous,
cacophonous process of reading, then s/he will be rewarded with a glimpse into "the main
gist of the whole fitful and high-strung tune," the momentary articulation of the otherwise
inarticulable connection between "the strange diversities and discords which intervene"
(194).
Swinburne declares that this approach requires a "degree of symbolism" that is
"excessive"; but, that very excess is essential "to the strength of expression and directness
of dramatic vision, peculiar to Blake" (Blake 195}-and now revised to become a
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dramatic aesthetic vision peculiar to Swinburne. At one point, Swinburne seems to worry
that, as the ready acceptance of excess is found in "[t]he confusion, the clamour, the jar
of words that half su�ce and thoughts that half exi st," which can induce "obscure play of
licence and torturous growth of fancy" (Blake 1 85), the lingui stic sign may not seem to
represent anything associated with .co�ventional mat�rial reality at all (Borch-Jacobsen
1 3 5). But the individual, a "fleshly and mutable house of life" (Swinburne, Blake 1 9),
constantly produces his or her own, ever-changing association with material reality
through words. The individual forms a supposedly immaterial "medium or state of
existence" which seems separate from the material world; but, it is actually "inevitable"
in and "inexpl icable, insuperable'' from the material world (Swinburne, Blake 40), as this
"state" is formed through the individual expressing his/her feel ing of being "other" than
the world, and then constantly repositioning his/her "otherness." Swinburne capitalizes
on this sense ofindividual "otherness" which plays on and fashions an aesthetic to
express it. His approach to the aesthetic suggests it is perhaps only in an individually
created and individually-interpreted relation ship to reality that. the linguistic sign can still
1

"express the inexpressible." In his "greatest manifesto," then, Swinburne articulates his
aesthetic theory by critiquing, and thus re-inventing, the works of Blake to develop and
employ this kind of purposefully aestheticized critical language.
Many critics, in both Swinburne' s time and our own, have disparaged his essay on
Blake as sheer egotism or even critical naivete on Swinburne' s part, specifically
condemning its numerous lengthy paragraphs of minutely-detailed description and the
extensive footnotes in which Swinburne speciously attributes his excurses (digressions
1

This is based on Adorno, Negative Dialectics 108-10.
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into purely private interests which relate mostly to Swinburne's artistry and merely
tangentially to Blake's) to unnamed critics and philosophers. A more careful
consideration of the essay, though, reveals that even in his most superfluous moments
Swinburne executes a distinctive linguistic quality like that which Adorno found and
admired in Brecht: "a linguistic quality that . . . is itself a form of expression that is
eloquent only as determinate negation of that expr�ssion" (Theory 32). Adorno felt that
conventional expressions only distort their own meaning; however, when that very
limited mode of expression carries within it the _ implied possibility that a future mode of
expression witt convey the meaning without distortion, -it is negated. More simply, it is
cryptographic expression which simultaneously gestures · at what it means, what it does
not "mean," and what it could possibly "mean." Swinburne's cryptographic treatment of
the conventions of the literary criticism of his era, oscillating between deference and
disregard, demonstrate his earliest experiments in aesthetic negativity. This quality gives
his essay what Christoph Menke notes is the crucial attribute of aesthetic negativity : a
"paradoxical character [which] gives expression to the opposing tendencies involved at
the effort at-and the subversion of-understanding" (73). These recurrent oscillations
produce an aesthetically negative hesitation between "the two poles of superabundant
meaning" in the essay (Menke 73). These moments of hesitation create gaps between
what Swinburne conjectures that Blake's poetry may "mean" and what he claims it may
not "mean," and, in tum, these gaps are the spaces which allow moments of hesitation in
the reader's own process of deciphering what Swinburne's essay "means." In these
hesitative -moments, the reader can move from reading with the perspective Swinburne
provides to reading with a perspective they can invent themselves.
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In this way, Swinburne' s excessive descriptions subvert the reader' s expectations
about the modes one should employ when reading and critiquing Blake's work.
Swinburne discusses his predecessors' work, incorporating their readings in his clai ms to
further �heir conventional modes of critique; but Swinburne employs previous critics'
works and methods only superficially, and only to stage his reversal of their respective
approaches. The personal and digressive fo_otnotes are purposefully placed to oppose the
more traditional, "objective" interpretations of Blake's poetry and thus subvert those
conventional modes of understanding. Furthermore, the sections in the essay which seem
to indicate Swinburne getting overly caught up in the rapture of his own descriptive
abilities should instead be recognized as sectio�s in which Swinburne again purposefully
produces moments of hesitation in his text. Moments in which Swinburne seems
flagrantly to express his sense of "self,�' his pervasive textual ego, can be read as
negative-especially considering that the expression of textual identity here, as with all
other expressions, is decisively cryptographic. Because Swinburne, stating an aesthetic
theory, wants to present the voice of the artist (encompassing past,· present, and future
artists), the textual expression of "Swinburne" can be read as a determinate negation of
Swinburne-enunciating-Swinburne, and thus enunciating a conceptual artist signified as
"Blake." Swinburne's excessive display of his own talents is one "pole of superabundant
meaning" and Blake's poetical excess is the other; Swinburne purposefully places us, the
readers, between the two poles to continually explore the flux of this "between space." It
is not by coincidence that it is often difficult to tell where "Blake" ends and "Swinburne"
begins in the essay.
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Moreover, when reading the Blake essay, one must be aware that Swinburne uses
his predecessors' critical endeavors only to counteract them. For example, when
comparing Blake's early lyrics t9 the later Prophetic Books, Swinburne remarks, "So
beautiful indeed is [Blake's] structure and choice of language that its author's . . . later
vagaries and erratic indulgences in the most lax or bombastic habits of speech become
hopelessly inexplicable" (Blake I 0). Yet this remark, an obligatory echo of previous
Blake criticism, functions in a manner whkh negates its original critical purpose; for
Swinburne spends 125 pages explicating the "inexplicable" Prophetic Books, and a
significant portion of the other l 8� pages explicating the Prophetic Books amid the
discussions of the "Lyrical Poems" he initially presents as the Prophetic Books'
conceptual opposites. The same goes for Swinburne's ostensible deference to the work
of Alexander Gilchrist, Blake's critical biographer. In one of the personal digressions
Swinburne appends to his essay, 2 Swinburne claims,
What has been written in the text is of course based upon the assumptio n
that Mr. Gilchrist has given an account of the matter as full and as fair as it
was assuredly his desire to make it. As junior counsel (so to speak) o n
behalfofBlake, I have followed the lead of his biographer; for me in fact

2

Swinburne appends this note when he mentions two business associates of Blake's, Cromek and Stothard,
whose dealings with Blake are generally described as dishonest. It seems that Gilchrist's presentation of
these men's troubled relationship to Blake was considered inflammatory and erroneous by some readers,
who claimed that there was no substantial proof of many biographical details Gilchrist imparts as fact. It is
particularly interesting that Swinburne discusses this relatively minor event in a footnote 1that spans the
bottoms of three pages, right after stating in tl1e body of his essay, "IO)f this we need not wish to speak at
much length" (Blake 47). · Again, one could argue that Swinburne meant tl1e footnote to serve to express
solidarity (identification) with Gilchrist's work on Blake only to negate that solidarity. Several times in the
footnote Swinburne attests to Gilchrist's excellent treatment of such details, to tl1e point that it becomes
obvious that Swinburne attests too much.·
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nothing remained but to revise and restate with such clearness and brevity
the case as laid down by him. (47-48nl , emphases mine)
This footnote is remarkable because Swinburne's particular word choices indicate the
"negative" way his statement is intended to be read. Swinburne states that he merely
. assumes for the sake of argument that Gilchrist;s account is correct, all the while calling
that correctness into question by aligning Gilchrist's account with Gilchrist's "desire" to
make it so, thus making the reader question Gilchrist's objectivity in the matter.
Furthermore, Swinburne names himself counsel to Blake, not Gilchrist, thus intimating
that in no way should this statement be read as anything but a reversal of Gilchrist's
presentation; for Swinburne employs a distinctively negative mode to "revise and restate
. . . the case" for Blake-and for a revolutionary aesthetic on the margins of dominant
ideology-made too ideologically palatable by Gilchrist.
Consequently, instead of presenting a critical reassessment of the historical,
biographical Blake, as he initially claimed was his intent, Swinburne conjures an
impression of an idealized artist who projects the epitome of aesthetic negativity and calls
him "Blake." Swinburne's rediscovered Blake is a paradoxical figure of Romantic and
post-Romantic artistry who becomes a curious, if not somewhat unstable, compound of
nearly every artist Swinburne made into his idols and named as his influences in the
1 850s and 1 860s: Charles Baudelaire, Percy Bysshe Shelley, Theophile Gautier, Dante
Gabriel Rossetti, the Marquis de Sade. In this way, "Blake" is like Swinburne's version
of Blake's Albion, the Eternal Man, made Eternal Artist: a form larger than life,
imaginatively refashioned to illustrate how his revaluated Romanticism could be the key
to generating and advancing an internally produced aesthetic theory. It is important to
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note that every individual artist Swinburne names as part of, or a Blakean emanation of,
the Eternal Artist, produced work that self-consciously employed, if only affectively t�
distort and even collapse, the power of visuality and imagery in regards to the aesthetic.
As Arthur Symons later declared, the "fundamental truth" of Blake's art is that it was
intended as "a record of vision which has not been thoroughly mastered as vision"
(William 139). Swinburne' s essay, then, exhibits th_e continuum of work toward that

mastery. The biographical William Blake, in Swinburne's essay, is not the master
craftsman but the relevant Journeyman apprenticed to the greater aesthetic visionary (The
Eternal Artist). It is Swinburne, able to ascertain that greater Artist arid Artistry, who
aims to emerge at the end of the essay as the master craftsman.
The official date o.f publication for Swinburne' s William Blake: A Critical &say
is 1 868, but the majority of the manuscript was written well before then. Most
Swinburne scholars agree that Swinburne began writing the first version of the
manuscript in 1 862,3 finishing it the following year while visiting Paris with Whistler.
Alexander Gilchrist died in 1 862, leaving the manuscript of his study, _the Life ofBlake,
unfinished. SwinbuJTie had been asked by his friend William Michael Rossetti, who along
with his brother Dante Gabriel had .been corresponding with Gilchrist's widow, to write a
sort of epilogue �bout Blake's Prophetic Books to "complete" Gilchrist' s book for
publication. Swinburne declined, stating in a letter to William Michael that he meant to
make "a distinct small commentary of a running kind" on Blake' s work himself, "as full

Swinburne's correspondence indicates that the project was at least in the planning stages then (Lafourcade
193-94). Henderson is a bit more specific. citing "October 1862" particularly (58).

3
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and satisfactory as it could well be made,t'4 thus implying that he found Gilchrist's study
lacking. Furthermore, as Gilchrist had been just as frequent a visitor to Dante Gabriel
Rossetti's home in 1 860-1 86 1 as Swinburne, it is entirely likely that Swinburne had heard
Gilchrist and Rossetti discussing Gilchrist's project in great detail. 5 Perhaps Swinburne's
recollection of those discussions convinced him that he wanted no part of the Gilchrist
project himself. In Swinburne' s Blake, deviating from his usual double-speak,
Swinburne does speci�cally declare that he believes Gilchrist "passed perhaps too
lightly" over some biographical details ( 1 4) and that Gilchrist's discussion of The

Marriage ofHeaven and Hell is "insufficient" ( 1 86).6 However, especially in his
explications of Blake' s Prophetic Books, it becomes implicitly clear that Swinburne felt
compelled to pen a "full and satisfactory" treatise on Blake himself because Swinburne
was not able to see his "Blake" in Gilchrist's text. In other words, Swinburne had to
rewrite the Blake biography in order to make the historical Blake more like the figure of
"Blake" that he saw in his mind's eye.

Letter from Swinburne to YJ .M. Rossetti, 6 Oct. 1862 (Letters I : 60). This letter is quoted in nearly every
major critical assessment of Swinburne's Blake essay appearing to date.
s According to Oswald Doughty, Gilchrist and Rossetti had cemented a close friendship, in part based on
their mutual interest in Blake, the year before Gilchrist's death. As a result, Gilchrist asked Rossetti to edit
his manuscript, and Rossett� 's involvement with the project was so intense that he became more like a
collaborating author than an editor (Doughty 273, 281 ).
6
Swinburne's correspondence with W.M. Rossetti suggests that. the comments Swinburne makes here are
meant to be read straight-forwardly. A reading of Doughty's biography as well as Gilchrist's Life suggests
that the many criticisms Swinburne heaped on Gilchrist perhaps should have been given to Rossetti.
Doughty relates that Rossetti commenced his work on Gilchrist's book "in a shockingly unscholarly way,
omitting, transposing, altering and inserting at his own sweet will . . . " (281). Perhaps Swinburne was not
fully aware of Rossetti's extended hand in t11e parts of the book attributed to Gilchrist alone; or, as
Swinburne was very much Rossetti's devotee at this time, perhaps he either willfully chose to ignore
Rossetti's handiwork or was afraid to criticize his idol. According to Swinburne's most recent biographer,
however, Swinburne actually told William Rossetti that the Gilchrist book "would be a waste of time" for
him to try to fix (qtd. by Rooksby, Life 79).
4
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Blake, Nature, and Reason
Swinburne's Blake is the forefather of aesthetic dissonance. By introducing his
essay lamenting that Blake lived and died-in relative obscurity, unappreciated and
undervalued in a society in which he was "beautifully unfit" to live (Blake 1 ), Swinburne
carefully emphasizes the importance of Blake's obscurity from the beginning in order to
set up the continuing theme of social "unfit"-ness.as correlative to aesthetic beauty.
William Blake's art makes apparent his-disdain for conventional social rules and
obligations. This appealed to a growing sense of discontent in the young Swinburne who,
according to Thomas Connolly, already imagined himself very much like the Shelley of
the notorious &say on Christianity,1 rejecting the epistemological assumptions and
"orthodox belief' that merely obscured his artistic visiGn "llr outworn and derived
principles and dogmas" (34). The subversive possibilities fo_r Blake's aesthetic, though,
were more applicable than Shelley's; Swinburne points out, "Shelley in his time gave
enough of perplexity and offence . . . [but] was less made up of mist and fire than Blake"
(Blake 3). Swinburne indicates here that .the tension of the dialectic between two

<?Pposite poles, here represented by "mist" and "fire," is better represented in Blake's
work. Swinburne thus works with a definition of "beauty" much like that established by
Adorno: "[B]eauty is the result not of a simple equilibrium per se, but rather of the
tension that results" from the dissonance between the two poles- that dialectic always
7

Biographer Jean Overton Fuller agrees, stating that the adolescent Swinburne "was fond of comparing
himself with Shelley, his predecessor at Eton," especially as Shelley had been known as "Mad Shelley" and
Swinburne was thus christened "Mad Swinburne" by his schoolmates (26). Swinburne perpetuated the
comparison throughout most of his adulthood. especially in correspondence with his friends. Swinburne's
vast attachment to Shelley might have in part resulted from his mother specifically forbidding Swinburne
from reading many of the works of the Romantic poets "until he was grown up." See Henderson, especially
p.8.
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generates (Theory 46). Blake embodies such beautiful tension because "[i]n a time of
critical reason and definite division, he was possessed by a fervour and fury of belief'
(Swinburne, Blake 4);8 in other words, because Blake opposed rational epistemology with
,
his "innate and irrational perception, (Blake 3 5), his artworks, to borrow one of
Swinburne's best phrases, demarcate his "intervals of revolt.

,,

Swinburne also identifies in Blake the supposition that any kind of moment of
harmonious resolution achieved in an artwork alway .already contains the catalyst for the
inevitable rebellious interval in which the tension will be renewed. As Adorno reminds
us, denying tension under the guise of harmony will inevitably become "something
disturbing, false, and effectively dissonant" (Theory 46). Previous criticism of
Swinburne's essay on Blake· interrogates its supposed claims for the aesthetic possibilities
of achieving harmony, averring that Swinburne aspires to present either the achievement
of "spiritual harmony with the universal essence'' or the other-worldly divine achieved
through an inclusive transcendence of the material world (Connolly 37), or a
"harmonious fusion" of man and nature which recreates the prelapsarian condition
(Riede, Study 34). But these approaches ultimately fail to comprehend that Swinburne
discusses harmony while drawing on the implicit assumption that "harmony" is really
effective dissonance.
One must consider Swinburne's embrace of dissidence-which-precludes
dissonance, then, when elaborating his version of the Blakean aesthetic creed: 9

8 This actually marks the second time in four pages tbat Swinburne comments on Blake's opposition to
conventional reason. Two pages earlier, Swinburne remarks -ibat "all the medicines of reason and
experience must have been spent in pure waste" on Blake (2).
9
It is important to note here that Swinburne specifically refers to it as a "creed."
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[A]s long as a man believes in all things he may do any thing; scepticism
(not sin) is alone damnable, being the one thing purely barren and
negative; do what you will with your body, as long as you refuse it leave
to disprove or deny the life eternally inherent in your soul . . . . . The body
shall. not deny, and the spirit shall not restrain; the one sh�ll not prescribe
doubt through reasoning; the other shall not preach salvation through
abstinence. (Blake 96)
Swinburne recalls his earlier descriptions of Blake' s opposition to "critical reason" to
reinforce his main point that the ideology promoted by a rational, methodological culture
that values materialism and empirical objectivity over all else leaves no room for the
"spirit" to satisfy immanent human needs and desires. He uses the terminology of
enlightened reason against itself to demonstrate its insufficiency. Skepticism is a product
of the iron cage of reason; rational skepticism causes us to disbelieve in that which we
cannot materially (re)produce or factually prove. Yet Swinburne redefines skepticism to
mean the refusal to believe in the very "innate and irrational perception" that allows us to
"apprehend and enjoy" that which does not easily subject itself to rationalization or
uphold the tenets of reason, such as art (Blake 35). Swinburne, like Blake before him,
recognized that "unreflective enlightened thinking . . . always tends to convert into
skepticism, in order to make enough room for the existing order" (Horkheimer and
Adorno 93). So Swinburne, drawing upon though revising the Romantics' previous
expositions on reflection, implies that his �rand of aesthetic reflection will oppose such
skepticism. This resembles the kind of self-reflection Coleridge prescribes for "men of
commanding genius" in chapter two of the Biographia Literaria: those who interpret the
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world around them as a series of self..impressions that they analyze as such, "with a
satisfying degree of clearness, distinctness, and individuality" (449). However, this does
not mean one simply materializes one's own perceptions to perpetuate illusions of
typically rational (empirical) clarity or distinction. Rather, Swinburne's adaptation of the
Coleridgean formula is used.to explain a process of aesthetic signification enacted to
defer conventional determinations of"meaning," which are "barren and negative"-and
not negative in the sense of aesthetic negativity. The aesthetically negative requires
"truth [to take] the shape of folly"-what Swinburne would define as the innate,
irrational perception that man can do anything-"when, amid untruth"-meaning the
"damnable skepticism" of empirical reason-"human beings refuse to surrender"
(Zuidervaart 21 1) what they hold as the truth eternally inherent in the soul. Swinburne
carefully differentiates between the empirically negative and the aesthetically negative
here not only to reclaim the word -negative for his own purposes, but also, more
importantly, to enforce the aesthetic creed meant to reclaim the truth, in its actual
dissonant form, that can only be achieved through an art that counteracts all rational
paradigms. These paradigms "prescribe doubt" in what reason tells us does not and
cannot exist, what is not and cannot be possible.
Swinburne sees Blake acknowledging something quite close to the Adomian
precept that "what is true in art is something nonexistent," that "[w]hat does not exist
becomes incumbent on art in that other for which . . . reason, which reduced it to material,
uses the word nature" (Theory 1 3 1 , italics in original). Art, when it attempts to
reproduce the image of nature, really produces an image of what nature is not. Actual
"nature" itself is the shadow, or penumbra, haunting the artwork's boundaries or margins.
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The aesthetic prod�ction·of"nature," then, actually displays and maximizes the
dissonance in "nature," specifically. the division between the impulses housed in the
"natural" body and the social imperative preventing the body from engaging in any
"unnatural" impulses. Initially, Swinburne invokes Blake to embody a Romanticized
need to recognize "nature in disunion with itself' (H�rkheimer and Adorno 39) and
consequently meet that need by reliving a trace memory of organic nature apart from.the
bourgeois appropriation ofit. . As Horkheimer and Adorno have pointed out, "[t]he
bourgeois ideal of naturalness intends not amorphous nature, but the virtuous mean" (3 1 ),
whereas the Romantic ideal of the natural, though also serving as a "touchstone of
stability and order," asserts the possibility of an ecological integrity which the "inner,
spiritual" self can emulate (McGann, Romantic 67-68). However, Swinburne seems to
work through his initial idealization of Blake enough to indicate tacitly that his
romanticized notion of a fully organic, prelapsarian nature. is a convenient, retrospective
trope used to denote dissatisfaction with the present, invoking nostalgia for a utopian past
that never really existed. 10 Swinburne is particularly affected by the "historically
transformed" concept of nature Adorno attributes to the ni�eteenth century, in which the
"artifactitious domain" of"cultural landscape" regulates and eventually displaces
"natural beauty" (Theory 64). Yet this displaced nature is Swinburne's object of
nostalgia, fragmented "from its historical context, from its continuity" and conceptualized
as a "mythic, eternal, timeless" entity (Zizek, Lacan 1 1 2), thus removed from any
historical dilemma.

10 I have based my obse1Vation, in part, on Orrin Wang's Fantastic Modernity (10).
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This marks a point at which Swinburne and Adorno do not closely correlate. If
Swinburne was working here in a distinctly Adornian mode, then he would have to
acknowledge more clearly the "historical forces that [shift] the relationship between the
whole and the parts" (Nicholsen 49-50); meaning, he wou.ld have to articulate-via his
prevailing treatment of the trope of nature-his own subjective mediation between the
historical transformation and ever-changing reception of the trope and the particular
qualities of the trope that seem ahistorically .i mmanent. For Adorno, meditation on any
"mythic, eternal, timeless," ahistorically-immanent qualities of a trope always requires
continual reference to historical change. The dissonance experienced in the subject's
process of making, discerning, and critiquing meaning is always historically contingent.
Conversely, in a Lacanian/Zizekian position, the subject must become "decentered" from
historical contingencies in order to embrace the "eternal, timeless, mythic" dissonance of
the aesthetic. The trope of nature becomes an ahistorically subjective fetish. As Zizek
explains, by means of the nostalgic trope of a nature "other" than the dominated one, "we
encounter this 'bizarre category of the objectively subjective': what the fetish objectifies"
as the subject's "true belief' (Plague 120). Through such a trope, the subject creates
his/her own "social reality" only tangentially relative to his/her "participation in social
exchange" (Plague 120) or historical transformation. In this way, Swinburne's treatment
of the trope of nature seems more akin to a Zizekian rather than an Adomian rendering.
Nonetheless, Swinburne ascribes a peculiarly "double character" (Adorno, Theory 7 1 ) to
nature, in that the nostalgic, mystified version is anxiously held in suspension within the
culturally dominated version. And because Swinburne's work does exhibit the socio
historical components of the "natural" landscape, often implicitly portraying how
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"natural and historical elements interact in a . . . kaleidoscopically changing fashion"
(Theory 71), the correlation between Swinburne and Adorno here, though perhaps

uncomfortable and far from perfect, can still plausibly be made.
Swinburne finds the tension between nostalgically-organic and bourgeois nature
best exemplified in Blake's "To Tirzah," which S�inburne considers the clearest and
most earnest illustration of Blake' s aesthetic creed:
'Tirzah' . . . represents the mere separate and human nature, mother of the
perishing body and daughter of the 'religion' which occupies itself with
laying down laws of the flesh; which, while pretending- (and that in all
good faith) to despise the body and bring it into subjection as with control
of bit and bridle, does implicitly overrate its power upon the soul . . . and
thus falls foul of fact on all sides by assuming that spirit and flesh are
twain . . . . (Blake 121)
In the third stanza of"To Tirzah," Blake portrays the Earth, "Thou Mother of my Mortal
part," in its materiality as the oppressor, "mould[ing] my Heart" with "cruelty," "And
with false self-decieving [sic] tears, I Didst bind my Nostrils Eyes & Ears" (Blake,
"Tirzah" 9-1 2). Here Earth (nature)--read by Swinburne as a separate, human, perishing
body-is always already disenchanted, already subjected to the domination of rational
man. "What men want to learn from nature is how to use it in order wholly to dominate it
and other men," Horkheimer and Adorno observe (4); likewise, Swinburne's Blake
presents us with "nat�re" that reflects the lesson of domination already learned.
Swinburne regards "Tirzah;' as asserting that man is already bound, not by nature "itself,"
but by dominant social conventions of what has been deemed "natural." Very aware of
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the problem of domination, Swinburne seems to use the obvious appeal of Romantic
claims for organicism and a return to a pure, unadulterated natural state only to negate
them. To believe in a return to_an unsubjugated nature, ·says Swinburne, is to be . misled
by"the sweet poison offalse faith"; such false faith creates the fantasy that art can
transform or even rejuvenate the"barren branch and deadly leaf' that dominated nature
has become (Blake 1 20). In fact, Swinburne applauds Blake for making a "direct . . .
appeal against any rule . . . based on reference to the mere sexual and external nature of
man" or the world (Blake 1 22). This should not be read as an outright rejection of
Romanticism on Swinburne's part, but a way for Swinburne to use Romanticism as a way
to free himself from its very limitations. 1

1

It is particularly relevant that the portrayal of domination is put in bodily terms
and especially in terms of the female body-since one of the most exigent elements of
this essay is Swinburne's conflation of body and nature. The physical body is a
complicated symbol for Swinburne, predominantly signifying sexual activity and
gratification. Sexual gratification in the Swinburnian canon signifies the fulfil lment of
immanent human desires, though a fulfillment that the material world has yet to offer:
i. e., Swinburne's statement that one cannot achieve the"salvation" of fulfilled desire by
abstaining from physical pleasure. Yet the very concretized materiality of the
gratifying/gratified body poses a significant problem for Swinburne, so much so that he
needed to re-imagine the concept of the body as his friend Stephane Mallarme re
imagined his concept of literature itself, as "an unlocatable--perhaps even unheard and
11

My reading here is based on Stephen Bronner's reading of Adomo's Negative Dialectics. Bronner
explains, "It is not a matter of rejecting concepts in the manner of irrationalism, but of using them to
comprehend a freedom beyond concepts" (online).
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unseen-performance devoid of any semiotic or epistemological authority," a
"nonpresentness constitutive of human attention and expression" (Bersani 25-26).
Swinburne is.especiaHy fascinated by Blake's "mythologic figures," which are not
concretely physical but are instead "savage abstractions" "created of fire and cloud"
(Blake 1 89). They "slowly . . . grow .into something of shape, [and] assume some foggy

feature and indefinite colour," but, in this emergent indistinction, "the fluctuating noise
condenses into music," so that the material itself signifies-performs the making of
meaning-differently (Blake · 190).
"[C]onstraining the abstract to do [the] service" of representing the traditionaHy
more concrete (Blake 1 90), Swinburne not only deconstructs the materiality of the
gratified/gratifying body, but also makes the site of that deconstruction function as a
place-holder representing what, to borrow from Zizek, could be caHed the "ecstatic
dimension [which] is thus properly unrepresentable" (Plague 1 76). The body of
"nature," almost always feminized by Swinburne as well as Blake, is already dominated
by the very human, very socially-mandated "bit and bridle" of abstinence so that it
signifies what it is no longer: "the enigmatic image of irresistibility and powerlessness.
In this way, she reflects for doniination the pure lie that posits the subjection instead of
the redemption of nature" ·(Horkheimer and Adorno 72); or, for that matter, the
redemption of the immanent yet obscured possibilities stilJ to be found in the material
world. One cannot resist the trace memory of nature as it was before its subjection to
ascetic 1imitations 1 2 that stiU underlie the bourgeois concept of nature, because that trace

12

This statement is very loosely based on Horkheimer and Adomo's assertion that "eloquent discourse,"
such as literary discourse, is intertwined with trace memories (78).
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memory suggests that the "properly unrepresentable" gratification is still somehow
possible. Yet the powerlessness of a fully subjected nature reinforces the illusion of
stability of the "abstract power of the [individual] subject" (Horkheimer and Adorno 90)
who wants to believe that s/he is the locus and agent of all possible fulfillment. By
admitting that the potential for fulfillment is only immanent in "nature" as it was
before/outside of the iron cage of reason and only as it exists outside its current
conception(s), one also admit_s that ra!ional man can only fail to fulfill his own desires.
Therefore, Swinburne had to make sense of an aesthetic dependency on depictions of the
physical body and its many desirous acts by treating both human bodies and the
conceptualized "body" of nature as "virtual bodies" that represent little more than the
vagaries of otherwise unrepresentable Desire. 13
One of the best examples of the virtual character of the Swinburnian body can be
found in the extensive footnote Swinburne appends to his explication of Blake's "The
Everlasting Gospel," which turns into an occasion to discuss Jerusalem at length.
Swinburne begins by quoting in its entirety the section of Blake's poem in which the
speaker questions Jesus Christ's chastity. By doing so, Swinburne plays with the notion
of the body of Christ as the ultimate virtual body, a notion he will revisit in many of his
Poems and Ballads as well as Songs before Sunrise 's notorious "Before a Crucifix."

Jesus, simultaneously human and divine, serves as the lone example of spirit and flesh
that are not assumed twain, even by the status quo. Yet even Jesus fails to elucidate fully

13

Here I am spinning on Martin Danahay's revaluaµon of Dante Gabriel Rossetti's "fleshly" aesthetic. See
Danahay, "Dante Gabriel Rossetti's Virtual Bodies," especially pp. 380-81, 386-87.
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the virtual synthesis ofHis ·own body as well as other bodies. · Swinburne points out that
Jesus/God is
[t]he creator by division . . . ; literally in the deepest sense 'the God of this
world,' who 'does not know the garment from the man' ; cannot see
beyond the two halves whic� he has made by violence of separation;
would have the body perishable, yet the qualities of the bodily life
permanent: thus inverting order and reversing fact. (Blake 15 5n 1)
By "inverting order and reversing fact," the figure of Jesus merely reinforces the
epistemology of reason: the privileged way of knowing the world is through repression
and denial of the body and the sexuality it represents. Swinburne demonstrates his
understanding that any human desire in connection with fleshliness or physicality is
rationalized away, made to disappear through the social regulations (or what Zizek calls
the "public Law") which repress desire only by effectively sustaining it. In Jesus, "God
is man, and man God," says Swinburne, but even when made flesh, God cannot
"partak[e] of the 'generative nature,' cannot partake of qualities which exist only by right
of that nature" (Blake 1 54). In short, God is thus never really represented through man
The representation-of God in/as man is incomplete, unfulfilling; it is a fantasy of
fulfilled desire, of unity between man and God that would preclude any dissonance.
However, Swinburne then says, "God must needs be (not more than man, but assuredly)
more than the qualities of man" (Blake 1 54, emphases mine). He reads Blake' s
"Everlasting Gospel" to mean that God-as-Jesus should not be more than his physical
body; in other words, God in material form should be read as actively exploring that
materiality rather than actively pursuing ways to transcend it. And Jesus' s active
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exploration of the possibilities of the material world-and, specifically in Blake's
"Gospel," desire and - its physical manifestations-reveals more qualities of and
possibilities in the material world than are typically evident. Consequently, Swinburne
realizes a kind of Zizekian "dialectical reversal also always involves a kind of
anamorphotic shift of perspective: what we (mis)perceived as the obstacle (the
Prohibition), the condition of impossibility, i s actually a positive condition of possibility
(of our desiring)"; moreover, that the tensjon between the failure to achieve fulfill ment
and the elusive -yet ever-looming conditions of its possibility is "the inherent condition"
of the individual subject's position -(Zizek, Plague 11). Thus Swinburne reads Blake's
Jesus as the symbol of bodily . prohibitions that implicitly represents the positive, virtual
possibilities of moving beyond those prohibitions only by failing to expose explicitly its
virtual quality. Inasmuch as "what is true in art is something nonexi stent" (Adorno,

Theory 1 3 1 ), the aestheticized body of Blake's Jesus demonstrates to Swinburne how the
failure to exist within social, rational paradigms attests to the body's "true" virtual
quality. Consequently, Swinburne suggests that only through the kind of "holy
insurrection" Blake creates in Jerusalem, a heretical "divine revolt against divine law"
_ which Swinburne calls "the radical significance of Christianity" (Blake 1 56), can the
rationalized, concretized body be negated and the virtual, dynamic quality of the body be
recuperated.
Moreover, Swinburne considers Jerusalem Blake' s tale of "perverted humanity"

(Blake 289). Perversion in this case, though, is not the wanton di savowal of existing laws
or even the misapplication of them. Rather, it is the post-Enlightenment condition,
occurring as "reason supplants faith, and law, moral or religious, grows out of reason"
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(Blake 289). Jerusalem becomes "the symbol of imaginative liberty" (Blake 289) that
reason leads one to obfuscate; or, to borrow the phrase Horkheimer and Adorno use to
describe the works of the Marquis de Sade, Blake's Jerosalem portrays the possibility of
"the bourgeois .individual. freed from [reason's] tutelage" (86). This is the freedom won
by the "holy insurrection," which is "strenuous battle against the God of nature"
(Swinburne, Blake 1 51.), very much like the Promethean battle of Blake's Los, the
"Eternal Prophet," who bound "the vast Spine of Urizen," 1 4 the creator god, so he (Los)
could wield the powers of creation himself. The power must be forcefully taken from the
God "who must have the organ of destruction and division, by which alone he lives and
has ability to beget, cut off from him" (Swinburne, Blake 1 57).

In perhaps one of the

most shocking passages of his essay, then, Swinburne advocates the castration of God. 1 5
Bearing in mind, though, that Swinburne probably considered, at least in this
context, the phallus "an imaginary form of the body" as well as "the signifier of power"
(Borch-Jacobsen 21 6), I believe that Swinburne uses this statement emphatically to
pronounce his alignment with the Sadean practice of"attacking civilization with its own
weapons" (Horkheimer and Adorno 94)-in this case, religion and rationality.
Swinburne wants to dismantle the concept of "God" as prohibition as well as the concept
of a concrete (rather than a virtual) body, and here Sade provides an expedient means of
14

See William Blake, "The Book of Los," especially Chap. I: 27-32 and Chap. IV: 4 1-47. Oddly,
Swinburne has very little to say about Los, though Los is perhaps tl1e best exemplar of"holy insurrection''
Blake's poetry offers. In tl1e Blake essay. Swinburne devotes a mere four and a half pages to the "Song of
Los," in which he fails to discuss the character of Los at all. He does say, though, that in Los "(t ] he old
themes of delusion and perversion are once again rehandled" (Blake 256). Furthennore, in his discussion
of Jerusalem. Swinburne declares that "no man [should ] attempt to define tbe post or expound the office"
of Urizen's "terrible sons and daughters": "These . . . let us leave to tl1e discretion of Los, who has enough
on his hands among them all" (Blake 286).
15 Swinburne does not link this pronouncement witl1 any particular Blake text. but it seems he is thinking of
the episode in the frrst chapter of The Book ofAhania. in which Fuzon tluows the "howling" "Globe of
wrath" at Urizen, a globe tl1at divides Urizen 's "cold loins" (see lines 1 -34).
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doing so. Affixed to this shocking pronouncement is a footnote in which Swinburne asks
his reader to compare his excursus on Jerusalem to "a lay sermon by a modern pagan
philosopher of more material tendencies," which he provides (Blake 1 57n l). Swinburne,
· of course, does not name his favored "modern pagan philosopher," but the "lay sermon"
is a patchwork of paraphrased passages from Justine and Juliette as well as Philosophy in

the Bedroom. 16
Swinburne's initial aesthetic interest in Sade concerns Sade' s portrayal of nature
as "ceaseless flux and action" (Juliette 1 7 1 ). 1 7 The Sadean version of nature at first
seemed a quick and fitting resolution to Swinburne's quest to construct a version of
nature "as something besides a completely mystified retroactive construction or a
completely transparent, originary form of knowledge" (Wang 10). Swinburne wanted to
apply a Sadean version of nature as a never-ending libidinous circuit as a means to
circumvent the "signifier of power," or the law which grows out of reason, altogether; if
the "natural law'' of relentlessly pursuing individual pleasure is introduced into the
dominant ideology, then in its relentlessly continual circuit the intrusion of perverse
pleasure interrupts and _displaces the dominant ideology just as continually. Moreover,
Sadean nature, modeled as a continuous circuit or cycle, suggests that all these pleasures
are momentary, fragmentary, and incomplete. One is never permanently or concretely

16 Georges Lafourcade has specifically traced the Sadean material in this particular footnote to particular
passages in these works. _See Swinburne: A literary Biography, pp. 103-04, as well as the second volume
ofLafourcade's French-language study, la Jeunesse de Swinburne (Oxford: Oxford UP, 1928) 355-56.
17
It is absolutely crucial to note here that I am specifically referring to his aesthetic, and not his prurient,
interest in Sade. Swinburne's nwnerous non-critical responses to Sade's work, mostly explicit letters to
close friends containing pornographic tales loosely copying and often parodying Sade's "wooden" writing
style, demonstrates a·decided-and one could even argue practiced-sexual, emotiona� and intellectual
immaturity vastly different from the critical adroitness, poise, and mental dexterity displayed in
Swinburne's poetry and critical prose.
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satisfied; for,. after-the last stage in which one experiences pleasure, one must return to
the initial stage of seeking pleasure, or seeking t� satisfy a decisively unsatisfiable desire.
The process ends where it begins, since it depends on the individual failing to satisfy
desire with any finality. -And Swinburne found the inevitable failure built into this model
very appealing.
The "sermon" begins wit� Swinburne-as-Sade proclaiming that ''Nature" is
synonymous with "crime." As she "lives and breathes by": crime, she is the fount of
desirous possibility, the ultimate antithesis to the obstacle that is Prohibition:
Nature forbid that thing or this? Nay, . . . no criminal will come up to the
measure ofh_er crimes, no destruction s�em to her destructive enough.
We, when we would do evil, can disorganise a little matter, shed a little
blood, quench a little breath at the door, ofa perishable body; this we can
do, and call it crime. Unnatural is it? Good friend, it is by criminal things
and deeds unnatural that nature works and moves and has her being; what
subsides through inert virtue, she quickens through active crime; . . . she
uses the dust of man to strike her light upon; she feeds with fresh blood
the innumerable insatiable mouths suckled at her milkless breast; . . . she
stabs and poisons, crushes and corrodes, yet cannot live and sin fast
enough for the cruelty of her great desire . . . . [H]er desire is continually
toward evil; that she may see the end_ of things which she hath made . . .
and with all her forces she labours in desire ofdeath. (Blake 1 57-58nl ,
emphases mine)
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Swinburne carefully distinguishes between the "perishable body" we usually
acknowledge and the usually unacknowledged virtual body signified here by nature.
Nature, though personified, is not a limited being; like the libido itself, nature "has no
extraneous temporal and spatial limitations" (Marcuse 49). "[S]he takes the pain of the
whole world to sharpen the sense of vital pleasure in her limitless veins" (Swinburne,
Blake 1 57nl): her "limitless" desire, her pleasure, is encompasses the whole world, and

thus her "veins"-normally suggesting a supposed physical presence-are metaphorical,
virtual. Swinburne represents Nature in a virtual body which functions only as a place
holder for the otherwise unrepresentable "polymorphous perversity" associated with
expressing that desire (Marcuse 49).
By appending this discussion specifically to the sentence in which he calls for the
castration of God, Swinburne implicitly asks us to associate this criminally desirous
virtual body of nature with the body of the Blakean Christ who did not come to "save 'the
world "' from evil, but to liberate what religion and rationality have mistakenly deemed
evil: "that imperishable body or complement of the soul which if a man 'keep under and
bring into [material] subjection' he transgresses against himself' (Blake 1 59). Swinburne
intends his reader to recall that Jesus was crucified as a criminal alongside other criminals
and thus equivocate Christlike criminality with the criminal desire of nature. If we read
this passage as suggesting nature's criminal disposition is the same as Jesus's-the
consequence of a life of"divine rebellion and 'spiritual war "' raged against "barren
physical qualities and temporal virtues" (Swinburne, Blake 1 69}-then we can also read
this passage as exhibiting a negative dialectic of criminality. By this I mean to suggest
that Swinburne uses the concept of"criminality" only to move beyond it. The pursuit of
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pleasure, nature's "desire," here becomes a transgressive activity, as it transgresses
reason, or more specifically the way reason has dominated and conceptualized nature.
This transgression is fashion�d by a desire that is not universalizab)e. 18 The criminality
or evil here, then, is Nature's refusal to be universalized. Arguably Sade creates a
universalized principle of "natural law" in his wo�ks (i.e., when the "natural law'' of
perpetually seeking pleasure becomes the ecstasy of monotony, the monotony becomes
its universalizing concept); .that is not to say, though, that Swinburne uses it in the same
way. Swinburne, sensing dissonance in the obligation · to adhere to Sade's unifying,
monotonous natural Jaw, chooses to explore the constellation of particulars in this
"natural law" to.reveal its plenitude. 1 9
Swinburne renovates Sade's "natural law" via the persistent convention of a
personified "Mother Nature" specifically� if paradoxicalJy, to demonstrate its
transgressive unpredictability. He appears to treat such conventions as always containing
"an external and heterogenous element" serving to "remind [conventions] of their own
boundaries" (Adorno, Theory 204). Swinburne's Sadean Mother Nature has "eyes . . .
sick of seeing and her ears are heavy with hearing" the same sights and sounds over and
over; she is "burnt up" by the monotonous "lust of creation . . . and rent in twain with
travail until she [can] bring forth change" in her environment (Blake 1 57n l). In other
words, she is bound by the limitations of the physicality she explores; but, as there are
always elements within universalizing physical conventions themselves that tend toward
18 This

is a loose paraphrase borrowed from Zizek 's chapter, "Superego by Default," in Metastases of

Enjoyment 68-69.

19 My observation is based on Adomo's section subtitled "Dialectics not a Standpoint" in Negative
Dialectics, particularly the following statement: "What we differentiate will appear divergent, dissonant,
negative for just as long as the structure of our consciousness obliges it to strive for unity" (5).
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particularity and dissonance, she can exploit those elements to "bring forth change." This
change is predicated upon the tension between conventional boundaries and that which
does not fit, or exceeds, those boundaries-which I would re-identify as the tension
between nature's concretized, feminized "body" and its virtual quality here. This, in turn,
produces a kind _of"fissure" within a universalized concept, or the monotony of the
Sadean natural law, in whi�h the convention collapses (Adorno, Theory 204).
Th� criminal "evil" of this version of "divine rebellion" against a "barren"
concept of physicality (Swinburne, Blake 169) is staged at the point of th�s fissure. This
fissure also represents tension between the "vital pleasure" in nature's "limitless veins"
(Blake 1 57n I) and the conceptualized or conventional body which is supposed to signify

the jouissance-though the body itself is foreign to the jouissance, or ultimate
enjoyment, it cannot fully contain or represent.�0 Jouissance exceeds the boundaries of
the universalizing convention that is foreign to the particularities comprising that
enjoyment. Swinburne did not quite find the jouissance he sought in Sade's works
themselves, resignedly admitting that Sade "worship[ped] the phallus as those first
ascetics worshipped the cross" (Swinburne, Letters I: 57); Sade, by attributing a quality
of absolutism to nature and its overarching "law," reestablishes the very signifier of
unifying power he claims to transgress. I think Swinburne was critically and aesthetically
disappointed by finding Sade's texts reluctant to divulge and to explore particularity with
any adequacy. Swinburne finds that he must imagine the possibility of"thwart[ing]
nature," or the conventions of natural law-meani ng, imagine the sites of fissure between

20

See Zizek, Metastases 1 1 .
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what the "natural law'' contains and what exceeds it in order to collapse or transgress the
conventions altogether:
Could but a man do this; could he cross the courses of the stars, and put
back the times of the sea; could he change the ways of the world and find
out the house of life only to destroy it; . . . could he draw down the sun to
consume the earth, and bid the moon shed poison or fire upon the air;
could he kill the fruit in the seed and _corrode the child's mouth with the
mother's milk . . . .- (Blake 1 57nl )
Swinburne realizes that ultimately one could not fully commit these acts, but the
emergence of the imaginative possibilities of such acts in discourse is itself transgressive.
This transgression is the kernel of truth anchoring the use of all such conventions and
tropes: the particular element buried within, negative in that it defies recognition or
identification, requiring a special "gift of spiritual sight" to recognize and to set into
motion (Swinburne, Blake 1 1 6).
In another negative play on conventional troping, Swinburne metaphorically
represents the transgressive attributes of the domination of nature in his descriptions of
the sexual relationship between man and woman. The previously quoted "sermon"
features variations of assertions functioning merely to emphasize the female attributes of
"nature" opposed to civilized society, always referred to as "man," the general-which-is
male. Swinburne-as-Sade pointedly reverses the courtly notion of "Nature" as a "fair
lady" deserving one's admiration and worship. This paradigm provides Nature "with all
the features that constitute so-called 'femininity "' defined only "in regard to her
(potential) relationship to man, as an object of his desire" (Zizek, Metastases 108) but
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fails to acknowledge the limitations inherent in that paradigm. Swinburne's "sermon"
may suggest a certain admiration for nature's cruelty, but it also focuses primarily on
nature's own desire, rather than man's desire for nature; pointi�g out that there really is
nothing innocent about the traditional- portrayals of the relationship of man to nature, as
this relationship is little more than a stand-in for the "contractual exchange" of bourgeois
marriage, man commanding woman to serve as the object of his desire (Horkheimer and
Adorno 72). Moreover,- Swinburne goes further and indicates that this symbolic
exchange should not be misunderstood as a relationship proper, since relationship implies
reciprocation that is not present here. "Behold, the ages of men are dead at her feet"
(Swinburne, Blake 1 51n1 ), and the men themselves do not actively engage with her; they
are figuratively "dead" to her as well. As previously mentioned, she "brings forth
change" in the "lust of creation"; but, this is self-lust, and, using this lust, she needs only
"the dust of man to strike her light upon" (Swinburne, Blake 1 57n 1 ). Anticipating the
famous Lacanian proposition that sexual rapport (or intercourse) is impossible, 21
Swinburne proposes that the "criminal'' power or "evil" of nature is really her ability to
(re)create herself despite the impossibility of (without) sexual generation; "she quickens
through active crime" of self-generation-again, she subverts or transgresses convention.
Nature's body is more than "the mere 'sexual' shell which only exists" to represent the
"division" of sexual and creative labor (Blake 1 59-60).
This is quite unlike Sade's nature or, for that matter, any of Sade's female
characters, who cannot transgress the "mere sexual shells" of their existence. Though
21 Lacan makes this pronouncement in Le Seminaire X¥: Encore (trans. Bruce Fink, ed. Jacques-Alain
Miller [New York: Norton, 1 999)).
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Sade's women are divorced from the biological imperative to propagate the species,,
divorced from the "repressive organization of sexuality which subjugates pleasure
,,
"under the function of procreation (Marcuse 40)-they are still delimited by their
physiology. The Sadean woman is the gaping hole of lack that can never be permanently
,
or actually sated. She is (the symptom of) man s pathological pleasure, the object of
,,
fantasies which prevent the disclosure of desire as a "lack of being (Zizek, Lacan 65-66;
Borch-Jacobsen 200). Repeatedly in Sade's texts, women are told by men, and thus they
internalize themselves, that they exist merely to fulfill sexual pleasure. 22 Moreover, Sade
cannot avoid encasing nature in a feminized sexual_ shell because his version of nature
remains very much like the woman in the bourgeois marriage contract: Sade embodies
nature in the same kind of female or feminized tropes.his masculine characters command
to embody their own motives and opportunities for the relentless pursuit of pleasure and
perversity. Sadean nature is perhaps best figured in the character ofJuliette 's sorceress
Madame Durand, the embodiment of the commanding law of nature, whose power and
authority proves to be illusory, imaginary, artificial. �ven Durand's individuality is
called into question, for she disappears as soon as she is introduced, leaving almost no
trace that she had ever existed.
Swinburne conceptually moves his version of nature beyond the trope of the
Sadean woman, because Swinburne's feminine nature is the ultimate display of the
22 For example, in Juliette. Madame de Clairwil tells Juliette, "Woman has one innate virtue, it is
whorishness; to fuck, that and that alone is what we were created for'' (492). Likewise, as Frances
Ferguson points out, Justine is primarily a female body to be repeatedly used by others for their own
pleasure ("Justine" 1 10). Arguably Juliette details women pleasuring themselves as well as others. 'That
being sai� since the overriding plot of the novel begins wit11 Noirceuil tutoring Juliette how to pleasure
him and ends with Juliette returning to Noirceuil to give him pleasure, it seems that the text remains
entrenched in sexual essentialism.
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individuality-the particularity-that bourgeois man denies to woman. In Sade's texts, as
Horkheimer and Adorno notice, a female character. is always a universal signifier, "a
representative of her sex," and thus "male logic sees her wholly as standing for nature, as
\

the substrate of never-ending subsumption notionally, and of never-ending subjection in
reality" {l l l). Swinburne's revision of the Sadean woman demonstrates his aspirations
to create a literary art superior to Sade's, in that Swinburne's women, not only "Nature"
as depicted here but also the many "ladies of pain" peopling the Poems and Ballads, are
only universalized as an aesthetic principium indivi£!uationis: the Swinburnian woman is
a universal trope only "in terms of its own meaning not [being] lodged beyond the
particular individuals who bear it" (Adorno, Theory 200).
By the time he completed the Blake manuscript, Swinburne recanted his initial
idolatrous worship of Sade and his work,23 but he still managed to use the faults he saw in
Sade's approach to his own benefit. Swinburne lambasted Sade as "a Christian ascetic
bent on earning the salvation of the soul through the mortification of the flesh,"24 but still
found Sade useful as an example of how to transform such Christian duaiism into a
negative dialectic useful for his aesthetic purposes. Julian Baird proposes that Swinburne
regarded Sade as a symbol for "emancipation from [the] crippling moral laws" and the
Christian concept of the physical body and its limitations (5 I), though I would qualify
this by adding that this statement only pertains if one perceives that Sade provided the
23

Swinburne is quite famous for pronouncing himself a fervent discipline of the "divine Marquis" as a
young man-before he actually read any of Sade's work. In fact, Swinburne did not read any of Sade until
he was halfway through his work on William Blake; and after reading Justine, a bitterly disappointed
Swinburne wrote to his friend Richard Monckton Milnes (later Lord Houghton) tbat he "wep (t ] . . . over a
shattered idol" (qtd. by Rooksby, Life 76) . Despite that fact, Sade continued to permeate Swinburne's
thought and speech over the next several years, but Swinburne presented himself less as Sade's disciple and
more as Sade's critic.
24
Letter from Swinburne to Richard Monckton Milnes (Letters 1 :57).
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means for Swinburne to investigate methods of Christian asceticism in order to move
beyond those conventional ascetic concepts. Furthermore, Baird declares that, for
Swinburne, Sade "is part of the natural order" (5 1), the very concept Swinburne proves is
always already invalid. Consequently, it is tempting to hypothesize that Swinburne
associated Sade with the universalized trope of the Sadean woman he found inadequate.
Horkheimer and Adorno assert that the "emotion which corresponds to the practice of
oppression" of the revered fair lady "is contempt, not reverence" ( 1 1 1 ); and, as his vast
disappointment at Sade's boorish and maladroit artistry led Swinburne finally to
pronounce to his friends, "I drop my apostrophe to M. de Sade" (qtd. by Rooksby, Life
76), it seems Swinburne came to resent Sade for creating an aestheticized subject
position for himself in which he (Sade) failed to develop his own particularity and,
consequently, was not able truly to divorce himself from rational, bourgeois, and
religious concretizing universals. 2-5
Because he felt that Sade failed-to rebel enough against the traditions and
conventions of Christianity, Swinburne uses Sade only in a footnote to the "holy
insurrection" which is the "radical signi�cance" of an unconventional faith. Thus
Swinburne turns back to Blake. "Divine rebellion," or "radical Christianity," must be
comprised of a set of particulars that present the universal only in conste11ation which
"illuminates a specific side" or· aspect of a given concept (Adorno, Negative 1 62);
meaning, what one refers to as "divine rebellion" has many individual, particular
qualities-all of which will not be evident or available simultaneously, and some of
lnte�ngly, Horkheimer and Adorno come to tile same conclusion about Sade, saying, "(T]he
individualism which Sade proclaimed in combating the laws ends in the absolute rule of the generality. the
republic" ( 1 17). Swinburne himself had conflicting ideas about the efficacy and idealism of republicanism.
which I will discuss furtber in my explication of the Songs before Sunrise in Chapter 5.
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which will not seem synchronous with other qualities. Moreover, each individual will
comprehend the relationships between the particular qualities differently, identifying
constellative patterns unique to his/her individual perspective. In . this way, no particular
quality gets subsumed by an overarching universal whole, although particularities
typically get subsumed by the universal because specificity is "a matter of indifference or
a burden" to universalizing practices (Negative 1 62). Sade merely refurbished the
· conventional, universalized, and universalizing Christian classifications (i.e., spirit/flesh,
good/evil, asceticism/eroticism). Swinburne cl�ims that Blake, though, creates
a faith of his own, made out of art for art 's sake, and worked by means of
art . . .. In a rough and rapid way he chose to mass and sum up under some
one or two types, comprehensible at first sight to few besides himself, the
main elements of opposition which he con�eived to exist. (Blake 1 0 1 )
Even though Blake uses "some one or two types" as universal throughout his canon, they
all contain the "elements of opposition" to universality, the particulars, which direct one
to understand any sort of universal only as it is figured in particular, individual
instances-in this case, the particular, individual works of art. And artistic particularities
should be understood as exceeding any and all social, and thus universal, use. 26
Swinburne says, once art becomes "useful to men in general (say, by furthering their
moral work or improving their moral nature), she is no longer of any human use or value"
(Blake 92, italics his). Blake's unconventional faith in particularity, then, extends to art

26

This is not exactly a typical dialectic of synthesizing praxes between antitheses, though; rather, this kind
of dialectic works only "on the level of analysis" (Skjerdal online). constantly seeking to re-analyze and
disrupt-rather than transcend-lite fonnation of universalizing concepts.
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an aesthetic value that opposes conventional use-value which, according to Horkheimer
and Adorno, makes an artwork into a fetish (I 58).
Swinburne recognizes that when art is forced to prescribe and uphold the status
quo it also becomes the "site of a special power that must either be contained or
exploited" (Mitchell, Jcono/ogy 1 5 1 ), and thus presages the Adornian dictum to recognize
the "fetish character" of an artwork only to "critically dissolve it" (Theory 1 83). He
wants to reach the point of what Zizek calls . "troppofisso, " or "the very moment of 'non
dialectical excess,' of ' exaggeration,' when 'one particular moment stands for all'
(Plague 91) and yet the excess still stains the very moment. Swinburne finds this
moment in the fifth chapter of Blake's Ahania, in which Ahania, separated from the
"status quo" as figured in the creator god Urizen, exceeds the limits of the Urizenic
world. In the "[o]ne final glimpse . . . of Ahania" offered before she dissolves, she at first
seems "impotent therefore and a shadow"; but, as Ahania, intimates "great suggestions of
something more than our.analytic ingenuities can well unravel" (Swinburne, Blake
254}-something that can only be expressed in a fissure between Ahania and Urizen.
The lamenting voice of Ahania,
Weeping upon the Void!
. . . Distant in solitary night,
Her voice was heard, but no form
Had she; but her tears from clouds
Eternal fell round the Tree.
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And the voice cried: 'Ah, _Urizen ! Love!
Flower of morning! I weep on the verge
Of Nonentity-how wide the Abyss
Between Ahania and thee ! ['] (Blake, Ahania V: 1-1 1)
Just as all discourse exceeds itself, suggesting absence in its attempt to satiate absence,
Ahania's discourse, forged on.the "verge of the abyss," gestures at the abyssal excess that
escapes all kinds of discourse. In similar vein, Swinburne's own aesthetic discourse
gestures toward the inaccessible excess of particularity in the same moment it tries, and
significantly fails, to render it accessible.
This "special power' of particularity must be neither contained nor exploited
neither unfairly universalized nor incorporated into an ideological gesture that imposes
the power of false (social) consciousness upon the artwork-but explored in its own
right. Swinburne claims that Blake's work is able to circumvent the long-armed,
usurping grasp of dominant ideology because Blake's "impulsive instinct of form"
represents "the exquisite d�sire of just and perfect work" (Blake I 09), a quality that must
be sensed, not deduced, by the reader. Consequently, Blake's aesthetic, requiring what
· the early Marx might have called a sensuous consciousness, 27 "deconstructs the
opposition between the practical and the aesthetic" by refusing to "purge the specificity

27

In the Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844. Marx distinguishes between the "sensuous
consciousness" of the bourgeois. capitalist "fetish-worshipper" and "that of the (ancient) Greek," who was
able to apprehend "the hwnan feeling for nature, tl1e hwnan sense of nature. and tl1erefore also the natural
sense of man" in a way tl1at rational, modem man cannot. TI1e ancient Greek. then. would not
conceptualize a vast divide between thought and sensuous reality tl1e way the rational, modem man does
(Tucker 98, 120). This is comparable to Swinburne's assertion that Blake promoted "an equal reverence
for spirit and flesh." or the immaterial and tl1e material, "as tl1e two sides or halves of a completed creature"
(Blake 96).
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of things," and thus refusing to "stri[p] their sensuous content to a pure ideality of form"
(Eagleton 204-05). In short, one might say that the Blakean aesthetic faith is faith in the
representative "truth" of the specific.
Furthermore, by invoking the catch-phrase of the aestheticist movement that
Swinburne was pioneering (I 'art pour I 'art) and its ensuing proposition that art itself,
rather than any moral, ideological or political commitment, is the foremost concern of
aesthetics, Swinburne again invokes his Romantic predecessors. For many Victorian
readers, the "basic doctrine ·which Romantic poets continually present for reader
consumption"--or, at least, what particular Victorian readers of the Romantics
continually present-"is that they are innocent of moral or doctrinal commitments" while
speaking their "universal truths" (McGann, Romantic 66). Swinburne seems suspicious
of his contemporaries' suggestions of Romantic non-commitment, though, in a rather
puzzling footnote affixed to this section on art and use-value. In this footnote, Swinburne
remarks that h� is "not . . . aware that the written work of . . . Shelley did ever tend to alter
the material face of things," although he "may have desired that it should" and his
"unwritten work may have done so" (Blake 93n l ). 28 �ut the key term here is the
"unwritten work": not Shelley's specific political intentions manifest in his written
words, per se, but the "unwritten work" of Shelley's ideas as they become manifest in
every individual reader with an equally individualized, particularized, and particularizing
perspective. Each reader will approach one of Shelley's texts to derive meaning from it
by forming a constellative pattern between the textual elements, and that pattern in
28

To be fair, Swinburne pairs Shelley with Dante in this particular quote; however, for purposes of
discussion here, I have chosen only to focus on Shelley here, considering Swinburne's great interest in and
identification with him.
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unique to -each individual reader. Consequently, the written text itself may not alter the
material world, but the written text can affect the ways in which a reader understands,
organizes, and thus reacts to, the material world.
In other words, the written work leads the reader to shape or affect "the before
unapprehended· relations of things" (Shelley 482). And, in turn, Shelley
says that poetry "strips the veil of familiarity from the world," "lifts the
veil from the hidden beauty of the world, and makes familiar objects be as
if they were not familiar'' [505, 487]. Furthermore, all this is deemed
"revolutionary." Poetry's work of defamiliarization . . . lead[s] to "social
renovation. . . . " (Kaufman, "Legislators" 723)
The "commitment" Swinburne reads in Shelley and Blake is a commitment to a kind of
aesthe�ic "play impulse" intervening between sensuousness (affect, emotion, pleasure)
and reason (the conventions in which one organizes and understands the world), in which
the very interaction between the sensual and the rational becomes a "vehicle of
liberation" from social constraint (Marcuse 1 86-87). This play impulse is interpreted
within · dominant ideology as "an 'irresponsible' aestheticism . . . of ornament, luxury,
holiday"-an uncanny and unwelcome intrusion "in[to] an otherwise repressive world"
that the aesthetic dimension cannot infiltrate (Marcuse 1 88). It does not externally seem
to revolutionize morality or politics across the board� but, affecting how the individual
perceives the world around him/her, the play impulse enacts a shift in perspective which
initiates an imaginative reconsideration of that which exceeds ideological conventions.
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Thus a commitment to exploring excess can potentially "alter the material face of things,"
or at least one's consideration of the materiality of artistic "things." 29
Swinburne saw the problematic relationship of Romantic particularity to the
conventions and expectations of the status quo echoed in the works of Gautier and
Baudelaire, which he read rather intensely during this period. Gautier and Baudelaire,
progenitors of French decadence, define the individual artist as embodying the ultimate
paradox: "a hatred for modem civilization and a love of the refinements modem
civilization made possible" (Carter 6). This is similar to Shelley portraying the poet, in
the "Defence," as both legislator and a prophet (Shelley 482)--meaning one who ushers
in a new order as the public Law that allows for the necessary "refinements," yet has
enough vision to recognize the "hateful" social limitations that must be broken.
Swinburne envisages all these qualities in what he calls Blake's "lust of paradox" (Blake
37), which I believe is the utmost characteristic of Swinburne's ideal ultimate artist, a
figure representing a constellation of particular, desirable aesthetic tendencies. Viewed
from one angle, the artist is Blake; from another angle, it is Gautier; from yet another
perspective, the artist is Baudelaire. And Swinburne, I think, aspires to present himself as
another figuration of this constellative ideal.

29

Many critics would disagree with me here, at least in part. For example, in his careful study of Shelleyan

Ideas in Victorian Poetry, Roland Duerksen observes that Swinburne was among the Victorians interested

"almost exclusively by [Shelley's) aesthetics, symbolism, and poetic technique," thus failing to produce
"any work appreciably informed by Shelley's sociological ideas." Duerksen also notes, though, that
Swinburne's letters reveal that Swinburne was in fact in '"general agreement with Shelley's social views"
(150). This suggests to me that it is feasible that Swinburne's essay on Blake is also "infonned by"
Shelley's ideas, though Swinburne does not necessarily always agree with them wholeheartedly. As with
his treatment of all his favorite authors and artists, Swinburne's appropriations of Shelleyan ideas are
revaluative and imaginative in nature.
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Particularity is the key to emancipating art (and the artist) from its "commodity
character," meaning its supposed cultural and social use-value-i.e., to propose and
reinforce certain modes of conduct or uphold prevailing religious and moral principles.
Swinburne believes that, by avoiding universalization in his art, he heeds Baudelaire's
warning that "the aim of a work of art [ should] never be uti1ity or morality" because
"what is useful is ugly."30 He also seems to recognize the potential danger of avoiding all
universality and u�ility by emphasizing only the _particular, though. Adorno specifically
notes that the process of "[p]rogressive subjective differentiation, the heightening and
expansion of the sphere of aesthetic stimuli, [makes] these stimuli manipulable" by the
very status quo the differentiation is supposed to subvert (Theory 239); similarly,
Swinburne notes that Blake's readers tend to approach his work to force the
comprehension of"identity . . . [between] things which never can become identical," or
fully harmonized, universalized (Blake 99). Swinburne also claims that Blake stands
apart from other poets because, "where others dealt by inductive rule and law, Blake dealt
by assumptive preaching and intuition" by finding "form of his own for the body of [his]
thought" (Blake 149, italics mine). As discussed earlier, the body ofBlakean thought
here is virtual rather than material, thus apparently eliding the conventional reliance on
empiricist materiality. Yet the prerequisite dependence on subjectivity-the subject
position-problematizes this. The question of dominant ideology remains, as the status
quo always "offers [the] position for the subject" (Eagleton 2). This seems to suggest
that "Blake," and successively Swinburne, falls into the Romantic trap McGann terms

30

This is Anne Walder's translation of Baudelaire's statement "JI n y a de vraiment beau que ce qui ne peut
servir a rien ... . Tout ce qui est utile est laid" (IO).
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"The Consciousness Industry," in which the individual creates a self-revelatory aesthetic
ostensibly "free of cultural contamination," all the while refusing to see that such
freedom from "the ruins of history and culture" is all a "grand illusion" (Romantic 91).
However, I choose to read this as indicative of how Swinburne portends the decadent
dilemma as specified by Adorno, who points out that even
the most fleeting individual reactions [are] bound up with the reification of
these reactions . . . . [T]o this extent the watchword ! 'art pour / 'art was the
mask of its opposite. What is true in the uproar over decadence is that
subjective differentiation has an aspect of ego-weakness, an aspect shared
with the mentality of the culture industry's customers and something the
culture industry knew how to exploit. (Theory 239)
"Ego-weakness'' refers to how the individual, in all her/his rebellion against the status
quo, actually identifies �ith that which s/he tries to di�er her/himself from. In the
decadent's denunciative reaction to the status quo, s/he actually makes the status quo her/
his own, thus producing an illusion of autonomy and autodetermination. 3 1 Therefore, I
contend that Swinburne revaluates Romanticism, as well as the "decadence" of such
poets as Gautier and Baudelaire, to develop an aesthetic theory based on particularity and
subjectivity that will not be felled by, but instead productively contend with, the "ego
weakness" that threatens the very subjectivity on which the aesthetic depends.
I believe Swinburne finds the inspiration for this revaluation in Blake' s Book of
The/, although, like all his discussions of the Prophetic Books, Swinburne's reading of
The/ relies heavily on his earlier readings of Blake's other works. Swinburne interprets
31

See Borch-Jacobsen 3 1 .
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The/, via the lens of"The Everl�sting Gospel," as a metaphor for how British

Romanticism formulated a response to the underlying dominant ideology which anchors
the Roma�tic subject-position by exploiting the anxiety that ideology creates and then
conceals. Blake scholar Heather Glen describes this as an anxiety that can only be
"marked" by a prophet or artist: the potential for "disclosing the hidden logic of a whole
society in a way which transcends rational analysis, creating something which becomes
independent of--and capable of questioning . . . anything its creator may consciously
have intended" (95). Glen's definition of the artist recalls Shelley's definition of the poet
and his/her function as well as corresponds to Swinburne' s reticence to admit full
awareness of the effects art may have on "the material face of things." More importantly,
though, this is the "secret" of aesthetic creation .revealed: that the individual's role, even
in an aesthetic that relies ·on subjective particularity, must be understood as limited. The
artist must acknowledge that the artwork, because it must surpass the artist's intentions
and assume an autonomous existence beyond the artist's reach, contains an element that
"remains alien" to him/her; that art maintains the penumbra of otherness "that the subject
can never fully participate in . . . and still retain the sense of self' (Nicholsen 1 75).
Likewise, in the "confusion, clamour, the jar of words that half suffice and thoughts that
half exist" presented and evoked in art (Swinburne; Blake 1 85), there will always be
something that "remains alien" to the reader, even in the process of reading
constellatively. A limited creator-a limited subject-could ensure that "ego-weakness"
does not become as important a factor when the artwork achieves autonomy from the
creator's conscious intentions.
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,
This is part and parcel to Swinburne s shocking suggestion, mentioned earlier,

that the ultimate creator should be castrated. "Playing Prometheus," says Swinburne, the
poet "bring[s] from extreme heaven the immediate fire in the hollow of his reed or pen"
.
(Blake 149)--in other words, stealing the phallic symbol of creative power. Moreover,
the gods created fire for their pleasure; Prometheus separated the gods from their
creation. Thus Swinburne applies the image of castrating God to suggest the separation
of artist/subject from the artwork that Swinburne claims is essential. Interestingly,
Swinburne correlates .the castration of God with the crucifixion, as he claims such "death
or sacrifice" represents "not merely . . . the redemption of man," but "the union of divine
crucified man with the creative governing power' that paradoxically only transpires in
. the loss of power, control, and stability (Blake 1 56). The crucif xion, the sacrifice, itself
i

is a symbolic gesture or symbolic creation, like a work of art itself. One is not redeemed
by any kind of actual transcendence or achievement of unity. Rather, this is the
confrontation of the subject with that which remains "alien" to her/him, the subject
realizing what s/he is capable of creating and what the creative power cannot attain,
simultaneously. In this case, the confrontation is realized by the subject's encounter with
the crucified body, which is ostensibly available to the subject through the ritual Christian
sacrifice but never actually, practically attainable or tangible. Art is capable of this
paradox because, as Adorno would .say, "as the negation of practical life, it is itself
praxis" (Theory 24 1 ). Swinburne presents us with an anxious praxis between the
"rational society" that initiates the irrational when it sanctions redemption of"the bodily
man" by sacrificing the body itself-exposing the material, rational body as virtual and
thus irrational.
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Swinburne sees the character of Thel as a site of such praxis. Whereas "To
Tirzah" demonstrates a "vision of t�e creator divided against his own creation"
(Swinburne, Blake 1 50), The/ utiliz�s that vision to generate praxis between creator and
autonomous creation. In Blake's poem, Thel discovers that
[t]he secret of creation is sacrifice; the very act of growth is a sacrament:
and through this eternal generation in which one life is given for another
· and shed into new veins of existence, each thing is redeemed from
perpetual death by perpetual change. This secret once made evident to
Thel, her fear is in a measure removed . . . . (Blake 20 I )
Thel's contradictory relationship to "Mother Nature" is central to the poem. In sum, Thel
moves from fearing death as an end to accepting death as a new beginning. Thel fears
death because it represents a return to the nature she is estranged from: " . . . therefore did I
weep, I And I complained in the mild air, because I fade away, / And lay me down in thy
cold bed, and leave my shining lot" (The/ III: 1 1 - 1 3). However, when "the matron Clay"
bids Thel to "enter [her] house" (The/ III: 1 4- 1 6), Thel seems to go willingly. This, says
Swinburne, represents how "[t]he forces of material nature," even under the yoke of
human domination, can "give way" to the immaterial (Blake 20 I). Swinburne does not
specifically discuss the problems inherent this rather drastic turn of events (Thel' s fear of
death and nature giving way to acceptance) coming too quickly; nor does he discuss the
reversal of this acceptance which occurs in the following· chapter of the poem, in which
Thel flees "Mother Nature"-except to say that Thel experiences "affright" at "the
sudden nakedness of natural -life," the "great questions of physical life" (Blake 20 1 -02).
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Thus, at first, Swinburne _seems to provide a resolution for Blake's poem and the

character of Thel that Blake's poem itself does not provide. What Swinburne calls Thel's
"affiight" is actually Thel' s inability to resolve the conflict between fear and acceptance,
dominated versus unadulterated nature. The poem may be "an inspired exposition of
material things" demonstrating how "the strong imagination . . . wrestles with the great
questions of physical life in hopes that "perchance it will yield up the heart of its
mystery" (Swinburne, Blake 202), but also how the "perchance" fulfillment of that hope
never really ·occurs. Despite the many words offered by both Blake and Swinburne, still
"no word spoken upon earth or under could explain the marvel of the flesh," or offer
fulfillment in "the infinite beauty and delight of it, the infinite subtlety and danger; its
prodigalities and powers" (Blake 20 1 ). This is the foundation of the all-important proviso
of artifice central to Swinburne's aesthetic. True to the Swinburnian "lust of paradox,"
artifice here is the means by which, in order to preserve the self and/or the subject
position so aesthetically crucial, one goes to great lengths to lose it. 32 Thel demonstrates
how human "estrangement from nature . . . is realized in the process of the abandonment
to nature" (Horkheimer and Adorno 48) that she accomplishes in her inability to
surrender herself to "the matron Clay." Since she not only makes herself an artificial
sacrifice to the "matron Clay" but also runs back to the vales of Har, Thel does �ot really
sacrifice herself to. nature; consequently, "the secret of creation" is artificial sacrifice.
That being said, we cannot accept the aesthetic rapport between sacrifice and
artifice without considering its deceitful quality more fully. According to Horkheimer
and Adorno, sacrifice is "the magical pattern of rational exchange, a device of men by
32

See Horkheimer and Adorno 48-49.
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which the gods"-or, -in our specific case here, natur�"may be mastered: the gods are
overthrown by the very . system by which they are honored" (49). By this token, one
could read Thel's sacrific� as yet another event in which reason has dominated nature.
Swinburne conspicuously fails to comment on the poem's ending, in which The) seems
overwhelmed by the "forces of material nature," and her senses are still constrained by
reason. The) encounters several small but significant barriers preventing her from fully
embracing the sensuous consciousness that would allow her to perceive the "exquisite
desire of just and perfect work." Rather than sensing "the secrets of the land unknown"
(The/ IV:2) that Mother Nature offers her in death, The) deductively tries to rationalize
what the symbolic landscape surrounding her "means." She thinks she hears warnings of
her own demise, interprets the glances of others towards her as murderous, and finally
assumes herself as the victim in an impending rape scene (The/ IV: 1 1-20).33 At the
poein's end, "The Virgin started from her seat, & with a shriek / Fled back unhinderd
[sic] till she came into the vales of Har," the place she was before she accepted Mother

Nature's invitation (The/ IV:21 -22). Thel, Swinburne's proclaimed aesthetic exemplar, is
thus left in a "no-progress" state in which fulfi11ment cannot take place, in which her
sacrifice "implies recollection of something that was not a primal component of the
individual but originated instead in the history of domination" itself (Horkheimer and
Adorno 5 1 ). In her attempt to circumvent domination, The) becomes complicit in it.

33

Specifically, in Chapter IV; line 20, Thel asks, "Why a little curtain of flesh on the bed of our desire?",
intimating tl1at her long-protected virginity is in jeopardy. 111el. though in nature's realm, still clings to the
manmade dictwns prohibiting sexual activity and sexual pleasure, especially for women; consequently,
The) interprets all sexual contact between 111c:111 and woman as tl1e dominating man forcing the act upon the
dominated woman (i.e., rape). 11lis. again, reinforces the "always already dominated" status of nature.
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If Swinburne had discussed Thel'·s breakdown thoroughly, he would have had to
contend more explicitly with the "decadent" ego.weakness it insinuates.. Swinburne is
relatively dismissive of The/ 's final chapter because in this chapter Blake disappoints
him, as Blake arguably fails here to deal effectively and aesthetically with the "trickery
which elevates the frail individual to the status of vehicle of divine substance, [which]
has always been apparent in the ego" (Horkheimer and Adorno 5 1 ). In other words,
Blake reveals the trickery ·but does not use the trickery to any aesthetic advantage. The
closest Swinburne comes to admitting The/' s basic problem is in the conclusion to his
discussion of the poem:
Throughout this book his extreme andfeminine tenderness of faith speaks
more softly and shows a simpler face than elsewhere. One might almost
say that The/ had overmuch of this gracious and delicate beauty; that the
intense faith and compassion which thus animate all matter gives a touch
of almost dubious and effeminate sweetness to the thought and style. (202,
emphases mine)
Swinburne' s repeated emphasis on the "femininity" of Blake's poem presents an implicit
recognition that not only did Blake fail to live up to his own agenda of transgressing
"mere ' sexual ' shells," but also that Thel' s particularity is inevitably elided by the
ideological universals of "femininity" Blake ·himself found problematic. Swinburne' s use
of sexist language here is problematic, too-but I believe it. is purposefully problematic,
suggesting that the poem leads one to read it in divisive ways to indicate more deeply the
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failure to transgress the status quo.34 Furthermore, any autonomy or auto-determination
that Thel achieves here is also artificial. On the surface, it may look like her decision to
return to Har is made autonomously, but" does she really have a choice? The "lal)d
unknown," that which is other than the status quo, is not accessible to her. Her return to
Har further establishes her assumption into the status quo, rendering the substantiality of
Thel' s subject-position ou�side of dominant ideology, in a virtual space that is neither Har
nor other-than-Har, "but a semblance and an illusion" (Horkheimer and Adorno 51 ).
Considering the problems presented in the final chapter of The/, then, 'it almost
seems incongruous that Swinburne duly claims Thel as the emblem of the artist clued into
the "secret of creation." It is important to note that Swinburne tempers his criticism of
Blake, quoted above, by recanting that such criticism perhaps is not "justly" proffered,
since "there is a.firm hod)' of significance i_n the poem" (202, italics mine). I believe that
this, too, is just as much a play on the subtext of the given language as the previously
quoted sentences, especially considering that Blake's poem, for all its celebration of
nature's "material forces," is not populated with "firm bodies" at all, but the semblances
of material bodies. Thel herself is described an apparition without substance; introduced
in the second stanza of the poem's first chapter,
. .. Thel is like a watry [sic] bow. and like a parting cloud.
Like a reflection in a glass. like shadows in the water.
34

Notably, Swinburne does not utilize the same sexist language when discussing the other female
characters in Blake's texts. For instance, he derides Bromio� from The Daughters ofAlbion, for
subjugating Oothoo� "born for rebellion and freedom" (Blake 229). Furthennore, be compares Bromion's
defiling of Oothoon to the way women generally are defiled by men in society: "That is, woman has
become subject to oppression of customs; suffers violence at the hands of marriage laws and other such
condemnable things . . . . [E]rror, fear, submission to custom in law, is that which 'defiles' a womann (Blake
230nl).
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Like dreams of infants. like a smile upon an infants face.
Like the doves voice, like transient day, like music in the air.
(Blake, Thel I: 8- 1 1 )
Thel is always "like" something that cannot b e substantively represented. Thus, twice
removed from the material world, Thel is a mise en abyme of abstraction, a reflection of
already-reflected concepts which, to begin with, d� not even have physical or concrete
qualities that could easily cast a reflection.
Moreover, even the exquisitely detailed descriptions of the physicality of the
"body'' of nature·throughout the poem give way to the ephemera Thel discovers nature
really is. As a result, the "firm body of significance in the poem" is significant because it
is an artifice offering "firm" representation of what is actually abstract. "The secret of
artistic creation" Thel offers ·is that art is illusion qua illusion, virtuality at its utmost.
Thel represents aesthetic artifice, or "[t]he transformation of sacrifice into subjectivity
[that] occurs under the sign of the artifice that was already a feature of sacrifice"
(Horkheimer and Adorno 56). The sacrifice, as we have seen, was always artificial . Thel
did not give her life for another or "shed [herself] into new veins of existence"; Thel went
through the motions of death without really surrendering herself to it (Swinburne, Blake
20 1 ). Rather, Thel' s sacrificial ritual was an assertion of her own selfbood, position
herself as other than the "beauty of the vales of Har" in which "we live not for ourselves"
(Blake, Thel III: 1 0). And _deceit is always already part of the position of subjectivity in
the aesthetic (Horkheimer and Adorno 56).
Ideology always offers the position for the subject; however, i� Swinburne's
Blakean aesthetic, the subject illusorily positions herself outside of ideology-all the
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while knowing the position is artificial: Swinburne even notes that conventional ideology
is still " constraining the mute rebellious flesh" (Blake 202). But, despite that constraint,
the artist/subject manages to create a virtual, anomalous aesthetic space within an actual,
normative space, and it is the art_ist-subject's very consciousness of the virtuality, the
artifice, of that space that prevents his/her act of separation from being completely
subsumed into the fold of the norm. The) must be understood as knowing her sacrifice is
as artificial as the dominated nature to whom she "sacrifices" herself; as already
understanding herself, on some level, as a virtual body making a virtual sacrifice which is
deceitfully presented as an actual exchange. Consequently, I feel Swinburne glosses over
the final chapter of Blake's The/ because it does not fit this paradigm. Swinburne
suggests that Blake should never have presented Thel's return to Har because she never
really left it. Thel's death-her sacrifice-is virtual; it is symbolic, not actual. Nature,
always already dominated, cannot allow for an escape from the status quo because nature
has been made into a pawn of the status quo. Blake's "matron Clay" is the norm, not the
exception, but Thel makes her serve as the virtual, anomalous space that locates the
conscious illusion of exception. Because Swinburne recognizes Blake's poem is "an
inspired exposition of material things'; in tension with the abstractions of "spirit" (Blake
202), his analysis of The Book of The/ reveals his supposition that the poem's aesthetic
"truth" is finalized in Chapter III with the deliberately artificial resolution that refuses to
resolve the poem's tension, making Chapter IV an unnecessary and undesirable ending to
the poem.
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· CHAPTER THREE
Swinburne Remediating Blake:
Imagination, Perception, and Transforming Ego-Weakness

"[C]onsciousness of limits drives Swinburne to haunt boundary lines. His verse was
remarkably rich in boundaries-in images, poeticforms, andprosodic devices which can
suggest a point of limits. " -Jerome McGann
"The speaking gesture of almost every line ... is not so much the gesture ofa person
speaking but rather, in its intention, the epiphany oflanguage. " -Theodor Adorno
"[/ amJ the voice of one crying in the wilderness, Prepare ye the way of the Blake .... "
-Algernon Charles Swinburne

As Swinburne establishes in his reading of The/, the artist aware of the secret of
creation is also aware of his/her own virtuality, the artifice that serves as one's subject
position, and accordingly, the limitations of the aesthetic subject and his/her subject
position. Swinburne, for all his great admiration of and respect for the poetry of Shelley,
. does not exactly share Shelley's belief that the imaginative production of poetry is "the
creation of actions according to the unchanging fonns of human nature, as existing in the
mind of the Creator''-an expansive, unlimited mind responsible for "the act of primal
creation" which all other mind share in and thus repeat (qtd. in Abrams 282). For that
reason, Swinburne wants to refigure Romanticism through his reading of Blake, and
present Blake as achieving an ironic distance from the Romanticized ego contemplatus; 1

1

In chapter four of the Biographia, Coleridge refers to the ego contemplatus as the "personal identity under
the fonn in which [the mind] imagined itself previously to have existed," signified with the use of personal
pronouns such as "I" and "me" (468-69n I). In many Romantic poems, the contemplative "I" establishes its
identity imaginatively in symbiotic relationship to a kind of immanent "trace memory" of prelapsarian
nature. Perceiving Blake's Romanticism as much more· subversive, Swinburne believes that the speaking
subjects in Blake's poem-anxiously and virtually situated "I"� wants to demonstrate the impossibility
of that relationship.
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though this irony, as Anne Mel1or points out, this irony is itself a Romantic gesture.
Blake,
[h]aving ironically acknowledged the fictiveness of his own patternings of
human experience, . . . engages in the creative process of life by eagerly
constructing new forms, new myths. And these new fictions and self
concepts bear with them the seeds of their own destruction . . . . The
resultant artistic mode that alone can properly be called romantic irony
must therefore be a form or structure that simultaneously creates and de
creates itself. (Mellor 5)
This irony allows Blake, and consequently Swinburne, to "deconstruct the mystifications
of self' (Mel1or 5), or the ego-weakness which threatens any aesthetic highly dependent
on subjective particularity. Rather than projecting an ego with the mythic, omnipotent
creative power of God-in which a particular subjective differentiation, a "fleeting
individual reaction" accompanying the formation of aesthetic constellatives (Adorno,
Theory 239), masquerades as a universal, touchstone aesthetic principle-Swinburne
wants to demonstrate more accurately how the artist, "contriv[ing] to divert and infuse
this overflowing fervour of mind," often destabilizes the very work, the very process of
creation, into which s/he ·funnels her/his "fervour" (Swinburne, Blake 85). Myth, like
"[f]antastic art, . . . presents something nonexistent as existing," and produces the illusory
"presentation of the nonempirical as if it were empirical" (Adorno, Theory 1 9), but myth
does not acknowledge its fictive properties. Swinburne finds in Blake' s Prophetic Books
a new mythology which represents the fictive properties of myth itself. Consequently, he
embarks on a mission of exploiting the instabilities of myth to explicate the critical
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tension incarnate in the artifice that paradoxically determines and threatens the Romantic
subject position.
To do this, Swinburne revaluates what he calls the "old'' aesthetic "war . . . not
between facts and fancies, reason and romance, poetry and good sense, but simply
between the imagination which apprehends the spirit of a thing and the understanding
which dissects the body of a fact-this strife which can never be decided or ended"
(Blake 91). This is more than a dismissal of fact and reason from the equation in favor of
.,

spirit and imagination, though. Swinburne also takes on the Coleridgean opposition
between imagination and fancy. He does rely on Coleridge's dismissal of the "fixities
and definites" of fancy, since such "fixities and definites" too much resemble the end
results of dissective reason, as well as the recognition that the esemplastic power of the
imagination "dissolves, diffuses, dissipates in order to re-create" (Coleridge 5 1 6).
However, unlike the Coleridgean version, the Swinburnian imagination does not
"struggl[e] to idealize and to unify" (Coleridge 5 1 6). Swinburne's work shows how that
idealization and unification merely obfuscates the tension, or effective dissonance,
fundamental to this aesthetic dedicated to enacting the necessary encounter with the
"clamorous kingdoms of speech and dream" where the "ruling forces of supreme discord
preside" (Swinburne, Blake 1 91 ).
In these clamorous, dissonant myths, there are no fixed or definite principles, nor
are there struggles for idealization and unification that are not already acknowledged as
artifice. The old aesthetic war, says Swinburne, pits imagination against reason, all the
while misrecognizing the parties in conflict. The aesthetic conflict is re�dly b�tween
imagination and understanding, as the very heart of the aesthetic is the contentious
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traversal of conventional understanding (mimesis, even)-the identification of a given
object or concept with another, socially established object or concept.

As

Swinburne

himself acknowledges, one must, like Bla�e, have "the sense to see that the one thing
utterly futile to attempt [is] a reconciliation between the two sides of life and thought
which have no community of work or aim imaginable" (Blake 97). In other words, one
cannot and should not attempt to forge a relationship between conventional (or
ideologically-driven) understanding and aesthetic imagination, since the "[a]esthetic . . .
does not consist in establishing relationships between signifying elements, but in the
reenactment of the process" by which they are momentarily, constellatively
"interconnected in such a way as to gain meaning" (Menke 49); but this is "meaning" is
an "immediate expression," a "nonidentifying cognition" in which the imagination does
not process information by relating it to already-established concepts (Gebauer and Wulf
285-86). The momentary, constellative process of the aesthetic imagination creates a
myth of ego strength and stability, a myth in which the phenomenal representation of the
belief in the noumenal appears possible. This myth functions only to reveal its own
transience and subsequently its own failure to explicate truly the "patterns of human
experience."
Swinburne gestures back to Blake's Songs ofInnocence and Experience to
establish the function of the myths of aesthetic understanding in the Prophetic Books.
These poems evidence the aesthetic issue at hand: "Experience must do the work of
innocence as soon as conscience begins to take the place of instinct, reflection of
perception; but the moment experience begins upon this work, men raise against her the
conventional clamour of envy and stupidity" (Swinburne, Blake 124). "Experience" here,
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or ideology, is the mimetic catalyst forcing the individual subject to become "an
expression of difference in relation to nature" (Gebauer and Wulf 282). The subject, who
experiences his/her surroundings reflected via experience instead of via unmediated
perception, thus becomes subject to a profound loss of immediacy. The Songs of
Innocence are best sung by the "Infant Joy," who is "but two days old" and thus unaware
of his inevitable transformation into "The School Boy" of the Songs ofExperience whose
indoctrination into experience "drives all joy away."2 In Innocence, Blake presents
personas "who have or who deserve the gift of spiritual sight," whereas the personas in
Experience find only "what things there are for them to see" (Swinburne, Blake 1 16, ·
italics mine). The Songs ofExperience thus serve as bleak illustrations of the
predominantly material existence one has when that "spiritual" immediacy is lost. Blake
himself even remarks that the "Dress" of the individual who has lost that immediacy "is
forged lron."3 It is as if the power of the imagination dissipates in experience, leaving the
subject to resort to mere fancy with which to contemplate the fixed and definite
properties of the things s/he sees.
Nonetheless, considering S�inburne was aware that Coleridge himself declared
that such fancy "is indeed no other than a mode of Memory emancipated from the order
of time and space" (Coleridge 5 1 6), or dominant ideology, Swinburne seems to read the
Songs ofExperience to find the trace memory of spiritual innocence in the fixities of
materialism. Such a trace memory, what Horkheimer and Adorno call the "remembrance
of nature," meaning an unadulterated, unsubjected nature, "in whose fulfillment the

2
3

See William Blake, "Infant Joy," lines 1-6 and "The School Boy," lines 6-10.
This is from l�e 5 of"A Divine Image." See Complete Poetry and Prose 800.
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unacknowledged truth of culture lies hidden" (40), is also mythic in that it is artifice. It is
an idea of a pre-mimetic perception in which imagination exists in its purest form, before
it was differentiated into dichotomies, i.e., imagination vs. fancy, spirit vs. form. 4 This
goes "[a]gainst aH articulate authority" (Swinburne, Blake 1 1 5). Speaking .
metaphorica1ly of this purest imagination, Swinburne says, "If the 'Songs oflnnocence'
have the shape and smell of leaves or buds," then the Songs ofExperience "have in them
the light and sound of fire or the sea" (Blake 1 1 6). And "a fresher savour and a larger
breath strikes one" who "enters" the Songs ofExperience, having intuited "the gift of
spiritual sight," or innocence, to see "what things there are . . . to see when that gift [of
innocence] has been given" (Blake 1 1 6). This virtual trace memory of "[i]nnocence, the
quality of beasts and children, has the keenest eyes; and such eyes alone can discern and
interpret the actual mysteries of experience" (Blake 1 1 6). The myth of innocence
becomes the site where the individual positions her/himself to enact the illusion of
revaluating experience as if s/he has regained her/his lost sense of immediacy. In other
words, what s/he recalls in her/his reversion to myth is itself a mythic gesture
(Horkheimer and Adorno 70), and thus another model of the use of aesthetic artifice.
Swinburne tests this model in his reading of "The Crystal Cabinet," calling the
poem "an example of the somewhat jarring and confused mixture" of artificial, mythic
perception and "actual 'vision "' {1 75).
The 'cabinet' is either passionate or poetic vision-a spiritual gift, which
may soon and easily become a spiritual bondage. . . . [H]is prison built by
his love or his art, with a view open beyond of exquisite limited
4 My reading here is based on Horkheimer and Adomo's discussion of mana (39-42).
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loveliness, soft quiet and light of dew and moon, and a whole fresh world
to rest in or look into, but intangible and simply reflective; until you try at
too much and attempt to turn spiritual to physical reality-'to seize the
inmost form' with 'hands of flame' . . . to translate eternal existence into
temporal . . . ; when at once the whole framework . . . breaks up and leaves
you stranded or cast out, feeble and sightless . . . . (Swinburne, Blake 17576)
Swinburne seems to read this poem as a reinforcement of the particularly artificial quality
of aesthetic vision. The subtext here could be paraphrased accordingly: "If you do not
recognize your aesthetic subject position as artifice, you will be�ome imprisoned in an art
that is nothing but a solipsistic prison." Particularly notable is Swinburne's emphasis on
the limited nature of Blake's "poetic vision." This sight is guided-illuminated-only by
light that is always already reflected: the moon reflects second-hand light from the sun,
and the dew is a reflective surface that reflects the already doubly-reflected light from the
moon. This is the same mise en abyme signified by Thel, with the same result: the
significance of art is that it is illusion qua illusion. To accept the illusory vision as real is
�ramatically to increase one's compulsory obligation to the "iron dress" of human
experience, or the mimetic "bondage" purportedly eluded via art. If one does not fully
acknowledge that the artifice of perceptual immediacy must always fail to actually
(materially) be realized, then one is perpetually imprisoned in the same kind of "deep
romantic chasm" 5 of ego-weakness as Coleridge's Kubla Khan.

5 "Kubla Khan," lines 13-14.
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The intrusion of"actual 'vision "' into the "deep romantic chasm" is best
illustrated in the third stanza of Blake's poem, in which the speaker looks into the cabinet
of art and reports,
Another England there I saw
Another London with its Tower
Another Thames & other Hills
And another pleasant Surrey Bower. . . . ("Cabinet" 5-8)
Blake very carefully uses the pronoun "f' to signify the very subjectivity of the speaker's
perception (as it would be quite a different poem if the contents of the cabinet were
reported in a more objective manner, i.e., "There was another England there . . . ") and
Swinburne was very aware of this. Swinburne's reading of"The Crystal Cabinet" seems
informed, to some extent, by nineteenth-century theories concerning the relationship
between vision and subjectivity as explored by such major thinkers as Goethe and
Schopenhauer.6 As Jonathan Crary explains in Techniques of the Observer,
Schopenhauer "repeatedly demonstrated how 'what occurs within the brain, ' within the
subject, is wrongly apprehended as occurring outside the brain in the world" (75).
Schopenhauer's discoveries were related to Goethe's experiments concerning the
visualization of color; Goethe was particularly interested that one can still "see" color
even when one's eyes are closed. This observed "stain" of color left on the retina, even
when the retina no longer directly reflects the images of the outside world, suggests that
6

Swinburne's letters indicate he had an interest in the works of Schopenhauer; see especially volume 2, p.
300 and volume 3, p. 166, of the collected Letters. References to Goethe are not as common; however, in a
letter Swinburne wrote to Lady Trevelyan, dated 15 Mar. 1 865, he mentions having read George Henry
Lewes's Life ofGoethe (London: Routledge, 1 864) and subsequently attempting to apply Goethe's ideas to
his reading of poetry (Letters 1 : 1 15-17).
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vision has some particularly subjective conditions. In turn, Swinburne' s treatment of
vision in his aesthetic shares some similarities to these nineteenth-century studies of the
subjectivity of vision. Swinburne establishes an aesthetic vision that dispenses with
and/or radically overtakes the mimetic element of art, only in the very end to reinforce
the inescapability of mimesis. Even if one refuses to recognize (or closes one' s eyes to)
the reflection as such, the reflective element still stains one's attempt at refusal. After all,
the alternate England that the speaking poet of Blake's "Crystal Cabinet" sees is actually
the reflected image of reality, or the status quo, that still haunts or "stains" any and all
efforts to evade imaginatively that reality altogether.
The "threefold" nature of the cab1_net's contents7 further suggests tension between
aesthetic and "actual" vision. The Romantic artist of Blake's poem assumes a given
object exists independently of one's perception (that is, even when one is not looking at
it, it is still there), but he ascertains its supposedly objective, independent existence only
subjectively when its image is reflected upon the retina. Arguably, then, perception is
always "second-hand" because it depends on reflection. Then the artist uses his
imagination to reflect further upon the already-reflected image; in the "Preface to 1 8 1 5,"
Wordsworth describes this as the "operations of the mind upon objects" that serve to re
create and re-compose them (483). The Blakean-Swinburnian Romantic ironist, though,
.

.

breaks through this "conceptual enclosure, where [artistic] vision is still theorized from
the standpoint of a subject placed at the center of the world" (Bryson, "Gaze" 87).
Again, "Kub la Khan" is a good example of the poet whose mind is "naturally the mirror

7

"O what a smile a threefold Smile / Filled me that like a flame I burnd / I bent to kiss the lovely Maid /
And found a Threefold Kiss returnd" (lines 17-20).
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of the fairest and most interesting properties of nature" (Wordsworth 455): a mirror
which turns on itself in Swinburne's revaluation of Romanticism. Kubla Khan never
escapes his solipsistic "pleasure-dome."
Furthermore, although Coleridge portrays the artist-speaker of"Kubla Khan" as
able to perceive the inmost, eternal "form" that underlies externality and gives it
meaning, 8 it is imp�rtant that Coleridge presents that moment of pure, unadulterated
perception as a dream. Kubla Khan's supposed aesthetic prowess cannot be given in a
first-hand account. It is doubly reflected, as the speaker of Coleridge's poem recalls his
dream "vision" of Kubla Khan's "vision," thus casting doubt on the neo-Platonic belief
"that there exists a deeper, timeless order'' or absoluteform "behind the surface confusion
and randomness" of the temporal, material world (Tamas I I ). Blake's speaker " . . .
strove to sieze [sic] the inmost Form / With ardor fierce & hands of flame / But burst the
Crystal Cabinet" (lines 2 1 -23). H� realizes the inmost, absolute form ostensibly held in
the cabinet is a delusion. His cabinet must burst because artworks cannot completely seal
themselves off from the external world. The "inmost Form" is really an imaginative
reworking of the external, material form. Even though the work of art places any
elements borrowed from external, material reality into a "fully changed context"
(Adorno, Theory 5), the "stain" of reality that persists in the aesthetic realm presents the
poet with a limit experience. 9
As Swinburne himself notices, the speaker in Blake's poem "having had the
larger vision, . . . lost [his] hold of it by too great pressure of impatience or desire" (Blake
8

As suggested by the last two lines of the poe� in which the speaker imagines that he "on honey-dew hath
fed, I And drunk the milk of Paradise," and thus holds the key to higher, immanent aesthetic perception.
9
Adorno even relates these "immanent problems offonn" with a limit experience in which "(t]he moment
a limit is posited, it is overstepped and that against which the limit was established is absorbed" (Theory 6).
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176, emphasis mine). The poet cannot sustain the'"larger vision" of immanence since not
only is it artifice, but it is also unable to satisfy his desire for immanence. The cabinet,
the work of art, does not really, nor even adequately, signify any achievement of
immanence, as a desire for. such "cannot really have any object at all, if [such] desire is to
remain what it is: the pure negativity of a subject who desires himself in his objects"
(Borch-Jacobsen 199, italics in original). The aesthetic vision cannot represent anything
but the eventual failure to visualize what lies beyond the horizons of reality.
In this compelling account of"The Crystal Cabinet," Swinburne establishes the
outline of the mythos of the limit experience and aesthetic failure, then, that he sees more
overtly established in the Prophetic Books, specifically The First Book of Urizen, The
Book ofAhania, and Jerusalem. In the mythic "clamorous kingdoms of speech and
dream" (Swinburne, Blake 191) of the prophecies, more than in the lyrical poems,
Swinburne relishes finding "more overflow of lyrical invention, [and] more of the divine
babble which sometimes takes the place of earthly speech or sense" (Blake 1 95). For in
his study of the Prophetic Books, unlike his study ofBlake' s other poems, Swinburne
finds clearer examples of how the practice of aesthetic artifice becomes a conscious play
of and with the particularities of language itself. David Riede has already established
that Swinburne reads the Blakean canon as "the inevitable result of a radical division in
society between two perpetually conflicting cultures: the analytic, scientific culture of
Urizenic . . . repression and the imaginative, artistic culture of creative freedom" (Study
1 6). However, I want to push Riede's thesis further to suggest that Swinburne reads the
Blakean canon as radical division within language, not' only a division between language
as it is used socially and as it is used aesthetically, but also as language is used in
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aesthetic practice: a division between Janguage that builds mythic forms and practices
and language that is "in contradistinction to mythic song," stained with "the possibility of
retaining in the memory the disaster that has occurred" (Horkheimer and Adorno 78)--in
sum, what Adorno, in Aesthetic Theory, calls the "catastrophe of meaning" (22).
Swinburne had learned from reading Baudelaire that the displacement of
established Romantic conventions in favor of abstraction and indeterminateness allows a
given symbol or image in an artwork to function as a "cipher" signifying the "aesthetic
distancing" from reality that the "traditional fantasy" of the Romantic ego contemplatus
"no longer achieves" (Adorno, Theory 20-2 1). Swinburne compares the power of
Baudelaire's art, a "murmur of revelation" in which the poet subtly suggests imaginings
which cannot be overtly stated, thus knowing "at once the limit and the licence of his art"
(Blake 9lnl), to Blake's, noticing that both poets use an ideogrammatic kind of visual

imagery in their verbal works. For Swinburne, this ideogram or cipher functions "not as
a pictorial likeness or impression, but as a synchronic structure in some metaphorical" or
aesthetic "space-'that which' (in Pound's words) 'presents an intellectual and emotional
complex in an instant of time "' (Mitchell, Jcono/ogy 25). Swinburne's Blakean ideogram
is a synchronic structure in which one presumes to connect "earthly speech or sense" with
"divine babble." Swinburne seems to perceive "earthly speech or sense" similarly to how
Lacan, in "The Agency of the Letter," describes the effect of the great divide between
signifier and signified: because the signifier always lacks veracity, the given signifier
"carr[ies] a purely animal Dissension, destined for the usual oblivion of natural mists, to
the unbridled power of ideological warfare, ... a torment to the Gods" (Ecrits 1 52,
emphasis mine). What makes "sense," rationally, only does so in its distance and
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dissention from the immediacy of sensation; in other words, the "natural mists" of a
distinctly sensuous ("animal") consciousness are obliterated by a rationalist ideology in
the formation of conventional meaning. "Earthly speech" is always metaphorical, as it is
a substitution of sense for sensuality; it reduces sensuality and emotion to "a reducible
and amenable quality" (Swinburne, Blake 195). Thus it always contains the tension
between signifier and signified-the reducing signifier and the reduced signified
subjugated though this tension might be.
Swinburne portrays Blake as waging a crucial "ideological warfare" within
language by implementing intricate yet dense symbolic images that focus on this
underlying tension, introducing a dissonance that intentionally problematizes the
conventional methods of signification. The crucial element to this problematic is "divine
babble," the "non-sense" from which the "sense" made via metaphorical earthly speech
emerges (Lacan, Ecrits 158), embodied in Blake's tormented creator-god, Urizen. This
"non-sense," signifiable only by its very failure really to be acknowledged in earthly
speech, is like a primordial soup of significance. It is a condition of "meaning-full"
(im)possibility, a trace memory of complete, immediate "meaning" as it might have
existed prior to reason's dominance. The "catastrophe of meaning" mentioned earlier is
an important component of this trace memory. It is the imaginary event in which the
signifier's immediate access to an "undiminished plenitude" of available signified
"meanings" was irretrievably lost, in which literal speech gives way to mediating
metaphorical speech, and in which "appearance becomes abstract" (Adorno, Theory 22).
However, with any kind of disastrous, cataclysmic event such as this loss of immediacy
comes deluge, overflow, excess-in this case, that for which metaphorical "earthly
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speech" cannot account. The abstractions of metaphorical speech contain nonfigurative,
non-representational facets that subtly suggest that which exceeds the metaphor, that
which the metaphor elides: "the floating final impression of power', of possibilities that
will always remain "formless" (Swinburne, Blake 252). Through the ideogrammic visual
image, Swinburne hopes to recover the abstractions so that art can communicate the
possibilities of that unfigurable excess, and he hopes Blake' s works provide an adequate
prototype for that recovery.
Even Swinbur:ne is at first skeptical about the feasibility of this plan. Upon an
initial reading of The Book of Urizen, Swinburne remarks the poem is "more shapeless
and chaotic . . . than any other of these prose poems," as it is full of"[c]louds ofblood,
shadows of horror, worlds without form and void, [that] rise and mingle and wane in
indefinite ways, with no special purpose or appreciable result" (Blake 248). However, I
think this is a statement more of praise than criticism. The very indefiniteness suggested
is the means of showing constellation: Urizen's world(s) is/are without unity, consisting
only as a multiplex of individualized moments in which patterns of temporary "meaning
making'' are established in order to facilitate engagement with those world(s), as there is
no definitive framework underlying the poem. They lack definite form because their
appearance is abstract, with no concrete, objective referents to give them a framework of
stability and support.
Swinburne describes Urizen as "warring with" the abstracted, amorphous "shapes
of the wilderness" he forms around him, attempting but failing to establish such a
framework because he is always "at variance" with those shapes (Blake 248-49).
Furthermore, Swinburne notes that Urizen' s "unprolific" failure is mirrored in the painful
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formation ofUrizen's physical form: the "twisted forms" of his bones, covered by flesh
more like "flames" which are themselves "tortured elemental shapes that plunge and
writhe and moan" (Blake 249-50). We, the readers, "recoil in fear" from the horrific
sight of"the dawn of human creation and division" (Blake 250). The "shadows of
horror" which haunt the poem are "phantasm[s] of a lost remote antiquity" (Horkheimer
and Adorno 78), or the trace memory of the immediacy of perception-what Swinburne,
borrowing from Blake's poem, calls the "all-flexible senses" (Blake 249)--supposedly
existing before the catastrophe of meaning. Adorno tells us, "In the image of catastrophe,
an image that is not a copy of the event but a cipher of its potential, the magical trace of
art's most distant pre-history reappears under a total spell, as if art wanted to prevent the
catastrophe by conjuring up its image" (Theory 33). The potential is limitless, although
the language in which it can be expressed is quite limited. So, an ideogrammatic
aesthetic trope or device allowing for multiple constellative perceptions is the closest
Blake/Swinburne can come to approximating the "eternal form" of potential. The end
result is always the same, though; the trace memory of the catastrophe of meaning is
always conjured. It serves as a reminder that no constellation will reveal the
"ungraspable, fugitive moment" in which "the Apocalypse of desire has already taken
place" (Borch-Jacobsen 1 1 6). The imaginary event of"meaning-full" immediacy that
would satisfy our desire is such a "distant pre-history" that, even in aesthetic space, "it is
we who, catastrophically, always come too late to receive it" (Borch-Jacobsen 1 1 6).
Swinburne himself remarks that Urizen is "at war with Time" (Blake 249), although
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Urizen himself invents the time (history) 10 that serves as the principle that mediates
perception.
At first, though, Blake presents Urizen as a dynamic, amorphous immediacy
carrying the promise of apocalypse in the first two chapters of the poem. But _even this
presentation is problematized since the catastrophe of meaning has always already taken
place, as evidenced in the poem's first stanza:
Lo, a shadow of horror is risen
In Etemityl Unknown, unprolificl
Self-closd, all-repelling: what Demon
Hath form'd this abominable void
This soul-shuddering vacuum?-Some said
"It is Urizen," But unknown, abstracted . . . . (Blake, Urizen I: 1-6)
Even in his primordial state, Urizen is already "abstracted." Furthermore, he is "self
closd," indicating that the immediacy of Eternity is an illusion, already mediated through
Urizen' s perception, that threatens to collapse on itself. Urizen, even before assuming a
bodily shape, is already subject to the "demand for manifestation" 1 1 of metaphoric,
earthly speech. This suggests· two things: first, that Blake pointedly demonstrates that
aesthetic language is metaphoric language that conveys the idea of a pre-abstracted
"Eternity'' (or eternal form) only by demonstrating the impossibility of conveying the
idea; secondly, that aesthetic language is metaphoric language interpreted negatively.
Aesthetic negativity "cannot be understood as the severing of all connections between
10 In Chapter IV[bJ� Urizen is "forging chains new & new / Numb'ring with links. hours� days & years"

(17-18).
n See Borch-Jacobsen 1 3 1.
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letter and [conventional] meaning"; consequently, aesthetic language can only be
interpreted negatively "vis-a-vis the meaning ascribed to it" by conventional modes of
interpretation "in its connection with this meaning" (Menke 23) as well as how this
meaning fails to "ring true." The negative interpretation requires "render[ing] visible the
'ex-timate,' [extimite] inherent decentrement of the field of signification" (Zizek,
Metastases 29). Swinburne realized that Urizen must be presented as a subject squarely
positioned in the field of conventional signification before the conventions can be
challenged and he can "manifes[t] himself in language" by negating that conventionally
comprehended "reality'' (Barch-Jacobsen 191 ). He also realized that Urizen' s
subjectification, described by Blake as Urizen becoming (realizing himself as) an
"abominable void," reveals the vacuum of his solipsism in which he must "confront the
nullity of [his] narcissistic pretensions" (Zizek, Lacan 64).
To arrive at this moment of revelation, though, one must first understand Urizenic
narcissism as resembling that which Marcuse. designates "primary narcissism," which
"engulfs the 'environment,' integrating the narcissistic ego with the objective world"
( 168). This is more than the kind of "autoeroticism" Swinburne conjures in his earlier
descriptions of the Sadean self-generative Nature. The cruelly creative impulses of
Sadean nature do not "denot[ e] a fundamental relatedness to reality" the way Urizen' s do.
Still, Urizen assumes a material body that fails to function as "the source and reservoir
for a new libidinal cathexis of the objective world-transforming this [material] world
into a new mode of being" (Marcuse 1 69). This is definitely a "new mode ofbeing,"
compared to Urizen's prior state of complete immanence and immediacy; �owever, this
is a negative, divisive transformation of"being."
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The significance of the Urizenic problem, says Swinburne, lies in the bifurcation
of"the material body of nature" (Blake 250)-an important observation that Swinburne
makes and yet does not fully elaborate. I believe Swinburne's text suggests we should
read this bifurcated material body of nature as not only the body Urizen fashions for
himself but also the body of a "mother nature," Enitharmon, who both is and is not
Urizen' s own creation. 12 Urizen creates the world "from his sorrows" (Swinburne, Blake
250), as a sacrificial gift of himself to himself, or the nature that must be," like Marcuse
would suggest, "'given' to the ego as somethin_g that had to be fought, conquered and
even violated" as part and parcel to "the precondition for self-preservation and self
development'' in and of the material world (1 10). Interestingly, feminized nature in the
world of Urizen does not carry the trace memory of a pre-dominated state. Unlike
Urizen, whose "pre-history" makes up the greater part of the poem, Enitharmon is
presented as born of domination, in the aftermath of Urizenic mediation, divided from
that "pre-history," ·since she functions as "the material body of nature," the already
dominated space which allows for positioning of the subject, or assertion of ego--in
Blake's words, "Man begetting his likeness / On his own divided image" (Urizen VI: 1 51 6).

This is also a "new mode of being" according to the Adomian definition of the
"new," in which "the knot is tied aesthetically" between the subject and the world around
him/her; "its concept . . . labors under its own abstractness" (Theory 2 1 ). The libidinal
cathexis-meaning the channeling of creative energy into a material object, or trying to

12 Enithannon's

physical fonn was not created by Urizen; she is a cipher of the Urizenic world actually
given physical fonn by Los, another of the "Eternals."
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embody the quality of an immanent, immaterial nothingness in a thing-is attempted in
the Urizenic world, though it fails to recognize or to harness human desire and its
potential fulfillment. The titanic figures of Urizen, says Swinburne, are "[s]trange semi
human figures," with as yet unrealized qualities "clad in somber or in fiery flesh" (Blake
25 1) that disallows any attainment of the fulfillment of desire. Rather than allowing for
such cathexis, such flesh will "allure and confuse the fancy" of the reader; as "[e]very
page vibrates with light and color" (Blake 25 1 ), the spectator/reader might mistake the
frenzied imagery as evidence of realized transcendence and fulfillment. As Swinburne's
treatment of The Book of Urizen illustrates, though, the end result must always be the
stalemating abstraction of metaphor. Therefore, Swinburne is more interested in the
creation and exploration of imagery in which the attempt to recognize and to harness that
desire, and ultimately, inevitably failing to do so, is meaningful in and of itself. In other
words, Swinburne wants to transform the very way we read the image(s) of the
catastrophe of meaning. Urizen exemplifies this transformation in The Book ofAhania,
which Swinburne considers "The Second Book of Urizen" (Blake 252). 13
The character ofFuzon in Ahania, the son ofUrizen "born of the fiery part of the
God of nature" (Swinburne, Blake 252), captures Swinburne's particular interest, as
Fuzon accomplishes the astonishing task of separating Urizen from his desire. Fuzon,

13

Swinburne justifies his comment: "It is worth observing that while some copies [of Urizen] are carefully
numbered throughout 'First Book,' in others the word 'First' is erased from every leaf: as in effect the
Second Book never was put forth under that title. Next year however the Book ofAhania came out" (Blake
25 1 -52). However, I feel it is worth noting that, in his commentary appended to the Complete Poetry and
Prose, Harold Bloom points out that althoughAhania generally "is treated as a mere continuation of The
Book of Urizen" because its "action carries on from Urizen, it is an altogether different kind of work"
(907). Swinburne obviously would disagree; and, ifhe ·could respond, Swinburne's answer would probably
suggest that Ahania provides a constellatively different perspective on the same issues of materiality, m�
and aesthetic metaphor introduced in Urizen, and even earlier in the Songs.
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one of the "children begotten on the material body of nature" (Blake 250), is presented as
a Moses figure at the end of The Book of Urizen, calling together "The remaining
children ofUrizen" and leading them away from "the pendulous earth" of their father
god's making (Blake, Urizen IX[2]: 20-2 1). The Fuzon-led exodus is an artificial attempt
to reclaim the immediacy Urizen forfeited on their behalf. The last line of Urizen
indicates that the children ofUrizen, dismayed by their awareness of being "bound down
I To earth by their narrowing perceptions" (Urizen IX: 46-47), are heading to "the salt

ocean rolled englob'd," a kind of pre-repressive (pre-Urizenic) narcissistic fluidity that
does not rely on ego-projection; 14 meaning, whereas the Urizenic world is one impelled
by the individual ego, this pre-Urizenic world would be compelled by an immanent,
collective ego. However, just as the Biblical Moses never emerges from his exodus into
the Promised Land, Fuzon never accesses the pre-Urizenic world. Urizen has already
made the differentiated and differentiating ego both the product of and condition for
Fuzon's (material) existence. Fuzon' s very awareness of being born into, and as a result
of, the lack of immediacy depends on Fuzon' s own ego functioning as "the synthetic unit
of apperception" (Horkheimer and Adorno 87) which apprehends and understands the
very concept of difference. In other words, Fuzon apperceives the material world in
terms of Otherness, and blames Urizen for the discomfort and feeling of "decentered
ness" Otherness brings.
In his distress, Fuzon seems to realize that the projecting ego "encounters in itself
something ' more than itself,' a strange body in its very center," or extimite (Zizek, Lacan
14

I think it may be of interest here to add that Marcuse refers·to this pre-repressive narcissism as an
of connection "with oneness with the universe," or a "limitless narcissism" of undivisive,
unmediated and wunediating selfhood (168-69, italics mine).
"oceanic feeling"
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169), and like the casting of"light to 'Egypt, "' Fuzon attempts to reveal that which
exceeds "the house of bondage and place of capitivity" formed by Urizen (Swinburne,
Blake 253). Thus Fuzon separates Urizen from his desire, that excessive part of the
Urizenic ego which is "more than itself," to try to make sense of difference. Swinburne's
Fuzon seems to manipulate his awareness of an ego-weakness in Urizen caused by
subjective differentiation. To Swinburne, The Book ofAhania demonstrates how the
constant differentiation involved in the making of the Urizenic world, complicates the
"creative myth" of Urizen-how "it grows, if not wilder in words, still mistier in build of
limb and shape of feature" (Swinburne, Blake 253). Moreover, Fuzon's death at the
hands of Urizen, demonstrating the "barren pain of unprofitable fruit and timeless burden
of desire" one can neither transcend nor fulfill (Blake 254), suggests a resignation to
differentiated desire.
Fuzon, then, is another image invoking the Urizenic catastrophe of meaning as
well as the resultant problems of aesthetic abstraction. He is '.'in revolt against his father"
as creator (Swinburne, Blake 252), seeking an autonomous existence in difference to the
Urizenic ego as well as to limit the creator's power. "Typify[ing] dimly the . . .
Promethean sacrifice" (Blake 253 ), Fuzon steals what the creator god has created for his
own pleasure: Desire. When Urizen's desire, Ahania, is separated from him, "Dire
shriek'd his invisible Lust / . . . He groand anguishd [sic] & called her Sin" and "Then hid
her in darkness in silence" (Blake, Ahania I: 30-35, 38) where any perception of
materiality is impossible. There, Ahania/Desire becomes "Unseen, unbodied, unknown"
(line 42): she is abstracted. As noted earlier, desire "cannot really have any object at all,
if [such] desire is to remain what it is: the pure negativity of a subject who desires
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himself in his objects"; this subject can only desire himself in objects "by perpetually
negating himself in them, by negating them as what he is not-a 'given object' . . . , a
thing 'in-itselr" (Barch-Jacobsen 199, italics in original). Urizen knows Ahania is his
"ex-timated" self, the "strange body" that is a projection of his own ego yet differentiated
from that ego. As Swinburne describes her, Ahania represents "the divine"-meaning
Urizen's-"desire . . . , translated on earth into sexual expression; the female side of the
creative power-mother of all things made" (Blake 255). As Urizen's desire-as-object
given to him, she resembles Enitharmon, the female embodiment of"nature" given to the
masculinized ego. Ahania does seem to serve as the "natural" woman "arous[ing] the
primitive anger of the . . . man who is required to revere her" (Horkheimer and Adorno
1 1 1) as well �s a "precondition for self-preservation" (Marcuse 1 1 0) on Urizen' s part, for
his reverence and sorrow for the separated Ahania 15 seemingly exhort him to kill Fuzon.
But, tellingly, the words Urizen utters when making the kill reveal the murderous act as a
performative fiat intended to affect ego-strength to counter the ego-weakness the
separation caused: Urizen declares, "I am God. said he, eldest of things !" (Blake, Ahania
II: 38). Declaring himself "God," Urizen projects an image of complete being-in
himse/f-an evocation of that comprehensive narcissistic fluidity mentioned above. 1 6

This declaration is of course a conscious artifice since Urizen, divided from Ahania,
knows he is not a complete being.

15 Following the agonizing separation, Urizen apprehends Ahania by "Kissing her and weeping over her'
(Ahania I: 35).
16 In a more Hegelian sense, this comprehensive fluidity could be described as being which is beyond
"abstract being, " or "precisely that simple fluid substance of pure movement within (the] self' (Hegel I 0607).
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Urizen is distressed by his own ego-weakness, and he seeks to achieve an illusory
unity of selfhood by eradicating Fuzon, the visible and thus opportune_ emblem of his
subjective differentiation. However, the differentiation very evidently lingers. Ahania
remains invisible throughout the poem, signifying Urizen's inability to reconcile himself
to the concept of being-for-an-other. 11 Swinburne observes that Ahania represents how
"the love of God, as it were, parted from God, [is] impotent therefore and a shadow"
(Blake 254). Urizen's love is very egocentric; he must see his love as a projection of his
self meant only to further the egocentricity of his contemplation of"his" material world.
Ahania is too much an estranged other, a "not-f' representing "the ' selr (the 'subject') of
desire [who] is not identical to himself," who is now "something other'' (Borch-Jacobsen
90). Urizen can only conceive his relationship to his own desire in an "I/Other''
format. 18 Concomitantly, Ahania is pure being-for-an-other. As suggested by her
lamentations at being unable to traverse the wide abyss separating her from Urizen and
thus being unable to physically consummate her (his) desire (Ahania V: 54-7 1), Ahania
has none of the aspirations of being-in-itself.
All of this suggests that the radical decentering of subjectivity initiated by Fuzon
creates a rapturous disunity in which the "dim and gre�t suggestions of something more
than our analytic ingenuities can well unravel" can be detected (Swinburne, Blake 254).
In the disharmony between Urizen and his desire, or what Zizek calls "the absolute
negativity ofl = r� (Metastases 43), when the "f' is exactly the sacrifice, loss,
expenditure of that which constitutes the "I." Those "suggestions of something more"17

A note on the psychoanalytic purpose for Ahania's invisibility: "Desire cannot even pose itself in front of
itself in order to (re)cognize itself in another itself (another 'self-consciousness't (Borch-Jacobsen 91-92).
18
As evidenced by chapter five of the poem, in which the speaking "I" is Urizen's Otherness, Ahania, very
much differentiated from tl1e speaking "I" of Urizen who issues the perfonnative fiat in chapter two.

97
in other words, the images in Blake's poems that attempt to iconize that which cannot
really be seen or comprehended-are the key to aesthetic negativity. The importance of
Swinburne's reading of the Book ofAhania, then, is that, more than in his reading of
Urizen, Swinburne distinguishes the possibilities for synaesthetic subjectivity, a "pouring

out [of] a succession of images as analogues or facets of a single subject or perception"
(McGann, Swinburne 73).
The very excess of this "pouring-out" process which stains the "murmurs of
revelation" (or "divine babble") rumbling at the boundaries of art's use of "earthly
speech" points us right back to the issue of the ideogrammatic representations of the
catastrophe of meaning and the limit experience. Swinburne felt he had to extend the
aesthetic praxis evidenced in The/, between the exploration of the illimitable possibilities
of the virtual subject and necessity of limiting the pre-eminence of the creating subject to
avoid "ego-weakness," to include the necessity of subjectively exceeding the
conventional boundaries of making and discerning meaning, 19 as evidenced in his
readings of Urizen and Ahania. That brought him to settle on Blake's Jerusalem as the
site for furthering such praxis. In the process, Swinburne again echoes his predecessors'
unenthusiastic criticism of the Prophetic Books, only to use their disparagement in a
negative way to imply high praise, saying,
Of that terrible 'emanation,' hitherto the main cornerstone of offence to all
students of Blake, what can be said within any decent limit? or where
shall any traveller find a rest for feet or eyes in that noisy, misty land? It
19 1rus, too, can be understood as a facet of the Adomian principle, initially presaged in Swinburne's
reading of The/, of art establishing praxis because it is "the negation of practical life" (Theory 241 ).
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were a mere frenzy of discipleship that would undertake by force ofwords
to make straight these cro9ked ways or compel things incoherent to
cohere. (Blake 280, emphases mine)

What Swinburne finds most exciting about Jerusalem is that it exceeds all the "decent
limits" of empirical experience as well as meaning-making a reader may typically bring
to a text.

Jerusalem affects the kind of limit experience instigated but not fully examined in
Ahania: what Pierre Blanchot describes as "the desire of a man who is without desire, . . .
pure absence wherein there is nevertheless fulfillment of being" (qtd. by Borch-Jacobsen,
7). Whereas in Ahania we see the frustrated dissatisfaction of the subject separated from
(and thus without) his desire, we do not see pure absence or fulfillment of being. Ahania
is invisible but very much present in the poem, not an absence or a void, and the
problematics of being prevent the realization of any kind of fulfillment of needs and
desires in the Urizenic world. The problematics of being are also the problematics of the
poetic language. Swinburne suggests that the very "force of words" that could render the
"divine babble" of Blake's Jerusalem into the "earthly speech" that would compel a
rational "understanding" of the poem's meaning would ultimately fail, as it would require
"frenzy"-exceeding the limits of scholarship, interpretation, study. The "force of
words" here, then, is the linguistic enforcement of the limit experience of frustrated

being, frustrated desire.
The frustrated desire represented by Urizen/Ahania is amplified in Jerusalem 's
"great qualities":
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[Its] certain real if rough and Jax power of dramatic insight and invention
shown even in the singular divisions of adverse symbol against symbol; in
such allegories as that which opposes the 'human imagination in which all
things exist'-do actually exist to all eternity-and the reflex fancy or
. belief which men . . . prefer to dwell in and ask comfort from. (Swinburne,
Blake 290)
The barrier between Urizen· and Ahania, "adverse symbol against symbo1," is the barrier
of metaphoric language, or the mediating barrier(s) separating creation, perception, and
interpretation. 20 It is particularly significant that Swinburne again evokes the Romantic
distinction between imagination and fancy here. Fancy's fixed, limited character
provides one with modes of interpretation (via an always-already mediated perception)
that offer conclusive order and definite "meaning," that always appear to compel the
incoherent to cohere. Furthermore, one may find comfort in the limits of"fixities and
definites" that fancy offers. The imagination can provide a virtuaJ (rather than "real")
way to surmount those limitations, but the surmounting has a very virtual quality to it, as
it is all a conscious pretense; an open acknow1edgment that any transcendence of
limitation the imagination offers is really an artificial transcendence is required here.
And the recognition of transcendence-as-artifice might cause even more discomfort and
dissatisfaction than the actual limits one feigns to transcend.
The recognition of artifice qua artifice might also bring one too uncomfortably
close to the catastrophe of meaning, and thus recognize all appearance as abstract.
However, as Swinburne's/Blake' s dueling, divisive symbols propose, fancy cannot
20

See Zizek, The Plague ofFantasies 35-36.
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remain a safe haven from instability and abstraction. Fancy still functions as a cipher of
that catastrophe. Even Coleridge noticed that fancy served as "a mode of Memory
emancipated from the order of time and space" (5 16), or that trace-memory of"pre
history'' of immediacy existing prior to the mediated material (or, in Blake's case, the
Urizenic) world. Fancy and imagination, though differentiated, are both crucial to
aesthetic insight and invention; in terms ofJerusalem, the tension between the utility of
fancy and the initiative of the imagination is necessary in the construction of the "myth of
this building of 'Golgonooza' (that is, we know, inspired art-by which salvation must
come)" (Swinburne, Blake 287).
Golgonooza is described in the last two plates21 of the fourth chapter of Jerusalem
as a "great City'' in "the Shadowy Generation" (Blake, Jerusalem IV: 55); as Swinburne
says, it is a "spiritual"-or immaterial-dream city "which is redemption and freedom
for all" (Blake 287), "shadowy" as the trace memory of the pre-Urizenic existence is
shadowy. In Blake's poem, this city harbors "Visionary forms" in "new Expanses,
creating exemplars of Memory and of lntellect / Creating Space, Creating Time
according to the wonders Divine / Of Human Imagination . . . " (Jerusalem IV: 28-33).
Swinburne compares this to "the latter chapters of Ezekiel, with their interminable
inexplicable structures and plans" (Blake 288). Amid the inexplicable plans for "the new
Jerusalem" given in the Old Testament Book of Ezekiel remains the promise of the
restoration of Israel to unity with the glory of God. 22 Swinburne reads Jerusalem,
though, not as an achievement of unity with the subjectively differentiated creator god,

21 Plates 98 and 99
See especially Ezekiel 28.24-26.

22

1 01
Urizen, but as the figurative site of"imaginative liberty" established on the margins of
Urizen's creation; it is an emanation of the trace "of [the] unfallen days" of an
undifferentiated world that haunts the Urizenic world, the revelation of "Tirzah"
exceeding "the perverted incarnation" she takes when reason has been substituted for
imaginative intuition (Blake 289-90). Furthermore, "the variation of Time & Space" vary
"according as the Organs of Perception vary," and Golgonoozan subjectivity is described
as "One Man reflecting each in each" (Jerusalem IV:· 3 8-40). Here, finally, Swinburne
reaches the zenith of aesthetic synaesthesia and its counterpart, synaesthetic subjectivity.
This is what lies· beyond "that 'mild heaven' of dreams and shadows where only the
reflected image of [men's] own hopes and errors can abide" and the "duplicity and
division, perple�ity and restraint" (Swinburne, Blake 290, 282) of differentiated
subjectivity.
One of the most pressing question Swinburne must answer, though, is how these
"Visionary forms" can actually be seen. Blake's constant reliance on the tropes of vision
and visuality in Jerusalem forces Swinburne to confront again the complicated
relationship between visuality and the act of perception, especially to consider that
"[b ]etween retina and world is inserted"-ideologically-"a screen of signs, a screen
consisting of all the multiple discourses on vision built into the social arena" (Bryson,
"Gaze" 92, italics in original). We must read the passages of Jerusalem with "equal
eyes," Swinburne says, to find them "'full of wisdom and perfect in beauty'" (Blake 297),
seemingly calling on the idea of stereoscopic vision. In "binocular parallax," the angle of
each eye differs even when each focuses on the same point in space; thus vision is
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established as "an operation of reconciJing disparity" (Crary, Techniques 1 19-20). 23
Moreover, nineteenth-century studies in optics suggested that the convergence or fusion
of images viewed stereoscopically "might not actually be secure" (Techniques 120); to
again quote from Jerusalem, "the Organs of Perception vary."
In the case of Swinburne's reading of Blake, the instability of stereoscopic or
binocular vision seems employed to find a way to differently employ this scree� which
filters out or at least obscures that which exceeds such discourses and that which does not
seem to fit conventions of and for comprehension (making "meaning").
This screen casts a shadow [ of death] . :. . For when we look through the
screen, what we see is caught up in a network that comes to us from the
outside: mobile tesserae of signification, a mosaic that moves. This
network is greater than its individual agents or operators. . . . The screen
mortifies sight. Its terms are points of signification, chains of signifiers,

that of themselves have no light. The signifier operates on light and with
light, but has no light of itself. . . . The signifier casts its shadow of
darkness acro�s my vision . . . . (Bryson, "Gaze" 92)
The fact that Golgonooza itself is described as the place of the "Shadowy Generation"
might be cause for hesitation. If Go)gonooza is just another production of screened
discourse, then it is just another "mild heaven" of dreams and shadows reflecting the
mortifying (meaning the limited and limiting) chains of signifiers. However, if the
"multiple discourses on vision" include anamorphotic discourses-as each eye "looks" at
Golgonooza on a different axis, at a different angle-then it might be possible to "see"
23

Binocular, or stereoscopic. vision was established by Charles Wheatstone in 1833.
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what is obscured in the shadow of the almighty screen. However, Golgonooza's
"shadowy" character could also indicate that it exists in some sort of netherspace in the
shadow of darkness that falls across "enlightened" vision, and thus beyond the reach of
rational, ideological "illumination." Golgonooza could be visuality beyond conventional
vision.
Blake's declaration that the "Organs of Perception vary" in this unconventional
visuality thus suggests to Swinburne a synaesthetic approach in which Swinburne finds
the catalyst to pursue concepts of visualization beyond what the eye can see. He thus
approximates the gaze-the attempt to imag(in)e visually that which the eye, or the
conventional means of visualizing, renders invisible. 24 Swinburne assumes an aesthetic
position in which he presumes to take a "lateral perspective" (Zizek, Lacan 90), a
completely virtual-meaning knowingly artificial, not transcendent-position in which
he imagines he sees both sides of the screen: that which is seen through the screen but
also, more importantly, that which the screen obfuscates or prevents from being "seen"
altogether. That which the screen excludes is subject to the Swinburnian gaze, which
employs all organs of perception to "produce ever new 'hidden meanings "' for that which
exceeds "the ground of the established, familiar signification" (Zizek, Lacan 91). In the
Poems and Ballads, Swinburne will put this aesthetic theorizing into practice by creating
poetic embouchures, abyssal mouths which are also gaping eyes, which signify the gaze
and its many possibilities.
It is absolutely crucial to distinguish this as being different than the Romantics'
quest to achieve a subjective "unmediated vision," to reclaim a "pure representation, a
24

See Jay, Downcast Eyes 353.
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vision unconditioned by the particularity of experience" (Hartman 1 55). The Romantic
"unmediated vision" believes the screen can be thwarted or even obliterated. Swinburne
has no such pretensions. The screen is very much present, very much a crucial
component, in his schema of remediated vision. As indicated above, any myth of
unmediated vision Swinburne may present is only used as artifice. In the Romantic-ironic
style, Swinburne will utilize a myth of immediacy only to deconstruct it in his very use of
it. Perception is always already mediated, and any claim to bypass the mediation is folly.
However, if one actively remediates-that is, renegotiates-the mediating ideological
boundaries, or the limits contained within the multiple discourses with which one
contends in order to arrive at meaning and understanding, then the myths perpetually
change. In other words, remediated vision is a procession of a flux of new fictions and
new self-concepts that continually open new doors of perception by closing others. This
is not quite a perpetual regression of perspective, mise-en-abyme style; if it were, this
would merely be aesthetic redux, the reduplication of the same perceptive act, producing
the same results, ad infinitum. Instead, i� Swinburne's remediated vision, the boundaries
which place limits on perception are like a "repetitive but variegated surface, which is
experienced in its expansiveness and its depth only through the work of the viewer's own
dis-integrated or decentered but expanded subjectivity" (Nicholsen 134).
The new conceptualization of selfhood Swinburne discovers in Jerusalem does
not exactly stipulate the immanent, collective ego of the pre-Urizenic world, after all.
Each individual seems irreparably "lapse[d] . . . into separate self-righteousness"
(Swinburne, Blake 25 1 ). The individual subject remains a differentiated and
differentiating ego, but each individual's particularities have a share in the trace memory
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of"the final vision of an [undifferentiated] eternity where the . . . personal affections
'born of shame and pride' will be destroyed or absorbed in resignation of individual
office and quality" (Blake 284-85nl), as suggested in Blake's concept of"One Man
reflecting each in each." Yet, remaining true to the principle that any universal can only
be understood "in terms of its own meaning not lodged beyond the particular individuals
who bear it" (Adorno, Theory 200, italics mine), Swinburne stubbornly clings to the
utopian idea of a subjectivity beyond contradiction,25 and settles on Blake's
hermaphrodite as the emblem of the universally particularized subject who both
possesses and becomes a hieroglyph for remediating visuality. In this impossible unity of
self and other, Swinburne imagines a being united in its very violence of disunity. In a
sense, this is the closest Swinburne can approximate a Urizen-who-is-and-yet-lacks
Ahania.
The hermaphrodite, traditionally representing sexless (undifferentiated) beauty,26
here represents for Swinburne a kind of trace memory of collective subjectivity within
subjective differentiation. In chapter four of Jerusalem, Blake says, " . . . Man cannot
unite with Man but by their Emanations / Which stand both Male & Fem ale at the Gates
of each Humanity" (Plate 88, lines 10-1 1 ). Though the hermaphrodite traditionally
represents the "duplicity and division, perplexity and restraint" of the heterosexual
relationship with feigns the fulfillment of being it cannot bring about, to Swinburne the
hermaphrodite advocates the amalgamation and annihilation (Blake 282) of the problems
of ego differentiation. The divided and inconsistent self becomes the site for a liberating
25

See Adorno, Negative Dialectics 146.
Richard Dellamora discusses the aesthetic tradition of hennaphroditism and how that tradition relates to
the works of Swinburne and Pater in Masculine Desire; see pp. 67-69.
26
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"play impulse." This figure also represents how the imagination professes the
paradoxical power of its powerlessness to escape the reality in which it is positioned. It
diwlges how the imagination's fantasy of transcendence is grounded and inhibited by
material reality while striking an uneasy ambivalence between fantasy and reality,
providing moments which gesture toward le trait unaire, or what Zizek explains is the
"differential feature that cannot be pinned to" a point of definite, delineated "symbolic
identification" (Lacan 75). In sum, the hermaphroditic emblem suggests the
imagination's pivotal role in establishing a kind of subjective differentiation which works
around ego-weakness. Moreover, as the next chapter will further illustrate, this emblem
also suggests an artificial bridging of"the gulf between words and images to be as wide"
as that division between language's conventional usages and its aesthetic functions
(Mitchell, Jconology 43), as Swinburne's Poems and Ballads put into practice-and
praxis-the complicated tension between visual images that pretend not to signify any
real thing and yet signify what is supposedly unsignifiable in symbols that declare their
artificiality but teem with diffuse and potential representative meanings.
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CHAPTER FOUR
The Influences on Swinburne's Poems and Ballads:
Rossetti, Baroque Mirrors, and the Semblance of Truth
"We know that once we are consci�s of it, we have to react to the desire ingrained in us
to overstep the limits. "-Georges Bataille
"The artist 's imagination scarcely ever completely encompassed what it brought
forth. "---:-Theodor Adorno

Swinburne's most infamous collection, the Poems and Ballads, First Series of
1 866, was met with a public uproar that Swinburne, despite his claims not to have
anticipated such a reaction, eagerly perpetuated. The initial reviews of the volume, all
negative, appeared on August 4th of that year in The Athenaeum and The London Review,
but Swinburne was particularly upset by the review appearing in the Saturday Review, the
review which was arguably the most brutal of all.
The story of Swinburne's reaction to this review has become almost legendary.
Swinburne, while walking around London with publisher James Bertrand Payne of
Moxon and Company, purchased a copy of the Saturday Review and immediately began
reading the article. Swinburne had been expecting the Saturday Review 's appraisal of his
poetry to be more positive than the others, given that the journal had commissioned one
of Swinburne's friends from Oxford, John Morley, to write it. Morley, as the editor of
the Fortnightly Review, previously had been quite receptive to Swinburne and his work.
However, Morley developed his vehement aversion to the subject matter and style of
Swinburne' s Poems and Ballads into an attack on Swinburne's character. Swinburne's
immediate reaction to the harsh criticism was to perform a "torrent of vituperation"
(Rooksby, Life 1 36), a litany of obscenities and "scatological abuse" so intense that
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Payne, embarrassed by his client's very public tantrum, begged Swinburne at least to
scream his obscenities in French so other people would mistake him for an "eccentric
foreigner" (Henderson 121).
In "Mr Swinburne's New Poems," Morley lambasts Swinburne for being an
indecent and undignified person whose very "position makes it impossible for him to [be]
receive[d] with anything but laughter and contempt"; moreover, he suggests that
Swinburne is so incapable of adhering to the "social duty" of decency that it is "no use,
therefore, to scold Mr Swinburne for grovelling down among the nameless shameless
abominations which inspire him with such frenzied delight.'' Morley also proclaimed
that the material in the Poems and Ballads was so prurient that even "a professional
vendor of filthy prints might blush to sell" it. 1 Morley's rancorous reaction to
Swinburne's poetry suggests the very radical character of Swinburne's aesthetic, though.
Like many of their contemporaries, Morley was discomfited by the prospect of
Swinburne, precariously tiptoeing the margins of the already-marginalized traditions of
the "fleshly" Pre-Raphaelites and French decadents, changing not only the way art is
perceived but also how art can change, if not in some way reveal new "truths" about, the
acts and modes of perception. Though Swinburne was enraged by the venomous tone of
Morley's presentation, he was no doubt inherently pleased by Morley' s discomfort.
Morley exhibited the discomfort which Swinburne wished his art to instigate, the
discomfort caused by tensions between the "delight" found in "nameless shameless
abominations" and the ossifying constructs of "social duty" that often suppress the realm
of human creative possibility.
1 Material quoted and discussed by Henderson (I 18-20) and Rooksby (Life 136-40).
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In 1 856, Swinburne entered Balliol College at Oxford as an undergraduate, and he
(at his parents' insistence) spent two summers doing additional study at neighboring
Radley College as well. Swinburne' s Oxford career was marked by numerous failures,
inconsistencies, and disappointments. Swinburne
failed his "Responsions"
qualifying
.
.
examination in 1 857 because he spent his time reading Browning's Sordello instead of
the assigned texts, and then failed his 1 858 examination in classics, thus earning two
stern warnings from the Master and Dean for "neglecting his studies.'' He was often
assigned to work under tutors such as Benjamin Jowett who discouraged and even
denigrated his interest in poetry. This made Swinburne even more despondent upon .
losing the Newdigate Prize for poetry to students he felt were his intellectual and poetic
inferiors. His disgruntled landlady added to his trouble, lodging complaints with the
Balliol Master about Swinburne's late hours, "questionable" company, and "irregular"
behavior. 2 Finally, Swinburne left Oxford in 1 859, despite an apparent improvement in
his academic progress. 3 Reportedly, he was asked by the Balliol Master not to return to
the college until he was ready to retake his classics examination. He returned in 1 860 to
retake the exam, but this was probably done only to placate his mortified and angry
parents; in the end, he failed to take a degree. Swinburne's real interest in Oxford had
never been in his tutors or his coursework but in the surrounding intellectual scene, and,
for Swinburne, the scene lost its appeal when Dante Gabriel Rossetti left Oxford in late
1 858.
2

See Gosse 63-64.
The reason for Swinburne's sudden departure is still somewhat a matter of conjecture. Following his
careful examination of the Swinburne family correspondence, Rooksby suggests that Benjamin Jowett,
Swinburne's Greek tutor, convinced Swinburne's father that a leave of absence was the only way to prevent
Swinburne from having another clash with the Master and Dean ofBalliol and thus preserve Swinburne's
last chance to earn a degree (Life 59).
3
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It is not surprising that Swinburne,s academic breakdown coincides with �he 1857
commencement of the Pre-Raphaelite Brotherhood's "Jovial Campaig��, 4 in Oxford.
Rossetti and his friends Edward Burne-Jones (then simply "Jones") and William Morris
were hired to paint pseudo-medieval murals on the walls of the new Oxford Union
building. Swinburne had been intrigued by the works of Jones, Morris, and Rossetti,
works in which these artists proclaimed their "Pre-Raphaelite Brotherhood" as
championing a new aesthetic movement. Swinburne was fascinated by the
"sensuousness, . . . symbolism [ and] mystery" which marked the Pre-Raphaelite effort
,
and "by a quality often cruel and melancholy in its pictures, poems and tales" (Doughty
232). In Rossetti's redefinition of aesthetic criteria, Swinburne found an articulated
defense of his own, often maligned, literary interests. And, in Rossetti, Swinburne found
a literary mentor who inspired him to explore the immanent possibilities for human
satisfaction latent in the material realm, to privilege the artist's subjectivity over the
disinterested critique of the aesthetic object, and, ultimately, to create the "Lady of Pain"
as the site of an emerging creative and aesthetic power.
By invoking what McGann calls a "debased" or a "contaminated Romanticism . . .
in which the poet comes to resemble Tennyson's Ulysses, who became a part of all that
he had met" (Game 44-45), Rossetti undertook an exploration of the uncertainties of the
artistic imagination and its relative powerlessness to unify self and other, flesh and spirit,
the subject and the art-object. His creative work demonstrates that he was both dedicated
to and disillusioned by the Enlightenment narrative of the universal, prolific, ideal self
capable of overcoming all obstacles, transforming the objective world by means of
4

This was Rossetti's own name for the time he spent painting the Oxford Union murals (Doughty 224).
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subjective revelation. He retains the Romantic notion that the "compulsion" driving the
individual artist to create art "lies in the disproportion between [human] desires, or
[human] ideals, and the world of reality" (Abrams 1 39), but with the realization that the
individual artist cannot create proportion or bring about balance between human desire
the individual ' s self-conscious aspiration to fill the lack or void preventing him/her from
experiencing full knowledge/recognition of him/herself as well as accessing the full
meaning �fthe symbols ofthe discourse which situates the subject5- and the reality of
the material world.
Furthermore, Rossetti appears to realize that, if it is the individual ' s exploration of
the disproportion between desire and reality that serves as the inspir�tion for art, that
disproportion must necessarily be maintained. Rossetti converts this narrative of
constantly exploring this disproportion into the narrative of the process of self
recognition; for, as one's desire leads him or her perpetually to propose grandiose
schemes of fulfilling desire in reality, schemes in which the subject would no longer
account for her/his existence by (mis)recognizing her/his "self' in an other, but see
her/himsel f as who s/he really is; however, if these schemes were to work, the process of
(mis)recognition would cease altogether, and the subject would fall into stasis,
"becom[ing] one with the assumption of his desire (Zizek, Lacan 1 3 1 ; Barch-Jacobsen
85). Thus, these schemes necessarily fail because "desire' s raison d'etre . . . is not to
5 Here I have applied several definitions of "human desire." As Borch-Jacobsen explains, the articulation
of desire "means that it is spoken in the language (the marginal symbol) of the dr� the symptom. or the
'individual myth.' but without being recognized in that language in the form of full and authentic symbolic
speech"; moreover, he reiterates the Sartrean idea that desire "bears witness to the existence of lack in the
being of human reality" ( 1 53, 200, italics his). Zizek discusses the lack which "the symbolic edifice"
offered in the symbolic network of discourse "attempts in vain to repair" (Lacan 32). And Lacan himself
points out that, in discourse, "(t)he subject is presented as other than he is, and what one shows him is not
what he wishes to see" (Concepts 104).
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realize its goal" of fulfillment, "to find full satisfaction, but to reproduce itself' (Zizek,
Plague 39). One is then led to recuperate his/her sense of "self' amid that failure to
fulfill desire just as perpetually.
This requires Rossetti's romanticized subject to re-establish his/her subject
position continually in order to buffer his/her "poetic and spiritual"-or, for "spiritual" I
would substitute psycho/ogical-"insecurity" (Honnighausen 1 50). This insecurity
emerges because the subject's acts of self-recognition are misrecognitions
(meconnaissances) or misconstructions of seltbood iri which the subject (self) rather

reductively exists only in the context of the unfulfillable fantasy. When the fantasy fails,
the context for seltbood dissipates, causing the subject to disperse, or vanish (Lacan,
Concepts 83). For Rossetti and subsequently Swinburne, as with Tennyson' s Ulysses,
every failure to articulate self-recognition becomes an opportunity to try a different mode
of articulation, "an arch wherethro "' to reach that "untravell'd world whose margin fades

I For ever and for ever" ("Ulysses" 1 9-2 1 )-the as-yet "untravel I'd" space in which the
self could potentially articulate recognition of itself, in its relation to both fantasy and
reality.
Rossetti channels this continual compulsion to articulate and recognize the self
into a serious attempt to reconstruct or restore "the original point of vision" from which
one can envision his/her own seltbood (Concepts 81 -82) as well as to secure a more
articulable subject position by altering the conventions of the fantasy providing its
context. Rossetti believed that the repeated attempts to breach the margin separating
desire and satisfaction, fantasy and reality, would find their eventual end in success,
insofar as he believed his art could reveal the margin to be just "an illusionist projection"
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(McGann, Game 102). Swinburne, though, is more interested in exploring the
compulsion, per se, thus rendering the compulsion similar to drive, "the domain of the
closed circular palpitation which finds satisfaction in endlessly repeating the same failed
gesture," a domain located "beyond the fantasy which sustains desire" (Zizek, Plague
30). More specifically, Swinburne is interested in how the selfs failure to recognize
itself as a manifestation of drive corresponds to the structure of drive itself, as drive
"attain[s] its satisfaction without attaining its aim" (Lacan, Concepts 203, 1 79). The
Swinburnian self is constituted by a radical drama of self-dispersal, in that the
Swinburnian self is compelled to enact repeatedly-and the self finds satisfaction in-the
failure to recognize itself. In other words, it constantly aims for self-recognition, but it
accepts and revels in the perpetual failure of desire, thus allowing Swinburne to find
pleasure in the perseveration of the drive.
I believe Swinburne gleaned this idea in part through his careful study of
Rossetti's works. Swinburne seems to have recognized what Jerome McGann does later,
that Rossetti's poetic "self' is so "immersed in its turning and shiftings" that, even in the
"[p]oems that seem evidently intimate and personal," the constructions of "self' "are
almost invariably haunted by other possible voicings" (Game 147). Rossetti's "self'
continually misrecognizes itself, and the "voices" of other possible misrecognitions, not
yet revealed, haunt him. Rossetti, though, wanted to establish within the self a notable
locus or matrix where all the "the great discourses of desire: dream, nightmare, art,
poetry" (McGann, Game 1 55) could meet, and thus merge. In this way, he could position
the self, meaning how he rendered himself in his art, as gatekeeper of the "untravell'd
world" of unified signifier and signified, or art before the catastrophe of meaning.
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Rossetti feels the inability to represent meaning with precision as a great loss; therefore,
Rossetti explores the discourses of desire, searching for satisfaction through the constant
construction of fantasies that are actually always what Zizek would identify as "the
narrative[s] of this primordial loss" (Plague 32).
In Lacanian/Zizekian terms, then, one could say that, whereas Swinburne shows
interest in the complex interplay between desire and drive sited in/by the subject, Rossetti
is more interested in how the subject expresses and contends with desire, not drive.
Rossetti's artistic subjects, both the representations of"himself' and his other poetic
personae, oppose what Zizek calls "the radical closure" of the drive, "the eternal return of
the same" failure (Plague 3 1 ). The "desiring subject" opposes this closed circular
structure with its "finitude [and] temporality" (Plague 3 1). In the case of Rossetti, the
"desiring subjects" featured in much of his poetry are fixated on the physical body as the
ultimate representation of human temporality and, especially in his later work, he
demonstrates an obsession with death. One could even say that Rossetti continually falls
under the spell of what Zizek calls the "false opening," or the construction within fantasy
of an ostensible way to circumvent the radical closure of the drive, whereas Swinburne
entertains no such illusions, entertaining the "false opening" of drive only as a reminder
that such circumvention is "precluded by the very fundamental structure" of the
drive/desire interplay (Plague 29).
Even though Rossetti's work, featuring desiring subjects such as the famous
"Blessed Damozel," explores the ideas of life after death and the existence of the eternal
soul, Rossetti's afterlives are such "false openings," notoriously effecting the limitations
of life on earth. For example, Rossetti's Damozel "leaned out / from the gold bar of
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Heaven" to look upon life on earth and "her bosom . . . made / The bar she leaned on
warm". (1-2, 45-46). Furthermore, she lies
across the flood
Of ether, as a bridge.
[And] Beneath, the tides of day and night
With flame and darkness ridge
The void . . . . (3 1-35)
Fundamentally distinct from the "the souls mounting up to God" which "[go] by her like
thin flames" (lines 41 -42), she represents the finitude ofthe material world. Clinging to
physical form, she also clings to the fantasy of fulfilling her desire in physical sexuality� 6
this fantasy serves "as the very screen that separates desire from drive" allowing the
Damozel "to (mis)perceive the void"-that loss or /ack-"around which drive circulates"
(Zizek, Plague 32). Swinburne, on the other hand, presents "The Leper'' in contrast to
Rossetti's "Blessed Damozel." Like Rossetti, Swinburne renders a sexual relationship
between one dead lover and one still living. However, there is a sense of an almost blind
perseveration present in Swinburne' s desiring subject (the narrator) that is not articulated
in the Damozel. Not only does Swinburne' s narrator continue his relationship with the
corpse of the woman who detested him whifo she was alive, thus eschewing Rossetti's
notion of a transcendent sexuality, but he also notes it has been "Six months, and I sit still
and hold / In two cold palms her cold two feet" ("Leper'' 1 02-03). Rather than fulfilling
him, this "Love bites and stings [him] through" (line 105).

6

In Rossetti's poem, the Damozel beckons her lover to join her in heaven for a sexual tryst.
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Arguably, Swinburne's narrator does not "(mis)perceive the void"- the loss, the
lack- in the same way Rossetti's Damozel does. Instead, Swinburne's narrator
articulates how this repetitive necrophi1ia fails to fulfill that lack:
. . . surely I would fain have done
All things the best I could. Perchance
Because I/ailed, came short of one,
She kept at heart that other man's. (132-36, emphasis added)
Swinburne's narrator repeats the act, knowing that it ultimately fails to fulfill him, and
also knowing that his desire will never be recognized by his lover-in part because she is
a corpse (thus unable to recognize anyone or anything) and in part because she, in life,
had focused on her desire for a previous lover.
Here desire is the effect of the conjunction between the compulsion of drive and
what Lacan calls "sexual reality," or the social structure which emerges because
"[e]xistence . . . rests upon copulation" (Concepts 1 50). Thus it "is more or less bound up
with the finality of reproduction," manifesting itself as the "effective presence" of the
libido (Concepts 153). The libido, for Lacan.and, I �ould argue, for Rossetti and
Swinburne, is not merely the compelling sexual instinct. It functions as a component of
the ego which makes the subject "the representative of reality's demands"; the subject
who looks for another to fulfill the lack attempts such fulfillment within a sexual
relationship in which one finds "an 'object' of love" and becomes "an 'object' of love"
for another subject (Barch-Jacobsen 28-29). However, Lacan also points out that "desire
is neither the appetite for satisfaction n'?r the demand for love, but the difference that
results from the subtraction of the first from the second" (Ecrits 287).
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In the libidinal economy situated in and by both Swinburne' s and Rossetti's
subjects, the object of the subject's "love"-the "object-cause of [his or her] desire"
(Zizek, Lacan 4)-- is not truly, completely attainable. The demand to be loved
(recognized) by the other is never met, and both subjects demonstrate an awareness that
they merely "encircle" the possibilities of satisfaction, knowing it will "elude [their]
grasp no matter what [they] do to attain it" (Lacan 4). However, Rossetti's Damozel still
attempts to find satisfaction in the fantasy "conceived as a scenario that realizes [her]
desire" intended to satiate desire, rather than "reproduc[e] it as such" (Lacan 6-7),
whereas Swinburne's leper finds a perseverant satisfaction knowing that his necrophiliac
scenario manifests and reproduces his desire without satiating it. Because Swinburne
explores the interplay between the failure of drive and the perpetuation of desire in his
Poems and Ballads, he strays from Rossetti's conviction that one must retain hope that
desire will not always fail to be satisfied despite art's perpetuation of the "vain desire"
and "vain regret" which fails to "assuage the unforgotten pain / And teach the
unforgetful to forget."7 However, haunted by Rossetti's hopeful belief in fulfillment,
Swinburne wrestles with the failure of desire, not by hoping to find an immanent
resolution within the perpetual and perpetuating structures of fantasy, but by
renegotiating within art the very understanding of and possibilities for human satisfaction
itself.
Swinburne admired what other critics detested about Rossetti's painting and
poetry: its emblematic excesses, especially as they relate to the excessive "fleshliness" of
Rossetti's erotic imagery. Whereas their contemporaries, such as Robert Buchanan,
7

Dante Gabriel Rossetti, "The One Hope." sonnet 101 from The House ofLife, lines 1-4 and 13-14.

, . 1 18
spumed Rossetti's aesthetic for asserting the primacy of aesthetic affectiveness over the
"meaning" of the individual artwork, Swinburne embraced Rossetti's attempt to privilege
aesthetic affect as a means of exposing the very indeterminacy of all processes of
producing/deducing meaning. Buchanan's claim that Rossetti's poetry eschews the
"clear, simple, natural, and beautiful" significations of"[t]he soul's speech and the
heart's speech," and instead draws more attention to its own textual, or linguistic,
"meretricious tricks" (895) uncannily resembles the criticism of Blake that Swin�ume
found iniquitous. Blake stood accused of creating "insipid" and "absurd" art which
reinforced the "utter impossibility of representing Spirit to the eye" instead of
surmounting it; Rossetti was subject to similar accusations. To Swinburne, at least
during the time the majority of the Poems and Ballads were composed (or at least heavily
revised from earlier manuscripts), Rossetti was the next "Blake," the Eternal Artist
revaluating a debased or contaminated Romanticism, focusing not on Romanticism's
achievements but on its failures-that which exceeded the Romantics' grasp, so to speak.
Swinburne admired the "clear sheer power and weight of plain passion clothed
with such luxury of colour and splendour of sound" of Rossetti's art (Letters 2: 64). 8 He
even compared Rossetti to Shelley, proclaiming that some of Rossetti's poems should
supercede Shelley's. Swinburne's overzealous comparison is, of course, the result of his
eager and sometimes blind devotion to Rossetti during this period. Nevertheless, it
reveals Swinburne's awareness of the shift from, and the resulting "affinities and
differences" between, Romanticism and the "late romantic symbolism" employed by the
Victorians. Rossetti's Pre-Raphaelite symbolism u_shers in "a new and striking self8

Swinburne, letter to Dante Gabriel Rossetti, 7 Dec. 1869.
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consciousness, colouring both inte11ect and sensibility, and, as a result . . . a complete
reorientation of its literary theory, forms and motifs" (Hennighausen 5). As Lothar
Hennighausen observes, "late romantic symbolism" like Rossetti's moves away from the
Romantic notion of creating "a direct experience of nature" in favor of exploring the
mediated quality of that experience, making the experience itself "secondary to its
symbolic implications" (40).
In the exploration of the mediation of experience, then, Rossetti strives to indicate
that which exceeds direct experience, or immediacy, itself. In this contemplative
deliberation and celebration of excess, Rossetti provides Swinburne a template for
reorienting the development of post-Romantic art, revitalizing traditional forms and
motifs with innovative possibilities. Shelley "conceives aesthetic experience as a formal
process that produces-in the mind's engagement with the dynamics, textures, and
resistances of art-critical thinking itself as a form of truth" (Kaufman, "Legislators"
709). As Robert Kaufman has argued, Shelley strives to "hol[d] emancipatory gesture
and formal constraint together'' ("Legislators" 7 1 0) by focusing on the relationship of the
imagination to the "materials, instruments and conditions of art . . . which limit and
interpose between conception and expression" (Shelley 483). Rossetti, on the other hand,
conceives aesthetic experience as an engagement with formal processes in a way that
draws attention to what those pro�esses exclude, acknowledging the excluded "excess" as
a pivotal component in critical thinking. For instance, as McGann has noted, Rossetti's
painting demonstrates a purposeful "erosion" of the typical way artists arrange
perspective (Game 67); likewise, I would say Rossetti, in his poems, uses language in a
way which purposefully erodes the readers' expectations of what such language usua1ly
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"means" in the given context. He reminds the reader that what the imagination conceives
is always more than what the language can express. So, while Shelley in the "Defence"
calculates a precarious dialectic between formal limitations and imaginative freedom to
create a conceptual space for the aesthetic, 9 Rossetti is more interested in gesturing
toward that which cannot be calculated at all, or what exceeds any kind of aesthetic
equation or formula. As Rossetti articulates in "Hand and Soul," one should consider the
trope or symbol in an artwork as something that the artist has imaginatively "seen," but
paradoxically also recognize that "it [is] not a thing to be seen by men" ( 56). The artist
imaginatively sees what exceeds sight.
In both his paintings and his poems, the excesses ofRossetti's visual imagery are
gestures toward the excesses of symbolization. In other words, Rossetti relies on the
production of verbal and visual excess in his art to convey his awareness that the artist's
symbol, or image, can never adequately represent the multiplicities of that which s/he
intended to signify. He hopes such excess will intrude upon the symbol as it is presented,
thus forcing the reader/viewer to consider the symbol as a virtual aggregate of all possible
but otherwise unrepresentable meanings concentrated into one "spot," to find the facet of
the symbol which suggests that it has a "mysterious detail that 'sticks out,' that does not
[otherwise] 'fit' into the symbolic network" (Zizek, Lacan 1 1 6). Thus Rossetti uses the
formal processes of aesthetic representation to stage a breakdown of those processes by
the very vulnerabilities in his language-the network of symbolic representation
available to him.
9

Most compelling is Kaufman's suggestion that, in his attempt to create a liberating dialectical relationship
between enlightenment reason and poetic/aesthetic "sympathy," Shelley must employ "calculative
restriction" so that art can '"enlarg(e] the circumference' of calculation's opposite nwnber, the
imagination" C'Legislators" 723).
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. The paradox lies in the fact that the unrepresentable is not, and by definition
cannot be, a product of human intention, since it is specifically what resists being
incorporated into symbolic representation. Rossetti did not claim to have found a way to_
overcome the paradox and to incorporate the otherwise incorporable into symbolism;
rather, his project was dedicated to pushing the limits of this paradox. He intended to
acknowledge the existence of the incorporable by creating visual and verbal excess,
though he also seems to have recognized the limits of his intent. McGann notes that
Rossetti's pictures provide "recurrent moments of perspective that play alongside
moments that develop contradictory perspectives"-or glances aside-as well as
"moments that refuse perspective altogether" (Game 1 1 1). In those moments that refuse
perspective, Rossetti gestures at the limits of aesthetic representation as a way of
gesturing toward the otherwise unrepresentable. In the end, Rossetti's intentional
excesses do not capture the unrepresentable, but they bring the acknowledgment of the
unr�presentable into play within the process of creating and viewing/reading art. His
excesses, moreover, are not intended to "fit" into the accepted, or acceptable, symbolic
network of the artistic conventions of his milieu. Rossetti's aesthetic works in reaction
against these conventions, to demonstrate defiantly that art strives to contend with that
which does not "fit" within the limitations set through the expectations set by convention
and to exceed both these expectations and the limitations of"acceptable" symbolism.
To create this reactionary aesthetic, Rossetti utilized nostalgic treatments of the
themes, tropes, and conventions of medieval, Renaissance, and baroque art, exploiting the
tensions between past and present, retrospective utopian fantasy and the dissatisfactions
of contemporary reality, seeing with the imagination and seeing with the vegetative eye.
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Swinburne was particularly fascinated by how Rossetti figured all these binaries into one
overarching, multi-faceted symbol which displaces, rather than erases, the schisms
between body and soul, physical love and emotional love. Rossetti focuses his painting
and poetry on a woman, the Beloved, in whom all binary tensions gravitate. Very much
like the medieval love poetry of his idol and predecessor, Dante Aligheiri, Rossetti's
work does not seek to "define and instantiate" the Beloved but use the Beloved as the
virtual site or center for the "presence and action" (McGann, Game 55) of his aesthetic.
The Beloved is
the apparition of Woman, of the woman who could flit out the lack in
man, the ideal partner with whom the sexual relationship would finally be
possible, in short, The Woman who, according to Lacanian theory,
precisely does not exist. The nonexistence of this woman is rendered
manifest to [the artist] by the absence of her inscription in the
sociosymbolic network: the intersubjective community . . . acts as if she
does not exist, as if she were only his idee .fixe. (Zizek, Lacan 80)
The Beloved does not exist in and of herself, because Rossetti presents her as male
fantasy, or, as Zizek phrases it, "only as she appears or is mirrored in male discourse"
(Metastases 105) situated by the male subjects/narrators in his poetry. Many of the
women who play the role of Beloved in Rossetti's canon blatantly do not exist, in the
most literal sense, because they are either deceased (the Damozel, the "dead ladies" of his
translation of Villon, the first beloved featured in "The House of Life" sequence) or
mythical figures (Lilith, Proserpine, Pandora). Rossetti has his male subjects/speakers
(re)create these women in attempts to fulfill lack that really cannot be fulfilled. As
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fantasies invented to fit into his male subjects' "'private' formula[s] for the sexual
relationship"-inasmuch as "for a man, the relationship with a woman is [thought]
possible only inasmuch as she fits his formula" (Zizek, Plague 7)-these supernatural or
mythic women end up reinforcing the relationship's utter impossibility, consequently
sustaining the male subjects' desire. Even the non-mythic, "Jiving" women in Rossetti's
poetry have almost as untenable an existence. They are depicted as prostitutes like his
famous "Jenny," who projects an image that exists only for the male gaze, and who
approaches the sexual transaction as the kind of"asymmetrical non-relationship" in
which, Zizek notes, the woman remains nothing but an object, an "inhuman partner"
whose subjectivity is a non-issue (Metastases 108-09). Or, the women are presented as
remote figures steeped in superstition or narratives of the distant past, like "Sister Helen,"
a witch who seems as much as an object of curiosity as her wax fetish, and Aloyse of
"The Bride's Prelude," who seems more like a stock character in a cliche morality tale
than a "real" woman. Because the Beloved's very "existence" is always so dubious, she
is unable to establish a determined identity for herself: there are never clear moments in
which "she realizes she is just a passive element in the interplay of libidinal forces," so
she is not established as a "subject" (Zizek, Lacan 64). "Deprived of every real
substance," she "functions as a mirror on to which the [male] subject projects his
narcissistic ideal" (Zizek, Metastases 90), but what/who is being reflected by the
Beloved? One cannot be sure if the Beloved demonstrates the male subject's "ego ideal,"
qualities/possibilities he wants to possess, or if she demonstrates the subject's "ego that
regards itself as the ideal," qualities/possibilities the subject already has or thinks he has
attained (Lacan, Concepts 61 ). The slippery slopes of identity here represent the same
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kinds of important slippages between the other binary relationships Rossetti surveys in
his work.
As Jerome McGann notes, "Identities, as well as the names and words that signify
them, are fluid, dynamic markers of the presence of [the] action" of revaluating
interpretative process in Rossetti's. aesthetic (Game 55). Moreover, this aesthetic is
"pursued through a series of intense moments" (Game 57), moments that are always
subject to change; meaning that a new, constellative relationship between seemingly
binary or opposing elements is (re)forged in every successive moment of intensity. The
Beloved is portrayed as both what she is and is not: dead and alive, absent and present, a
real woman and a fictional character, a historical figure and a contemporary. 1 ° Carole
Silver points out that this entails a "dream logic" that allows "a single image [to]
. symbolize numerous wishes, impulses, attitudes, and persons," "that one face may
represent those of many people," as well as allows one to see him/herself "as double or
multiple" (1 1 ). Thus the perspective of the subject-both the viewing/reading subject
and the artist-as-subject-is the catalyst for this aesthetic multiplicity. In sum, the
Beloved is not so much a sign of imaginative unity but of the imagination renegotiating
the old aesthetic, philosophic, and critical tensions.
Martin Danahay, in "Mirrors of Masculine Desire," claims that Rossetti's art
precipitates Rossetti's "search for his own identity . . . through the realization of

1
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For example, Rossetti painted the likeness of his wife long after her dea� and he painted the likeness of
Jane Burden Morris repeatedly, not only during their absences from one another but also after their affair
· had soured. Though his lovers served as models, the painted female figures are depicted as versions of the
"non-existent" Beloved- mythic goddesses, epic heroines, literary figures. Consequently, the paintings
were never intended, nor do they function, as portraits, per se. For a more detailed account, see McGann,
Dante Gabriel Rossetti and the Game That Must Be Lost, especially Chapter 6, "Venus Surrounded by
Mirrors."
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di.fferance, the sudden knowledge that what Rossetti would like to designate as an 'I' that
is present to itself can only be represented through artificial secondary media, such as
mirrors, texts, and paintings" (38). Yet Dahanay's argument, though astute and useful,
needs to be amended, especially when Swinburne's evaluation of Rossetti's treatment of
"identity" is considered. Danahay seems to suggest that Rossetti has a somewhat stable
concept of his own identity, or ego, which is perpetually reinforced by his aestheticized
relationship of otherness to the Beloved. The critical legacy of reading Rossetti's poetry
as autobiography and viewing his paintings 1ike snapshots in a family album often tricks
us into reading the historical "Rossetti" into the speakers of his poems. As Adorno
reminds us, every artist gives his/her artwork "shape from out of him [or her]self';
nevertheless, "art is no replica of the subject" (Theory 41), nor is art a statement
conferring identity. The reciprocity of subject and art object "cannot be that of identity"
(Theory 1 66). Instead, the artist creates a "latent f' which is a self which only "speaks . . .
through the [art]work . . . through the action of the work's language" (Theory 1 67), a self
which appears as an imaginary reconstruction of how the self is seen by an other; and, as
the work's language has been rendered vulnerable, the "I" rendered through such
language becomes a virtual site yielding multiple possibilities for viewing/reading
subjects to explore relationships between subjects and aesthetic objects.
More specifically, the "latent I" is a site where one can explore the paradox of
desire, its requisite meconnaissances and the compulsory failures of self-identification in
art. The "latent I" is part of the paradox of desire. The subject not only fails to identify
(recognize) him/herself in the art object, consequently not fulfilling his/her constitutive
lack of self-identification; the subject is also driven to seek and to represent him/herself
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in an "endless sliding" of one signifier after another, all the while "get[ting] hooked on a
particular object which thereby starts to function as the object-cause of his [or her]
desire" (Zizek, Plague 8 1 ). "[I]nfinite desire"-especially in the form of self-dispersal it
takes here-must "focus on a finite object" because the object must become the locus of
the signifying chain that "governs whatever may be made present of the subject" (Plague
8 1 ; Lacan, Concepts 203). The object in this case, the Beloved, functions to "give body"
to the subject's lack (Plague 8 1 ), place-holding the Jack she gives the illusion of being
able to fulfi11. In this way, the Beloved is a "specular image" of lack, she cannot be
"anything but a decay," or dispersal, of the process of identification (Barch-Jacobsen 96).
As a "specular image," she "gives body to the gaze" (Lacan, Concepts 84)-the gaze
being the mechanism which configures one' s perception, or how one "sees" not only his
surroundings but his or her self.
Nevertheless, to distinguish the Beloved, as Danahay does, as purely the site of a
specular relationship between the gaze and human desire is to oversimplify the operation
of the gaze and its compound manipulations. Notwithstanding its specular attributes, the
gaze, as it is deliberated in Rossetti's works, is the medium by which self-consciousness
is established; like Sartre after them, Rossetti and consequently Swinburne reaffirm the
Hegelian idea that "self-consciousness is real only as long as it knows its echo in another
person" (Stem 93). As Sartre explains in Being and Nothingness, the gaze inculcates
being-for-itself "determin[ed] . . . to exist inasmuch as it cannot coincide with itself' ( 1 2526): meaning, the self has "to exist at a distance from itself," thwarting the principle of
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identity 1 1 in that the "self' determined in the gaze is always indeterminate, not able to
reach or to express the self "one ii' (128, 367). The gaze requires one to re-circumscribe
constantly his/her subject position, to remake oneself perpetualJy as a "subject"; in other
words, the subject "is always in the making, always becoming" some other version of the
self (Stem 99) because "self one ii' will always be subject to misrecognition, the subject
positioned by misrecognition.
Granted, Danahay does admit that "the masculine subject's search for a
complementary self-image" in the other is always "thwarted" by the Beloved' s "refusal to
reflect accurately the artist' s self-image" ("Mirrors" 38), thus indicating that Rossetti's
aesthetic is concerned with the failure to recognize the self even through the mechanisms
described above. Though Danahay correctly reads the Beloved as "a threat to the
imaginative unity and coherence of the masculine subject" which ultimately leads to
Rossetti's "disappointment" ("Mirrors" 41, 50), he does not fully take into account that
Rossetti, like Swinburne, was fascinated by and compelled to investigate those very
"threats." Christopher Nassaar has commented on how Rossetti upholds a very Victorian
belief that "each human being has an unconscious mind"-or self--"where the real
personality is buried and [s/he] often tries desperately to get in touch with the buried self'
(24). Furthermore, Nassaar reads Rossetti's Beloved figure as presenting selfhood from
the "perspective of the agony of separation" (25}-what I read as the "separation" of the
"self one ii' from the versions of self perpetually interposed by the gaze. 1 2 I contend that
this is the separation between the projected/projecting ego, which is a "degraded
11

As Stem explains, "The being-for-itself, or human consciousness, was characterized as being what it is
not and not being what it is. It is not at all, but is always creating itself; consequently it never coincides
with itself, thus falling outside the principle of identity" (96).
12
Nassaar presents this assertion in an explication of Rossetti's "Proserpine."
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consciousness" and not "the adequate representation" of what the self is (Sartre 365), and
the "buried self' that cannot be present-inasmuch as the subject will never "coincide
with him [or her]self' (Stem 40), since the "true self' wil1 never coincide with any of the
subject positions imposed by the gaze of the other. When all these components of the
Beloved are considered, we can "see" the very illusory quality of the presentation of the
subject that is usually obscured. In other words, Rossetti's Beloved allows the viewer
virtually to "see" beyond the margins of the offered subject positions, virtua11y to "see"
· the dissonance between the representations of selves and the unrepresentable self, and to
acknowledge the aesthetic importance of the dissonance existing within such artful
renditions of the breakdown of art.
This specular quality-which al1ows the Beloved(s) of Rossetti's work, and
successively the "Ladies of Pain" which Swinburne creates, to operate as complex
symbols of ego differen�iation, desire, and dissonance-resembles the function of what
Martin Jay cans the "baroque mirror," which is not "the flat reflecting mirror'' that aids
"the development of rationalized perspective," but an "anamorphic mirror, either concave
or convex, that distorts" the flat, planar, rationalized "visual image" (Eyes 48). The
"visionary'' quality of the Pre-Raphaelites' work-"the understanding that forms and
images possess powers in themselves . . . that cannot be comprehended or even entirely
contro11ed by the artist who is their medium," the creation of provisional vantage points
to exercise the relativity instead of the stability of convention, subjectivity, making and
discerning meaning (McGann, "Medieval" 108)-is a nostalgic nod to the art of their
predecessors. This is a paradoxical treatment of the Lacanian Real here, the attempt to
account for "that which is refractory, resistant, . . . lacking in the symbolic order, the
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ineliminable residue of all articulation, the foreclosed element, which may be
approached, but never grasped: the umbilical cord" of all symbolic representation
(Concepts 280). The Beloved figures the nostalgia for both the past and for a "return" to
a mythic, prelapsarian moment of complete selfbood (in which the self could be
"apprehended as a real existent," in which the subject could be self) 1 3 in art that she
should conceal rather than express: Rossetti's Beloved beckons the spectator/reader to
become a "naive other" to her, so that the spectator/reader can be "absorbed, enchanted"
by the Beloved and believe in the "very illusion of perfect self-mirroring" she insinuates
(Zizek, Lacan 1 1 4). She deflects the spectator/reader's gaze, though, unsettling the
spectator/reader, allowing for the kind of traumatic eruption supposedly screened from
"the totality of [one's] field of vision" (Lacan 1 1 4). Because the Beloved fails to
revitalize the utopian aesthetic narratives of the past, she implies that a dystopic element
lurks in nostalgia, that the past cannot provide us a vantage point from which we can
objectively identify ourselves and thus aggressively counteract the gaze' s formative role
in the construction of subjectivity. We cannot "see ourselves seeing ourselves" as others
do; the subject cannot see her or himself as s/he appears in the other's consciousness.
,
Even more so than Rossetti s Beloved, Swinburne's "Lady of Pain" subverts
nostalgia to present the past nostalgically as such, to point out and exploit nostalgia
purposefully, and to expose the efforts to conceal the eye/gaze antinomy 14 as portrayed in

13

See S�e 123.
Lacan distinguishes the antinomy between the gaze & the eye in his Seminar XI: The Four Fundamental
Concepts ofPsycho-Analysis. Zizek summarizes Lacan's argument as follows: "[T]he eye viewing the
object is on the side of the subject, while the gaze is on the side of the object. When I look at an object, the
object is always already gazing at me, and from a point at which I cannot see it" (Lacan l 09). This is a
perspective so subjective that it cannot be shared. In other words, the subject cannot see the point from
which s/he is being seen (in the act of seeing).
14
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the relationship between the contemporary artist and his/her nostalgically objectified
narrative of"history." Swinburne's "Ladies of Pain," like the texts in which they are
situated, function as screens assertively deflecting the gaze of the other; they establish "a
fracture, a bi-partition," so to speak, "which isolates the function of the screen and plays
with it" (Lacan, Concepts 106-07). In other words, Swinburne's texts are "screen-like" in
that each text is a "locus of mediation" (Concepts 107) between the Beloved, who is
"characterized by being what [she] is not and not being what [she] is" (Stern 96) �nd
represents the past as it "no longer is" as well as the past that "is not" or never was
(Sartre 1 62), and the artist whose subjectivity is established only within the gaze of the
Beloved-as-other as well. There is no unity between the artist-as-subject and the
Swinburnian version of the Beloved: the artist wants to incorporate into a penultimate
version of "self' all possible "selves" anticipated via the Beloved's gaze, though the
Beloved is created to resist that very cohesion between "self' and "other-which-is-self."
As Adorno establishes in "Night Music," nostalgic elements-such as those represented
by Swinburne's version of the Beloved- gesture toward sites in an artwork where
cohesion disintegrates: the apparatus for interpretation and comprehension breaks down.
The "original contents" of history "are visible solely by virtue of the disintegration of
their gestalt-like unity in �he form of the work," and thus "interpretation wanders around
lost among the fragments. " 15 Swinburne, like Rossetti, cannot present the past except as
a fragmented pastiche of what may have been. Yet, by employing an artistic technique of
that fragmented, nearly inaccessible past-the baroque mirror-they both reflect on
history anamorp�otically, "reform[ing] a distorted picture" of history ·"by use of a
15 I have used Shierry Weber Nicholsen's translation, provided in Exact Imagination, Late Work 35.
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nonplanar mirror" (Jay, Eyes 48).
Martin Jay, in "Scopic Regimes of Modernity," describes the baroque as marked
by a celebration of "the dazzling, disoriented, ecstatic surplus of images" as well as its
rejection "of the monocular geometricalization of the Cartesian tradition with its illusion
of homogenous three-dimensional space with a God's eye view from afar" (16-17). 1 6 In
many ways, this could also be used to describe the Pre-Raphaelite art that so influenced
Swinburne. Though Rossetti and his followers had stated in The Germ that their art was
pledged to "truth to nature," adhering to every detail and providing an exact reflection of
such,1 7 Rossetti' s own work demonstrates his realization that any kind of truth content in
artistic representation is constantly renegotiated.
Any attempt to represent nature truthfully is to question continually "the truth of
something made," which is "the question of semblance and the rescue of semblance as
the semblance of the true" (Adorno, Theory 1 3 1). More simply, by attempting to be
"truthful to nature," Rossetti establishes that the concept of"nature" itself cannot be true.
Here the concept of nature comes into being when the artist establishes him/herself as the
dominating other. The artist creates the artwork which, "[w]holly artifactural . . . seems to
be the opposite of what is not made, nature"-nature distinguished here as that which is
beyond human creation, cohesive in itself, and thus something existing independent of
human reflection and human identity-thinking-yet "each refers to the other: nature to

16

To be fair, Jay draws upon the work of French philosopher Christine Buci-Glucksmann here-he cites La
Raison Baroque (Paris: Editions Galilee, 1984) and La Folie du Voir (Paris: Editions Galilee, 1986).
17
The Germ was a short-lived journal dedicated to the new Pre-Raphaelite aesthetic. These phrases appear
in F.G. Stephens's essay on early Italian art, commissioned by Rossetti and published in the first issue. See
The Germ: Thoughts Towards Nature in Poetry, Literature, and Art, intro. W.M. Rossetti, New York:
AMS, 1965. (This is a reprint of the 1901 collection. The four individual issues of The Germ appeared in
1850.)
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the experience of a mediated and objectified world, the artwork to nature as the mediated
plenipotentiary of immediacy" (Theory 62, emphasis added). Through this constant
mediation, culture violently imposes itself on nature; by doing so, in this particular case,
the Pre-Raphaelite artist knowingly acts as an aggressive interlocutor between himself
and nature, claiming that he can render nature truthfully because he renders nature as
other than himself.-and as a complete, cohesive other at that. To render nature
truthfully in every exact detail would be to render nature's complete cohesiveness: an
impossible task. So, nature conceptualized as a unified whole becomes material for art; 1 8
yet, as nature is always "in disunion with itself' (Horkheimer and Adorno 39), the
dissonance created by such disunion will exceed the fullness of cohesion necessary for
precise representation.
Such excess seems correlative to what Zizek calls "the foreclosure of the
[Lacanian] Real," meaning 'the exclusion of presymbolic "natural, substantial . . . 'being'
always identical to itself," which nonetheless leaves an "indivisible remainder" which
both sustains and traumatizes artistic representation (Plague 132; Borch-Jacobsen 17).
Similar to the violent imposition culture is to nature, this lurking, traumatic constituent of
the "Real" violently imposes itself on cultu�e; it resists being "reduced to a place" or
symbol, "even if it is an empty place in the symbolic order" (Zizek, Lacan 169). Thus a
triangular relationship between artist, nature, and the Real emerges: the artist, subject to a
symbolic network violated by the Real, violates nature in tum by trying to encapsulate
nature in an inviolate state, consequently violating it via human mediation which takes
18

This is based on Horkheimer and Adomo's statement that "nature as a whole is material for society"
(87).
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the form of domination. What results is disunion between all these contributing factors.
Moreover, complicating matters even further, the precise details of such disunion
themselves will exceed full representation, and the details rendered on the canvas or page
will be a semblance of the truth-in Rossetti's case, the truth of dissonance and its
resultant surplus-that one may try to rescue but never fully recover.
Hence Rossetti's use of a peculiarly flat perspective in his painting; in a very
baroque move, he purposely fails to create fully the illusion of three-dimensional space
on the canvas, choosing instead a more two-dimensional perspective which distorts
conventional depth perception. Conventional depth perception, Jay argues, is often
employed to de-eroticize art, as it "creates such a distance between the . . . eye and the
depicted scene that the painting lacks the immediacy associated with desire" (Foster 27).
Baroque artists, however, wished to gesture toward that kind of immediacy by employing
a distorted perspectivalism which "casts its attentive eye on the fragmentary, detailed,
and richly articulated surface of a world it is content to describe rather than explain" (Jay,
"Scopic" 1 3). A distorted, more two-dimensional perspective obliges the viewer to "look
awry" at the canvas, to view the canvas from several different angles to see the "exact
details" on it. In this way, the viewing subject must approach the artwork "with an
'interested' view, supported, permeated, and 'distorted' by desire" (Zizek, Lacan 12,
italics his), thus approximating the way relationship between subject and object, self and
other, is always "distorted" by the economies of desire. This is not direct reflection but a
multiplex of mediated and remediated reflections; and, with each different angle or
perspective the subject assumes in considering the artwork, s/he "self-consciously revels
in the contradictions between surface and depth, disparaging as a result any attempt to
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reduce the multiplicity of visual spaces into any one coherent essence" (Jay, "Scopic"
17). Moreover, the false sense of the unification of this visual multiplicity evoked by/in
the artwork is created by the visual excess or surplus of images in this multiplex. Though
the multi-faceted qualities of the baroque-inspired perspective tirelessly gesture toward it,
the "truth content" of art1 9 "negates the made" (Adorno, Theory 1 3 1 ). The content of
nature, like the content of history employed in art, must be apprehended as exceeding its
very conceptualization.
Swinburne, more consciously than Ros*tti, engaged in acts of play with
concept(s) of history commonly acknowledged to be unstable, fragmented, and even
"untrue." Antony Harrison points out that the majority of the Victorian artists treating
historical themes produce "an idealization" of those earlier cultures which "loo[k] back
nostalgically upon what they perceived as a period of uniform social and spiritual values,
of social integration, of political and cultural stability," portraying those epochs as
instances of "man and his society [existing] in idyllic harmony with nature" and with one
another (Medievalism 3-4). Swinburne's poetry, however, adopts a more radical stance
toward the past. He recognizes that any nostalgia for an era in which (hu)man and nature
shared a kind ofunmediated, symbiotic relationship is nostalgia for a trace moment of
wholeness which occurred before culture violently imposed itself on nature, a moment
that is both ahistorical and unreachable, never really having existed in history and
distinguished only by its absence. It is as if Swinburne searches for a kind of place
holder that Horkheimer and Adorno call mana, a place-holder for the otherwise unAdorno points out that the meaning. the "truth contenr' of artworks is enigmatical: "The indefatigably
recurring question that every work incites in whoever traverses it-the 'What is it all about?'-becomes 'Is
it true?'-the question of the absolute, to which every artwork responds by wresting itself free from the
discursive form of the answer" (Theory 127).
19
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placeable "remembrance'' of a prior, undifferentiated nature "in the subject, in whose
fulfillment the unacknowledged truth of all culture lies hidden" (40). Swinburne, though,
seems aware that his fascination with past searches for mana has everything to do with
revaluating how past artists/spectators considered, searched for-how they "gazed" at
mana. Swinburne thus foregoes the illusory stability granted by nostalgic treatments of
the past, instead opting to show how one' s perspective on the past is always shifting,
always transforming the "past" into a distorted mirror reflecting the "present"-and
present desire.
Consequently, he develops the themes of antiquity, medievalism, and the
Renaissance into vehicles portraying his contemporary concerns: the relativity of social
and spiritual values, social disintegration, and the instability of cultural conventions. To
Swinburne, the ancient world is less the golden age of civilization than an earlier stage of
the sensuous consciousness in revolt against the encroachment of reason; the medieval
quest for the Holy Grail figures the failure of an ascetic Christianity, which is haunted by
and is always perilously close to succumbing to the echoing thrall of the sensualities of
paganism; and, the cultural and artistic triumphs _ofthe Renaissance are infused with, if
not a result of, the sexual treachery, religious hypocrisy, and moral depravity of elite
ruling families like the Borgias. Like the decadentftn-de-siecle artists who succeeded
him, Swinburne is an "aesthetic voyager'' through history who "becomes a voyeur;
unable to encounter the real world"-or "real" history, history as it "really was"-"he
endures or lives an echo or a reflection or its visual counterpart" (Gordon 33). As
Swinburne prefigures thefin-de-siecle decadence movement by twenty years, though, the
decadence he draws upon is that which Jakob Burckhardt attributed to the end of the
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Renaissance, which culminated in the baroque-a period, says Burckhardt, which
ironically links "profound" moral and spiritual "corruption" with "an artistic splendor
which shed upon the life of man a lustre which neither antiquity nor medievalism could
or would bestow upon it" (2:- 443). The baroque style interjected i.nto the high
Renaissance "sign[s] of irresolution" providing diffident yet ornate glimpses of the
insecurity, disparity, and disunity lurking in its aesthetic conventions and the culture
which created them; yet these singular moments of cultural disintegration became the
seeds for "revolution or readjustment in the arts" (Sypher 106) as well as the subject's
relationship to art. Richard Le Gallienne, a major figure in late nineteenth-century
British decadence, similarly describes the decadent aesthetic as "consist[ing] in �he
euphuistic expression of isolated observations" (8 1 ), particularly observations of the
individual artist in dissonance with the world surrounding him/her. Similarly,
Swinburne's aestheticized history is comprised of observations (interpretations) of
isolated historical incidents; and, in a very baroque fashion, these observations are
"glaring flashes of perception" figured in "brutal acts and unexplained contradictions"
(Sypher 123).
One of the best examples of Swinburne renovating the complex liaisons between
subjectivity, desire, and history established in the Pre-Raphaelite aesthetic can be found
in "Satia te Sanguine." This poem experienced some minor attention in the late 1960s
when it was mentioned in a series of short articles about the life of Mary Gordon Disney
Leith, Swinburne's favorite cousin, published in The Times Literary Supplement. Among
the articles was an anecdote claiming that "Satia te Sanguine" was a "furious satire"
Swinburne written about "the vein of cruelty [Swinburne] thought he sensed" in his
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cousin, who seemed both to encourage and to repel Swinburne's romantic and sexual
interest in her, including a sexual interest in flagellation (Henderson 269). Apart from
such claims for the poem's biographical importance, though, the poem remains critically
ignored in favor of the lengthier, more blatantly sexual poems like "Anactoria" or "Laus
Veneris" and the mythically tragic attributes of"Dolores" and the poems to Proserpine.
But, as it demonstrates rather succinctly the schemes for exploring subjectivity and
perception Swinburne commences in grander fashion in these more celebrated works, the
poem sets up a dynamic model for reading the other poetry in the volume. 20
Furthermore, Swinburne' s portrayal of ritual sacrifice here serves as a rudimentary
template for the portrait of the ineffectuat pitiable Christ figure he later creates in Songs
before Sunrise 's "Before a Crucifix."

The poem's title indicates that it is loosely based on the legend of Queen
Tomyris. 2 1 According to Herodotus, King Cyrus of Persia attempted twice to capture the
widowed queen's throne: first by seduction, which failed, and then by force, murdering
her only son in the battle. In retribution, the queen had Cyrus killed and his decapitated
head brought to her in a bowl of blood. The bowl was inscribed with the words "Satia te
sanguine quem semper sitisti, " or, "Sate yourself on the blood for which you have always
20

Philip Henderson reports that many of these poems discussed in this chapter and the next--,-"Satia te
Sanguine," the Proserpine poems, and "Faustine"-were composed and continually revised between 18621 864. "Anactoria" and "Dolores" seem to have been written slightly later than the rest of these.
21
The legend of Queen Tomyris was a somewhat popular subject for Renaissance and baroque painting.
Queen Tomyris was among the historical and mythological figures painted by Italian Renaissance artist
Andrea del Castagno in his famous fresco, transferred to canvas in the mid-1800s and displayed in the
Galleria degli Uffizi, Florence; Swinburne went to Florence in 1864 and likely saw the painting when he
toured the Galleria with novelist Elizabeth Gaskell. Queen Tomyris was also painted by baroque artists
Jodochus van Winghe (the Flemish artist whose patron was Emperor Rudolph II) and Peter Paul Rubens.
As his letters indicate, Swinburne traveled Europe several times during the late 1850s and early 1860s,
frequenting art museums and galleries.
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thirsted." In Swinburne's dramatic monologue, though, the names of Tomyris and Cyrus
are never used. The speaker, a presumably male unrequited lover, addresses his distant,
cruel beloved. This evokes a surplus of implied images, asking the reader to "look at" the
dramatic situation of the poem fro.m several different angles. From one perspective the
speaker seems to be Cyrus failing in his attempt to seduce Tomyris, and from another
perspective the speaker seems to be an emanation of the conventional courtly lover
professing his devotion to the aloof object of his desire. Yet, from other perspectives, the
speaker can be seen as either a disgruntled admirer seeking violent revenge for his
spumed advances ("I wish you were stricken of thunder / And burnt with a bright flame
through" [lines 36-37]) or a cowering would-be lover expecting to be harmed if not
murdered by his beloved, who "kills men's hearts with a breath" (line 47) and "suck[ s]
with a sleepy red lip / The wet red wounds in his heart" (58-59), again invoking the
violent acts of both legendary figures alluded to in the poem's title.
Because Swinburne merely gestures toward the legend of Cyrus and Tomyris and
its various historical contexts (ancient, Renaissance, baroque, Victorian), the speaking
subject of the poem cannot be firmly located. The subject, who both is and is not Cyrus
and/or a courtly lover and/or the poet, is simultaneously positioned in several virtual
sites, created by the allusory presence-which-is-absence of those historical contexts,
while inhabiting no actual site at all. The poem creates in itself an amorphous fantasy
space for self-negation, allowing for what Adorno terms "incapacitation of the subject,"
or the moment in which one confronts "the truth which expels man from the center of
creation and reminds him of his impotence," imposing "a subjective mode of conduct
[which will] confirm the sense of impotence [and] cause men to identify with it"
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,
(Negative 66-68). _ The speaker of Swinburne s poem is impotent, or powerless, in that
the truth of his desire-his nothingness, the objectless (beloved-less) void of desire he

actually desires-renders him somewhat speechless within his very speech. For he can
only identify himself, his own powerlessness, with a figurative "f' which cannot be
definitively located, named, or identified. Consequently, he is not even the center of the
speech acts he creates; he "speaks out of' the poem which does not depict him as a real,
tangible subject, per se (Adorno, Theory 1 68). Thus this incapacitated subject "speaks
himself by abolishing himself . . . as 'real "' (Borch-Jacobsen 1 1 4).
Tellingly, in the last five stanzas of the poem, the speaker introduces a third term
or person into the libidinal economy depicted in the poem. For the first twelve stanzas,
the speaker seems interested only in depicting the self/other relationship, featuring
himself as the "I," or imaginary ego, who desires the beloved and wishes the beloved to
recognize, if not reciprocate, his desire in turn. However, in stanza thirteen, the speaker
addresses the beloved as "you that we love" (line 44, emphasis mine), temporarily
displacing himself-or the speaking "I"- as an object of/for desire in the stanzas that
follow, transferring that object status to another figure, Christ. With this move, he also
transfers the insatiability of his desire to the beloved, who violently tries to satiate her
desire through the crucifixion:
As the tame beast writhes and wheedles,
He fawns to be fed with wiles;
You carve him a cross of needles,
And whet them sharp as your smiles . . . .
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You thrill as his pulses dwindle,
You brighten and warm as he bleeds,
With insatiable eyes that kindle .
And insatiable mouth that feeds.

Your hands nailed love to the tree,
You stript him, scourged him with rods,
And drowned -him deep in the sea
That hides the dead and their gods. (52-55, 60-67)
The Christ figure here, a "tame beast," seems less than God and more like what
Horkheimer and Adorno, in their discussion of "specific representation" in ritual, call
"the sacrificial animal . . . massacred instead o/the god" (10, emphasis mine). The
speaker obviously relishes in the violence enacted on Christ, evoking what Bataille in
Erotism calls "the ancient comparison of sacrifice and erotic intercourse" (90). As

Bataille explains, both "the act of love" and sacrifice "reveal the flesh" (Erotism 92). For
the speaker, the beloved's body, like "the lost white feverish limbs / Of the Lesbian
Sappho, adrift" (I. 9-10), is not accessible to him, but the pleasures of the flesh can be
revealed to him at least partially through the spectacle of crucifixion. Here the Christ
figure and not the beloved becomes the object of the speaker's fantasy of being "laid
open to the violence of the sexual urges . . . ; t<? the impersonal violence that overwhelms
[him] from without" (Erotism 90). In this moment of specular fantasy, the speaker
imagines himself as both Tomyris enacting violence on Cyrus and as Cyrus the victim of
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frenzied violence, the denied courtly lover and the beloved taking pleasure i n denial. 22 In
a very Sadean way, the speaker derives pleasure from fantasies of being both sexual
victim and victimizer simultaneously. Thus Swinburne uses the Christian myth of
Jesus' s sacrifice to demonstrate the transformation of sacrifice into a virtual site for
exploring the multiplicities of subjectivity-specifically, the muitiplicities erupting from
the interplay between deflected subjectivity and destroyed (or annihilated) subjectivity.
The deflected subject identifies with another,23 as when Swinburne's speaker engages in
plural and inclusive serial identifications; the destroyed subject is "the imaged
embodi�ent" of the lack, aware that "no wealth of experiences" or serial identifications
can fill that void (Lacan, Concepts 89; Zizek, Plague 122).
When Swinburne has his narrator, in a mode of deflection, identify with both the
victim and the victimizer, he seems to (re-)employ the Romantic notion of the self
transcending subject able to "see himself seeing himself' in various roles. However, as
Swinburne brings the Sadean notion of sado-masochistic ecstasy into play, this "stepping
out of the self' becomes a gesture of the destruction of the subject as well. Swinburne's
narrator exhibits plasticity, as he is both the sadistic "absolute subject" who reduces
another ''to an object-instrument" for his own satisfaction and the victim divested of any

22

Because the speaker assumes two imaginary, simultaneous subject positions here, the speaker's
masochistic fantasy seems reminiscent of the kind of fantasy Freud discusses in "A Child is Being Beaten":
Not only does the act of violence become "a meeting-place between (a] sense of guilt" which "transforms
sadism into masochism" and "sexual love," but it allows an individual to enact a "masochistic attitude
(which] coincides with a feminine one" as well as assuming a sadistic attitude like that of the female
aggressor who is "endow(ed] . . . with masculine attributes and characteristics" (184, 193, 196). Ultimately,
though, it seems Swinburne's speaker, like the "girl" Freud says "escapes from the demands of the erotic
side of her life, . . . is no longer anything but a spectator of the event which takes the place of a sexual act"
( 196).
23
"What I myself am not (namely, a subject. free, autonomous, independent, and so on) is always another
. . . who is taking my place-that place or social position where I would like to be" (Borch-Jacobsen 24).
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subjectivity, reduced to object status.24 In sadism "we encounter direct negation" and
"violent destruction" of the subject-as-masochist who "assumes the form of disavowal"
negation takes here---"that is, of feigning, of an 'as if which suspends [the] reality" in
which subjectivity must be palpably signified (Zizek, Metastases 9 1). Paradoxically,
then, Swinburne's subject directly negates himself, assuming the "as if' moment in which
he refuses the n�rcissistic fantasies sustaining identification of self; all the while, if not
identifying, at least gesturing at, the subject as he who negates, or he who sacrifices
himself.
As Horkheimer and Adorno have pointed out, "The transformation of sacrifice
into subjectivity occurs under the sign of the artifice that was already a feature of
sacrifice"; in that artifice, the "self loses itself to preserve itself' (56, 48-49). The
sacrificial Jesus, God in human form, is supposed to signify "the appearance of the whole
in the particular'' (Horkheimer and Adorno 19), or every possible dimension of human
identity in one particular, symbolic form. When the speaker of"Satia te Sanguine"
addresses his the beloved as "you who we love," this "we" seems to suggest the speaker's
identification with Jesus: "the absolute mediation" of the human and God "in the person
of Christ, who is simultaneously the representative of God among human subjects and the
subject who passes into God," as "the only identity of man and God is the identity in
· Christ" (Zizek, Metastases 39). "God" is the signifier for that which can fill the lack.
Failing to identify with the beloved, who rein�orces rather than fills the lack, the speaker
here enacts a sort of transference. Jesus becomes the "subject who is supposed to know"
how the lack can be overcome (Lacan, Concepts 233). In yet another paradox, by
24

See Zizek, Lacan l 08-09.
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enacting identification with Jesus with the inclusive pronoun "we," the speaker attempts
to "step out of himself' and sustain that "as if' moment signified by Jesus/God-a
moment in which the desire for identification is _suspended, and the schism between "the
perishable individual," subject of7to the temporal finitude of fantasy or specular
identification, and the "perennial Universal," the radical eternity of negativity, is not so
profound (Metastases 40). Actually, though, by identifying with Jesus, the speaker
subjects the god "to whom [sacrifices] are made . . . to the primacy of human ends, and
dissolve[s] his power" (Horkheimer and Adorno 50) to fulfill any lack or bring about any
kind of transcendent "as if' moment. Zizek explains that Jesus's sacrifice marks "not the
passing of God's terrestrial representative but the death of the God ofBeyond"-the
(im)possibility of the "as if' moment-"Himself' (Metastases 46). Swinburne's poem
suggests this as well, since he establishes that Jesus and the speaker are both subject to
the impossibility of fulfillment. Jesus "loves" the beloved because he experiences the
same "lack" as Swinburne's speaker; or, perhaps more accurately, Jesus is portrayed as
having the same "lack" as the speaker because Jesus, the superlative deity who would
fulfill lack, does not really exist except as the speaker's fantasy projection of his ideal
"self," just as the ideal woman does not really exist for the male subject.
Because the Jesus figure in this poem is just another of the speaker's serial
identifications, the traditional redemptive qualities of Christ's sacrifice do not come into
play here. An actual sacrifice does not even take place, as the person sacrificed does not
really exist; the ritual of crucifixion is portrayed as artifice. In the poem's final stanza,
the speaker admits, "And for all this, die he will not; / There is no man sees him but
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f' (68-69). The speaker has come full circle, again invoking the personal pronoun,
speaking once again as an incapacitated subject. He is more aware of the impotence of
his subject position, in that he recognizes the artificial quality of his fantasy of sacrifice
and the failure of the sacrifice to satisfy his desire in ways the beloved either cannot or
refuses to. After the charade of the sacrifice ends, the beloved "came and went and
forgot" (line 70), obviously not as haunted by the emptiness of the violent act as the
speaker is. The symbolic body of the Christ figure in the beloved's Sadean ritual is
revealed as an empty placeholder. the speaker, identifying again with the beloved and
thus detaching himself from the Christ figure, realizes that Jesus cannot recognize the
beloved's desire, or any human desire, for fulfillment. He also realizes that fulfillment
cannot be found in any representation of otherness (the Christ figure or the beloved).
Thus, any pleasure the speaker initially takes in the transgressive Sadean fantasy of self
destruction and self-negation ultimately perpetuates rather than satiates the "pure empty
Otherness" (Zizek, Plague 30) of desire. So, the body of the Christ figure, an ineffectual
attempt to satisfy what is insatiable, is drowned in the deep sea "That hides the dead and
their gods" (I. 66-67), indicating that here "Jesus" functions as yet another symbol of (to
borrow Wordsworth's famous phrase) a creed outworn.
Importantly, the Christ figure, like the other characters in the poem, is never
referred to by a proper name. This reinforces his role as a mirror of the speaker as
incapacitated subject. Recalling the advocation to castrate God that Swin�urne explores
in his Blake essay, Swinburne creates a decisively disempowered god figure, a signifier
signifyi1'g the absence of God's presence in this world yet also representing humanity's
relative powerlessness over the lack signified in death, or the "truth" of the Real. In sum,
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the sacrifice as artifice is disclosed, and the speaker has realized "the inevitable
experience of the uselessness and superfluousness of sacrifices" (Horkheimer and Adorno
53). In the poem's final line, the speaker declares, "I hope he [the Christ figure] will
some day die," indicating that he wishes for a time in which the actual will be possible,
for a time that will end any reliance on artifi ce. Swinburne's choice to use "hope"
instead of "know" is quite important, though, as it indicates a sensitivity to the limitations
intrinsic to the material world.
The shadowy Queen Tomyris providing the tremulous foundation for "Satia te
Sanguine" is but one emanation of the legendary heroine pervading the Poems and
Ballads. Like the women featured in Pre-Raphaelite painting, many of Swinburne' s
legendary heroines are real women elevated to cultic or mythic status through
imaginative remediation. That is, just as history is constantly recreated and retold in his
work, transformed by the constantly fluctuating dimensions of subjective experience
(Nicholsen 50), Swinburne's historical figures attain specific aesthetic properties: They
become symbols, or placeholders, for the flux of multiple discourses and multiple subject
positions that continually create new sites for exploring the shifting relationship between
the given work of art and its subjective content(s) by displacing other, previously initiated
or recognized sites.
Many critics, like Lene Ostermark-Johansen, find such perpetuity of flux a
detriment to Swinburne's aesthetic, clinging to T.S. Eliot's famous dismissal of
. Swinburne's inability to make determinate assessments of any work of art, or the function
of any specific aesthetic properties in a given work. She claims:
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Each passage builds up toward a climax, but most of the thoughts and
ideas developed during [his] moments of excitement dissolve and are
never integrated into a full conclusion. Swinburne's associative mind
carries him from one image to the next, thus leaving the reader to finish
his train of thought in the intervals before yet another outburst of his
enthusiasm introduces another set of ideas. (50)
Ostermark-Johansen echoes Peter Anderson's claim that Swinburne is a poet employing
"endless deflections" in a failing dialectic tension "not between surface and depth, but
between surface and nothingness," a "nothingness [which] displaces depth"; in due
course, because Swinburne does not want to disclose (and thus endlessly deflects) the
"horror" of what Anderson calls "the void of desire," Swinburne "sought to escape in
himself' ("Sterile" 1 8).
Anderson's identification of Swinburne's fascination with the nihilistic qualities
of desire is crucial, as are Ostermark-Johansen' s observations of the disintegrative
element characterizing Swinburne's aesthetic. That being said, though, the
characteristics of Swinburne's poems that these critics tend to disparage are revaluated in
the strong, thought-provoking counterarguments of other critics such as Rikky Rooksby
and Ruth Robbins. Both Rooksby and Robbins, whose critical projects are influenced by
the proliferation ofDerridean deconstruction, recognize that the production of flux and
deflection in Swinburne's poetry importantly functions to "circumlocate"25 subjectivity
and history in Swinburne's aesthetic. These critics apply Derridean notions of play and

25

I have borrowed this tenn from Robbins. who coins it from her adaptation of Derrida's early work on the
aesthetic.
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deferral to their readings of Swinburne's poetry, characterizing Swinburne's poetry of
,,
flux as a seemingly endless "play of signifying references eroding the limited
possibilities of the circulation of representative "signs," thus allowing a symbol or
signifier to function like "reflecting pools" or images which provide "an infinite reference
from one to the other" but always defer definitive, concrete meaning-the "kernel of
truth" one is trying to represent (Derrida, Grammatology 1, 36). Arguably, Swinburne
seems to engage in what Derrida calls a "dangerous promiscuity and a nefarious
complicity between the reflection and the reflected," in which aesthetic representation is
a narcissistic exercise of self projecting "self," inasmuch as "one thinks as if the
represented were nothing more than the shadow or reflection of the representer"
(Grammatology 36). Additionally, for Derrida, writing (in this case, writing poetry) is
the attempt to restore what the shadow or reflection denotes as absent or lacking by
creating a "presence," but that presence will always be "disappointed" because it,
paradoxically, continually dislocates what it attempts to restore (Grammatology 143).
Ultimately, though, Swinburne's poetry suggests that this Derridean formulation can be
used to indicate that the "condition of impossibility" of locating truth in representatio�
,
locating the "true" self, is simultaneously "its condition of possibility , (see Zizek, Plague
129). More specifically, Swinburne's practice of enacting deferral of meaning-the
"reality" underlying aesthetic representation, the "real self' underlying the subject as s/he
is represented-via the process of serial identification can be read as the condition of the
possibility for representing subjectivity as such.
This, in tum, provides Swinburne the opportunity to display a dynamic of
"unfolding and shifting perspectives" (Nicholsen 38) in the exploration of the "radical
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intersubjective character" (Zizek, Plague 8) of fantasy and how it sustains desire.
Fantasy "'stages' desire" which "is not the subject's own, but the other 's desire" (Plague
8-9). And the Swinburnian subject engages in serial identifications. trying on "shades
of otherness," so to speak-to answer the fundamental questions of desirer--"What do
others want from me? What do they see in me? What am I to others?" (Plague 9)
while endlessly deferring the actual (inaccessible) answer. This is not, as Anderson
would have it, the "practice of profound poetic (self-)deception" ("Sterile" 18,
parentheses in original). I believe it to be more like Adorno's practi�e of seeking to meet
human desires and t<? provide the grounds for finding satisfaction-pleasurer--in the
perseverance of an intense multiplicity of perspectives inherent in aesthetic experience
itself. 26
It is important here to differentiate between the Adornian sense of negativity and
the Derridean, especially considering that Swinburne's strain of negativity arguably
portends Adorno's much more than Derrida's. With Derrida, aesthetic negativity can
translate into an "ultratranscendental" moment of"nonaesthetic cognition," in which one
is able to "make absolute claims" about "the reflective assembly of identity or meaning of
signs," assuming a grammatological position beyond the aesthetic; these absolute claims
point "in the direction of resolution" to the problems of representation (Menke 225, 1 9597). In Adorno, though, aesthetic enjoyment is unique, "based on pleasure . . . which does
not let itself be recognized or identified" definitively (Menke 12). In Adorno's version of
26

This is based on Adomo's contention in Aesthetic Theory that the artwork, in its entirety, elicits the
viewing subject to have a powerful aesthetic experience only inasmuch as the particular facets or elements
of which the whole is comprised are "restored to the detail," or not fully ceded to the whole. These
unceding individual facets or details, always in tension with the idea of artistic wholeness or "unity," give
the work of art an intensity which "thickens and explodes" with tbe flux of multiplicity ( 187).
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the via negativa, that pleasure is found in the exposition of where and in what we fail to
render that very pleasure literally, in the words and images and identifications which are
necessarily limited in their ability to express what they do not really signify. In the
Adornian mode of aesthetic negativity, when one intends to render something or someone
in art literally, one really subverts his/her own act of rendering. An example of this is
Swinburne' s presentation of Lucrezia Borgia in his "Ballad of Death": the more
Swinburne presents his Borgia as a literal rendering of the historical woman, the more it
becomes apparent that his Borgia is _a figurative rendering expositing the limits of the
rendering, expositing what Borgia is not, but what she could represent Swinburne does
not .create an "ultratranscendent" moment in which he (or his reader) becomes cognizant
of the nonaesthetic, singular Borgia, in which one can "see oneself seeing" the "true"
Borgia. Instead, Swinburne portrays Borgia as a fluid series of portrayals, each a
different facet of the untranscendable limits of rendering her "presence."
Precisely because his poetic persona have this serial quality, Swinburne is often
accused of providing only superficial portrayals of his subjects. In "Swinburne's Internal
Centre," Rooksby argues that the superficiality often ascribed to Swinburne's aesthetic
really results from a critical misunderslanding of Swinburne' s use of"lyric emotion" as a
mirror for the cycle of identifications his subjects enact in his poetry. Swinburne's
Poems and Ballads are indebted to the dramatic monologues of Browning and Tennyson,
in that the situations or events portrayed in Swinburne's poems are relayed via the
intonated voices of fictionalized speaking subjects, in a manner wholly dependent upon
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those characters' emotional, expressive reactions and interpretations. 27 In Browning's
work, for instance, one encounters a gallery of subjects whose monologues command a
version of the "subjective utterance of the Romantic lyric," in which they confess their
"intimate obsessions, fantasies, and pathologies," strongly persuading the
reader/spectator to identify with them (Gregory 494-95). But, because these forced
identifications rely on the use of an affected, bombastic rhetoric, the reader instead resists
the identification and regards the subject of the monologue in a detached manner. The
persuasion is revealed as persuasion per se, and the speakers appear more as superficial
and limited case studies of specific pathologies rather than as figurative sites
demonstrating the fluctuating dynamism of human subjectivity. It is probably for reasons
like this that many critics typically contend that the "lyric emotion itself is regarded as
untrustworthy and inauthentic" (Rooksby, "Centre" 26).
Swinburne, though, uses lyric emotion not to force identification with a singular
figure, but to facilitate an encounter with the poetic language triggering the serial
identifications which can express a wider variety of ''human feeling" as well as "the
articulation of a . . . vision of human existence" distinctive to each reader (Mcsweeney
125). He entices his reader to approach his poetry outside of the role of enlightened
spectator. Rooksby notes that the modem spectator cultivates distance from what s/he
observes, and from that distance "comes de�achment, [ and] detachment brings
27

Rooksby seems to have based his approac� in � on Thais Morgan's contention that, due to critics'
persistence in regarding Poems and Ballads "as the fictionalized autobiography of a sexually and socially
maladjusted individual . . . . Swinburne was not granted the skill of aesthetic distancing" generally
accredited to Tennyson and Browning (Morgan, "Dramatic" 176). Perhaps some of the critical perception
regarding Swinburne's lack of "aesthetic distancing" stems from the young Swinburne comparing his style
to the lyrisme romantique established in the work of his favorite French Romantic poet, Hugo. Hugo's
poetry is "deeply subjective"; like the poetry of Alphonse de Lamartine, Alfred de Musset, and Alfred de
Vigny, it "appear[s) to depend greatly upon the individual poet's experiences and feelings" (Cuddon 5 1 8).
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alienation," until eventually alienation "begets judgment" ("Centre" 26). But Swinburne
wants his spectator, the reader of his poetry, to submerge him/herself in the voice of the
poem's speaking subject-to feel what Swinburne's character feels, see what his
character sees. In other words, Swinburne's ideal reader will reflect upon the world as it
is (in the spirit of the baroque mirror) refracted by his character's distinctive perspective.
What Rooksby calls Swinburne's "lyric emotion" is the affective aspect of Swinburne's
poetry employed to overcome the alienation between observer and observed, gazing
subject and gazed-at object, promoted by reason. The Swinburnian spectator should
bypass the alienation which forces the observed "object . . . [to] be dominated by
preformed categories of the understanding"-meaning judgment-and instead experience
· the object "spontaneously," "naively" (Nicholsen 1 7- 1 8). Though, as Adorno would be
quick to point out, such naivete is an illusion, but an illusion that has not completely been
subsumed "under the categories of a dominating conceptual understanding" (Nicholsen
1 8). This illusion is "something always already required by [the] contemplation" of
artworks (Adorno, "Presuppositions" 97). Thus, for example, the historical figures
featured in Swinburne's poetry are not really the same figures described in canonical,
historical narratives; instead, Swinburne reimagines them so that his reader encounters
the figure, paradoxically, both outside of and despite the details already established and
irrevocably flavored by conventional historical narratives. In this way, Swinburne's
historical figure symbolizes his practice of "circumlocating" the subject in art: exploring
the multiple possibilities "in which a subject may be . . . placed in terms ofwhat is
(spoken or written) around or about it" (Robbins 42).
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Robbins' s argument relies heavily on Derrida's notion of ''aboutness"28 and his
claim that we must "negotiate, deal with, transact with marginal effects," especially
concerning the "differential network" produced within and by a given text, "a fabric of
traces referring endlessly to something other than itself, to other differential traces . . .
overrun[ning] all the limits assigned to it" (qtd. by Robbins 42). Considering her
emphasis on the trace, which is "the memory of an ever-receding origin that always
remains elusively outside of what it produces in the present . . . [which] never leads to
spatial simultaneity and full visibility" (Jay, Eyes 506), Robbins suggests that the
subject's position is always a virtual site, a kind of bridge provisionally suspended
between the margins of past (what has already occurred, accessible only by recollection
which is always erratic) and possible future experiences (what has yet to and may not
ever occur, articulable only as conjecture), what one has and/or has not seen and what
one has yet to and possibly may never see. This is the chaotic differential network of a
subject's current frame of reference. In the particular case of Swinburne's treatment of
the subject, Robbins notes,
Before we can begin to talk about something [or someone], we must know
what . . . limits it, defines it, frames it. What is at stake is the possibility of
communication, the sending of messages across the frame from the picture
to the world, or from selt7selves to (the) other(s) . . . . The frame is not a
pure limit, but a series of mo(ve)ments, events, in time and space, strung

28

'"About', as a preposition, offers us at least two modes of qualification-of time and space-which are
also merely approximation," leading us to question "circumlocution (talking about) and circumscription
(writing about) in order to think about the ways in which a subject may be circumlocated-pJaced in terms
of what is (spoken or written) around or about it" (Robbins 42).
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together or kept rigorously apart: it is several instances of the preposition
'about', multiple approximations. (43)
Because the Swinburnian subject is a circuitous "series of mo(ve)ments, events in time
and space"-movements which sometimes seem to lack a m�nifest continuity-many
critics have disparaged Swinburne's characters for lacking a discernible "internal centre."
In doing so, though, these critics fail to acknowledge that the speaking subject of a
Swinburne poem has for his/her virtual "internal centre" a kind of "tumultuous energy''
(Rooksby, "Centre" 28}' generated by the constant establishment and subsequent
absorption of the limitations of the "self' or ego in the cycle of serial identification. The .
Swinbumian subject refuses to be defined by the limits s/he cannot transcend, so s/he
perpetually lurks "about" these limits, recasting them with every tum of the identificatory
cycle, finding some gratification in the drive-like persistence. In this cycle, the
emergence of an expanded ego and the fragmentation of the ego coincide. 29 The ego
seems large enough to encompass the compilation of dissonant identities it encounters,
but it also becomes fragmented by the repetitive substitutions of the extraneous serial
"selves" for its own. In other words, the ego expands to accommodate the very
misrecognitions that fragment it. The ego is situated "about" its own dissolution.
In similar vein, then, Swinburne's historical figures are situated "about" their
usual contexts in traditional historical narratives. The frame of the conventional narrative
is Swinburne's point of departure. From there, he gestures at the traces of the Real in his
poetic subjects, the remainder of the dissolute ego stuck in the grand concourse of
29

My analysis here is based on Zizek's assertion that the Cartesian cogito-the "pure thought" and "its
bodily remainder"-is the site where "emergence and loss," or the "void of self-relating negativity,"
coincide (Plague 12-13).
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meconnaissance the subjects of his poems have become, by inventing discourse threads
which teasingly point toward what the reader will never fully know about those poetic
subjects. Swinburne cannot, of course, represent that which exceeds historical, textual
representation altogether, or the aspects of the subject -that the spectator/reader will never
quite see. However, he is aware that when one creates a representative figure, one
involuntarily creates the excess lurking "about" the figure as �ell.
As I mentioned previously, the outstanding example of the fluid textual
explorations "about" subjectivity is Lucrezia Borgia of"A Ballad of Death."
Swinburne's Borgia, the first "Lady of Pain" one encounters in the Poems and Ballads,
First Series, serves as a template for the endless deflection of self-certainty and the
refusal to resolve desire falsely through the temporality of fantasy. In a somewhat
restrictive fashion, Peter Anderson reads the motion of serial identification in the poem as
futile activity simply marking "the essential empti�ess of the beautiful image," which is
offered to the spectator/reader only "to be mourned as the lost object of desire" ("Sterile"
19). In his disparagement, though, Anderson dismisses the critical importance of the
"emptiness" Lucrezia Borgia symbolizes in the poem. Swinburne's "Borgia" is a study
of the network of differential traces that once constituted the real-life subject that was
Borgia, complicated not only by the spectator/reader's navigation of the traces of Borgia
sustained and created by history books but also by the spectator/reader's awareness that
Swinburne's "Borgia" is not the historical Borgia but a figure created about Borgia.
The speaker in the "Ballad of Death" circumlocates Borgia by imploring the
personified Love, the ostensible audience for his speech also seeking audience with the
princess, to "Cover thy lips and eyelids" and "let thine ears / Be filled with rumour of
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people sorrowing" (lines 4-5), immediately establishing that the "real'' Borgia will not
hear the invocations made in her name or be physically seen. Only by attuning oneself to
a symphony of aural components-like the music which Adorno attests "is a non
conceptual, non-discursive language which . . . represents the social world outside it" in a
kind of "re-presentation [that] can be more than a simple mirroring" (Jay, Adorno 1 33)
can one reinvoke the dead princess via the imagination, to be seen only in "the mind's
eye." Anderson astutely notes that Swinburne chooses Borgia to demonstrate his
departure fro� the Pre-Raphaelite treatment of historical subjects: instead of the
"sublime" idealism of Rossetti's medievalism, Swinburne offers "a counter ideal of a
lurid and bloodstained Renaissance" ("Sterile" 19). However, this is not exactly
"Swinburne's nostalgia for the lost licentiousness of the aristocracy" of the
Renaissance/baroque epochs, as Anderson simplifies it (1 9), but it is a treatment of
nostalgia nonetheless. Anderson convicts Swinburne of looking at the "licentiousness" of
the Renaissance/baroque aristocracy as a "nai've other" enchanted by the illusion that, in
Swinburne's very fascination with Borgia, Swinburne sees in her his own gaze-as if he
can see the world as Borgia had seen it. In Anderson's reading, then, Swinburne's Borgia
seems very much like a copy of one of Dante Gabriel Rossetti's Pre-Raphaelite historical
subjects, a subject who inhabits a world already re-enchanted by the "creative principle"
of art30 conveyed through the aestheticizing gaze of the individual artist. But, as much as
the Pre-Raphaelite artists like Rossetti wanted their idealized depictions of history to
,,,
project "aura or 'mystery, this ends up becoming "a reifying process of aestheticization
. . . which purchases a frozen aesthetic moment, or a 'moment's monument "' within the
30

See Dialectic ofEnlightenment 5.
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gaze "at the price of life in real time" (Barclay 1 9). However, Anderson, despite his ·
important claim that Swinburne's nostalgia is not the Pre-Raphaelite version, does not
consider how Swinburne very pointedly plays with the concept of the Pre-Raphaelites'
failure to re-enchant the world through nostalgia.
In a different way, Swinburne presents hi.s historical subject as object of the
speaker's gaze, demonstrating his awareness that the speaker (as well as the reader) will
"apprehend" Borgia "as an object at a certain distance . . . which escapes [the speaker]
inasmuch as it unfolds about itself its own distances" (Sartre 343). The object, as
"other," is paradoxically very distant fro.m the speaker and yet an interloper in the
"space" in which the speaker establishes his own subject position; concurrently, the
speaker must redefin� that space as organized around this other, tnough there is
something about the space-and the other who affects it-which escapes definition
altogether. Borgia escapes total definition because she is 'something he cannot actually
see; when the speaker says, "O Love, thou knowest if she were good to see"
(line 21 ), he implies that "Love" sees what he cannot, or that which exceeds usual human
vision. Swinburne's speaker, unlike his Pre-Raphaelite poetic counterparts,
acknowledges the screen, or the "opaque" space which mediates between self and other,
making actual rapport impossible {Lacan, Concepts 96). Here "Love" is not only, like
the screen, mediates between the speaker and Borgia; "Love" is also an imaginary
audience, and also the name assigned to the virtual locus of the "self-conscious
perspectivism" 31 in the individual imagination. In such "self-conscious perspectivism,"
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one tries imaginatively to collapse "the distance between the subjective consciousness" of
the observer and the object being observed (Jay, Eyes 1 90).
Moreover, the speaker also addresses "Time," the personification of the virtual
locus of varying historical narratives: "O Time, thou shalt not find in any land / Till, cast
out of thine hand, / . . . Another woman fashioned like as this" (22-25). Swinburne' s
Borgia is circumlocated by what Adorno, in "Beautiful Passages," calls exakte Phantasie
or "exact imagination."

32

Shierry Weber Nicholsen explains that such a site

marks the conjunction of knowledge, experience, and aesthetic form . . .
point[ing] provocatively and explicitly to the relationship between
exactness-reflecting a truth claim-and the imagination as the agency of
a subj ective and aconceptual experience[,] . . . emphasizing the
imagination' s capacity to discover, or produce, truth by reconfiguring the
material at hand . . . . (4)
"Time" wil l not find another Borgia fashioned as the speaker's Borgia, because the
speaker' s Borgia· exists only in the speaker's "complex relationship to the shifting
reception" of Lucrezia Borgia in history (Nicholsen 50). That relationship always
changes as the speaker's current perspective, a kaleidoscopic revision of the traces of
"Borgia" found not only in the conventional concept of Borgia but also in critique of that
convention, shifts. In other words, the poem is a site at which we can explore variations
on the theme ofLucrezia Borgia, "enact[ing] the mo(ve)ment" of the speaker' s imaginary
encounter with Borgia-which in turn becomes the reader' s encounter-rather than

32

Here I am following Nicholsen's lead, translating tl1e phrase as "exact imagination" rather than "exact
fantasy,n because " Adorno (seems to) evoke Kant and tlle aesthetic rather than Freud" (229n9).
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finding it presented "in a linear or narrative form" (Robbins 46).33 And all these
variations are "true": the speaker's implicit claim to have encountered the "true" Borgia
in his vision is just as defensible as an individual reader's claim to have encountered the
"true" Borgia in his/her act of reading the poem and thus enacting the "imagination's
capacity to discover" the "truth,'� which is always in a process of becoming.
The "Lady of Pain" is the template for this perpetual process of becoming. To
quote again from Robbins, the "lady" in Swinburne's work is a mirror image for the
viewer (or reader), "an image in which the viewer's gaze is ever caught between . . . two
faces"-the face that is reflected and face doing the reflecting-"searching for clues and
equivalence in the space-parergon-between them" (50). This is not presented as a
perfect(ed) mode of vision but as a suggestion of a remediated imaginative vision,
indicative of an active renegotiation of the limit experience within the multiple
conjunctions of knowledge, experience, and aesthetic form. In the sixth stanza,
Swinburne renegotiates the conjunction(s) of satisfaction and dissatisfaction of desire, the
paradox of finding ecstasy amid alienation, as he describes the permutations of his
speaker's ever-reflected-and-reflecting gaze reflected in the distorted (or baroque) mirror
which is Borgia:
The tears that through her eyelids fell on me
Made mine own bitter where they ran between . . .
She saying; Arise, lift up thine eyes and see
If any glad thing be or any good
Robbins actually uses these phrases in her explication of the poem "Verses: Before a Mirror'' Swinburne
wrote to accompany Whistler's painting, Symphony in White No. 2 (1 865), but the aesthetic trope of
"framing" Robbins discovers in the "Verses� is applicable to all Swinburne's poems from this period.
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Now the best thing is taken forth of us . . . . (5 1 -52, 54-56)
Borgia's eyes are closed, initially suggesting a faiJure to recognize the speaker's desire.
She cannot, will not, refuses to look at him. Thus she seems to function as a Lacanian
mirror which
captures, freezes, and alienates the subject by expatriating him in an image
that dominates, subjugates, and "suggests" him. On the other hand, and
simultaneously, it permits him to see himself--that is, to separate himself
from his image by seeing himself in front of himself. (Borch-Jacobsen 82)
With eyes wide shut, she redirects the speaker' s gaze back to himself, specifically his
tears. The speaker' s tears "run between" Borgia's, because there is really no distinction.
Borgia's tears are the speaker's because Borgia is really the speaker; or, more
specifically, Borgia is a projection of the speaker's prolifically fragmented ego.
This is further made evident by the fact that what Borgia "says" in the poem is
purposefully not set apart from the rest of the verse by the use of inverted commas. On a
surface level, the speaker seems to disappear in the statement attributed to Borgia,
"speak[ing] himself as nothing," but, on a deeper level, he uses Borgia as the screen
through which to enunciate his own "pure desire of self' (Borch-Jacobsen I 08). Desire is
the "best thing taken forth of us" (line 56): it is not only what allows the individual
subject to locate him/herself episodically among the "modulation of the signifying chain"
of the material world, but also to access that which exceeds the common understanding of
the material world as well-the truth(s) of "what we are as well as what we are not, our
being and our non-being" (Lacan, Seminar 3 2 1 -22). Here, the speaker speaks himself
cryptically as both what he is and as what he is not (Borgia). In the terms Swinburne
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introduces in William Blake, the speaker uses the modulations of the "kingdom of
speech" to enter the "kingdom of dreams" (or, given the presence of Borgia in this case,
one might suggest "queendom" is the better term here). In the realm of dreams, the
speaker aspires to access the "magic of enjoyment" which exceeds the material world
which binds him "to a specific social function and, ultimately, to the self' (Horkheimer
and Adorno 105).
The speaker's social function here would be that of a lover-specifically a courtly
lover. The speaker notes that "At kissing times across her stateliest bed / Kings bowed
themselves and shed" tears like "Pale wine" (lines 62-64), paying a respectful and
honorable homage to the "sweet . . . / Mouth whereby men lived and died" (73-74). To
these mourning kings, Borgia is the courtly beloved, detached and unattainable. The
kings are "condemned to remain an asymmetrical non-relationship" with Borgia, who
remains "an inhuman partner"; as such, the relationship between them and Borgia cannot
be "transposed into a symmetrical relationship between pure subjects" (Zizek, Metastases
I 08-09). The speaker, though, attempts to traverse the detachment the other mourners
have toward her: He throws hiinself upon the corpse in grief, lets his tears "r[un] down I
Even to the place where many kisses were," and the parting kiss to the deceased becomes
a series of cunnilingual kisses "fill[ing] the tender interspace" where "the flowers cleave
apart" (lines 83-84, 87-88). He becomes what Zizek, borrowing from Poe, calls "the imp
of the perverse"; by imaginatively engaging in necrophiliac activity with Borgia's corpse,
the speaker "accomplish[es] an act 'only because it is prohibited "' (Metastases 99). This
is a deliberate parody of funeral be�avior intended to, in the spirit of Sade, reveal not
only the perversions lurking but also the pervasiveness of excess within social
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conventions such as acts of mourning. The perversion of Swinburne' s speaker "marks
the point at which the motivation of an act, as it were, cuts off its . . . link" to external
reality "and grounds itself solely in the immanent circle of self-reference" (Metastases
99).
However, in this circle of self-reference, Swinburne's speaker reinforces the more
Lacanian "structure of perversion," the "inverted effect" of fantasy in which "the subject
. . . determines himself as object, in his encounter with the division of subjectivity"
(Concepts 1 85). He portrays himself as "the object-instrument of the will-to-enjoy
(volonte-de-:iouir)--which is not his own will" but the other's; the speaker thus "does not
pursue his [necrophiliac] activity for his own pleasure" (Zizek, Lacan 108-09) but to
pleasure Borgia. Whereas Swinburne's other necrophiliac persona, the leper, all but
admits that his actions are for his own pleasure (which he finds in his very failure to
fulfill the lack at the center of all constructions of subjectivity), the speaker here is more
pointedly portrayed as victim of the pleasure of thefemmefatale, the embodiment of the
lack, that fundamental divide which constitutes the subject, whose identity is always
determined by what/who the subject is not. 34
Because Swinburne's speaker perverts the mourning rituals for Borgia so that
they become more about the speaker's sense of lack than the actual loss of Borgia>
Swinburne > s speaker embodies the melancholia often mistaken for mourning, which is
obfuscated by mourning rituals and yet exceeds them. Freud established that melancholia
results when the subject's relationship with the object of his desire/"love," in whom s/he
is supposed to recognize her/himself and be recognized by the other in tum, proves
34

See Zizek, Metastases 5 1 .
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impossible. Rather than redirecting that desire of and for recognition to a new object, the
subject withdraws it into his/her ego instead. This establishes "an identification of the
ego with the abandoned object," which can result in "emptying the ego until it is totally
impoverished" (Freud, "Mourning" 586, 589). Zizek develops this further, explaining,
[T]he mourner mourns the lost object and kills it a second time through
symbolizing its loss, while the melancholic is not simply the one who is
unable to renounce the object but rather the one who kills the object a
second time (treats it as lost) before the object is actually lost.. . . [T]he
melancholic is not primarily the subject fixated on the lost object, unable
to perform the work of mourning, but rather the subject who possesses the
object but has lost his desire for it because the cause that made him desire
the object has withdrawn, lost its efficiency. ("Melancholy" 662)
Importantly, the melancholic has lost desire for himself: the "object-loss [is] transformed
into an ego-loss and the conflict between the ego and the loved person"-the subject-as
object who is lost-is transformed "into a cleavage between the critical activity of the
ego and the ego as altered by identification" (Freud, "Mourning" 586). Swinburne
purposefully includes the contrasting detail of the kings to demonstrate the difference
between melancholy and mourning in the poem. The kings, perhaps Borgia's former
lovers, move through the conventions of mourning not only to acknowledge the loss of
Borgia but also to symbolize the loss of their desire-as their desire manifested itself
through their desire/or her-with the "spikenard bruised for a burnt-offering" (line 65).
Importantly, the kings are a part of the speaker's fantasy visi�:m; they are meant to
represent historical men who, unlike the speaker, had known the flesh-and-blood Borgia.
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They had a physical "object-relationship" with her, a "narcissistic identification" in
which each king wished to "incorporate" her into hi mself, that was "shattered"
("Mourning" 586-87). The speaker, on the other hand, "knows" Borgia only in his
attempts to weave the historical traces of "Borgia" into an object of his desire. As Borgia
is not actually present in the poem, "we cannot see what it is," exactly, "that is absorbing
him so entirely" ("Mourning" 584). So the speaker constantly grasps at these traces
whose fullness is always already lost to him, demonstrating his fixation on the very
gesture of loss.
The speaker's fixation on loss becomes more evident in the stanza immediately
following the described necrophiliac event. Abruptly, .the speaker's adoration of Borgia
no longer functions as the central element of the poem, and the speaker's passionate
fervor suddenly turns bitter. His ecstatic engagement with the beloved shifts into a
lament that "in the days when God did good to me, / Each part about her was a righteous
thing," and that "The beauty of her bosom [was] a good deed / In the good days when
God kept sight of us" (9 1 -92, 95-96). The cause that made him desire Borgia has
withdrawn, and, as a result, the speaker withdraws into the kind of melancholy which
occurs "when we finally get the desired object, but are disappointed in it" (Zizek,
"Melancholy" 662). The difference is, of course, that the speaker only "gets" the desired
object in the spectacle of fantasy created in the poem. Nevertheless, even the fantasy of
"getting"-the artifice intended ostensibly to fulfill desire-causes the speaker
disappointment. By invoking God for the first time in the poem, Swinburne motions to
hi s use of God in other poems, like "Satia te Sanguine." In "Satia," the God-figure
symbolizes an absence-which-is-presence in the material world-a function very similar
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to that of Borgia here. Additionally, "God" reinvokes the catastrophe of meaning, in that
"God" (as well as Borgia) is the ultimate signifier of aestheti� signifiers. The signifier no
longer conveys meaning via its appearance, but the abstraction, and sometimes the very
absence, of definitive meaning. Here, Swinburne seems attached to the very indexical
gestures that mark the loss of definitive meaning.
The absence of the definite is marked by the "[s]cars of dam�ge and disruption"
by which "art desperately negates the closed confines" of the limitations which delineate
· the "definite" (Adorno, Theory 23). Swinburne gestures towards these scars in the final
stanza, when his speaker again addresses his ostensible audience, though this time the
audience is the poem itself, not "Love":
Now, ballad, gather poppies in thine hands
And sheaves of brier and many rusted sheaves
Rain-rotten in rank lands,
Waste marigold and late unhappy leaves
And grass that fades ere any of it be mown . . . . ( 1 0 1 -05)
On the surface, this appears a dismal description of encroaching autumn. However, the
"sheaves" and "leaves" can be read as references to paper, especially the paper upon
which the poem itself is written. 35 The speaker asks the poem itself to "gather
poppies"-to numb itself, to diminish its own power and affectiveness. The poem' s
power is further diminished by the state of the "sheaves" and "leaves" of the manuscript:
35 Linda McDaniel has also suggested that this is "alternate imagery for printed poetry" (98). However, she
also contends that the previous lines describing necrophiliac activity should also be read as metapoetic.
She suggests that we should read Borgia as a metaphor for the book itself, considering "the bosom or
'parted breast flowers' (to] represent the twi� parted pages of an open book, 'cloven apart' at the
'interspace' where the pages are bound" (97).
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rusted, waterlogged, and faded, the poem itself would scarcely be legible. Only a trace
of the poem would be left on such soggy pages, and if the poem were reduced to a mere
trace of other intersecting traces, one must begin anew the task of circumlocating Borgia,
as well as the speaker's subject position. With the introduction of another trace, the
viewing/reading spectator's perspective on these fi gures changes.
Swinburne chooses to end the poem with a very Hegelian commentary on desire
itself, imploring the ballad to "Seek out Death's face ere the light altereth, / And say 'My
,,,
master that was thrall to Love / Is become thrall to Death (107-09). From one
perspective, the speaker of the poem (or a version of Swinburne-as-poet) is the "master"
and the poem itself the "slave who works for the master," laboring to compress the
master's affects "in relation to an idea, a concept" (Kojeve 48)-in this case, Borgia.
From another perspective, the master of the poem "act[s] not for the sake of subjugating a
thing, but for the sake of subjugating another Desire (for the thing)" (Kojeve 40, italics in
original) by way of the screen, the locus of mediation between the gaze and the individual
subject. It is as if the poem has become an other to the speaker, generating its own
desire-portrayed here as desire for the desired object, Borgia-that competes with the
speaker's own. The speaker's last attempt to subjugate the other's desire is to
fi gu ratively "kill" the ballad by ending it. Here, one could argue that the speaker
attempts to move out of melancholy into mourning; for the speaker, mourning the loss of
Borgia, symbolically kills her a second time with the symbolic "death" of the poem itself
All these things considered, though, neither Swinburne's speaker nor his poem can
compete with the power of death itself, the "absolute master."
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As mentioned above, the cause·for Swinburne's speaker's desire ofi'for Borgia
suddenly dissipates from the poem, as it is deflected; the speaker realizes that Borgia, like
the uncanny Beloved of Rossetti's poems, is a specular image of himself.-specifically,
his real "desire of death," or desire to recognize himself as "pure abysmal ek-stasis in the
'nothing' of the other's desire" (Dorch-Jacobsen 96). In the conscious creation ofBorgia
as a fantasy object, Swinburne necessarily must have the speaker experience a "psychic
reality" in which he realizes that he is "the identificatory character who 'fulfills' [his
own] wish" as well as realize that identificatory acts "can neither 'fulfill' the wish nor
'satisfy' desire" (Borch-Jacobse,n 95-96). Swinburne's speaker wearily bids, "Bow down
before him [Death], ballad, sigh and groan, / But make no sojourn in thy outgoing; / . . .
Death shall come in with thee" (1 10- 1 1, 1 14). Importantly, the poem can no longer speak
but merely "sigh and groan." This marks "the boundary" of the poem's "negativity," or
where the "artwork say[s] what is more than the existing, and . . . do[es] this exclusively
by making a constellation of how it is, 'Comment c •est"' : the poem both represents the
absolute (of desire, death) and keeps it at a distance (Adorno, Theory 132-33). The poem
itself cannot absolutely signify the truth of desire. But, by constantly transposing each
member of a group of signifiers that gesture toward the truth of desire, though at a
distance, the artwork makes a "promise" to attempt to represent what is "yet to be heard,
yet to be seen, even if it [is] the most fearsome" (Theory 13 5).
The "promise" of a meaningful representation ofthe interplay between drive,
desire, and the misrecognitions inherent in any act of identity formation, in which we
may find some satisfaction, is the goal of Swinburne's aesthetic. His Borgia, the
template for all his poetic identities and identifications, may exist in a "'between' time
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and 'between-the-Jines' space"-the virtual space in which we establish subject-positions
as well as meaning-but she clearly exceeds "her own implied annihilation, her framing
into art" (Robbins 48). I think Peter Anderson is correct when he says Swinburne's
poetry is like a Foucauldian "incitement to discourse," but rather than inciting a discourse
which imputes universality ("Sterile" 20), Swinburne's poetic discourse "is disruptive,
not only of what we are seeing, but of the who we are that does the seeing" (Robbins 5 1,
italics hers), as well as the who we are actually looking at. The imaginary portrait of
Borgia becomes the imaginary portrait of the speaker-as-poet who, in tum, via acts of
reflection and identification, becomes an imaginary portrait of the spectator/reader at a
specific time, from a specific perspective. There is a vulnerability in this kind of
constellative or serial approach to subjectivity, noticed and called nihilistic by Anderson
and others, in that the plenitude of identifications risks identification entirely. In other
words, in the constant, deflective deferrals that occur with every attempt to assert
selfbood in the Swinburnian universe, "Who am I?" seems a hopelessly unanswerable
question. Yet, as Adorno writes in Endgame, "[N]ihilism implies the opposite of
identification with nothingness," but the negation inherent in nihilism can also be "the
possibility of another world"-or, in this case, a self--"not yet in existence" (qtd. by
Zuidervaart 1 59). Re-viewing the constellation of selves serially produced in each poem,
identity is not irremediably lost; it is present-made possible--as an "interface" between
multiple impulses toward identification36 with several possible "others." In his article
critiquing the '"New' Swinburne," Anderson defines this nihilism as "infinite desolation"
36

This is based on Jonathan Alexander's suggestion that Swinburne's fictional personae are established in
"the free play of . . . impulses" like one experiences in a consented-to sadomasochistic encounter: "Identity
. . . thus becomes the recognized, not sublimated, interface between simultaneously expressing violent
impulses and delimiting them" (34).
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and the "terror of total fragmentation , and accuses other critics of enacting "a denial" of
its "disintegrative power" (32); in doing so, he ignores how Swinburne's serial
identifications demonstrate his investiture in constellative practices which create
conditions of possibility rather than deny them.
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CHAPTER FIVE
Serial Identifications and Constellations: Poems and Ballads' Imaginary Portraits
"[T]here is a picturefor which I would give the eyes out of my head ifI could see it
without them .... "-Algernon Charles Swinburne
"[W]e ourselves always stand at the center ofthese curious pictures. " -Theodor Adorno
As his portrayal of the complex relationship of the spectator/speaker to Lucrezia
Borgia in "A Ballad of Death" indicates, Swinburne's pursuit of subjectivity through the
textual production of a constellation of selves renders identity-the idea of there being an
individual subject to pursue-vulnerable. If one portrays the subject as a kind of nexus
of multiple impulses toward identification with several possible "others," one runs the
risk of presenting a model of subjectivity that seems too fragmented, too disintegrative to
be actively effective or aesthetically innovative (Anderson, "New" 32); rather than
allowing the subject the conditions of possibility which more traditional models would
deny him/her, the subject-as-nexus might seem to be an agent reinforcing the condition of
impossibility. Many critics have previously noted that Swinburne excelled in the creation
ofpastiche, 1 so much so that the patchwork of various personae and narrative threads in
his poems seems (to some) disingenuously pieced together, the relationships between the
borrowed elements calculatingly ambiguous. Some contend that Swinburne' s pastiche is
self-conscious of itself as such, as pastiche that makes readers suspicious. A
constellatively produced and serially (re)positioned subject may seem to be another
version of Swinbumian pastiche, a kaleidoscopic melange which emphasizes its own
kineticism more so than the important interpretative possibilities presented by each
1 McGann discusses Swinburne and pastiche in great detail; see Swinburne: An Experiment in Criticism 7991.
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successive constellative connection being made. After all, pastiche is imitation;
Swinburne's processes of serial identification may seem like imitations of multiple
possibilities for identity-formation rather than actual possibilities. That being said, one
must consider that, for Swinburne, pastiche-in the forms ofimitation, allusion, and
translation-was among the "essential marks of the poetic life" (McGann, Swinburne
8 1 ). Swinburne himself called it "[t]he miraculous faculty of transfusion" which "is the
kind of test which stamps the supremacy of an artist" (Essays 16-77}-a transfusion of
(re)discovered and unexpected possibilities into established forms and once-familiar
personae. Swinburne, like Adorno after him, held fast to the belief that art "cannot be
isolated from expression, and there is no expression without a subject" (Theory 42);
believing in the multiple possibilities inherent in any single expression, he thus wanted to
represent a subject constituted by the very multiple possibilities s/he expresses.
Swinburne practices this kind of literary transfusion _in his recreations of historical
and mythological characters-his "Ladies of Pain"-in the Poems and Ballads. He
renders all these figures as monadic structures. As such, each character portrayed in
Swinburne's monologues functions as an ideogram which attempts to gesture at the
original version ofthe character, either the "real" historical person or the character as she
appeared in the very first account of the myth-though that original version is continually
displaced by the variants of the historical and mythological narratives that have
developed over time, variants which are also accounted for ideogrammatically. This
technique is not just a synechdochic practice in which one narrative strand is offered as
the whole or "true" narrative; instead, it is a practice in which Swinburne attempts to
crystallize the process of the variant narratives paradoxically differentiating from and

171
intertwining with one another. In other words, Swinburne creates the "Lady ofPain" to
demonstrate that the individual figure is always multiple, always a conglomeration of the
processes of serial identification.
In his recreations of historical women, Swinburne is primarily concerned with
revealing how historical narratives fail to account for or to represent adequately the
desires of history's human subjects; he seems to have understood that human history is
just as much "the history of a constant alienation of desire in the desire of the other"
(Barch-Jacobsen 90) as it is descriptions of the actions notable people took in past events.
Therefore, Swinburne' s historical portraits become spaces in which he represents the
perpetual human desire for recognition (of one's desire)
as it shapes and interplays with
.
!

conventional historical narration. However, Swinburne treats his mythological figures
somewhat differently from the way he treats his historical ones. His mythological
portraits, like his historical portraits, are sites in which he explores how desire shapes and
interplays with the development and continuation of narrative, as well; but, they are also
sites in which he explores the specifically tragic dimensions of desire. Whereas
Swinburne presents his historical women with an awareness that their very narratives
function to eterna1ize them, he imbues his mythic women with an awareness of the limits
of expressing human desire and the dissatisfaction caused by experiencing those limits.
As Lacan would say, the mythic characters demonstrate awareness that "life . . . is
[always] about to turn into certain death, a death lived by anticipation, a death that
crosses over into the sphere of life, a life that moves into the realm of death" (Seminar
248).
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Historical Portraits: Sappho and Faustine
Swinburne' s most celebrated literary transfusion of a historical figure occurs in
"Anactoria," which is probably the selection from the Poems and Ballads that has
received the most critical attention The speaker in this poem, Sappho, is a familiar
legendary heroine who, presented as a constellative chain of possibilities throughout the
poem, becomes increasingly defamiliarized. Once defamiliarized, she can "claim that 'I
am Metaphor"' because, no longer limited by conventional narrative, Swinburne's
Sappho can entertain multiple variants of the legend of Sappho, yet each version is
presented in terms of a previous or "other" version; in this way, Sappho "mirror[s]
multiple perspectives at once" (Wagner-Lawlor 9 1 7- 1 8).
Swinburne knew the multiple histories and fictions framing the figure of Sappho
well. What we supposedly know of the "real" Sappho is deduced from the fragmented
remnants of her poetry, which are but traces and probable fictions in and of themselves.
The "historical" accounts of her life appearing in later works are mostly suspect. Ovid,
for example, reinvented Sappho as an ideally tragic poetess, a heterosexual woman who
committed suicide because her love for a ferryman, Phaon, was unrequited. Renaissance
writer John Lyly represented Sappho as a double for Elizabeth I, the "Virgin Queen,"
idyllically renouncing her sexuality for the sake of duty. 2 Lylf s presentation was a kind
of model for the normative version of Sappho presented in the classical scholarship
Swinburne studied at Eton: he was taught that Sappho was a model of purity and chastity,
a poet and schoolmistress who lived the life of the mind by conceding, or at least deIn Sapho and Phao, first performed for Queen Elizabeth and her court and subsequently printed in 1584,
Sappho abandons Phaon to preserve her chastity and accept her duty as foster-mother to Cupid. Given
Swinburne's literary interests in the Renaissance and in euphuis� it is safe to assume that Swinburne was
familiar with Lyly's play.
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eroticizing, bodily pleasures. 3 However, Swinburne was familiar with the invocation of
Sappho and/or "her sisters" in decadent French poetry-specifically, Baudelaire's and
Gautier's respective uses of"lesbian personae . . . [to] cross over into the forbidden
. territory of feminine feeling and bodily sensation" (Dellamora 75)-and this invocation
is the primary framing device here. 4 Swinburne counts on his reader's initial perspective
of Sappho having been skewed by these multiple distorted accounts provided by previous
writers. His poem acts as an anamorphotic mirror in which these multiple distortions of
the "real" character of Sappho can be brought together in a variety of constellated
patterns, reflected into each other, and then refracted away from the reader's perspective
to suggest that the "real" Sappho will always deflect their gaze, inasmuch as the one, true,
"real" Sappho is not accessible, or even present(ed), here. Swinburne goes to great
lengths to suggest that Sappho-like any subject, in historical or mythical narratives, or
in "real life"-is a cipher of multiplicity.
As he does in the other selections in the Poems and Ballads, Swinburne proposes
the multiplicities of subjectivity by presenting his speaking subject in relationship to an
other, a beloved who is both present and absent. Unlike in the "Ballad of Death," in
which the audience ("Love") was a separate entity from the beloved, in "Anactoria" the
ostensible audience is the beloved. And, whereas in the "Ballad of Death" the virtual
3

Swinburne once remarked that the "fragments of Sappho . . . (that) were part of the classical syllabus of
boys in England's leading public schools . . . (were those) 'which the Fates and the Christians have spared
us"' (Rooksby, Life 142).
4
No recollections provided in any of the Swinburne biographies or in his collected letters indicate that
Swinburne had read Mary Robinson's Sappho and Phaon ( 1796). Perhaps this is not surprisin& since, as
Jerome McGann indicates. "Robinson's work had little influence on subsequent treatments of Sappho"
("Robinson" 55). However. as Robinson's poem portrays "Sappho's own desire" and elaborates "a fully
conscious eroticism" ("Robinson" 73), it seems equally surprising that Swinburne would not have had
knowledge of the poem-especially considering Swinburne's grea� lifelong interest in all things pertaining
to Sappho.
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presence of Borgia was marked by the speaker' s "dream vision" of her, Anactoria is
present only as she is framed by Sappho's descriptions of her. ·Anactoria is found only in
"aboutness," inasmuch as the poem is "about" her;5 Sappho, more so than the speaker of
the "Ballad," realizes the power she can wield within discourse to both create and dispel
the fantasies of sustaining and satisfying her own desire. Sappho is not eager to share
this power, though, as she implores Anactoria to "sigh not, speak not, draw not breath"
(line 5)--in short, Sappho warns Anactoria not to make a sound. Consequently, the
virtual Anactoria remains silent throughout the entire poem (unlike the virtual Borgia,
who is given somewhat of an entry into the speaker's language in the "Ballad of Death").
If Sappho were to give Anactoria entry into discourse, Sappho could not continue
to exude what David Riede would call "Romantic authority," or the "illimitable
ambitions" and power of artistic creation, over her: for Sappho, "communicat[ing] even
uncertainties in tones of certainty, . . . can only be done by writing"-or, in this case,
speaking-"within a 'world of poetry' that is removed from the world of [material]
actualities" (''Authority" 22, 37). Anactoria is circumscribed in Sappho' s description of
her own desire. Anactoria's "body is the song," her "mouth the music" (lines 75-76):
here Swinburne again emphasizes the poem's existence on the very margins of
materiality-the poem is a "song," a form of art without physical or visual body, rather

5

David Cook has argued that "the presence or absence of a listener in Swinburne's poem must remain an
open question, for so many of Sappho's lines are addressed to Anactoria not in apostrophe but very much
as ifshe were on the scene and capable of responding" (85, emphasis mine). I find Cook's use of the
phrase "as if' quite telling, for it seems to contradict his insistence on leaving the matter open. Instead, the
"as if' suggests that Anactoria is a likeness, or a virtual presence, which is about the paradox of
representing the presence and absence of a desired "other" simultaneously. Moreover, Swinburne has
based this poem on Sappho;s poem "Anactoria" (also translated as "To an Army Wife") in which Sappho
laments the loss of the already-absent Anactoria yet conjures up a specific visual likeness of her by
employing both memory and imaginatioa
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than a physical, visual artwork inscribed upon a page. 6 But this is a body, a mouth,
completely of Sappho's design and under Sappho's control. Sappho is quick to add,
"[T]hou art more than I, / Though my voice die not till the whole world die" (76-77).
Anactoria is "more than" Sappho because she is the symbol of Sappho as herselfand as
other. In other words, Anactoria is the "paradoxical 'mirror"' in which Sappho can "give
body" to her desire yet create a body-within the poem, and/or the body of the poem
itself.-"that, this time, would no longer be the image of the body," per se (Borch
Jacobsen 232).
As Allison Pease observes, "Bodies are de�cribed [here] . . . not as physical
artifacts, but rather as one great"-and I would ad� virtual-"body of desire, a series of
metonyms" (49). The (intact) physical human body itself conventionally suggests a kind
of material unity, a completeness; it also suggests the hierarchy of the universal over the
particular, insofar as, although the details of individual bodies differ, they all share the
same general shape and set of characteristics. But, if the body is treated as a metonym,
signifying a virtual rather than actual body (of desire), the descriptions of the body itself
reveal "the illusion that the power of fascination" and desire "belongs to the object [or
body] as such" (Zizek, lAcan 33). Moreover, it demonstrates that the body has no real
material unity; instead, it is a structure like all others in the symbolic field: "always
already barred, crippled, porous, structured around some extimate kernel, some
impossibility" (lAcan 33). As Adorno establishes in his Aesthetic Theory, "The material
unity of artworks is all the more illusory the more its forms and elements . . . do not

6

Swinburne also alludes to the fact that Sappho's poetry originally was intended as an aural art fonn; her
initial audience would hear the poem in recitation. Only later were the written poems pasted into scrolls.
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emerge immediately from the complexion of the individual work" (1 86). The bodies
Sappho constructs in her monologu�her own body, Anactoria's body, the body of the
poem-have no real distinction, nor are they unified. They emerge gradually,
incompletely, abstractly. Each is a particularized fragment circumlocating "the great
body of desire," gesturing toward the possibility of representing what is impossible to
truly represent in material form or symbol: all the possibilities of finding pleasure in the
quest to satiate an ultim.ately insatiable desire.
Swinburne employs the fragmentation of and confusion between the bodies in this
poem, so that the individual reader can arrange them in a constellative pattern,
subsequently envisioning one or more possible relationships between them and thus find
his/her own "meaning" in the poem. Jennifer Wagner-Lawlor astutely argues that the
confusion of these aestheticized virtual bodies acts as "a kind of metaphorical
'indiscretion "' marked by "that problematic crossing of subject ('I') and object ('you'),"
but she reduces it to a "symptom of warring impulses within a single metaphoric field"
(920). I would contend that the metaphoric or symbolic field, due to its fragmented and
porous quality, is never "single"; though we use the singular form ("field") to name it,
this field is a multiplicity of possible fields not reducible to a singularity (yet represented
by a term that suggests singularity). The bodies in "Anactoria" demonstrate that the
metaphoric visual image can no longer occupy merely one place, or function in just one
field of signification, in an artwork. Any conventional metaphoric images of unity, such
as images of bodies joined in sexual intimacy, speak only to the dissonance inherent in
that supposed unity of self and other, signifier a�d signified, subject and object.
Swinburne deliberately repudiates the conventional use of sexual metaphor by presenting
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sexual activity in this poem as sadistic, vampiric, �nnibalistic. He must "disrup[t] the
sexual fantasy of ecstasy and incarnation, in which ·the ideal becomes body' (Wagner
Lawlor 920) and attempt to demonstrate that those. very disruptions
of the ideal are the
.
most aesthetically crucial because the failure of th� sexual fantasy to realize the ideal
revives the plenitude of possibility.
The ideal fails to become embodied in the scene of Sappho's sexual fantasy, in
which Sappho literally wants to devour Anactoria and become Anactoria incarnate.
Sappho initially creates the fantasy as a means of transcending the separation between the
desiring "f'/"eye" and the desired "you"/object of the gaze. To do so, Sappho must
imagine that her "lips were tuneless lips," silenced as Anactoria is silent; moreover,
Sappho imagines Anactoria as the agent of her silencing, as Sappho is silenced by
pressing her lips "To the bruised blossom of [Anactoria's] scourged white breast" {lines
1 05-06). In the fantasy of her own silence, Sappho imagines herself surrendering control
of her own mouth, which creates the "song"-the poem-which not only circumscribes
the body of Anactoria but establishes Sappho's own presence. In silence, the mouth that
creates the poem, which gives it presence, would paradoxically create absence in the
cessation of speech (as the poem would cease to exist, here, if Sappho were silenced),
which is why Swinburne employs copious imagery of consumption:
Ah that my mouth for Muses' milk were fed
On the sweet blood thy sweet small wounds had bledf
. . . That 1 could drink thy veins as wine, and eat
Thy breasts like honeyf that from face to feet
Thy body were abolished and consumed,
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And in my flesh thy very flesh entombed! (1 07-08, 1 1 1 - 1 4)
Though Swinburne creates very visual images of vampirism and cannibalism, he has
S�ppho articulate them in specifically oral terms to indicate that poetic vision is a process
of attempting to represent visually those sensations that cannot really be seen (i.e., one
can "watch" this process, but still not know how it would really feel to be engaged in this
activity). In this cannibalistic "confusion ofbodies,n the mouth mimics the activity of the
gazing eye in that it wants to envelop and consume its object. But the mouth here also
achieves what the gazing eye cannot: when the subject engages in the act of consuming
the other, the image of the subject's desire emblematically receives the object of her
desire, implying that the subject is no longer "frustrated by an object in which [her] desire
is alienated," an object which represents the subject's alienation from pleasure, from
enjoyment (Lacan, Ecrits 42).
Thus the mouth, transposing the eye, functions much like what Derrida calls the
embouchure: the "mouth or outlet" that is the virtual locus of all correlations made in the
metaphoric field of poetry-virtual in that it "can no longer be situated in a typology of
the body but seeks to organize all the sites and to localize all the organs"
("Economimesis" 277, 282) in a site about the body. To apply this more directly to the
poem, the virtual locus of the poem itself can no longer be situated in the trope of the
body, neither Sappho's own or Anactoria' s virtual body. Even more, Sappho cannot
situate her subject-position with any precision in the body of her poem nor in the other
body (Anactoria's) she has created for herself, nor can she decidedly circumlocate her
desire in any of these aforementioned bodies. In her fantasy of devouring Anactoria,
Sappho attempts to localize in herself all the various aesthetic p�icularities generated
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within the poem. Her mouth is an embouchure which consumes particular elements of
art to (re)emit them as an individualized expression, inasmuch as her expression
reorganizes those particular elements into a different constellated pattern. In other words,
and to reinvoke Swinburne's cannibalistic image, Sappho wishes to consume the
particular elements which comprise "Anactoria" so that she may (re)emit a different
expression or version of" Anactoria"-a version which is more pointedly "Anactoria-as
Sappho." The Swinburnian embouchure, then, is an eye/mouth hybrid, an orifice that the
subject both sees through and senses with, and then emits the affect of the experience.
With the embouchure, Swinburne does not intend to provide an easy solution for
the "problems of identity and temporality" by conjuring a kind of deus ex machina in a
trope meant to induce a subsuming "imaginative transcendence" (Wagner-Lawlor 9 1 8,
924). In fact, the Deus in the poem is woefully unable to transcend: -"Him would I reach,
hill) smite, him desecrate, / Pierce the cold lips of God with human breath, / And mix his
immortality with death" (1 82-84). Like the God of the "Ballad of Death," Sappho's God
has left the world;7 and, like the Beloved's crucifixion of the Christ figure in "Satia te
Sanguine," Sappho's attempt to "kill" God reveals itself as an empty sacrifice. To
Sappho, he is but a lacuna, like Anactoria, though he lacks the fluid materiality Sappho
ascribes to Anactoria. In her deliberately enounced transgression of an absent authority
figure, then, Sappho transgresses nothing (no thing) but the idea of a Godlike
transcendence. She can imagine what it might be like to "be one with" everything in the
world, "With all the high things forever" (lines 276-77). However, this dream vision of
7 "Anactoria," lines 175-77: "Hath he not sent us hunger? who hath cursed / Spirit and flesh with longing?

filled with thirst / Their lips who cried unto him?"
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wholeness is always tempered by her admission that it is one of many possible, subjective
renderings of the feelings, ideas, sights, sounds, experiences she has taken in and
subsequently (re-)expressed: hence the poem' s most famous line, "Memories shall mix
and metaphors of me" (2 14). The very personal quality of the vision of transcendence
here is its own limitation: one can never transcend the self, even if one situates her
subject position in a virtual, fantasy space.
The canon of Swinburne criticism is overwhelmed with various interpretations of
�his cryptic line. I agree with Jennifer Wagner-Lawlor that it "points to a central
problematic of the poem" (922). She claims that the problem is the poem's "central
indiscretions-the conflict between states of love (I/you), of life (body/spirit), and of
metaphor itself (identity/nonidentity)" (922). Concurrently, Thais Morgan argues that the
central problem is that the very sexualized version of Christian sacrifice portrayed in the
poem destroys binary categories; that in the physical contact Swinburne envisions
between Sappho and God, '"Memories' of the deep relationship between religious and
sexual 'metaphors,' between desire for God and desire for erotic . . . pleasure, wil l trouble
the reader until he or she is no longer sure" of any demarcations ("Dramatic" 1 84).
Wagner-Lawlor and Morgan both effectively recognize Swinburne's poem as a careful
study in binarism, but they both portray the binaries in the poem as static. Even if the
demarcations get blurred, as Morgan observes, Morgan' s assumption is that those
demarcations are stil l there, just not apparent in Swinburne' s blurry perspective. Morgan
also assumes that Swinburne provides his reader with one specific perspective to employ
while reading the poem; but, as I argue above, such is not the case. Rather, I prefer to
reconsider Allison Pease's suggestion that Swinburne creates "semantically and
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physically ambiguous" aesthetic bodies, bodies whose very indeterminacy allows them to
exceed constructed conventions of gender and sexuality (50). Such ambiguous bodies
illustrate how demarcations between conventionally binary categories are just as
semantically and physically ambiguous here. As they were for Dante Gabriel Rossetti,
the margins dividing separate elements in a sequence, separate narratives, separate
identities and desires are constantly negotiable for Swinburne. The margins between
Sappho and God, Sappho and Anactoria, Sappho and the poem are constantly
renegotiated here as well . The reader navigates through the ambigu ities, individually
ascertaining how the "memories mix"-specifically, the cultural collective versions or
"memories" of the historical Sappho-and produce the "metaphors of me": not only the
"f'/"me" which demarcates the character/persona of Sappho, but the "f'/"me" which
demarcates the reader.
In these "metaphors of me," the reader/Swinburne explores a kind of Adornian

non-identity, which
doesn't just mean the opposite of identity . . . or what doesn't fit into
certain categories, which is usual ly just a metaphor for a different identity,
but refers to what escapes or eludes every sort of identity . . . which
nevertheless exists in the shadow or penumbra of identity, as the fleeting
reminder or glimpse of unrealized possibilities, of what that identity
locked out, excluded, or can't quite become. (Redmond online)
Sappho, the Swinburnian "Lady of Pain" in this poem, is the metaphoric site establishing
the non-identity of both the speaking subject and the reading/viewing subject. Sappho is
more than the locus of all the hi storical trace narratives surrounding her persona; she is
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more than what those traces gesture at. She offers a glimpse of the unrealized
possibilities of everything "Sappho" could ever possibly represent. Swinburne does not
offer his Sappho as just another different way of identifying Sappho; she is every possible
way one could identify Sappho. The spectator/reader, led through a kaleidoscopic
process of identifying "Sappho," can perhaps consider his or her own identity-his or her
own "metaphors of me"-just as kaleidoscopically. Importantly, though, Swinburne's
Sappho cannot "sing" what she has excluded in her auto-enunciation, what she cannot
quite or has yet to become. At the poem's end, Sappho admits that her metaphoric,
poetic language is the "Lotus and Lethe on [her] lips like dew"; with every enunciation
she speaks one possibility only to exclude or to eclipse another, the penumbra of which
remains elusively "shed around and over and under" her, an ambiguity like "Thick
darkness and the insuperable sea" (lines 302-04).
Swinburne's "Faustine" offers another treatment of history, identity, and the
· penumbra which exceeds such constructs. In "Faustine," though, Swinburne is able to
explore the problematics of historical representation more explicitly than he does in
"Anactoria," since "Anactoria" is a poem which becomes more about the aestheticized
psychology of the relationship between desiring subject and desired object than the
continual displacement of the historical subject within the historical narratives that frame
and circumlocate her. In tone and presentation, then, "Faustine" arguably resembles the
"Ballad of Death" more than "Anactoria," in that the speaker of"Faustine" passionately
addresses a deceased historical figure. Like Lucrezia Borgia, both Roman Empresses
Faustina-Faustina the Elder, wife of Emperor Antonius Pius, and their daughter,
Faustina the Younger-are primarily historicized as figures of sexual scandal. Due to
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Swinburne's considerable knowledge of and interest in the ancient world, his failure to
specify which Faustina he writes about should be read as intentional and not accidental,
suggesting yet another aspect of play in the precarious act of producing and recognizing
identity.
Faustina the Elder was principally known for her charity work throughout her
husband's reign; however, the elder Faustina became a figure of sexual depravity when
her daughter (her namesake) did. Faustina the Younger was more politically active; she
notably accompanied her husband, Marcus Aurelius, during most of his military
campaigns. Some historical reports claim Faustina's devotion to her husband gained her
the admiration of her husband' s soldiers, who nicknamed her Matri Castrorum, "Mother
of the Camp." Other accounts, like that offered by historian Sextus Aure1ius Victor,
claim that Faustina indulged in innumerable and sordid extramarital affairs with the
soldiers. 8 Oppositionally, though, Marcus Aurelius in his personal diaries describes his
marriage as hannonious, and Fausti�a as "so obedient, so affectionate, so genuine" (qtd.
by Bums online). Swinburne claimed to have written the poem after meeting a woman
whose face reminded him of the profiles of Faustina printed on ancient Roman coins, 9
which places him in a position not unlike his Sappho: from the "memories that mixed"
not only Swinburne's memory of the woman with a Faustinian profile, but also his
8

Following the title, Swinburne has appended "Ave Faustina Jmperatrix, morituri te salutant." As Marilyn
"'
Woroner Fisch has noted, this is "the very salutation addressed to Caesar by the g)adiators 'about to die
( 1 ). The speaker assumes the role of the gladiator saluting his empress here; interestingly enough, one of
the claims made by Faustina the Younger's detractors (a claim recorded in the Historia Augusta) was that
her son, the Emperor Commodus, was fathered not by Marcus Aurelius but by one of his favorite
f.adiators.
Swinburne gives this as his inspiration for writing "Faustine" in his "Notes on Poems and Reviews"
(365). However, this contradicts Frederick Sandys's earlier account, in which he claimed that Swinburne
wrote "Faustine" while he and Swinburne were on a train; to pass the time, they decided to see who could
write more lines of poetry using that specific name. (See ·momas 80.)
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memories of the various historical accounts of the empresses he had read during his
studies, and how the ancient historians themselves had let the accounts of each Faustina
mix together-he creates a virtual (re)presentation of a Roman Empress which
incorporates not only a11 he knows about each Faustina but also gestures toward what he
can never really know about either one of them. In other words, Swinburne gestures
toward the impossibility of desire: just as desire functions "not to realize its goal . . . but to
reproduce itself as desire" (Zizek, Plague 39), Swinburne's "Faustine" functions not to
realize the goal of determining all there is to know about the empresses Faustina, but to
reproduce, continual1y and serially, variant versions of"Faustine."
As David Riede notes, Swinburne adapts the "the He11enic and Roman idea of
cyclical alternation in generations" to his purposes here (Study 53), but this is not exactly
· a case of a Roman Empress being born again in Victorian England. Like the other
historical women presented in Poems and Ballads, Swinburne's Faustine is the figure
representing the multitude of alternating possibilities of representing "Faustina," even if
every one of those alternate possibilities is not in itself available for aesthetic
representation. By circumlocating the empress(es) Faustina in the "Faustine" of his
poem, which was in tum supposedly circumlocated by an otherwise unnamed
contemporary woman, Swinburne uses Faustine to enact "a process of alienation [and]
divestiture of the self' or the subject position (Nicholsen 52), as Faustine is a multitude of
possible "selves" shadowing the illusory constant "self' suggested by the singular name.
Swinburne beckons the reader to "look" at Faustine, to see what (as Norman Bryson
would say) exceeds the ideological screen which limits the perspective used to "view"
Faustine. The speaker of Swinburne's poem tells Faustine, "You have the face that suits
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a woman / For her soul's screen" (4 1-42), indicating that the face marking Faustine' s
identity limits the expression of "soul," or spirit, in her aesthetic representation.
Faustine's face marks her function as imago in the poem: her image represents the
perpetual "pregnant moment" of the poem itself, which resists its own concrete or
material representation, beckoning the imagination not to hypostatize simply in the
poem's "historical content" (Adorno, Theory 85) but to strive to exceed it. Faustine is an
aesthetic image or, rather, a series of aesthetic images that "are not fixed, archaic
invariants" already determined by conventional historical narratives ('f'heory 85-86);
however, because Swinburne's Faustine refuses to be determined by narrative, she must
fail to be determined sufficiently as plenitude within the poem, too. The imago of
Faustine-as object of desire-may be the "goal," but the goal of desire cannot be
obtained (Theory 85). Consequently, by describing Faustine as "A queen whose kingdom
ebbs and shifts / Each week" in the constant recapitulation of "Wine and rank poison,
milk and blood, / Being mixed therein" (I 1 - 12, 17-1 8}, Swinburne suggests that she
ultimately eludes his attempts to des�ribe her in her multiplicity.
At first, the speaker of the poem declares, "You come back face to face with us, /
The same Faustine" (63-64, emphasis mine). But, as he moves through various
descriptions of the possible motivations and explanations for her return-"the slain man's
blood and breath" which revived her (line 67), "the bitter lust / That galled" her (75-76),
her rebellion against the "dust and din" of "years entomb[ed]" (8 1 -82}-he finally
realizes this Faustine is never the "same" at all. He poses two seemingly innocuous
questions which actually demonstrate that the object of his desire eludes him in his
monologue: "Where are the imperial years? and how / Are you Faustine?" (87-88). In
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asking the first question, the speaker notes the passing of ancient Rome; in doing so, he
separates those "imperial years" of ancient Rome from the time and place from which he
speaks to Faustine. In doing so, on one hand, the speaker insinuates that continuing to
place Faustine overtly in those "imperial years" will only reduce her to her external
history; 10 on the other hand, though, he paradoxically reinforces Faustine's relationship to
that external history, a history he cannot access directly or depict with accuracy. Because
he can grant her only partial-and paradoxical, as it is wholly artificial-liberation from
the external historical narratives of the empress(es) Faustina, then, the speaker must ask
her the second question, in which he implores her to re-establish her identity, to
determine, how is she Faustine? To ask the question differently, how can she be the
Faustine of those "imperial years" if those years are long gone, if the real story of the
empress(es) Faustine is unrecoverable from the traces of historical narrative that linger in
the present-especially if one divorces Faustine from those narratives?
Swinburne answers the question by reinforcing his Faustine's very artificial
qualities. More specifically, his Faustine is an artifice representing the failure to
reincarnate the very empress(es) who ruled in those irretrievable "imperial years," all the
while entertaining the prospect that the "Faustine" persona is "historically ubiquitous,"
having omnipresent possibilities in the form of a "constant flux" (Riede, Study 53-54)
persisting in all incarnations of this historical narrative. "Art is no replica of the subject"
(Adorno, Theory 41 -42), but it must employ a subjec�-as-artifice in order to express
figuratively all the possibilities inherent in the artwork. "The first Faustine" is just one
10

My reading here is based on Adomo's statement that artworks are "incommensurable with historicism"
because, "instead of following their own historical content, (historicism] reduces them to their external
history" (Theory 182-83).
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constituent of the serial barrage of"new Faustine[s]" that the poem evokes; "after change
of soaring feather / And winnowing fin"-meaning, with every reallocation of the flux
a "new Faustine" wakes (100, 109- 12).
To reinforce his implication that Faustine is an ideal artifice for subjective
expression, as a circumlocated, expressive aesthetic subject that flaunts its very
aestheticization, Swinburne even offers a version of Faustine as an automaton:
You seem a thing that hinges hold,
A love-machine
With clockwork joints of supple_ goldNo more, Faustine. (140-44, emphasis mine)
As such, Faustine on one hand seems, like the courtly Beloved of the previous poems, the
"uncanny other," a "pure machine, . . . the Other which is not our 'fellow-creature "'
(Zizek, Metastases 90). On the other hand, however, Faustine only "seems" like a thing.
Her very status as artifice challenges her static "thingness"; she is a dynamic form that,
circa desire, defies the conventional reductiveness of form. She is a simple "thing" no
more. She exemplifies the decadent condition "under which aesthetic subjects and
objects become mutually substitutable, one for the other" (Gordon, "Spaces" 5 1 );
Faustine, as an aestheticized subject, is "bound up with, preformed and mediated by the
object"-in this case, the object being this automatized body (Adorno, Theory 166). Yet
she is more than simply the automatized body, inasmuch as the automaton, a work of art,
is a thing which "become[s] the antithesis of the reified monstrosity'' (Theory 1 67);
Faustine is a place-holder for a plenitude that exceeds "thingishness." Though she has
not transcended (because she cannot transcend) form altogether-Swinburne is careful
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still to mention Faustine's heavy hair (line 1 53), strong face and chin (1 57), and "sweet
and keen" lips ( 1 6 1 )-she becomes what Adorno would call an "open form" (Theory
1 4 1) in which, in a display of her "thingish" qualities, she openly aspires to represent, to
express, more than any "thing" currently can.

Mythological Portraits: Phaedra, Philomela, Proserpine, Dolores
In her article on "Swinburne's Divine Bitches," Marilyn Woroner Fisch discusses
what she calls "an anti-entropic monism" (1) common to Swinburne's revisionary
treatments of female mythological characters, such as Proserpine in both the "Hymn to
Proserpine" anci "The Garden of Proserpine" and the notorious Dolores, Swinburne's
archetypal "Lady of Pain." "Time can alter only the form" of Swinburne's mythic
woman, says Fisch, but "her essence, and her function" as an "immutable" superfluity of
possible permutations, exceed the physical form ( 1 0). Fisch claims these mythic women
are all variations of the "divine bitch archetype," though she fails to define what exactly
the "divine bitch archetype" is. I believe she has developed this archetype or trope by
drawing from representations of the ancient Lycian goddess Malija, who was
incorporated or "mixed into" the goddess Athena when Greek culture infiltrated Lycia. 1 1
Malija, as the goddess of the hunt, was often referred to as the "divine bitch." Also, as
the appointed guardian of a portal between earth and the underworld, Malija was believed
to lead her priests and priestesses in a journey to the underworld and back; paradoxically,
though Malija asserts her independence from the typical female role of creatrix by
11

It is likely that Swinburne had read about the archaeological studies of ancient Lycian culture occurring
in the mid-nineteenth century. It is just as likely that Swinburne would have seen the artifacts Sir Charles
Fellows had taken from his excavations of the ancient Lycian city of Xanthos and displayed in the British
Museum.
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maintaining perpetual virginity, she is responsible for the "re-birth" of souls rapt in the
underworld. Thus Malija, the "divine bitch," is a "monad" in that she represents the
,,
perpetual process of life and death as "immanent" yet "crystallized into a specific form
(Adorno, Theory 1 80); she is also a "monad" in that she has valence, or the ability
constantly to produce an effect/affect. 12 Within her "self' she is never singular, just as
,
Malija is not "just , Malija but also Athena: she is the combined effect/affect of self and
other, identity and non-identity, being and becoming, representation and what exceeds it.
One could argue that this combination is "anti-entropic," as Fisch suggests, because it
attempts to account for the loss of information or meaning which always occurs in any
act of signification, especially the use of metaphor.
Though Fisch does not list either Phaedra or Philomela among Swinburne' s
"divine bitches," I think the poems featuring both characters can be explicated as
significant case studies, though on a smaller scale than that of the major goddesses of
Poems and Ballads, of how Swinburne uses his mythological figures, even more than his
historical figures, to establish sites where the limits of artistic representation are pushed,
stretched, and redrawn. Jerome McGann has already established that Swinburne's
mythic female figures should not be read as '"compensations' . . . for the loss of a
previously valued possession or ideal" or beloved, but as attempts to "fantasize a so
called reality, even live through it, in order to justify and make possible a continuous
intercourse with the creatures of his imagination" (Swinburne 220). 13 Yet, if one should
12

Thus I am not only using Adomo's modification of Gottfried Wilhelm Liebnitz's definition of "monad"
but also applying how it is defined in chemistry ("an atom that has valence").
13
McGann argues in Swinburne: An Experiment in Criticism that Swinburne's "Ladies of Pain" are a
montage of "essential images" of his beloved cousin, Mary Gordon (220), to whom Swinburne may or may
not have proposed marriage. Rooksby also notes that. upon Mary Gordon's announcement of her
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not read the goddess-figure as a compensatory artifice by which Swinburne fulfills an
otherwise unrequited love, one should not read the subject fantasizing reality and
enacting a constant intercourse with art as the definitive Swinburne himself, either. The
"Swinburne" of this imaginative process is carefully and consciously crafted as an
aestheticized, artificial subject position; the subject who establishes a virtual (rather than
real) intercourse with "creatures of his imagination" is just as virtually and artificially
situated as those "creatures." One could even go further and suggest that the "creatures
of the imagination" are affects of the subject, or a Lacanian kind of '" formative'
identification" going beyond "vision and ideal modeling": they are multiple "matter[s] of

affection _ of the 'ego' by the ' other"' (Borch-Jacobsen 69, italics his). It "makes possible
the ecstasy of alienation" in which the "I" of the poem attempts to become the "other,
through a corporeal-affective mimesis" (Borch-Jacobsen 70), but the "ecstasy of
alienation" is intermingled with tragedy in all these cases. Phaedra has "strange blood in
[her]," which makes her realize that she is "not of [her kin's] likeness nor of' her stepson
Hippolytus's ("Phaedra" 50-5 1 ), and the alienation results in murder. Likewise,
Philomela realizes that she is not of her kin' s likeness, either; her sister Procne has
forgotten the murder of her son, which still haunts Philomela, and "The heart's division
divideth" them ("Itylus" 44).
In his seminar on The Ethics of Psychoanalysis, Lacan suggests that tragedy is the
site of perpetual action in which

engagement to Colonel Disney-Leith in late 1864, Swinburne fell into a state of "bitterness and anger," and
was overheard proclaiming that Mary's marriage marked "'the tragic destruction of all his faith in
woman. '" Rooksby concludes, "[H]e must have felt that [he and Mary) should have been together and that
her choice was the wrong one for both of them." He also notes that Swinburne wrote "Dolores" and "Satia
te Sanguine" during this period. See Rooksby. Life 9 1 - 1 10.
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[t]he hero[ine] and that which i s around [her] are situated with relation to
the goal of desire. What occurs concerns subsidence, the piling up of
different layers of the presence of the hero[ine] in time. That's what
remains undetermined; in the collapse of the house of cards represented by
tragedy, one thing may subside before another, and what one finds at the
end . . . may appear in different ways. (265)
The difference in what appears at the end, .of course, depends on the perspective with
which one co�siders that end. The relationship between the different layers of subsidence
can be arranged and interpreted in a variety of ways. This is similar to the presentation of
Swinburne' s historical women, in that the historical women are situated in relation to the
speakers' goals of desire-not only the goal to "fill in" the aporia of desire, but the end
goal of accepting the aporia desire will always cause, as well as be. They also consist of
the "different layers" of the variant versions of their respective personae, how those
personae have been reconstructed through the passing of time. However, Swinburne does
not emphasize the tragic element of his historical women as he does their mythic
counterparts. The "killing" of Anactoria is a mere gesture of tragic loss marking
Sappho's melancholy as well as the triumph of her own narrative, her poetic voice;
Faustine figures the speaker's resistance to reification and inertia in art via an embrace of
indeterminacy. Nonetheless, Swinburne's historical women do not demonstrate the kind
of catharsis enacted by his mythic fi gures; not a purgation as in a purification or a
removal, but a release-a release of emotion, what Rooksby calls "a tumultuous energy,
elemental, suffering but undefeated" ("Centre" 28). The embouchure of the "divine
bitch" is not merely "vomitive or emetic," as Derrida would say, but more "expressive
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and emissive" ("Economimesis" 282), and she does not express any need for purification
from or any other kind of forgiveness for behavior-specifically, sexual or sexually
motivated behavior-that resists the societal norm. Rather, to savor the excess in the
realization "that she is just a passive element in the interplay of libidinal forces, she
'subjectifies' herself, she becomes a 'subject "' by becoming "an object/or herself' rather
than just for an/other subject (Zizek, Lacan 64).
When the mythic woman becomes an object for herself, she still endures the kind
,
of suffering that accompanies tragedy� as a "passive element, in any given scene, she
sometimes seems more victim than heroine. But Swinburne's mythic women resemble
Sade's Justine, who is both victim and heroine, and who is heroic because she is not
destroyed by her victimization. Rather, the heroine's victimization allows her to create
her own virtual subject position, rather than simply allow others to establish that position
for her. As Lacan points out, in this "typical Sadean scenario," the victim
retain[s] the capacity of being an indestructible support. Analysis shows
clearly that the subject separates out a double of [her]self who is made
inaccessible to destruction, so as to make it support what, borrowing from
the realm of aesthetics, one cannot help calling the play of pain. For the
space in question is the same as that in which aesthetic phenomena disport
themselves, a space of freedom. (Seminar 26 1)
In the expression of the "play of pain," the heroine rebels against semblance, or
conforming to societal norms. In this way, Swinburne's mythic women-his "Ladies of
Pain"-demonstrate what Adorno claims is art's "rebellion against semblance, [its]
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dissatisfaction with itself," and expresses art's "desire for di ssonance" which is
"effectively expression" (Theory 1 10).
Swinburne' s Phaedra is a "piling up of different layers" of the character offered in
previous texts, Euripides's Hippolytus and Jean Racine's Phedre. Both texts are versions
of the ancient myth of Phaedra, wife of King Theseus, whose unrequited desire for her
stepson Hippolytus brings her to an unfortunate end. Racine's Phedre embodies "[t]he
soul of Racinian -tragedy" established by his previous treatments of tragic classical
heroines Andromache and Iphigenia: "the machine inferna/e steering the helpless and
graceless protagonist fueled by his/her. obsession and egoistic instincts to certain
irredeemable doom" (Chapman online). Euripides's Phaedra is similarly limited by ate,
or a "criminal desire'' 14 that entices one to exceed an established limit, that determinately
brings an unfortunate end. However, Racine wanted his Phaedra, unlike Andromache or
Iphigenia, to retain some dignity and nobility despite her adulterous and incestuous
passion, dignity and nobility that he felt she did not have in the Hippolytus. 1 5 Racine's
Phaedra regains her dignity by confessing guilt and then committing suicide as atonement
for her sin; in other words, she regrets having exceeded the established limit, cedes her
desire, and becomes noble only in that regret. Swinburne, too, wishes Phaedra to
demonstrate a certain kind of nobil ity, but not through regret or atonement. His Phaedra
proudly, unrepentantly refuses to cede her desire. Her nobility is in defiance, or what

14

This is Lacan's rendering of the tenn, as he is not satisfied with defining it simply as "misfortune." See

Seminar, pp. 262-64, 283.
15

Whereas in Euripides's version Phaedra herself accuses her stepson of rape as revenge for spurning her
advances, making the accusation in her suicide note, Racine has Phaedra's maid Oenone make the
accusations instead.
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David Riede calls her "Promethean urge," akin to the inversion of Christian asceticism
Swinburne reads in Blake's "To Tirzah" (Study 55).
Swinburne structures a triangular narrative, voiced by Phaedra, Hippolytus, and a
,,
"Chorus of Troezenian Women. Phaedra figures the machine infeniale of excessive and
exceeding desire, Hippolytus the object of that desire, and the Chorus the social attempts
to limit desire. Unlike the typical function of the Chorus in classical drama, Swinburne's
Chorus does not provide "emotional commentary''16 but attempts to restrict Phaedra's
emotional outbursts by applying reason. Phaedra's speeches are vibrant, affective
catharses for which the Chorus admonishes her: "O queen, take heed of words; / Why
wilt thou eat the husk of evil speech?" (10-1 1). The Chorus believes Phaedra's speech is
"evil" because they regard it as dangerously empty speech (a "husk"), performances
gesturing toward what discourse should not express. Her speech reveals what the Chorus
wishes to avoid. To put it another way, the Chorus reads Phaedra's speech as a kind of
"imaginary resistance" in which she wants to "avoid [her] desire by calling on the
other''-the Chorus-"to bear witness," but Phaedra's speech is really "symbolic
revelation," signifying the recognition of (her) desire that Phaedra caHs on the Chorus to
witness (Borch-Jacobsen 1 1 7). Phaedra's mouth is like an embouchure, which takes in
the Chorus's resistance to her confessions and recasts it as recognition of what cannot be
fully embodied in the images provided in her speech. At one point, the Chorus describes
Phaedra's mouth in terms that evoke the embouchure, referring to her mouth as "an evil
born with all its teeth," spewing "love . . . cast out of the bound of love" (74-75). The

16

Here I am privileging Lacan's assertion that the Chorus in Greek tragedy typically functions to "talce
care" of the play's "emotional commentary" (Seminar 252).
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Chorus speaks husks of words with the husks of mouths, whereas Phaedra speaks about
other possibilities of sensing the sinthome-the signifier as it is "not yet enchained"
within discourse, thus "permeated with an enjoyment" impossible to articulate (Zizek,
Lacan 132)--belying the usual articulation of the empty symbols of empty speech to
which the Chorus usually "bears witness."
Hippolytus, assuming the crown in his father's stead, is also the empty husk of a
king. At the beginning of the poem, Hippolytus begs Phaedra to stop making him the
,
object of her gaze: "let me go; / Take off thine eyes that put the gods to shame; (1-2).
This admonition has two functions: on one hand it is Hippolytus' s attempt to deflect
Phaedra's gaze, and on the other hand it is an attempt to wield authority over her. The
Chorus also attempts to wield the same kind of authority over her in its appeal to her
sense of "Pure shame" (line 46), to no avail. Hippolytus beseeches the Chorus to
interrupt Phaedra' s gaz�"Let not this woman wail and cleave to me," "Loose ye her
hands from me" (42, 44}-because he is uncomfortable with his status as the other who is
not only the object of but a "powerless witness" to Phaedra's gaze. He is a microcosm of
the Chorus, the "big Other" acting as "the agent of social authority" here rendered
impotent, unable to enac� any authority to limit Phaedra's actions (Zizek, Metastases 74).
Hippolytus is quick to attribute Phaedra's behavior to "the gods' wrath with her'' rather
than the configurations of desire, declaring that he plays "no part" (line 43) in her desire
for him. By having Hippolytus so quickly deny his role in the dynamic of desire, though,
Swinburne has Hippolytus reinforce his very role as the fantasy object, the other with
whom the sexual relationship is impossible. Moreover, Hippolytus i s importantly unable
to comprehend that Phaedra, looking awry at him, eventually gazes beyond him; that her
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gaze is transfixed, not on Hippolytus, per se, but on the awesome "event whose
comprehension exceeds our capacity of representation" (Metastases 74)---the
manifestation of desire itself. Phaedra admonishes him for his limited power to thwart or
even interpret her gaze, as well as his readiness to believe that her desire is limited to
desire simply for him: "Man, what have I to do with shame or thee?" (line 48).
Moreover, by posing this question, Phaedra asserts that she really has nothing to do with
Hippolytus. Swinburne's Phaedra seems to understand that Hippolytus is not actually
"an embodiment of the impossible Thing, . . . the materialized Nothingness" (Zizek,
Lacan 83) that will fulfill her desire. Even if she had something to do with Hippolytus

meaning, even if he were amenable to a physical relationship with her-Phaedra would
not be satisfied. Her repeated requests for sexual contact are juxtaposed with requests for
Hippolytus to kill her. If Phaedra is slain, then she can ostensibly traverse the actual
distance between illusory fulfillment and actual fulfillment of desire.
As a "passive and impotent" observer to this display, Hippolytus is "divided
between fascination with enjoyment and repulsion at it" (Zizek, Metastases 15), whereas
Phaedra elides the division between being fascinated by and being repelled by the horror
at the event horizon of death and desire. "My veins are mixed, and therefore I am mad,"
she proclaims (line 53), but her "madness" figures her embrace of the dissonance and
multiplicity contained in the poem's narrative. Phaedra herself is what Adorno would
call a figure of a "progressive [aesthetic] consciousness of antagonisms on the horizon of
their possible reconciliation" (Theory 1 9 I ). Yet she also delineates the impossibility of
fully representing any such reconciliation; at one point, she asks Hippolytus, "What shall
I say? / There is no good word I can compel thee with" (1 07-08). As yet there is "no
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good word" to compel reconciling the different and antagonistic layers of aesthetic
representation; there is only the unspoken practice of perpetually arranging the layers in
constellation to approximate the possibility. And the possible is what Swinburne, in the
poem, calls his readers to visualize, or "bear witness to."
As Phaedra tells Hippolytus and the Chorus near the poem' s end, "I take you to
my witness what I am" (I 30):
For like my mother am I stung and slain,
And round my cheeks have such red malady
And on my lips such fire and foam as hers.
This is that Ate out of Amathus
That breeds up death and gives it one for love. ( 1 37-41)
Here she names herself inheritor of the legacy of her mother, Pasiphae, the notorious
lover of the bull, as well as her sister Ariadne, who had previously been Theseus' s lover
but was spumed by him; some versions of the myth name Amathus as the place where
Theseus had abandoned Ariadne. Phaedra wants Hippolytus and the Chorus to see that
she is the "red malady"-the symbol of the "criminal desire" or ate that persists despite
each generation's attempts to erase it, control it, and even blind us to its existence. The
"fire and foam" on Phaedra's lips is the narrative of that perpetual desire which breeds
death in love's stead; again, this is part of Phaedra's comparison of herself to her mother,
as "Desire flows out of her / As out of lips doth speech" (147-48).
Like Pasiphae, Phaedra performs desire to give it representation; as these women
affect desire, they provide "a locus �fthe sensual element in art" that does no� require,
nor does it promise, any "sensual pleasure in the observer" (Adorno, Theory 82).
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Hippolytus certainly takes no sensual pleasure in Phaedra s performances of desire; by
the time Phaedra delivers the speech quoted above, he has already recoiled from her,
demonstrating his repulsion "with cloak upgathered to the lip, / [And] Holding his eye as
with some ill in sight " (1 17- 1 8, emphasis mine). Phaedra accepts her ek-sistence-the
"ultimate possibility" of representing all, which is "a 'freedom-toward-death "' (Borch
Jacobsen 1 5) which only a tragic heroine can accept:
For now shall I take death a deadlier way,
Gathering it up between the feet of love
Or off the knees of murder reaching it . . . . (1 83-85)
Her acceptance is a display of "tumultuous energy," as she takes into herself the
"elemental" quality of the ate which drives rather than commands her; her narrative
expresses her aspiration not only to situate a representation of all possibilities, but also to
have others "bear witness" (recognize) her aspiration, and she remains at the end
"suffering but undefeated" (Rooksby, "Centre" 28).
But what if the tragic heroine has to demand perpetually that someone "bear
- witness to" the narrative of desire that flows from her lips, speaking "what she is"? What
if the tragic heroine, encumbered with immortality, is unable to emulate Phaedra and thus
cannot accept her death at all? Can she still be an aesthetically effective cipher of the
"tumultuous energy" of the limit experience that Swinburne celebrates? Swinburne
considers such questions in his rendering of Philomela in "Itylus." Philomela is the
emissary of many tragic events: she was raped by her sister Procne's husband Tereus, and
Tereus cut out Philomela's tongue to prevent her from telling Procne about it. However,
Philomela wove her narrative account of her rape into a tapestry and sent the tapestry to
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Procne; as a result, Procne murdered her son (Philomela's nephew) and fed the body to
Tereus in revenge, a grisly and cruel act to which Philomela bears witness. In some
versions of this myth, Philomela plays an active role in the murder, whereas in other
versions Procne acts alone. However, the gods took pity on these ill-fated women and
turned them into birds: Philomela the nightingale, Procne the swallow. In Ovid's version
of the myth, Procne's son is named Itys; "Itys," though, is a variant spelling of "Itylus"
which, not coincidentally, is the name of the son of another tragic mythic heroine, Aedon,
who envied her sister Niobe so much that she conspired to kill Niobe's son. Aedon
murdered her own son by mistake, and the gods turned her into a nightingale forced
continually to sing her sorrow. 17 As in "Satia te Sanguine," Swinburne uses only the title
of this poem to circumlocate his speaker's identity within the interwoven traces of several
previous narratives; proper names are never used, and only the mention of the swallow
Procne-suggests that the speaker of the poem is Philomela. But Swinburne's version of
Philomela is also a version or emanation of Aedon, as both Philomela and Aedon are
complicit in the same "criminal desire" and, as nightingale(s), complicit in the same
creation of an affective narrative of that desire. 1 8
In her study of the poem, Margot Louis asserts that the narrative of"Itylus" also
has a triangular structure. However, whereas the triangle of "Phaedra" is formed by three
characters, the triangle of "Itylus" is formed by three different "modes of
communication":

17

Margot K. Louis compares the myths ofPhilomela and Aedon in more detail in "Family Secrets, Family
Silences" (455).
18
In Swinburne's poem, Philomela and Procne have already been turned into birds, and the poem is the
song the nightingale (Philomela) sings.
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one a visual art, explicit but disastrous; another, a beautiful but
meaningless poetry, an art of denial; while the third mode is that of a
poetry powerful and painfully meaning-full, an art of memory and the
affirmation of tragic events . . . . Swinburne's language can range from the
non-referential or even anti-referential deconstruction of meaning, to a
furious fullness which relies for its energy on a passionate belief in
,
referentiality, a passionate commitment to referentiality. ("Family , 454,
emphasis mine)
Swinburne must triangulate these three "modes of communication" to make the
entropy-or "meaninglessness,"-ofthe poem' s verbal aporias or blind spots
aesthetically effective (and/or affective). Philomela' s narrative, a verbal version of her
· tapestry, strives to provide visual images of the catastrophe of meaning, to retain the
"tumultuous energy" of emotion that nostalgia otherwise tends to subjugate, to
accommodate the immediate meaning which is otherwise lost. In comparison, the
swallow' s song lacks any real signifying capacity-that is, instead of abstractly gesturing
toward the "no-thing of desire" that cannot really be signified, it fails to gesture at all
and Philomela (and, I would further argue, Swinburne) is troubled by this instance of
failure.
Procne and her troubling song, much more manifestly than Phaedra and her
performances of desire, address the problematics of the sinthome: Procne is the "certain
One" who
does not partake . . . of the articulation proper to the order of the Other.
This One is of course precisely the One ofjouis-sense, of the signifier
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insofar as it is not yet enchained but rather free-floating, permeated with
enjoyment: it is this enjoyment that prevents ir from being articulated into
a chain. (Zizek, lacan 1 32)
Philomela, on the other hand, cannot share in Procne's ex-sistence, the enjoyment which
is impossible for her to experience, because that very enjoyment is excluded by her very
referential song, which is part of the symbolic order. Through the character of Philomela,
Swinburne seems to admit a version of the Lacanian realization that "we are always
forced to choose be�een meaning and ex-sistence: the price we have to pay for access to
meaning is the exclusion" of the kind of ex-sistence (lacan 1 37).
The dizzying verbal/visual collage of Philomela's narrative can be compared, in
several ways, to a phantasmagoria. In such a "magic lantern show," the projected scenes
swiftly change; but the individual slides are arranged on a circular device, suggesting the
repetitiveness of a cycle. Likewise, "A thousand summers are over and dead" (line 2) for
Philomela, yet she has relived the same cycle-not only the cycle of seasons, but also the
cycle of events involving her life's tragedy-repeatedly, in the same way, a thousand
times. Swinburne also begins each stanza, save one, with a variation of the poem's first
line, "Swallow, my sister, 0 sister swallow," to further suggest that the poem's cycles are
almost inescapable. The problem Philomela has with her sister Procne is that Procne has
literally swallowed the narrative of their tragedy and does not reconstitute or re-express it.
Procne' s song has become a beautiful but meaningless "art of denial," prompting
Philomela to ask,
What hast thou found in thine heart to sing?
. . . Shall not the grief of the old time follow?
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Shall not the song thereof cleave to thy mouth?
Hast thou forgotten . . . ? (5, 10- 1 2)
Philomela seems trapped in a cycle of nostalgia, in that she is transfixed on "[t]he small
slain body, the flowerlike face" ofltylus (line 53); in her refusal to release her
transfixion, she has extracted the figure ofitylus from the context of the past and
"inser[ted] it into a kind of mythic, eternal, timeless present" (Zizek, Lacan 1 12). In
perpetually singing her nostalgic lamentation for Itylus, Philomela claims she is "fulfilled
of [her] heart's desire," and her description of how the song emoted from her "tawny
body and sweet small mouth / Feed[s] the heart of the night with tire" ( 1 5- 1 8) suggests
enjoyment. However, this claim is undermined by her identification with the figure of
"the grief of old time." For "to identify with the dead one . . . amounts to identifying with
a simple image of death, and thus to postponing enjoyment" (Borch-Jacobsen 96).
Procne has not postponed but has embraced her enjoyment, and Philomela seems to
resent her for it. In fact, Philomela wishes that she could do the same, crying, "Could I
forget or thou remember, / Couldst thou remember and I forget" (4 1 -42). In this
nostalgic cycle, Philomela has a limited, imaginary existence in "the place of [desire's]
unfulfillment (or, if you will, of its 'fictional' fulfillment)" (Borch-Jacobsen 96). Her
fulfillment is illusory, like the heightened illusions of semblance and unity projected by
the phantasmagoria. 19
It is important to note that Philomela does acknowledge her entrapment in the
cycle of illusions in the fourth stanza. In this stanza, Philomela does not begin by
addressing her sister, but by acknowledging her own subject position as fixed within the
19

See Adomo's discussion of the phantasmagoria in Aesthetic Theory, pp. 102-03.

203
cycle of unfulfillment-a fixed quality which Procne, the ever-"changing swallow," does
not appreciate:
I the nightingale all spring through,
0 swallow, sister, 0 changing swallow,
An spring through till the spring be done,
Clothed with the light of the night on the dew,
Sing, while the hours and the wild birds follow,
Take flight and follow and find the sun. ( 19-24)
Here Swinburne triangulates the aporia of Procne' s song, the "painful meaningfull[ness]" of Philomela's song, and an explicit visual image of nostalgia, albeit a
different perspective on nostalgia than offered in the previous stanza. Swinburne
redirects the reader's perspective to insinuate a parallel between Philomela's nostalgic
lament for Itylus and the poet's nostalgic lament for an unmediated relationship with
nature before human domination-the kind of nostalgia Swinburne reads into Blake. In
the moment in which Philomela sings and the "wild birds follow," Philomela seems to
have become part of a nature which is not the "artifactitious domain" of "cultural
landscape" which regulates and eventually displaces "natural beauty" (Adorno, Theory
64). However, in this poem, Philomela is treated as an artifact of a specific cultural
landscape. As a mythic character, she is the product of the human mediation of nature
implemented in antiquity; as a mythic character whose story is perpetuated in every
succeeding er�, she is as a figure of the continual human mediation of nature, as wen.
This is why the image of the wild birds is crucial here. Philomela does not follow the
wild birds; they fonow her lead. When she speaks "what she is," her "criminal desire," in
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her narrative, it is not merely her personal tragedy of rape and murder; above all, it is the
disenchantment of nature.
As Horkheimer and Adorno remind us, humans "have always had to choose
between their subjection to nature or the subjection of nature to the Self' (32); even as a
nightingale, Philomela leads the "wild" birds, making them her subjects as they "find the
sun." Nonetheless, when nature has already been disenchanted, "the dark horizon of
myth is illumined by the sun of calculating reason" (Horkheimer and Adorno 32);
Philomela is ordering the "natural" scene around her according to what Robert Kaufman
might call a "self-interested narrative" (''Legislators" 718). Philomela' s narrative
disrupts the "blur" of signifiers {Louis, "Family" 458), untethered to the symbolic
network that gives meaning, comprising Procne's song-intentionally, as Philomela later
begs her, "I pray thee sing not a little space" (50, emphasis mine). By "resisting
symbolization," Procne's song indicates that she has "lost [her] place in the symbolic
universe" (Zizek, Lacan 1 36-37), and Philomela, in contrast, continually reconfirms her
place in that symbolic universe by determining how the surrounding
elements of the
,,
natural scene relate specifically to her, to the narrative she constructs. The unknowability
of Procne's total immersion into nature threatens P�ilomela's affirmations of her self, her
existence. 20
Procne does not acknowledge her self at all; the only vestige of Procne' s human
identity or seljhood extant in the narrative is in Philomela's constant cry of"sister,"
which is Philomela' s attempt to tether Procne to the symbolic network through the
20

Here I mean "existence in the sense of a 'judgment of existence, ' by which we symbolically affirm the
existence of an entity: existence is here synonymous with symbolization, integration into the symbolic
order-only what is symbolized fully 'exists'� (Zizek, Lacon 1 36).
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"social bond" of discourse (Lacon 1 32). Philomela admits, though, that "where [Procne]
fliest"-beyond the social bond of discourse--"! shall not follow" (line 28): in other
words, Procne has flown to "the dimension of 'what is in the subject more than [her]self'
and what [s]he therefore 'loves more than [her]self'" (Lacan 132). Philomela, on the
other hand, seems to remain "at the level of mythology at which the self appears as
sacrifice to itself," a "denial of nature in men [and women] for the sake of domination
over non-human nature and over other[s]" (Horkheimer and Adorno 54). As a mythic
fi gure, Philomela is a "figure of repetition" and "compulsion," "programmed always to
do the same thing" (Horkheimer and Adorno 5 8}-sacrifice that element of what is
"more than herself' to repeating the actions of domination, subjecting everything in her
midst to the social bond. Philomela is compelled to revisit "the occasion of an historic
catastrophe" of sacrifice (Horkheimer and Adorno 5 1 ), because she cannot escape the
event which for Procne is "all past over'' (line 33). She "goes forth among sea-gulfs
hollow / To the place of the slaying of ltylus" (46-47), to find "[tlhe ruins and fragments"
of the tragic moment "left behind," which "take on an expressive quality" (Nicholsen 42)
when woven into Philomela' s "tapestry of signifiers."21 She takes in the ruins and
fragments of Itylus' s life and death and emanates the artifice of
The hands that cling and the feet that follow,
The voice of the child' s blood crying yet
Who hath remembered me? who hath forgotten? (56-58, italics in original)
Her nostalgic object becomes the artifice by which she represents her "criminal desire,"
her mediation of not only nature here, but subjectivity. By projecting the voice ofltylus,
21

I have borrowed the phrase "tapestry of signifiers" from Margot Louis ('Family" 460)�
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Philomela calls us, as readers/spectators, to bear witness to "what she is," by speaking as
who or what she is not: she is not ltylus, though she uses the sacrifice ofltylus to
represent her own sacrifice of self.
As Louis defines her, Philomela is the tragic heroine circumlocating subjectivity
via the "powerful plurality of modes" <?f communication "and the ways in which
opposing voices within a single text actually cooperate to a single if complex end-the
revelation and commemoration of the past'' ("Family" 461 ). More that this, though,
Swinburne' s Philomela calls our attention to the revelation of"truth" as it is only in
"error, forgetting, slips of the tongue, bungled actions, deformation, and pretense" that
she reveals herself to us, the readers-we "who insist on pursuing [her] where [she is]
not" (Borch-Jacobsen 1 1 5). She commemorates the slain Itylus in her "radical
negativity": Philomela is a subject who negates herself at the end by adapting Itylus' s
voice, coming close to representing "pure Desire, pure difference from [her]self as the
condition of relationship with [her]self' (Borch-Jacobsen 1 9 1 ). Swinburne makes sure,
however, that the divisions between "selves" and "others" in this poem are blurred,
creating the kind of "compendium-like dialectic without detail" found in Adomo's work,
"in which one idea"-or one narrative, one subject, one historical moment-"shifts into
the next virtually without boundaries" (Nicholsen 49, emphasis mine). Thus Louis's
comment should be taken further to indicate that Philomela is the virtual site for revealing
and commemorating myth and myth's failures, illusion and illusion' s inability to re
enchant a disenchanted world, artifice and artifice' s necessary failure to satisfy a desire
which is ultimately unsatisfiable.
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Both Philomela and Phaedra function as virtual sites for the constellative
expressions of an aestheticized "revelation and commemoration" of desire, in the same
way that Swinburne's major goddesses, such as Proserpine and Dolores, do. The "radical
negativity" of_Philomela' s song and the "freedom-toward-death" expressed by Phaedra
are modes of illustrating what Antony Harrison calls Swinburne' s "moments of life
where hope and fantasy mingle," in which the expressed lived moment becomes
peculiarly similar to the "dissoluti �n of the self' and "expansion into the world"
Swinburne associates with his images of death ("Eros" 30). Harrison goes further to
suggest that the end result is an approximation of a sought-after "perfect continuity with
the world" in which "perfect freedom" is found in the "fluid unrestraint" of the subject's
"complete penetration of and combination with all surrounding elements" ("Eros" 30);
nonetheless, I think he is mistaken in his assumption that Swinburne' s poetic "fluidity,"
or flux, is unrestrained. 22 Swinburne may stretch the restraints or limitations of
discourse, perhaps even eliding some of them in his uses of artifice, but, as illustrated in
his treatment of Procne, the "fluid unrestraint" of le sinthome cannot be reached.
Procne's song cannot be artistically rendered and, moreover, Philomela's narrative
reveals how myth attempts but fails to restore the "ruins and fragments" of the lost
continuity of the enchanted world, including, of course, the dissolution of the established
22

Harrison makes a similar contention in a later article, claiming that Swinburn�wing upon the
"mythology of 'Soul-Making, '" of"enrichment and redemption through desire and suffering" he admired
in Byron's and Keats's poems, as well as the "interpenetration" of physical and moral passions in the works
of Victor Hugo-does not deviate from his predecessors' "fundamentally Romantic concern with the need
to escape the constraints and limitations of mortal life and carnal passions" ("Losses" 690-91, 699). I agree
that Swinburne is interested in pushing the limits of any kind of boundary or "constraint"-material,
ideologicaJ, visual, verbal-but I think Swinburne is clearly invested in pushing those limits within the
scope of material existence and most definitely carnal passions. Many of his characters exhibit a
conspicuous des'ire for death but any transcendence via death is suspect; likewise, many of his characters
are dead but, as they remain very much a part of the material world (e.g., his Borgia), they do not represent
transcendence or escape strongly at all.
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dichotomies between human and nature, flesh and spirit. Yet the very presence of Procne
in "ltylus"-and the very mention of the song that even Swinburne cannot transcribe-
retains and renews the hope of restoring the lost continuity amid the failure.
In the Proserpine poems, Swinburne finds that conventional renderings of myth-
and the conventional renderings of goddesses in those myths-merely force "all dead
years [to] draw thither" to portray "Dead dreams of days forsaken" ("Garden of
Proserpine'' 67, 69). Such a "dead dream" fails to suggest the possibility of restoring
such continuity; and, left merely to express dead years and dead dreams, Swinburne's
goddesses become tragic figures, languishing in their discontinuity with the world,
seemingly having no place in it whatsoever . . By portraying the goddesses' estrangement
from the world while simultaneously provoking his readers to hope continually for the
goddesses' return to it, Swinburne arguably offers, in an Adornian fashion, "a critique of
myth as well as a [movement] toward its redemption" or revaluative recovery (Theory
1 1 8). Proserpine is still relevant "To men that mix and meet her / From many times and
lands" ("Garden" 55-56). Like the other tragic goddesses, she is perpetually (re)made
relevant by the men and women who read Swinburne's poem, mixing the threads of
various narratives about the goddess, in their readings of the poem and consequently
"meet" the new possibilities that the goddess figures. In short, the goddess becomes a
trope in which the "tumultuous energy" she represents is predominantly generated by the
affect engendered in the reader. In the reader/spectator's encounter with the figure of the
Swinbumian goddess, s/he encounters a virtual stte in which (as Harrison claims) "hope
and fantasy [can] mingle," but where fantasy is comprehended as failing to satisfy human
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desires, where the limitations of the fantastic in art are acknowledged as such, and the
hopefulness for the future moment in which human desires can be met still remains.
Proserpine, like Philomela, is traditionally caught in a nearly inescapable cycle; as
the reluctant goddess of the underworld who emerges annually to banish the winter, she
seems to be the inescapable cycle. But Swinburne questions this traditional reading of
her. The customary versions of the myth portray Proserpine's time in Hades as a misery
she longs to end with her joyful production of the spring, but in Swinburne's "Garden of
Proserpine," she has withdrawn her promises of regeneration from the seasonal cycle.
The spring does not arrive to replenish the "Blown buds of barren flowers" (line 14) and
nothing grows but "bloomless buds of poppies" (27) and the "grapes of Proserpine"
which "she crushes / For dead men deadly wine" (28, 3 1-32). Here Swinburne echoes
Keats's reference to "nightshade, [the] ruby grape of Proserpine" in the "Ode on
Melancholy" (line 4); however, whereas the speaker in Keats's ode exhorts his listener
not to withdraw from the world by partaking in such "poisonous wine" (2), the speaker of
Swinburne's poem aspires to achieve that withdrawal. Swinburne's speaker vocalizes a
desire for death in his proclamations that he is "weary of days and hours" and longs for
the "sleep eternal / In an eternal night" ("Garden" 1 3, 95-96).
The same occurs in the "Hymn to Proserpine," in which the speaker beckons the
absented goddess to return to the Christianized world, to save the world from the empty
ritual of Christ's death and resurrection and its untenanted promises of eternal life. The
speaker of the "Hymn" derides "the pale Galilean" conqueror as well as Christianity's
use of the "ghastly glories of saints, dead limbs of gibbeted Gods" (lines 3 5, 44) as
· concrete proofs that "life goes on" even after death, rather than as abstractions suggesting
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the indetenninacy of death. 23 Instead of seeing the "gibbeting" of God as symbolic
sacrifice, the speaker sees it as an empty "imitation of fear" that still subordinates the
individual subject (Adorno, Theory 47), as it operates only on the subject's fear of
death.24 Yet death is an inevitable part of nature; and the "pale Galilean," thwarting
death, making it into a fearful taboo, has trumped the natural cycle, leaving the speakers
ofboth Proserpine poems victims of"too much love of living" ("Garden" line 8 1 ) and
thus not able to embrace the death which brings "fulfill[ment] of unspeakable things"
("Hymn" line 52). The natural cycle as traditionally figured by Proserpine has been
disrupted. Now, reminiscent of Philomela, Proserpine is the uncanny element in her
. milieu. She signifies disenchantment, specifically here the disenchantment of the
Christian attempt to "re-enchant" the world. The speakers of both the "Hymn" and the
"Garden" call on her limited powers-as a goddess assumed immortal but able to die in a
disenchanted world-to demonstrate that "dead men rise up never" ("Garden" line 86),
that "there is no God found stronger than death" ("Hymn" line 1 10). Christianity can
suggest that death in the material world is insignificant in light of the suggestion of
eternal life, but Proserpine-a disenchanted figure-must necessarily re-emerge as the
"freedom toward death," the desire, that Christianity cannot eclipse.

23

My reading is based on Adomo's discussion of how an artwork's abstractness-"that irritating
indeterminateness of what it is and to what purpose it is"-"is a provocation, (since] it challenges the
illusion that life goes on" (Theory 22-23).
24
To some readers, Swinburne's negative treatment of Christianity seems almost glib, superfici� even
forced. Margot Louis attributes this to Swinburne mixing his interest in "demonic parodies" -such as
Baudelaire's "Les Litanies de Satan" and, of course, Sade's over-the-top reversals of Christian moral
codes-with a more seriously thoughtful and deeply felt "pessimistic, anti-sacramentalist vision of
language itself (as] one aspect of a broad and bitter pessimism" about a God who seems powerless to stop
"the disintegration which proceeds everywhere and always." See Swinburne and His Gods. pp. 22-25,
especially the section on ''The Tradition of Blasphemy."
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Remarkably, then, Proserpine's significance lies in her suggested insignificance to
the Christian world, because the Christian world dismissed her for locating the
possibilities of exploring the "desires and dreams and powers" ("Garden" line 1 5) it
sublimates. To underline this play of "significance," Swinburne does not have Proserpine
speak in either poem, rendering the reader/spectator unable to "bear witness to" the
goddess; she is only gestured at, circumlocated by the multitude of layers created within
the speakers' impassioned pleas. Margot Louis has argued that both poems portray
Proserpine in "faint figures of the . . . fleeting and uncertain things we call material
realities, or of the still less certain prospect of a better and ideal existence" and in words
that "can only be flung at" the goddess "they attempt to describe," words that "can only
evoke"-because they are unable to "embody"-"a reality beyond themselves"
("Proserpine" 3 1 7- 1 8). Louis astutely recognizes that, as readers of Swinburne's poems,
we must not rely on the ordinary processes of finding the goddess and deciphering what
she "means" in Swinburne's poems. Like the speaker of the "Garden," Proserpine's
ersatz worshipper, Swinburne's reader must look at the world via a perspective of
"doubtful dreams of dreams" (lines 4-5).
Consequently, this suggests embracing a kind of "crisis of aesthetic semblance"
(Adorno, Theory 101 ); for, in dreaming about dreams, the kind of perspective determined
by the conventional limitations of the material world is doubly altered. This perspective
allows one to embrace the "inconsistency in the form of contradictions" between what
something "appears to be" and "what it is," and to see how Swinburne "emphasizes"
Proserpine, art(ifice) like. the poem itself, as "[art's] own impossibility"
(Theory 101).
.
Here Swinburne applies the Pre-Raphaelite "dream logic" that he admired in Rossetti:
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Proserpine is "a single image" symbolizing "numerous wishes, impulses, ·attitudes" and
thus can be seen "as double or multiple" (Silver 1 1 ) .2s
From the dream perspective, Proserpine performs a different kind of mimesis in
that she does not merely "foste[r] assimilation to the world and Others" by simply.
,
providing the reader/spectator access to Swinburne/the poet s specific wishes, impulses,
and attitudes which may be other than his/her own; by affecting each reader individually
and provoking a variance of wishes, impulses, and attitudes in each reader, she makes
"sensuous access to the world" possible (Gebauer and Wulf 288). Such "sensuous
access" is not a "pessimistic" practice of the "sexual delights of pain" that Louis claims
undermines the hope for a "better and ideal existence" ("Proserpine" 3 1 5). Instead, it is
the sensual (re)affirmation of the promise of"all the joy before death" that Proserpine
figures-the possibility of some day accessing the "things fairer than all these things"
currently available to one in the material world ("Hymn" lines 26, 29). As Bataille
explains it, the "joy before death belongs only to the.person for whom there is no beyond;
it is the only intellectually honest route in the search for ecstasy'' ("Joy'' 236, italics in
· original), or a sensuous experience of enjoyment in the world. The "pale Galilean" defers
desire and ecstasy to the beyond, but Proserpine represents the limit disconnecting the
here from the beyond: that is, she represents the beyond of death-that which cannot be
tethered to symbolic discourse-only as it can be artificially represented in the here and
now. In the �mbrace of that artificiality, she .implies that the beyond, like the sinthome, is
25

Louis offers a similar comparison between Swinburne's and Rossetti's depictions of goddesses: "[In
Proserpine] we find two constructions of the feminine, one inextricably involved and identified with the
world of the senses, one almost entirely detached from that world. This duality is very common . . . in the
works of D.G. Rossetti" ("Proserpine" 3 17). However, whereas Louis explicitly sees this as Swinburne's
way of exploring binary constructs, I wish to emphasize Swinburne's concentration on multiplicio/, how the
"single image" proposes numerous (and notjust two) possibilities.
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inarticulable. In the material world, one can certainly dream and fantasize about
articulating the inarticulable, but dreams and fantasies are indeterminate illusions of
exceeding material limits, not guarantors of actual transcendence. The "dream logic" just
allows one to manage those limits differently, to generate new possibilities of
representation within those discursive limits.
Notwithstanding the above observations, the following question is still left
partially unanswered: why must this aesthetic require reaffirming the promise of
enjoyment through pleasure-which-is-pain? The answer, I believe, can be found in a
reading of Swinburne's poem, "Dolores," about his notorious, penultimate "Lady of
Pain"-the professed epitome of all the women of his Poems and Ballads. Antony
Harrison has commented on the poem's "consuming 'depth of feeling'" and its "tortured
expression of simultaneous lust, fear, doubt, rebellion, and hope" ("Losses" 693); Allison
Pease on its "transgression away from the frame of civilization and its . . . emotional
norms" (47); Jerome McGann on its "self-indulgent histrionics" (Swinburne 208); and
David Riede on its parodic treatment of "the spiritual, emotional suffering of the Blessed
Virgin" and her role in Christian asceticism (Study 50). However, these critics tend to
read the poem's dialectic of "asceticism and sadism" as potentially resolving itself in a
kind ofpraxis 26 that Julian Baird suggests is the transformation of spiritual love into
physical cruelty (55).
Yet where Harrison wants to find the poem's "redeem[ing] . . . subtle spiritual
qualities" ("Losses" 693) and Riede wants to find "an eternal feminine principle" (Study
26

Praxis in the sense that the dialectic is resolved via an envisaged "transformation of these forms" or
categories, transcending the boundaries separating tbese supposedly diametrically-opposed categories
(Lukacz, History 177).
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54), there is only the perpetual flux of expression which "shaH change as the things that
we cherish, / ShaU fade as they faded before" ("Dolores" 429-30). She arguably
embodies BataiUe' s "Heraclitean Meditation" in that she allows the reader to "imagine
human movement and excitation, whose possibilities are limitless: this movement and
excitation can only be appeased" or even represented "by war" ("Joy" 239)-or, more
speciticaUy in this case, the violent extremes of human sexual behavior which bind one to
the here of the material world, the experience of the body, rather than what lies beyond it.
Swinburne is vigilant in his insistence that Dolores is "A beautiful passionate body / That
never has ached with a heart" (8 1 -82). Like one of Sade's heroines, she neither practices
nor responds to the transformation of sexuality into tenderness which "express[es] the
delusion of spiritua1 love"-what Sade's Count Belmor, in Juliette, caHs "a false and
always dangerous metaphysic" like religion; when lust is transformed into Jove, the Jover
and the beloved are both prevented "from being seen as what [she or] he really is"
(Horkheimer and Adorno 108). To avoid all prospects of seeing such delusion, "the pulse
of [Dolores's] passion" (line 22 1) must befelt; and the feelings of extreme pleasure and
extreme pain exhibited in the poem attest to the "richness of detail" Swinburne uses in his
art to celebrate the "diffuseness" in which every visual aesthetic element engenders a
non-visual-a moving, exciting-counter-impulse (Adorno,

'I'heory

1 88). This also re

examines the issue of "joy before death" that Swinburne introduces in the "Hymn to
Proserpine." Like the worshippers of P�oserpine, the worshipper of Dolores focuses on no
other object than what is presented him in the immediate, material life (Bataille, "Joy"
236).
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In "Dolores," the speaker i s not deluded into thinking his worship of Dolores is a
spiritual encounter in the religious sense. 27 Rather, the speaker encount�rs the "spirit" of
the aesthetic, or that quality which makes an art of appearances seem more than mere
appearance. Twice he calls Dolores "mystic" (in lines 7 and 20) but only ironically. The
poem may denote an attempt at communication between man and goddess, but only as it
represents the actual impossibility of such communication as well as its inability to
quench "the hunger of change and emotion, / . . . the thirst of unbearable things" or to
satisfy "the desire that outruns the delight" ( 1 05-06, 1 1 0). Swinburne/the speaker can
write Dolores into being, but her only "mystic" quality is what Derrida would say is "in
the tracing potency of the trait, at the instant where the . . . inscription of the inscribable is
not seen" (Memoirs 45, italics in original). We are called to bear witness to Dolores, "our
lady of suffering," through the performative speech acts of Swinburne's speaker, though
she "escapes the field of vision" (Memoirs 46). Or, to put it another way, we are called to
bear witness to how Dolores escapes the field of vision, how she "shalt blind" the
speaker's-and thus our-"bright eyes though he wrestle" with the task of representing
her (line 201 ). Dolores cannot be seen, so she must be sensed in other ways; to
experience Dolores, one must, as the speaker does, affect her.
And, to do so, one must rediscover "the ability to live intensely, [though] this has
been lost"; the speaker of"D?lores" suggests that this rediscovery lies in "[t]he ability to
sin intensely" (Riede, Study 54).
As our kisses relax and redouble,
27 "I have passed from the outermost portal

To the shrine where a sin is a prayer;
What care though the service be mortal?" (129-3 1 )

•
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From the lips and the foam and the fangs
Shall no new sin be born for men's trouble,
No dream of impossible pangs?
. . . Too sweet is the rind, say the sages,
Too bitter the core. (89-92, 95-96)
The tragedy of Dolores is that she expresses the "lips" and "foam" and "fangs" of an
expressive "criminal desire" which goes largely ignored. The "sages" of Christian
asceticism have decided the range of possibilities in its tastes are too extreme and thus
forbid experiencing them; but, in this narrowing of experience, the "sages" advocated a
life devoid of intensity, in which enjoyment is always postponed, unattainable. The
speaker here, then, resembles Swinburne's Philomela: his offering to Dolores is also a
song gesturing toward "the place of [desire' s] unfulfl/lment (or, if you will, of its
'fictional' fulfillment)" (Borch-Jacobsen 96). Such songs to Dolores had been silenced
by those "sages," but Swinburne's speaker' s song is a very purposeful rebellion against
that silence; his song is what Adorno would cal l a "desecration of silence" (Theory 1 3 4).
Because Swinburne' s speaker repeatedly refers to physical experience as "sin," the poem
does seem "entangled in the nexus of the guilt" (Theory 134) of Christian asceticism;
however, Swinburne uses the word "�in" only to negate that guilt typically invoked by it.
For, also like the case of Philomela, it is the guilt that postpones and prevents fulfillment
that must be refracted-deflected, obscured-from experience. In the heightened
illusions of semblance and unity offered by the ascetic Christian promises of fulfillment
in the beyond, Swinburne's speaker longs for a moment, now lost, in which "Pain melted
in tears, and was pleasure; / Death tingled with blood, and was life" ("Dolores" 1 79-80).
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Like all the other characters and speakers in the Poems and Ballads, the speaker
in "Dolores" strives to establish a constellative moment in which "rebellion against
semblance, [its] dissatisfaction with itself," and art's "desire for dissonance" (Adorno,
Theory 1 10) can be effectively expressed. In this way, Swinburne attempts to situate his

readers, as well as himself as "poet," within a relationship to dissonance and
dissatisfaction. In this relationship, the multiple ways of discerning dissonance and
dissatisfaction become, in themselves, experience� in which one approximates beauty and
pleasure in the resistance to what is traditionally beautiful and pleasurable, and one
approximates satisfaction in the perpetuation of the attempt to satisfy insatiable human
desires.
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CHAPTER SIX
In the Space between Decadence and Democracy:
Swinburne, Republicanism, and Songs before Sunrise
"I have tried not to get the mystic elemental side of the poem, its pure andfree
imaginative part, swamped by the promulgation of the double doctrine, democratic and
atheistic, equality ofman and abolition ofgods... . "-Algernon Charles Swinburne
"[L]anguage is itselfsomething double. Through its configurations it assimilates itself
completely into subjective impulses; one would almost think it hadproduced them. "
-Theodor Adorno
"My voice was often the voice ofmany, the echo ofan idea shared by the young. "
-Giuseppe Mazzini
Following the publication of Poems and Ballads, First Series in 1 866, Swinburne
began to pursue his interests in European revolutionary politics more actively. At
Oxford, Swinburne had demonstrated an evident amount of sympathy and allegiance with
the republican movements in France and Italy. However, at that time, his republican
fervor seemed more like a reiteration of his friend John Nichol's republicanism than a
fully realized personal commitment. Both Nichol and Swinburne were members of the
Old Mortality Society, a group of Balliol students who met weekly to discuss "the more
general questions of literature, philosophy, science, as well as the diffi.Jsion of a correct
knowledge and critical appreciation of our Standard English Authors" 1 -and, at Nichol's
urging, politics. As fellow member A.V. Dicey once noted, Old Mortality's discussions
took up "the cause of foreign nationalities, and especially of lta�y, the crimes of Louis
Napoleon, and the abolition of . . . all restrictions on the freedom of opinion" ( qtd. by
Rooksby, Life 51 ). Swinburne became interested enough in these discussions to place
1 The name "Old Mortality" refers t� the members' belief that tbey were all in delicate, questionable health
and thus were going to die young. 1rus often-quoted description of the Old Mortality Society's purpose is
taken from The Old Mortality Register, the minute-book of all their meetings, which is now in Oxford's
Bodleian Library, MS. Top., Oxon. d. 242.f.4.
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two portraits of revolutionaries on his wall: one of Felice Orsini, who tried to assassinate
Louis Napoleon in 1 858, and one of Giuseppe Mazzini, a prominent figure in the Italian
revolutionary movement (the Risorgimento), whose name was linked to Orsini's at the
time.2 At this time, Swinburne also began writing about republican themes, 3 but once
Rossetti's "Jovial Campaign" arrived at Oxford, Swinburne seems to have transferred his
fervor from revolutionary politics to the Pre-Raphaelite project.
In some ways, Swinburne's interest in social and political revolution seems to
have been, like his forays into Sade, French decadence, and Blakean Romantic prophecy, .
a measure of rebellion against the orthodoxy expected and promoted by his privileged
upbringing. Swinburne's maternal grandfather was an aristocrat, the third Earl of
Ashburnham, who claimed to trace his family lineage back to the Norman Conquest. His
favored paternal grandfather, Sir John Swinburne, having lived the majority of his life as
a nobleman in France, continued to maintain the social and political principles and even
the customary dress of the ancien regime even after moving to England. Sir John did
eventually renounce his Catholicism and become an "ultra-liberal" member of Parliament
(Henderson 6); as Donald Thomas has noted, though, "Sir John did not believe in taking
his political radicalism to extremes," having considered the post-revolutionary socialist
movements in France as "enemies of liberty" ( 10), and Swinburne shared his

However, by the time Orsini attempted to assassinate Louis Napoleon, he and Mazzini had already
severed ties, and Orsini never infonned Mazzini about the assassination plans. Because Orsini' s bombs
had been manufactured by a British engineer, Thomas Allsop, who was sympathetic to Mazzini and his
cause-and because Orsini had frequented Mazzinian circles in London before the assassination attempt
it was publicly assumed that Mazzini had been involved in Orsini' s plot. (See Sarti 178.)
3
For instance, Swinburne wrote a poem about republican Rome, "Temple of Janus," for a poetry contest he
did not win and thus seemed to have lost interest in the piece. At this time, he also wrote an "Ode to
Mazzini," which was found among Swinburne's private papers only after his death and posthwnously
published by Edmund Gosse.
2
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grandfather's lifelong suspicion of democratic equality for all citizens. 4 He seems to
have combined his grandfather's suspicion of democracy with Victor Hugo's belief that
noblesse oblige and revolutionary leadership were complementary (Thomas 1 0).
Undeniably, Swinburne took pride in his aristocratic lineage throughout his life, using the
posture of noblesse oblige during his most republican period: for example, in a letter to
one ofMazzini's more radical associates, Emilie Ashurst Venturi/ he boasted of how
"unspeakably important" his aristocratic background was (Letters 2:29-30).
Swinburne's insistence on reminding his correspondents of his aristocratic lineage
also diwlges his lingering interest in how his predecessors' poetry is admixed with
noblesse oblige politi�s. In the precedent established in the works and lives of Byron and
Shelley, in particular, Swinburne found the paradoxical alliance of nostalgia for
aristocratic privilege and the encouragement of revolution. Ideally, the aristocrat was in a
unique, privileged position to be called to the "duty to become an active, transfigurative
force in material life" (Eagleton 2 1 ). The aristocratically privileged poet, especially, had
right of entry into what Shelley calls "an additional class of emotions" which produce a
"treasure of expressions" which can become "the representat.ion and the medium . . . [for]
equality, diversity, unity, contrast, mutual dependence, . . . the principles alone capable of
affording the motives according to which the will of a social being is determined to
action" (48 1 , emphasis mine). Robert Kaufman identifies this orientation as the site of an
Adornian tension between "emancipatory gesture and formal constraint"; in this case, the
emancipatory gesture of"imaginative aspiration" which presents itself as political
Edmund Gosse, in the introduction to his Life ofAlgernon Charles Swinburne, famously quips, 'The poet,
although so great a republican, was no democrat" (3).
5 Venturi and Swinburne corresponded frequently between 1867 and 187 1 . The letter is dated "September
28," but the year is missing; Lang presumes it to be 1 869 (Letters 2:29).
4
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aspiration ("Legislators,, 7 1 0) collides with the constraints of the position of privilege,
which "takes for granted" the "'under-class[es]'" who exemplify "a struggle for survival
to which all else is sacrificed" (Lucas, "Republican" 42}-a struggle that the privileged
poet's "imaginative aspiration" not only conspicuously conflicts with but also
romanticizes.
One of the most interesting aspects of Swinburne's politica] poems is that his
republican lyrics retain the monarchical structures associated with the governments
Swinburne advocates dismantling. Freedom/Liberty is almost always represented by-or
personified as-a benign monarch or humanized divinity, very much like the
representation of Freedom in Tennyson' s "Of old sat Freedom on the heights."6 In
Tennyson's poem, Freedom is "in her place" "on the heights"; she must step down from
her lofty position "To mingle with the human race" (lines 1 , 5, 10). This mingling,
though, seems rather aestheticized. Tennyson's Freedom is a source of imaginative
inspiration, a "fair form [which] may stand and shine" (line 2 1 ), but a form which seems
psychologically rather than physically manifest; Freedom here is the intangible belief that
"light[s] our dreams" (22) and thus inspires the labor of political struggle. Yet, though
this inspiration may be the "Grave mother of majestic works" ( 13) of liberation, the
inspiration seems somewhat removed from the Jabor required to actuate these "majestic
works," since the poem does not account for them.
6

Swinburne's rather vehement dislike for certain aspects of Tennyson's personality as well as his frequent
deprecating remarks about Tennyson's poetry have been well noted. Donald Thomas observes that, in the
1870s in particular, Swinburne made Tennyson into the archetypal "sanctimonious philosopher" to whom
he directed "merciless ridicule" (183). However, Swinburne and his friend Edwin Hatch had once spent an
evening discussing poetry with Tennyson in January 1858, and the experience left quite an impression on
Swinburne, so much so that Swinburne recounted the conversation of that evening, quite fondly and in
vivid detail, when offering his condolences to Lady Tennyson upon Tennyson's death. (See Rooksby, Life
55, 269-70.)
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Similarly, in Swinburne's Songs, those who labor to restore "Liberty" to the seat
of power perform aesthetic labor which is presented without its corollary, material
(manual) labor. For example, in "A Watch in the Night," Liberty assumes one of the
noblesse oblige voices featured in the Songs, wistfully noting that, distanced from the
bloodshed and physical warfare,
I feel not the red rains fall,
Hear not the tempest at all,
Nor thunder in heaven any more.
All the distance is white
With the soundless feet of the sun. (146-50)
-The revolutionary subject-as-poet is the "prophet" who uncomfortably stands "Banished,
uncomforted" yet "free" on the verge between the privilege granted by previous
structures of undemocratic government and the desire to "Freely to freedom . . . [give] /
Pledges" ("Watch" 1 0, 3 1-32) to undermine the very structures ensuring that privilege.
This is Swinburne's way of re-engaging the Romantic paradox of resisting the status quo
at both ends of the spectrum: in his poems, Swinburne reveals what Adorno would call
the "yawning schism between their aesthetic trouvai/les'-discoveries, which require
travail (work)-"and a political posture that is manifest in the content [/nhalt] and
intention of [art]works," a schism which purposefully and "significantly damages
artistic," and even political, ideological "consistency" (Adorno, Theory 254).
Swinburne's return to exploring republicanism was the compound result of his
discussions with friends William Michael Rossetti and George Meredith, who shared
John Nichol's political fervor, and meeting Mazzini, whom Swinburne came to call his
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"Chief," on March 30, 1 867. Before this meeting, Swinburne' s correspondence with
several friends demonstrates his increased desire to become more politically oriented.
Swinburne implored Meredith for details about Meredith' s experience as a war
correspondent in Italy and Austria "when the heat of the storm" of political unrest "was
raging" (Letters 1 :23 1 ).7 William Michael Rossetti, whose father had been exiled from
Italy in 1 82 1 for conspiring against King Ferdinand and his Austrian supporters,
corresponded with Swinburne often about their shared hope for "a present revolution and
republic" in Italy as well as for "a successful Orsini to plunge France into a Medea's
caldron of life-restoring troubles and ferments" (1 :230). In a letter to Bayard Taylor,
dated March 1 8, 1 867, Swinburne even expresses a wish to leave England, "this Siberia,
this exile's Lapland, for my chosen Mother Italy" (1 :232). And, after finally meeting
Mazzini, Swinburne told his sister Alice that he "cannot . . . believe more in the
Republican cause" (1 :240). 8
As many biographers have noted, it is unclear if Swinburne arranged to meet
Mazzini through politically connected friends, such as Nichol, or if he arranged the
meeting himself through his correspondence with the exiled politician. There is also an
often-repeated tale, attributed to Edmund Gosse, that Swinburne's former tutor Benjamin
Jowett gathered a group of Swinburne's friends and acquaintances together in early
March 1 867 to figure out "what could be done with and/or Algernon" (Gosse 1 66, italics
in original). Many of Swinburne's associates, including Jowett, were troubled by
7 Letter from George Meredith to Swinburne, 2 Mar. 1 867. Meredith was recounting the events of the
previous year. In 1866, Italy formed an alliance with Prussia and declared war on Austria The Italian
annies did not fare well in the war, but, as Austria suffered a major loss at the hands of Prussian forces at
the battle of Sadowa, the Italian forces were able to liberate Venice from Austrian rule. Austria then
relinquished its political interests in Gennany to Prussian reunification efforts.
8
This letter is dated 10 Apr. 1 867.
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Swinburne' s activities during this period: his regular visits to London's flagellation
brothels, the bizarre behavior he exhibited during his frequent public drinking binges, and
his association with Simeon Solomon and George Powell, both of whom were rumored to
be homosexual and thus were considered socially disadvantageous.

9

Supposedly, Jowett

recruited Mazzini to divert Swinburne's attention from his vices and from disreputable
friendships.

10

This account, like many of the other anecdotes in Gosse's Life of

Swinburne, is questionable, but Gosse is correct in his report that Mazzini did have some
interest in Swinburne' s "moral improvement" ( 1 66).

11

Mazzini told Swinburne that he·

disliked most of the Poems and Ballads, which. he considered "songs of egotistical love
I

and idolatry of physical beauty," and that Swinburne was wasting his talents on
meaningless poems that could "lull us to sleep" (Mazzini qtd. by Henderson, 1 37).
However, Mazzini apparently thought well enough of the few politically charged poems
that do appear in that volume to encourage Swinburne to continue to write political
poetry in the spirit of "do[ing] good and serv[ing] others exclusively'' (Letters 1 :242). 1 2
In the late 1 860s, Mazzini lived in London and organized the Universal
Republican Alliance, a group of European and American supporters of republican ideals.
Roland Sarti comments that "[s]omething resembling ·a personal cult developed around
9 Solomon's arrest for soliciting sex in a public restroom confinned the suspicions about his sexual
orientation, but this arrest did not occur until February 1873. After the arrest, though, Swinburne refused
any further contact with him.
10
See Thomas 1 58-59; Henderson 1 37.
11
A significant portion of Gosse's book depends on uncorroborated stories from people who knew
Swinburne only briefly and on second- or third-hand accounts of events which occurred before Gosse
befriended Swinburne in the early 1870s, after nearly all the work on the Songs had been finished.
Moreover, Gosse's text is an uncomfortable balancing act between his admitted "hero-worship" of
Swinburne (Gosse 200) and his professed need, as he told Thomas Wise, to "conquer a feeling that
Swinburne was rather sickening (as] there is a very ugly side to him" (Gosse qtd. by Greenberg, 96). This
discomfort leads Gosse to admit that he did not consider Swinburne "quite like a hwnan being" (Gosse
201). � as such, Gosse's Life o/Swinbume is a work of "concealments and distortions" (Greenberg 96).
12
Letter from Swinburne to Lady Jane Swinburne (his mother), 7 May 1 867.
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[Mazzini]," as Emilie Ashurst Venturi garnered support for Mazzini' s causes from the
scholars, philanthropists, and other "free-thinking Christian" political activists in her
family's acquaintance ( 1 2 1 , 1 12). 13 As Cecil Lang notes in his introduction to
Swinburne's Collected Letters, it is only because Venturi saved her letters from Mazzini
that we know about the prolific correspondence Mazzini and Swinburne shared during
this time (1 :xxxv). Very few of the actual letters between Swinburne and Mazzini
remain. Mary Gordon Disney-Leith burned any letters she found upon Swinburne's
death that "disturb[ed] the marmoreal image of Algernon that she wanted to bequeath to
posterity'' (Lang I :xxxii), likely including Swinburne's correspondence with Mazzini, of
whom Swinburne's family sharply disapproved, and Mazzini did not save any of the
correspondence he received (Sarti 8). Among one of the extant letters, though, is one
Mazzini sent to Swinburne on March I 0, 1 867, before they had even met face-to-face. In
this letter, Mazzini commands Swinburne to "shake us, reproach, encourage, insult, brand
the cowards, hail the martyrs," to "[g]ive us a series of 'Lyrics for the Crusade"' and thus
fulfill "his great Duty" as a poet of revolution (qtd. by Henderson 1 37). Thus Swinburne
began to work seriously, and sometimes in fits of frustration, on the poems that comprise
the Songs before Sunrise.
It is important to note that the shift from hedonistic dissolution to revolutionary
vehemence is not as great as Mazzini (pr possibly Jowett) may have thought, particularly
considering that Swinburne's interest in the political corollaries of Sade's writing was
13 Emilie Venturi was rather well connected in London. Her father, William Henry Ashurst, was a
prominent London solicitor who had campaigned for many radical causes including the emancipation of
women. The family's circle of friends included Thomas and Jane Carlyle. The family also had notable
connections in the British government, as Emilie's sister Caroline married an "ultra-liberal" member of
Parliament.
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part and parcel to his interest in the Sadean explorations of human sexuality. Despite the
disappointment Swinburne claims to have felt in "that 'rosy hour' with eyes 'purged by
the euphrasy and rue' of the Marquis de Sade and his philosophy," discovering that
Sade's shock value depended mostly "on the pungency of the perfume and its power over
the nerves," he was still intensely affected by how Sade "stimulate[d] the senses by that
preliminary pleasure so as to inflict the acuter pain afterwards on their awakened and
intensified susceptibility" (Letters 1 :78). 14 In other words, Swinburne perceived Sade's
writings as attempts to awaken human sensibilities in a way that would allow for what
Marcuse calls the "release of sensuous energy," a release that allows for freedom which
can "only . . . [be] founded on and sustained by the free gratification" of individua!s ( 1 9 1 ).
Furthermore, as Dorothea Barrett suggests, Swinburne saw in sadomasochistic
practice the possibility that such practice could be used as a model for ideal "human
interaction" (1 1 1 }-a model in which all human interactions are recognized equally,
democratically, without censure or exclusion. Just as one "confront[s] the mutability and
proximity" of supposed opposites "pleasure and pain," one must confront the mutability
and proximity of social, political, and religious polarities (Barrett 1 1 1 ). However, a
model which privileges these kinds of sensual expression must also account for the
economy of desire-and, specifically, what desire lacks-which compels human
interaction as well. Just as Swinburne was fascinated by how Sadean fantasy reveals the
inability of fantasy to (ful)fill the lack (desire), 15 and thus perpetuates itself, he was also
Letter to Richard Monkton Milnes (Lord Houghton), IO Feb. 1863 . As Lang notes, Swinburne quotes
here from Milton's Paradise Lost, Book XI, line 4 14.
15
Inasmuch as the desired object of the fantasy is "not symmetrical with the subject" but is instead "the
'lack of object' insofar as the subject finds him (or her]self in it as the object (she or] he is not-that is, as
desire" (Borch-Jacobsen 200-0 l ).
14
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fascinated by how revolutionary struggle demonstrates the inability of revolution to meet
its own goals, and thus perpetuates itself. The bodies subject to sexual violence in
Sadean fantasies are "so displaceable . . . that the narrative cannot reach any closure, or
rather only a kind of 'half relier that administers salt to [the] wound," or the
un(ful)fiJlable lack (Vincent 284). Likewise, the bodies-agents-of revolutionary
struggle in Swinburne's political poems are displaced via the same kind of serial
identifications enacted in the Poems and Ballads, so that the narratives of revolution they
profess do not reach any closure, either, and instead punctuate the inability of revolution
to fulfill its own goals.

Revolutionary Failure and Political Androgyny:
Glimmers of the Republican Aesthetic in the Poems and Ballads

In her recent study of Swinburne's political poems, Stephanie Kuduk identifies
what she calls the "republican aesthetics" informing and being formed by Swinburne' s
poetry of the late 1 860s/early 1 870s. In the republican aesthetic, "poetry [is] an agent of
social and political change," and poets "translate republican ideals . . . into poetic form"
(Kuduk 253). In Songs before Sunrise, Kuduk asserts, Swinburne explores "[t]he
republican idea that ideological and physical power are united" by providing within each
poem a site where the conflation of political power and repressive ideology can be
negotiated (260). Revolutionary action aims to challenge the ideas that sustain the
dominant ideology-the body of ideas representing the social needs and aspirations of a
specific culture, as promoted and upheld by the government-or to replace it entirely.
When one thinks of revolutionary action, likely one thinks of some kind of physical,
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material conflict, like Orsini' s assassination attempt on Louis Napoleon, Garibaldi's
revolt against the monarchic rulers of Sicily, or even the organization of political activist
associations like the Universal Republican Alliance. However, as Mazzini
communicated to Swinburne, physical, material conflict can only put into practice the
ideals already generated by the persuasive, creative power of the intellect. To Mazzini,
"[l]iterature . . . was the secret political weapon" (Sarti 32) upon which the success of any
revolutionary activity depends; Kuduk's definition of the Swinburnean republican
aesthetic echoes Mazzini's assertion that "the ink of the wise is a match for the sword of
the strong" (qtd. by Sarti 54). Three poems featured in Poems and Ballads, First
Series-"A Song in a Time of Order," "A Song in a Time of Revolution," and "Les
Noyades"-can be evaluated as initial considerations of the politicized and politicizing
aesthetic Swinburne later negotiates in the Songs. However, these poems seem to suggest
that the "ink of the wise" reveals the shortcomings of the republican "sword"; instead of
assuring its strength, the poems demonstrate how a politicized aesthetic can conflict with
the predominant ideas of actual political movement which inspires its very creation.
"A Song in a Time of Order" is subtitled "1 852," which is not the actual date of
its composition 16 but the date marking the false sense of despotically imposed calm that
existed before the revolutionary stonn that would soon overtake Europe. In 1 852, the
citizens of France voted to give Louis Napoleon the title of Emperor, thus ending the
period of the post-revolutionary Secon� Republic; Camillo Benso, Count of Cavour, who
opposed Mazzini's "radical" ideas for revolution, became Prime Minister of Sardinia16

As Rooksby notes in A Poet 's Life, 1858 is the earliest date of composition for any of the Poems and
Rooksby does not offer a more specific date for this poem, but Swinburne did publish the
poem in the April 26, 1862 issue of the Spectator prior to including it in the Poems and Ballads.

Ballads (132).
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Piedmont and used his power to undermine the revolutionary efforts of Mazzini's
factions; and Austria, which controlled many Italian principalities, passed the

Sylvesterpatent, or New Year's Eve Edict, which returned the country to the rule of an
absolute monarchy. The speaker of Swinburne' s poem exhorts his audience, the
revolutionaries quieted by the resurgence of absolutism, to "Push hard across the sand" of
the desert of such ossifying autocracy, to retain or to rediscover the hope that their ideals
can still be translated into a material expression: "For the salt wind" of a still-possible
republicanism still "gathers breath" (lines 1 -2), and the revolutionary movement remains
"The pulse tide of the sea" which "swells and welters and swings" with the promises of
"the fresh fierce weather'' of a radical political vital ism on the horizon (7-8, 1 3). These
possibilities will be materialized, the speaker promises repeatedly, by the "three men"
who "hold together'' so that "The kingdoms are less by three." These men are not named,
but one of them is undoubtedly Mazzini; one could argue the other two are followers of
Mazzini ' s-perhaps Giovanni Pianori, who attempted to assassinate Louis Napoleon in
1 854, and Giuseppe Garibaldi, who led several armies of revolutionaries in attempts to
oust the French and Austrian rulers from their Italian strongholds. However, Swinburne
could just as easily refer to other Mazzinians such as Carlo Pisacane, who led an army to
liberate Naples from Bourbon rule in 1 856, or the priest Enrico Tazzoli, a Mazzinian
organizer in Austrian-controlled Lombardy. In the end, definitively identifying those
who complete the Mazzinian trinity here may not matter, as to Swinburne any of these
candidates are synonymous with Mazzini himself Like so many of the other personae
created in Poems and Ballads, the figures in the poem are purposefully not named
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because they are intended to figure in the processes of serial identification: they are all
versions, or traces, of the republican savior.
Notably, all the men I have named as possible historical · analogues to the shadowy
revolutionary figures mentioned in this poem are marked by failure, as are the other
Christ figures featured in Poems and Ballads, who fail to fulfill the conventional
promises of redemption or transcendence. The plots that began to take shape in 1 852 all
failed: Garibaldi suffered major losses in his early military ventures on behalf of
Mazzini's cause, Pianori was executed for his crime, Pisacane committed suicide to
prevent being taken a prisoner of war, and Tazzoli was arrested for conspiring against the
Austrian government and publicly whipped. 17 Furthermore, Mazzini's popularity was
greatly diminished due to his prolonged exile from Italy as well as Cavour's skill at using
his political triumphs to make Mazzini look ineffective and out of touch with the needs of
Italian people.
At the same time, it is important to realize that Swinburne writes about 1 852 with
the allowances of hindsight. Swinburne recognizes, as Karl Marx does in his 1 852 essay
on the "Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte," that the failures of the past "weig[h]
like a nightmare on the brain of the living" (Marx 595). Swinburne saw the culmination
what Marx had predicted: that many of the revolutionary ideas that evolved from the
reinstitution of authoritarian order in Europe that year failed to counteract that oppressive
authority. Furthermore, Swinburne's remediated vision of 1 852 serves as an example of
how, in their attempt to "creat[e] something entirely new," revolutionaries "anxiously
conju_re up the spirits of the past to their service and borrow from them names, battle
17

Interestingly, in line 50 of the poem Swinburne specificalJy mentions "the Austrian whips."
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slogans, and costumes to present the new scene . . . in this time-honored disguise and this
borrowed language" (Marx 595). Marx stated that revolution in the nineteenth century
should not "draw its poetry from the past, but only from the future"; that revolution "must
let the dead bury their dead" (597). In similar vein, Swinburne' s poetry demonstrates
how drawing upon the past, how reconstructing templates for revolution from "the bones
of the dead," 18 will necessarily result in the failure of that revolution-albeit the kind of
necessary failure which allows the revolutionary "to keep [his or her] passion at the
height of . . . great historical tragedy'' (Marx 596)--the kind of tragedy which, Lacan tells
us, "reveals to us the line of sight that defines desire" (Seminar 247). In this "line of
sight," one is forced to describe revolution as Lacan defines desire, as a "perpetual effect
of symbolic articulation"; revolution is envisioned as a self-perpetuating event. 19
Such emphasis on the tragic dimension of political revolution suggests a notable
and important difference that exists between Mazzini's republicanism and Swinburne's-
one that existed well before Swinburne was officially drafted into Mazzini's circle, and
one that would cause Swinburne to write poems that did not quite characterize the
revolutionary effort in ways Mazzini wanted, or even anticipated. Whereas Swinburne's
political poetry anticipates revolutionary failures, thus concentrating on the struggle itself
rather than its improbable, even utopian, goals, 20 Mazzini never fully acknowledged the

18

See line 46 of Swinburne,s "Song in Time of Revolution."
See the "Translator's Note" to The Four Fundamental Concepts ofPsycho-Analysis. pp. 278-79.
20
Swinburne,s treatment of revolutionary failure shares some similarities with Shellefs, such as Shelley's
depictions of cyclical violence in "The Mask of Anarchy" and the perpetuated conflict between Asia and
Demigorgon in "Prometheus Unbound." Notably, at the time he composed many of the Songs before
Sunrise. Swinburne corresponded frequently with William Michael Rossetti concerning Rossetti's
upcoming volume of Shelley's poems as well as with the poet Mathilde Blind whose "Shelley: A Lecture',
,
was published in 1870. Swinburne's letters suggest he was more intrigued by Shelley's poetic style than
Shelley's political agenda. At one point, though Swinburne asked W.M. Rossetti to read portions of the
,
19

232
possibility or prospect of failure in his quest to create an Italy unified by republicanism.
Throughout his life, Mazzini truly believed he "had to carry out the will of God on earth
'so that the divine plan may be fulfilled'" (Sarti 8 1 ). He presented himself as the messiah
of the Italian people, "the Cristo uomo sacrificing [himself] for their redemption"; in
other words, Mazzini is the universal symbol of the possibility of a unified, less
autocratic Italy not lodged beyond the particularities of the Italian people, w�om he
called "the Cristo popo/o" (Sarti 8 1 ). Swinburne was aware that the possibilities once
signified by Mazzini's public persona had not materialized, especially as the Cristo
popo/o demonstrated "a notable lack

of interest in prolonging the national revolution"

(Sarti 198). On the surface, the "Song in a Time of Order'' seems a call to relight former
revolutionary fires; upon a closer reading, though, it seems more like a statement
pronouncing the inevitable failure to bring radical possibilities to fruition. There is a
sense of bravado in the speaker's exhortation to "Let the wind shake our flag like a
feather'' and face "the teeth of the hard glad weather'' (lines 45, 53), especially as he has
already admitted that "the ranks that are thin shall be thinned" and "the names that were
twenty are [now] ten" (35-36).
The companion piece to this poem, "A Song in Time of Revolution (1 860),"
considers the political climate of that year. 1 860 marks the end of Louis Napoleon's
dictatorship, as he initiated a series of liberal reforms relinquishing many of his powers to
France's National Assembly; likewise, Emperor Francis Joseph I introduced a form of
constitutional government in Austria. In Italy, Garibaldi finally experienced military

drafts of the Songs to make sure he was not "treading too much on ground preoccupied by Shelley . . . on
the outworks of 'Prometheus Unboundm (Letters 2: 120).
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success, capturing Sicily and creating a provisional government there; the Piedmontese
army invaded the Papal States, wresting political authority from the church; and Cavour
convinced several other Italian principalities to vote for annexation to Sardinia-Piedmont,
setting the stage for the creation of the unified Kingdom ofltaly the following year.
Swinburne's poem, though, expresses only muted happiness at such turns of events. The
speaker of this poem comments that the wi�d pushing the old regimes out of these lands
"is full of the shouting of mirth" (line 33), a mirth which is sustained by revolutionary
chaos-the priests are "scattered like chaff," the rulers are "broken like reeds,'' the
. aristocracy is left "utterly naked and bare" (lines 6, 1 6). Strangely, though, Swinburne' s
poem focused more on the ousted parties, who "are grieved and greatly afraid" and
"grievously stricken at heart" (1 1 , _29). The only revolutionaries specifically mentioned
in the poem are deceased. The events of 1 860 comprise "the song of the quick . . . to the
ears of the dead" (line 2), though the song does not stir them, and the events are also "the
breath of the face of the Lord that is felt in the bones of the dead" (46), though it fails to
breathe life back into them. 2 1
The Christian Lord may be "the life and the resurrection" (John 1 1 .25}, but
Mazzini, the self-proclaimed Lord of the Revolution, is unable to fulfill that role and thus
is conspicuously absent from this song. His sacrifices for his Cristo popolo have been
made in vain. Mazzini was estranged from the events of 1 860: Garibaldi, like Cavour,
had distanced himself from Mazzini in order to appease the political moderates, and there
21 See Ezekiel 37. 1-14. In this vision, God shows Ezekiel a valley of dry bones which represent those who
are exiled from Israel and thus are not in a position to rebuild Israel as the kingdom of God. In the vision,
though, Ezekiel is commanded to prophesy while God breathes on the bones, and the bodies are
reassembled and resurrected. Notably, in Swinburne,s poem, the exiles remain dead, thus unable to rebuild
Italy as a unified kingdom.
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were anti-Mazzinian demonstrations in the streets as well as anti-Mazzinian tracts printed
in several newspapers following Garibaldi's victory. As a result, Mazzini's figurative
"sword of the strong" is rendered dormant and ineffectual in Swinburne's poem: "Where
the sword was covered and hidden, and dust had grown in its side, / A word came forth
which was bidden, the crying of one that cried" ("Revolution" 43-44). Again, though,
whereas the traditional mythic Christ is the "Wor� made flesh" (John 1 . 1 4), an example
of a performative fiat that accomplishes its goal of rendering the ideal in the material
world, the savior of the revolution's performative fiat is an empty gesture. It is "bidden,"
perhaps by the memory of the lost revolutionaries; thus it seems perfunctory, a duty of
mourning rather than a contemplati�e act of belief, solicited in a time of anguish rather
than fervor for and sincere devotion to the cause-qualities that Swinburne's poem
purposefully refuses to evoke. Just as Christ cried out that God had forsaken him, the
supposed savior of the revolution-the "sword of the strong"-cries out that he has been
forsaken by the revolution itself.
The failures inherent in the Italian revolutionary struggles are anticipated in the
failures experienced in the French Revolution, which Swinburne chronicles in "Les
Noyades." As Karen Alkalay-Gut argues, the poem in part demonstrates a "supremely
romantically and politically fulfilling death, a dream of gratification made possible only
by the Revolution" (54); but, like all other dreams of gratification Swinburne explores in'
his poetry, the dream a�tually gratifies nothing. Instead, it perpetuates a kind of drive
circling around the very impossibility, a lack, of fulfillment, again demonstrating how
Swinburne equates revolutionary struggle with the erotic pursuits he investigates in his
poetry; his revolutionary politics, like his sexual preoccupations, become a "strange
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domain . . . of the closed circular palpitation which finds satisfaction in endlessly
repeating the same failed gesture" (Zizek, Plague 30). In "Les Noyades," revolutionary
political fantasy and sexual fantasy are the same.
The poem's title (literally, "The Drowned") refers to French revolutionist Jean
Baptiste Carrier's practice of drowning political prisoners in the Loire River during the
Reign of Terror (1793-1 794). Carrier would strip the prisoners naked, tie each man face
to-face with a woman, preferably pairing a peasant with an aristocrat, and then drop the
"couple" into the river through trap doors in the bottom of his ship; he called this practice
mariage republicain. In his account of Carrier's noyades, which inspired Swinburne' s

poem, Thomas Carlyle recounts that Carrier, seeing "the pale swollen corpses . . . tumble
confusedly seawards along the Loire stream, the tide rolling them back," marveled that
the scene embodied " 'fieJ torrent revolutionnaire ' " (648-49). The revolutionary torrent
is the excess of terror made visible; by focusing on the corpses, Carlyle/Carrier redirects
our attention to how the "external, material feature[s]" of revolutionary atrocities reveal a
"truth" about revolutionary idealism that would otherwise be eclipsed (Zizek, Plague 3).
Carrier's remark demonstrates what Zizek would call an attitude of"contemplative
fascination" toward the corpses which are the "traumatic" "excremental excess" of the .
revolution; Swinburne's poem shares that attitude, though it also demonstrates how that
fascination creates an ambiguous and unsettling "relationship between fantasy and the
horror of the Real it conceals" (Plague 5, 7). Swinburne's poem recasts Carrier's
fascination with the corpses into a fantasy in which the corpses embody physical
sensuality, a fantasy meant to conceal the horror of death and yet "at the same time . . .
creates what it purports to conceal" (Plague 7).
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In the poem, Swinburne assigns the fantasy to a man "rough with labour and red
with fight" who is paired with a "faultless, . . . wonderful, white" noblewoman (lines 14,
1 8), awaiting the watery completion of their "republican marriage." The laborer declares
that the event of his demise, though a "small thing in [God's] eyes, / . . . is greater in mine
than the whole great sea" because he will drown with his fair lady (43-44). Both critics
who have offered thorough studies of this poem previously, Robert Greenberg and Karen
Alkalay-Gut, have read it as a companion piece to "The Leper," in which Swinburne
explores sexual taboos by manipulating the trope of the untouchable fair lady of courtly
love. Greenberg sees the poem as an attempt to capture the "transgressive moment" of
passion (1 03); similarly, Alkalay-Gut decides it is a description of being "[ d]rowned not
in water but in passion" (59). However, whereas the leper has an authentic experience of
passion in his relationship to his "fair lady," the laborer seems very far removed from any
sort of experienced passion. When the laborer declares, "I have loved this woman my
whole life long" (line 45), the statement seems empty since nothing in the poem indicates
that the laborer and the noblewoman had any prior connection.
Here Swinburne superimposes fiction onto historical fact, since he would have
known from his studies that Carrier paired his victims together at random. Swinburne
uses the fiction of the laborer's unrequited love for hisfemme repub/icain to emphasize
the inhumanity and injustice of the laborer's death-a meaningless death which displays
the inhumanity and injustice that characterized the Reign of Terror in revolutionary
France. By constructing a fantasy in which he orgasmically drowns "laughing for love"
(line 55) with an ostensible lover who is a part of himself (''we are one not twain" [50))
a lover who he claims will "mix with me, touching me, lips and eyes" (56), filling his
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lack and offering transcendence-the laborer attempts to make his death meaningful. He
tries to present his death as the moment in which he overcomes adversity, his class status,
his human limitations; the laborer boasts, "For never a man, being mean like me, / Shall
die like me till the whole world dies" (53-54). With this boast, Swinburne demonstrates
how the laborer obfuscates the horror of his own situation, his own death, by constructing
a sexual fantasy in which the formerly sublimated happiness and pleasure can re-emerge.
The laborer's fantasy is one in which dying with his desired other becomes the attempt to
recog}!ize and to retrieve what he had hitherto lacked,22 as well as the attempt to release
himself from "the eternal struggle against suffering and repression" (Marcuse 1 8, 29).
The laborer's death is also a "forced choice," the only option he has in the Reign
of Terror, though his fantasy deludes him into portraying his own death as a freely made
choice among multiple options ostensibly available for him to consider. Here the fantasy
operates to "maintai[n] the false opening''-a construction, says Zizek, which reinforces
rather than disrupts the public symbolic order (Plague 29). Paradoxically, the
revolutionist regime of France, despite its declarations of liberte, imposes a "phantasmic
frame of unwritten rules" which determines how each individual wil1 "choose 'freely'"
(Plague 29)-rules which differ, of course, based on one's social class and political
affiliations. The laborer desires la liberte as promised in the Revolution's slogan,
although Carrier's scheme here implicitly excludes him; his very "capacity to desire
involves the paradoxical structure of the forced choice" that reinforces his exclusion
(Plague 30). I think Swinburne purposefully represents the laborer's desire for freedom
through the construction of fantasy, just as h� purposefully chooses to describe this desire
22

See Borch-Jacobsen 200.
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in a laborer 's voice. Through the fantasy, Swinburne equates the libidinal economy of
sexual fantasy with that of revolutionary fervor; the lover will always fail to attain his
beloved, and so the revolutionist will always fail to attain the utopian government of true
equality, liberty, and fraternity. This failure represents the desire for attainment it
sustains. Attainment would imply a troubling self-dissolution, since the
lover/revolutionist would no longer labor to sustain "that dialectic of the ego and/or the
[desired] other" which is equated here with the dialectic between the "proletarian," whose
sense of self is positioned in his alienation from the "master," and the "master'' in whom
the proletarian wants to recognize himself.-a dialectic which would be dissolved in a
"universal and homogenous State (alias the classless society)" (Borch-Jacobsen 86, 90).
Yet one labors for that all-elusive attainment nonetheless. Swinburne's laborer, though,
performs what Robert Kaufman, following Adorno, calls the ''special kind of labor" of
aesthetic experience, in which "the subject," "effectively reconstructing what Adorno will
represent as the artwork's own process of discovering still-obscured areas of the social,"
realizes that "significant facets of society remain to be discovered" although ''such
discovery is unlikely to occur through use of society's ow� extant concepts for
understanding itself' (Kaufman, "Social"). This kind of re-discovery of the social
condition requires finding ways to (re)position the ego in a plenitude of new positions
which allow for reconsiderations of the very alienation such ego-positioning entails
rather than the attainment of one's ultimate goal.
Conceivably, it is the recognition of fantasy asjust a false opening which is
obscured in the social and political milieu. If one were to recognize the false opening for
what it really is, then one could "traverse the fantasy," or "suspen[d] the phantasmic
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frame of unwritten rules'' by treating the forced choice as a true choice (Zizek, Plague
29). In thi s particular case, the laborer treats the forced choice (the "choice" to die made
for him by Carrier) as a true choice (as if he really does have the option to not enter into
the deadly "republican marriage" but freely chooses not to exercise it). If the laborer
were to traverse his fantasy, though, he could recognize that_ hi s professed autonomy-his
ability to choose between options-is merely "appearance qua appearance," or artifice.
Importantly, the laborer fails to recognize hi s fantasy as a fal se opening as such. He is
problematically limited to two choices in this libidinal economy: he can either embrace
his own death or retreat into fantasy, and he does the latter. Either way, the laborer is
stuck in a very limited position; in death as well as in the escape fantasy provides, the
laborer is excluded from the plenitude of possibi lities for what does not yet-but could
exist in the material world,

23

despite the many limitations that world exacts.

Accepting the dual limitations of the libidinal economy is not the same as
considering its limitations as fluctuating, variable, subject to redefinition. Seemingly
recognizing the stalemated position of his laborer, then, Swinburne abruptly breaks from
the character of the laborer, introducing another speaker to contrast the laborer' s voice.
At first, this speaker seems to share the laborer's fantasy of drowning with a lover in the
Loire; however, he uses only conditional verbs in hi s speech, distancing himself from the
fantasy in a way the laborer could not, consequently indicating that he recognizes that
fantasy is an unreal event of an improbable fulfillment. "Lost beyond hope, [and] taken
far out of sight" (line 63), this second speaker is aware that there is no end to his longing.
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I have based this, in part, on Adorno's contention that "art stands as a reminder of what does not exist"
(Theory 240).
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He realizes that "fantasy cannot be the mere capacity to escape the existing by positing
the nonexisting as if it existed" (Adorno, Theory 173). Still, like the laborer, he cannot
effectively use fantasy to reveal the moment of total demystification. Swinburne uses
both personae in an Adornian fashion to propose that fantasy is able to suggest an
"unrestricted availability ofpotential solutions" to the problems of social and material
limitation (Theory 173, emphasis mine) inasmuch as political revolution entails the
constant production ofpotential means of resolving, rather than actual resolutions for,
social ills and material inequities.
Swinburne' s eroticized description of Carrier's "republican marriage," the
supposedly fulfilling fusion of male and female, borrows from the tendency in
nineteenth-century French literature to make hermaphroditic or androgynous characters
symbols of republican/revolutionary ideals. As A.J.L. Busst remarks in his landmark
study of the androgyne in nineteenth-century literature, "In the class strife of post
Revolutionary France, . . . the androgyne often signified . . . absolute social equality" (9). 24
Busst points out that this idea was developed considerably by the philosopher Pierre
Simon Ballanche, who compared the French Revolution to the conflict between the
patricians and the plebeians in ancient Rome. According to Ballanche,
[t]he male, patrician principle will rehabilitate the female, plebeian
principle by gradually initiating it into the knowledge of the religious,
moral and civil laws which God gave man to prevent him from misusing
24

Busst also notes that "(t]he distinctions . . . between the tenns 'androgyne' and 'hennaphrodite' have
always been purely arbitrary and consequently often contradictory" (1). As Busst's study is both careful
and compelling, I defer to his scholarship for my purposes here and use the tenns somewhat
interchangeably, as he does, with the understanding that both indicate aesthetically "a person who unites
certain of the ... characteristics of both sexes and who, consequently, may be considered as both a man and
a woman or as neither . . . , as bisexual or asexual" (I).
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his liberty, and which the patricians handed down from generation to
generation. (Busst 21)
This idea was echoed in some of the French literature Swinburne read, notably that of
Victor Hugo and Honore de Balzac. Swinburne carefully studied how both Hugo and
Balzac expressed the socio-political implications of the hermaphroditic trope in the very
material components and physical activity of the hermaphroditic body. Their treatment
of political androgyny resembles the Saint-Simonian philosophy of the French social
reformer Barthelemy Enfantin, who had belonged to the Carbonari, the secret society
dedicated to the Italian revolutionary cause, at approximately the same time as Mazzini. 25
To Enfantin, "republican marriage" was a paradigm for civic virtue rather than
punishment. He insisted that "the social individual is a couple, composed of a man and a
woman-in other words, that the individual citizen is an androgyne" or hermaphrodite
(Busst 26).
Yet, as Busst explains, Enfantin' s doctrine of the androgynous republican is a
celebration rather than a disparagement of the substance of human sexuality: "[T]he
material world must be shown to be in no way inferior to the intellectual or moral world,
the activity of the body to the activity of the mind, manual labour to philosophy" (25).
According to Enfantin' s Saint-Simonian doctrine, "thought and matter are not two
distinct entities but just two aspects of existence" (Busst 25). "The rehabilitation of
matter" allows for "the rehabilitation of the flesh',; "to raise woman up from her inferior
25 Enfantin joined the French offshoot of the Carbonari. a faction founded by the many Italian exiles living

in Paris at that time, in 1823; Mazzini did not seek membership in the Carbonari, and thus start agitating the
Carbonari to step up their revolutionary efforts. until 1827. There is no evidence that Mazzini and Enfantin
ever met, but Mazzini did spend the early 1 830s in Paris trying to incite the Carbonari there to liberate the
province of Savoy from Piedmontese rule.
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position"-to allow her equal standing with the male principle in the hermaphroditic
trope-is "to legitimize sexual pleasure," to legitimize "the natural activity of the body"
(Busst 25), as a way of demonstrating the possibilities still avai lable in the material world
which could be made evident through revolutionary socio-political change. Thus, in
nineteenth-century French literature, Swinburne found revaluative treatments of the
premise he found important in Sade's work: the reimagined body as the site for the equal
and inclusive recognition and legitimation of all human interactions and pleasures.
However, as Busst also notes, literature written in the latter part of the nineteenth
century emphasizes the "isolation, loneliness, . . . and despair" of a decadent,
hermaphroditic sexuality (39). This shift demonstrates the revolutionists' disappointment
at their failure to actualize their goals and to live their ideals, the citizenry's i mpatience
with wavering (and often poorly organized) revolutionary causes, and a pervasive
pessimism generated by class struggles which were perpetuated rather than reconciled.
From the French decadent writers he admired, such as Henri la Touche and Theophile
Gautier, Swinburne distinguished how the failure to achieve a position of autonomy in
the "real world" often led one to seek such a position within art and to find similar failure
there. In La Touche's Fragoletta, a novel set during Napoleon Bonaparte' s struggles to
control Italy, the hermaphroditic hero/ine dies without establishing effective relationships
with any of the persons he/she encounters, and his/her inability to establish a definite
social role for him/herself subtly mirrors the ins�ability of the Italian political climate.

26
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I agree more with Nigel Smith's reading of Frago/etta, which opposes Busst's. Busst dismjsses La
Touche's novel as a poorly written potboiler that exploits the hermaphroditic trope for its sensationalism; in
doing so, Busst completely disregards (by not even mentioning) the novel 's many political subplots,
subplots which often depict actual historical figures tliat had played a part in Bonaparte's rise to power.
Nigel Smith notes how the juxtaposition of Fragoletta 's hermaphroditism and the France/Italy conflict
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And, in Gautier's Mademoiselle de Maupin, the androgynous title character who is the
embodiment of an aristocracy detached from (and thus made to seem extraneous to) the
everyday world, pronounces herself the heir of the "thirst for the impossible" associated
with the degeneracy of the privileged class of anci ent Rome; this suggests that she feels
she has no place in a post-Revolutionary society.
Swinburne mirrors these sentiments in poems such as "Fragoletta" and
"Hermaphroditus." In "Fragoletta," a poem inspired by La Touche' s novel, he creates a
"sexless" (line 4) Medusa-like androgyne who delivers empty promises of sexual
fulfillment in fleeting dreams. Likewise, in "Hermaphroditus," an homage to Gautier' s
similar poem "Contralto," Swinburne declares that "the fruitful feud of hers and his" has
turned into "the waste wedlock of a sterile kiss" (li nes 1 8- 1 9). These poems are read
appropriately as statements about the impasse of I 'art pour / 'art-demonstrating with
eerie precision how "artworks with truth content do not blend seamlessly with the
concept of art" (Adorno, Theory 227). Adorno notes that "[t]he truth content of artworks,
which is indeed their social truth, is predicated on their fetish character" (Theory 227). In
these poems, the hermaphroditic/androgynous body is a fetish-a concentrated locus or
site of expressive power-which, though a product of the social milieu, is situated as
something outside of that milieu, containing a self-sufficiency, or ''ideological autonomy,
. . . allowing it to speak against the very social order" which produced it (Eagleton 348).

delllOlllstl'lates "clear development of a mise en abyme of binarism" (67). Furthermore, Smith suggests
that La Touche, who published his novel in 1829, "wtdoubtedly felt that the situation in [Italy] ... reflected
that of his own society as it headed towards another revolution" (69).
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Such a symbol, as offered in art, cannot express the "truth" of its social relevance;
instead, it perpetually expresses the triangular conflict between art itself, the condition <?f
its production, and the variety of ways a work of art can be interpreted.
This continuum of conflict, as demonstrated by the Poems and Ballads as well as
the study of Blake, plays out in its own virtual space, responsive to its own artificiality,
on the margins of the "real world.". In the case of the Songs before Sunrise, as we shall
see, Swinburne's poems are not quite lyrics for a real-life crusade but lyrical explorations
of a revolutionary aesthetic which parallels, rather than advances, the real-life politics of
their historical moment. Swinburne foretells Adorno' s conviction that a work of art "is
internally revolutionary," inasmuch as art "has the tendency toward social integration"
although society does not tend to want to integrate art into itself (Theory 228).
Moreover, he also foretells Adorno's conviction that art is revolutionary because it
depends upon-and perpetually redefines-the "palpable dependencies and conflicts"
between art's "autonomy and [its]fait social" (Theory 229). Rather than aiming to enact
social and political change among the masses, as Kuduk claims, Swinburne' s
revolutionary aesthetic aims to enact artistic and introspective change on an individual
level by offering a superfluity of possibilities for social critique which are subject to
constellative interpretations.
As part of the development of this revolutionary aesthetic, as I will demonstrate
below, Swinburne brings his earlier explorations of the hermaphroditic trope to his poems
about Italy. Swinburne offers the Songs before Sunrise as an aestheticized field of
myriad and sometimes contradictory revolutionary possibilities, lodged in diverse
representations of an ineffectual messiah in an uncomfortable relationship to an ancient
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divinity, a gender-full god/dess of "the Beloved republic" ("Hertha" line 227), who can
only fail to fill his lack. This is not to claim that all of Swinburne's political poems
specifically revolve around the transformation of the hermaphroditic trope, though.
Rather, Swinburne uses the Italian revolution itself in the Songs before Sunrise in the
same way he uses the hermaphrodite/androgyne in his works-as a fetishized trope
locating the conflict between art and reality, the conflict between an aestheticized
perception of the material world and the ossified perception of that world offered by the
dominant discourse. Of course, this ·involves various treatments of the complicated figure
of Mazzini, the celebrated visionary whose political vision is exposed as incongruously
indeterminate.

"I set the trumpet to my lips and blow": Childe Swinburne to Republicanism Came
Swinburne told William Michael Rossetti that "The Eve of Revolution," the third
poem in Songs before Sunrise, is "the centre poem and mainspring of [the] volume"
(Letters 2: 95). 27 Kuduk finds the poem to be indi�ative of Swinburne's ''experiment
with formal strategies for realizing [the] power" of poetry to articulate the formulations
of political change through "the fusion of one man's specifically literary endeavor and
the fiery power of republican politics" in action (259-60). McGann, though, reads such
articulation as an end in itself, pointing out that Swinburne is unable to envision "the final
end of war or suffering or struggle because his understanding . . . [of it] is cyclical"

27

Letter from Swinburne to W.M. Rossetti, 14 Feb. 1870. Also, in this letter, Swinburne mentions that the
poem is "all but finished."
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(Swinburne 248-49, italics his).28 While the poem does suggest that "poetry can break

the chains" of ideological power "by liberating the reader's consciousness," it does not
quite reach the purported goal of "secur[ing] the complex relation between song and
sword," thus "mak[ing] automatic the political power of poetry" (Kuduk 260-61 ).
Instead, the complex relation between the aesthetic and the political is perpetually
renegotiated-thus never secured-in what McGann calls "a feeling for death and the
flux of change" (Swinburne 249). Moreover, even if the poem lives up to its promise to
"liberate the reader's consciousness," liberation of consciousness on such an individual
level does not guarantee the generation of any kind of mass political power; thus the
poem does not provide a definitive call to political action. Instead, I contend that the
poem almost seems like a retreat into artifice, a defiantly decadent escape, via art, from
an environment of socio-political dissatisfaction.
I believe that the speaker of "The Eve of Revolution" should be recognized as a
slightly distanced commentator masking his irresoluteness of authority or purpose with
an oscillating voice of bravado rather than, as Kuduk claims, a Blakean prophet of
"political radicalism" (257). The speaker does emote the lofty, authoritative tone of the
prophetic seer that Swinburne admired in Blake's Prophetic Books, a tone which conveys
the new "evangel" of a revolutionary aesthetic in words bearing "strong significance and
earnest passion" (Swinburne, Blake 194). But, it is important to note that Swinburne was,
Again, Swinburne's depiction of human/social struggle is similar to Shelley's. Elsewhere in his boo�
McGann says that Swinburne uses a Shelleyan "technical (poetic) device" in which he "pour(s] out a
succession of images as analogues or facets of a single subject or perception," and "(t)he repetitive
character of the device makes it extremely adaptable to the sort of prophetic lyric Swinburne constantly
wrote . . . . (T]hey heighten . . . one's attention to the vastness of the unity of cosmic hannonies and
correspondences" (Swinbume 73). Applied to the political poems in particular, this device demonstrates
how the social and political conflict of any historical era "is equally involved in (such] processes of
repetition and variation" (Swinbume 249).
28
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at times, perplexed by, if not skeptical of, that style of delivery; as Swinburne notes in his
Blake essay, the prophetic tone featured in some of Blake' s poetry allows for "the
confusion, the clamour . . . and other more absolutely offensive qualities-audacity,
monotony, bombast, obscure play of licence and torturous growth of fancy" that
accompany and perhaps even taint the prophetic message of impending revolution and
promises of the fulfil1ment of the republican ideals of social and intellectual freedom

(Blake 1 85). 29
Additionally, one might also propose that the prophetic voice is used ironically,
given the poem's resemblance to Robert Browning's "Childe Roland to the Dark Tower
Came."

30

Referring to his propagation of revolutionary prophecy, the speaker of

Swinburne' s "Eve of Revolution" says repeatedly, "I set the trumpet to my lips and
blow." I believe this line refers to the end of Browning's poem, in which Childe Roland
declares, "Dauntless the slug-horn to my lips I set, / And blew . . . " (203-04). In
Browning's poem, Childe Roland, having "Heard failure prophesied so oft" (line 38),
29

Though Swinburne is careful here to add that such "offensive qualities" ultimately do not "quench or
even wholly conceal the living purport and the imperishable beauty" of Blake's Prophetic Books (Blake
185), he discusses the portentous qualities of the works repeatedly. Curiously, Swinburne felt that the
bombastic tone of Blake's poems specifically about political revolution detracted from their effectiveness.
He callsAmerica ''a noble myth of rebellion" which nonetheless suffers from "ha(ving] more of thunder
and less of lightning" than Blake's other works; Europe, he says, is equally lamentable in that Blake's
apocalyptic prophecy of revolution seemsjust a "somewhat halting and bewildered fable" (Blake 237-39,
243-45). Yet one could argue, nonetheless, that the "Eve of Revolution" somewhat resembles Blake's
Milton-particularly the end of Blake's poem, in which Satan "Come(s] in a cloud, with trumpets &
flaming fire," declaring, "I hold the Balances of Right & Just & mine the Sword" (Milton 2: Plate 38(43],
lines 50, 54, emphasis mine). In his explication of Milton in the Blake essay, Swinburne claims that a
"single, final act of redemption" in which one successfully reaches a goal of peaceful perfection "is not
admitted as sufficient, or even possible" (Blake 267).
30
Swinburne knew Browning's poem well and admired it enough to borrow almost exactly Browning's
descriptions of Roland's inhospitable environs to describe the barren landscape ofMentana, Italy, in a letter
to Lady Trevelyan, 19 Jan. 1861 (see Letters 1:38). Mentana was also the scene of Garibaldi 's failed
attempt in 1867 to take over papal territory-a failure Swinburne commemorates in other poems in the
volume, "The Halt before Rome" and "Mentana: First Anniversary." Additionally, Swinburne seems to
have had some regular acquaintance with Browning during the time he was writing the Songs (see
Rooksby, Life 164, 199).
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seems resigned to the futility of his quest, and the "furious, self-frustrated energy"
(Bloom, "Broken" 549) that Childe Roland experiences throughout the quest becomes an
end in itself. The quest is undertaken for the sake of questing and not with the hope of
successfully finding the impossible object he seeks.

31

In the poem' s open-ended finale,

Childe Roland is flanked by the ghosts of his predecessors, all fallen knights marked by
their failures, who conditionally form around him "a living frame / For one more picture"
(200-0 1 ). All Browning offers us is Roland heralding his own arrival at a pivotal
moment in which, to borrow one of the lines from Swinburne' s poem, "[His] name is not
yet writ with theirs that fell" ("Eve" 25 1 ); but, by calling out his own name, Roland ·
seems to add it to the list of the fallen. However, Browning' s poem effectively casts
doubt on the prophetic mode in its demonstration of uncertainty: prophecy suggests the
impending attainment of the goal of a quest, even if the goal is one's own death, but
Childe Roland does not experience any sort of attainment. As Leslie M. Thompson has
carefully noted, one can read Roland' s journey as paralleling the journey of the Christian
believer who lives life preparing for the imminent, apocalyptic battle between good and

31

As Robert Langbaurn notes, Browning's poem is a tale of "sheer questing" in which "the experience not
the situation" (192), not the goal or the end result, is important. Somewhat similarly, Harold Bloom (in
"How to Read a Poem") has suggested that Browning replaces the "ego-ideal of the traditional quest" with
the enigmatic Dark Tower as a way of demonstrating that any object of a quest is unattainable. The
majority of the criticism of Browning's poem notes-and. in some cases, laments-that it is not clear what,
exactly, the goal of Roland's quest is. Given the often-noted similarities between "Childe Roland" and
Tennyson's "Sir Galahad," one could allude that Roland is on a Grail quest, especially if one agrees with
John King McComb's assertion that "the object of the quest . . . (should} be imagined as some bright
spiritual success" (464-65). Furthermore, Mario D' Avanzo compares the poem.to Shelley's "Triumph of
Life," asserting, "The spirit of beauty and truth that rewards the once oocorrupted Rousseau with visionary
power [in Shelley's poem} . . . is akin to the grail vision that Roland has quested to achieve" (703).
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evil because Browning borrows heavily from the language of biblical prophecy (347). 32
Whereas the biblical prophecies suggest this conflict will be ultimately resolved, though,
Browning leaves his hero irresolute; perhaps pronouncing nothing more than bravado
when faced with the radical closure of his situation-a situation in which his final act,
irresolute though it may be, seems forced by prophecy itself In some ways, it can be
compared to the forced choice masquerading as a false opening in the symbolic
framework like that faced by Swinburne's laborer in "Les Noyades"; only Childe Roland
demonstrates awareness of the prophecy as a limit experience, noting that the forced
choice, "ended, then, / Progress" by comparing the forced choice to "when a trap shuts
[ and] you're inside the den" ("Childe Roland" 1 7 1 -72, 1 74).
The speaker of "The Eve of Revolution'' proclaims the coming of the "hidden
hour that hast our hope to bear" (line 41 8) which seems to be just another false opening
in the political framework. To make the false opening seem like an actual prospect of
freedom, he claims to be invested with a prophetic authority originating from "The
trumpets of the four winds of the world," which "From the ends of the earth blow
battle . . . " (lines 1-2). . Swinburne's speaker seems eager to present the revolutionary
events as ushering in an epoch "of liberation that go[ es] beyond the historical instant" and
to insinuate that his song is "fraternally allied with the world spirit" (Adorno,

Theory

208). The "world spirit," in this case, is posited in the idea of an Adam Kaedmon-like
"single, individual," hermaphroditic being-not unlike Blake's Albion--whose separate
parts, driven "to the four corners of the modern world," strive for harmonious
Various lines hi Browning's poem evoke the warnings given to the Israelites by Isaiah and Jeremiah as
well as the apocalyptic scenes prophesied in the Book of Revelation. For specific details, see Thompson,
pp. 349-5 1.

32
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reunification; this struggle to recuperate a lost wholeness thus becomes the template for
all "universal history'' (Busst 1 3).33 On the "Eve of Revolution," the world spirit suffers
from this diffusion: Swinburne's speaker counterposes the oppressive "dim tribes of
kings," "reaping men that reap men for their sheaves," with a freedom-seeking feminine
force whom he describes as an invasive "night. [that] heaves, / With breasts palpitating
and wings refurled," inspiring revolution with her "wild wind of vision" (lines 2-1 1 ,
emphases mine). The speaker problematically relies on a grandiose creation myth to
authorize his voice. And, even more problematically, the speaker does not have direct
access to the prophetic vision entrusted to him; the original vision is twice-removed from
him. First, t�e vision is given to the speaker synaesthetically, "With many tongues of
thunders" (line 1 8)--meaning, what was once an ideogrammatic visual communication, a
"synchronic structure" conveying a multitude of intellectual ideas and affective states
simultaneously (Mitchell, Jcono/ogy 25), is transmuted into vocal speech which cannot
signify all the possibilities inherent in the ideogram. Secondly, the speaker receives the
transmuted vision indirectly, as the message of revolution is delivered by a voice distinct
from the goddess-like force's "wild wind of vision." Described as "A voice more instant
than the winds are clear" (24), it
Say[s] to my spirit, "Take
Thy trumpet too, and make
A rallying music in the void night' s ear. . . . ["] (25-27)

33

This is actually Busst,s gloss on the development of this idea offered in Victor Hugo,s Fragment
historique (1829) a work with which Swinburne-given his enthusiasm for, as well as extensive
, Hugo-would have been familiar.
correspondence with,

25 1
This voice, as it echoes his request for Swinburne to deliver a "series of lyrics for the
crusade," is surely meant to be Mazzini's.
Consciously portraying himself a leader of the revolution, both the historical
Mazzini as well as Swinburne' s fictionalized version upheld himself as the chosen one
authorized not only to receive the prophetic vision but also to share it; since Mazzini
consciously mythologized himself as the Cristo uomo despite his inability to manifest
much of his· claimed political clout, his authority is somewhat suspect. Yet the Mazzini
figure in Swinburne's poem shares this tenuous position of"authority" with the speaker
and urges him to "set the trumpet to [his] lips and blow'' (38ff.). The Mazzinian prophet,
though, is presented as another failed Moses, unable to meet his goal despite the very
prophecy which promised him the impending satisfaction of reunifying the "world spirit"
in the Promised Land. Mazzini and/or the speaker remain(s) divorced from the ''one
Republic" (line 270), the vision of a new, political Canaan. The night, which earlier
brought the prophetic vision of freedom, "is broken eastward" (49). Moreover, the ·
promised land-the embodiment of that freedom-is a barren mother who once nursed
The weanling peoples and the tribes that were,
Whose new-born mouths long dead
Those nine-fold nipples fed . . . . (I. 56-58)34
But now, as a "Dim face with deathless eyes and withered hair," a distanced "Fostress of
obscure lands'' (59-60), Freedom' s impending promise to manifest herself rings false.

34

These lines allude to the nine tribes of Israel that God bade Moses to lead to the Promised Land (Joshua
14.2; Num 34. 13).
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Thus Swinburne's speaker, trying to renegotiate the impasse between the prophet
renounced by his own prophecy and the promised land that cannot be reached, interjects a
nostalgic lament for "where for us began·/ The first live light of man": Greece (73-74ff.).
Greece is a manifold emblem in the poem, signifying not only another example of
nineteenth-century political revolution but also a lost "golden age" of republicanism.
Mazzini had encouraged the Risorgimento to model itself after the Phili/re Hetairia, the
secret society of revolutionaries who instigated the 1 82 1 Greek revolt against the
repressive rule of the Ottoman Empire. Though Swinburne had some interest in the
Greek revolution due to Byron's involvement in it, he was much more interested in the
political climate of ancient Greece-as much for the Greeks' constant political struggles,
I believe, as for their idea of the polis, a representative government equated with the
notion of"the whole citizen body'' (Morris 26), a unified "world spirit." Swinburne is
careful to include sites of both ancient Greek success and despondency in his description;
tellingly, all the sites Swinburne mentions are important to the Persian Wars, in which the
city-states of Athens and Sparta had to work together to defeat a common enemy despite
their very different ways of putting the idea of the polis into practice. "[T]he sun"
guiding the speaker's survey of the imagined Grecian landscape first rests on
Thermopylae (line 86), the site of the Spartan army's defeat at the hands of the Persians
in 480 BC and then becomes "The light [which] is Athens where those remnants rest,"
presumably meaning the remnants of the city after the Persians burned it to the ground
following their victory at Thermopylae; but the "light" is also "Salamis the sea-wall of
that sea," where the Greeks managed to defeat the Persians in a naval battle (lines 87-88).
By carefully counterbalancing each site of Greek victory with one of defeat, Swinburne
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implies that the "golden age" of Greece was an age of perpetual political strife and,
consequently, implies that the European struggle for freedom will be just as unremitting.
Moreover, as Swinburne knew from his very meticulous study of ancient Greek
history, the Greek victory at Salamis did not lead to any political stability in the region.
It led to the formation of the Athenian Empire which smothered the previously
independent Spartan city-state. As an empire governed by an elite group of dictatorial
archons, Athens itself became wholly incompatible with the idea of the polis on which it

was founded. With Athens' traditional social fabric so frayed, rebellious Spartans were
able to overthrow the Athenian Empire in the following Peloponnesian War; the resultant
era of the oppressive Spartan Hegemony eventually gave way to the Theban uprising; the
Theban rulers were subsequently toppled by the formation of the Second Athenian
Empire, and so on. By proposing the comparison between the political instability of
ancient Greece and nineteenth-century Europe, then, Swinburne suggests that the struggle
to "Build up our one Republic state by state, I England with France, and France with
Spain,35 / And Spain with sovereign Italy . . . " (270-72) will never end with the creation of
a unified republic, or even the installation of similar practices of republicanism in each
individual country. There is no way to unify the "whole citizen body" of Europe with
one trope, one rubric, or even one prophecy.
Because the prophecy of republican unification presents itself as untenable, just as
the goal of establishing a stable (if not utopian) republican government remains
untenable, Swinburne's speaker attempts to abandon the prophetic mode near the end of
35

In 1868, Queen Isabella II traveled to France to cement an alliance with Louis Napoleon; she returned to
find her country in a state of civil unrest and political upheaval. Shortly following Isabella Il's abdication
of the throne, Giuseppe Fanelli, who had once headed a Mazzinian organi7.ation in Naples and fought in
Garibaldi's anny, moved to Spain and began the Spanish anarchist movement
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the poem: "I take the trumpet.from my lips and sing . . . " (369, emphases mine). Here the
speaker consciously constructs his own song, a song that allows him an escape into an
isolated, purely aesthetic realm. In fantasies of a "Swift Revolution" ushering in the era
of a "Serene Republic," the speaker "Strike[s] music from a world that wailed and
strove": he proclaims that the "very freedom" one seeks in political revolution should be
found in the "change and death, / Whose now not hateful breath / . . . gives the music
swifter feet to move" (374-414). On one hand, the speaker's own "song," distanced from
the prophetic mode, could be polemical music in the Adornian sense, in that it "sets itself
at a distance from . . . the impoverishment and falsity" of the previous mode of discourse
(Adorno, Theory 177). In it, the "crackling" of "the friction of the antagonistic elements
that the artwork [otherwise] seeks to unify" (Theory 1 77) can be heard-in this case,
meaning the "crackling" of the antagonism underlying the pairing of the Mazzinian and
the Swinburnian voices, the pairing of political idealism with aestheticized fantasy.
Earlier in the poem, the speaker advocates shifting international borders in the
formation of the idealized single Republic; here he demonstrates the perpetual shift but
constant delineation of the border between the actual practice of revolutionary politics
and the aesthetic representations ofthose politics. On the other hand, this kind of
"republican aesthetic," despite the self-aware negotiations of its own internal tensions,
may not completely "break the chains" of the dominant discourse and achieve the
"liberat[ion] of . . . consciousness" (Kuduk 261). Whatever "autonomy" the speaker's
song claims, whatever independence his song achieves from the earlier prophetic mode, it
is still "a function of the . . . consciousness of freedom" that Adorno tells us remains
"bound up with the social [and political] structure"-and. prophecy-it claims to defy
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(Theory 225).

The speaker can only "take the trumpet from [his] lips" once he has used

the trumpet of prophecy to establish his position; meaning, in other words, it is only in a
,
differential relationship to the prophetic mode that the speaker s anti-prophetic "song" is
granted independence from prophecy. Just as "art becomes social by its opposition to
,
society' (Theory 225), the speaker's song of liberation becomes prophetic by its very
claim to oppose the prophetic message. As such, the speaker's escapist fantasy of ideal
freedom falters in the end, for the speaker reverts back to the prophetic mode, beckoning
the exiled Cristo uomo, Mazzini, into his fantasy, as if Mazzini could make his fantasy a
reality: the speaker asks the prophesied "child-god" to "Come forth, be born and live," to
bring the "hand reconquering heaven, to seat man there" (lines 4 1 9, 427-28).
Evocatively, in the poem's last line, the speaker begs the messianic leader to "Hasten
thine hour" of his prophesied deliverance of the people into a new era of governance, as
,
the speaker s song itself seems an ineffective call for liberation.
In "Super Flumina Babylonis," 36 Swinburne recreates the fantasy of ideal freedom
which falters in "Eve of Revolution," but this time the fantasy includes the "blast of
deliverance [which] in the darkness rang, / To set thee"-meaning the Cristo popolo, the
audience addressed in the poem-"free" ("Babylonis" 7-8). The first incarnation of the
popo/o in

the poem, though, are the ancient Babylonians, for whom the revolutionaries

alternately weep and sing (I, 5). King Cyrus of Persia, when he conquered Babylon by
36

The title of this poem refers to Psalm 137:
By the rivers ofBabylon
there we sat down and there
we wept
when we remembered Zion. (1 37. l )
This psalm is a lament of the Jewish exiles for the lost holy city. Interestingly, the exiles in the psalm are
asked by their captors to '"Sing us one of the songs of Zion'" (3). However, in his poem, Swinburne seems
to equate the Jewish exiles with the Babylonians subject to Belshazzar's tyranny.
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dethroning the tyrannical King Belshazzar in 539 BC, was heralded by the citizens as
their "deliverer," but Swinburne seems to question whether Cyrus delivered the
Babylonians out of their oppression. Cyrus, considered a predecessor of Christ, was a
prophesied savior of God's chosen people: after Babylon fell, he allowed the Jewish
captives to return to their homeland. But he also created the vast, powerful Persian
Empire, imposing his monarchic rule on the Babylonian people. Xenophon and other
ancient hi storians may have characterized Cyrus as a rather benign and ethical ruler;
nonetheless, as Cyrus' s legacy remained an exemplar for future projects of empire
building, Swinburne seems to have found him a problematic messiah. An aspect of
cruelty persists in sovereignty, as Swinburne makes evident in Poems and Ballads ' "Satia
te Sanguine," in which Cyrus engages in fantasies of sado-masochistic subjugation . . In
"Babylonis," Cyrus engages in another form of subjugation, leaving the "bondmen and
bondwomen" who struggle to replace an empire with a republic "to be scourged and
smart, I To toil and tend"; as long as hi s empire persisted, they were "harrowed,"
"subdued," and "crushed" by the weight of oppression, and "no change came" (Jines 2328). The supposed deliverance does not occur until Babylon is figuratively reborn as
nineteenth-century Italy, and the neo-Babylonian/Italian people, in torpor because they
have forgotten or dismissed their prophetic legacy,

37

will meet the next coming of their

deliverer (29ff. )-Mazzini.
However, Babylon, even as it is reborn as Italy, remains a fallen state in which the
messianic leader has always already been crucified and resurrected. As such, the leader

37

"[T)hey knew not their forefathers, nor the hills and streams / And words of power, / Nor the gods that
were good to them . . . " (37-39).
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is only accessible within the elusive, speculative fantasy of a unified republican nation.
The revolutionaries are unable to have actual contact with-and thus are unable to relate
to-the fantastic, transcendent incarnation of their supposed deliverer. Instead, they
encounter an angel who announces that Mazzini has been resurrected as an all
encompassing "Mother Italy" (see lines 77-88). 38 The angel further instructs them to
"Put no trust in men's royalties, nor in great men's breath, / Nor words of kings" (91-92);
here the serial identification between King Cyrus and Mazzini is interrupted, and the
angel-the very agent of prophecy-instructs the re�olutionaries to disregard the
prophecy he decrees fulfilled (the prophecy the revolutionaries would have received via
the "breath" of "great men" [line 91 ]), revealing it as artifice.
The opening of the sepulchre itself, an alleged act of revelation, is another mode
of artifice exposed in the poem, representing the false opening for republicanism that
Mazzini and his followers created in Italy's dubious political framework. Instead of
bearing witness to a resurrection, Swinburne's audience is asked to bear witness to an
ideological vulnerability lingering within Mazzini's republican movement. 39 In the
rhetoric of his public speeches and published political tracts, Giuseppe Mazzini tended to
"trea[t] abstractions"-such as the God of deliverance (the Father of a Nation), the
unified Mother Italy, and the Italian people delivered into republican utopia-as if they
were corporeal entities" or entities waiting to manifest themselves corporeally and thus
38

The angel tells them that Mazzini/Italy's "body most beautiful, and her shining head / These are not
here" (8 1-82). Swinburne draws upon two New Testament accounts of the resurrection here. In Matthew
28. 1-7, the angel appears to Mary Magdalene in front of Jesus's empty tomb; in John 20. 17, Jesus himself
appears to Mary Magdalene, instructing her not to touch him, calling his materiality into question-it is as
if he is a presence-which-is-absence. One could also argue that this is an allusion to the "daughter [of]
Babylon," or the personification of the Babylonian people, featured in Psalm 137.8.
39
My reading is based on Zizek's discussion of how "phantasmic support of the public symbolic order . . .
bears witness to the system's vulnerability" (Plague 28).
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transform material reality (Sarti 41 ). Yet, like the liberatory ideals explored in "The Eve
of Revolution," these abstract possibilities are only possible inasmuch as they are
functions of the political system they claim to defy; these are the possibilities the current
system "is compelled to allow for" while simultaneously ensuring that they "will never
actually take place" (Zizek, Plague 28).
Swinburne's poem shows Mazzinian abstraction to be an artifice; the blending of
Mazzini, the proclaimed Father of a Nation, and Mother Italy into a seamless "republican
marriage�' proves to be, like Swinburne's Hermaphroditus, the ineffectual "waste
wedlock of a sterile kiss." In "Hermaphroditus," the hermaphro.ditic figure is an
inaccessible ideal of harmonious unity that ultimately fails to signify an ideal state of
achieved integration, self-sufficiency, and praxis; in "Babylonis," the androgynous
messiah-figure fails both to signify a similar ideal state and to deliver the Cristo popolo
into it. Instead, this "perfect" political androgyne is a political ideal so transmuted into a
purely aesthetic object that its relevance to political practice is questionable. The
aesthetic object can mediate between lived experience (in the material world) and
aesthetic experience, but, if the object does not have a significant presence, the
reading/viewing subject will not be able to situate him/herself in a dynamic, effective
relationship to it. 40 Aesthetic experience as lived experience should "co-enac[t] or
folio[w] . . . the internal dynamic" suggested by the object (Nicholsen 1 7)--in this case,
the aestheticized object internalizes the dynamic between the revolutionary and the ideal,
unified Italy. However, if the object is inaccessible, then the possibility of converting the
aesthetic experience of the object into lived experience becomes inaccessible as well.
40

See Adorno, Theory 1 15.
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Significantly, Mazzini-as-Italy-incarnate never actually appears in the poem; the
resurrection is never made manifest except in the angel's proclamation. So what the
revolutionaries in the poem-and, consequently, Swinburne' s reade�s-see is a failed
dynamic, the alienation between revolutionary and revolution, Mazzini and Italy, even
the power of the pen and the power of the sword.
As he also illustrates Mazzini's very alienation from the unified "Mother Italy"
which is the object of his (Mazzini's) desire, Swinburne demonstrates how the perception
of the revolutionary spectators shifts. In doing so, Swinburne introduces a differential
relationship what the spectators wish to see and how the Mazzini figure is situated in/by
their gaze; in a very Lacanian way, then, Swinburne allows the Mazzini figure to be seen
"as other than he is" (Concepts 104). Here Swinburne' s version of Mazzini is not meant
to be perceived as the Cristo uomo inspiring a "religion of politics," or as a cipher
encompassing all the possibilities promised by the Risorgimento 's faith in the
revolutionary cause; he isfantasmata, a place-holder for the "revised versions of those
impressions called up by the imagination in the absence of . . . [that which] originally
stimu)ated them" (Mitchell, Jconology 10). His lack of presence in the poem
demonstrates the ineffectiveness of the split subjectivity the historical Mazzini cultivated:
Mazzini spent his life trying to adapt himself to the revolutionary movement's
expectations of political and social freedom-enacting a "being-for-others" in which he
became an object signifying the goals of the revo1ution as a way of obtaining
"acknowledgment of [his] being" (Stern 93) within the collective gaze of the
Risorgiment�so desperately that he eventually began to project himself as the
"punctiform object" of his fantasy, a revo1utionized, socio-politicaJly liberated Ita)y,
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itself. (See Lacan, Concepts 83.) Yet, even in his incarnation as an aestheticized subject
who becomes his desired object, Swinburne's Mazzini still appears in a divided state in
which he signifies the revolution and its goal only by signifying its impossibility. In
other words, he signifies his own aphanisis; he is a vanishing subject fading from view
(Concepts 208- 10), his vanishing act rendered in media res. Even the angel admits as

much, saying, "Fotan hour, if ye look for him, he is no more found, / For one hour's
space" (lines 109-10).
· In "Before a Crucifix," Swinburne creates one of the most notable brief spaces in
which the Christ/Mazzini figure is (re)visualized. As both Margot Louis and David
Punter have previously noted, the poem makes strong statements about the hypocrisies of
Christian doctrine and the failure of Christian practice to bring relief to the suffering or to
bring freedom to the subjugated. Both critics acknowledge the poem's political subtext:
Punter, using the lens of Deleuze and Guattari's theories, reads the poem as an
exploration of how religion is a political tool used to produce social repression; Louis
reads it as an analogue of the French Revolution peppered with ideas borrowed from
Victor Hugo, Jules Michelet, and Ernest Renan. 41 However, neither critic situates the
poem in the context of the volume's Italian theme, and, problematically, neither critic
even mentions Mazzini. Both critics do provide crucial assessments of the poem. Louis
observes that "Swinburne attempts to affirm the worship of Christ in a new sense" only to
find "that any kind of Christian affirmation is impossible" (Gods 98}-an observation
41

Jules Michelet, a friend of Victor Hugo's, wrote La histoire de la revolutionfranfaise (1868), an
enthusiastic firsthand account of revolutionary France before the rise of Louis Napoleon; in the book,
Michelet claims that Christian ideology and Republican idealism are the two antagonists of revolutionary
struggle. Ernest Renan was a noted scholar of history and philosophy dedicated to the Republican cause;
he wrote La Vie de Jesus (1863), in which he suggests that "the human Christ is 'hidden' behind the
'viewless veil' woven by centuries of Christianity" (Louis, Gods 94).
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that could be used to describe the challenge Swinburne issues to Mazzini's·Christian
posturings. Punter claims the poem is Swinburne's rebuke of a Christianity which fails to
articulate the particularity of human desires, since Swinburne draws our attention "to an
ambivalence at the heart" of Christianity which forces any messianic figure in the
position "to deny difference" ("Cross" 356, italics his); Punter's claim seems supported
by Swinburne's commentary on Mazzini's singleness of vision and his alienation from
the Italian people in other poems.
That being said, though, the poem does not aim to create "a symbolic system
[which] can adequately present the People, their suffering and their self-regeneration," as
Louis suggests (Gods 98), nor does it, as Punter contends, really "provid[e] us with
enactments of the poet, the artist, striving for a place in this world where power swings
free and has the means to make us experience anew the wound," or psychic trace, of"the
violence of generations" perpetuated by "self-defeating lust" ("Cross" 359). Instead,
Swinburne takes extreme measures to demonstrate how such a symbolic system functions
as a constellative field denoting only the possibilities of representation, as well as to
suggest that any messianic figure's claim to rematerialize fully the trace of generations
old human struggle, and then rectify it, is yet another mode of artifice.
Swinburne portrays the "piteous God" of the crucifixion (line 8) as an icon of
human alienation. He is "God of this grievous people, wrought / After the likeness of
their race"; yet, with his "blind, helpless, eyeless face" (13-14, 16), he hardly serves as
the other who allows the people to recognize themselves in him. Instead, the eyeless
Christ is a symbol of meconnaissance: the individual subject's construction of the
illusion of transcending one's pitiable state by "seeing oneself see oneself' (Lacan,
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Concepts 83) is frustrated if the figure meant to epitomize the attainment of this godlike
view is really eyeless. The scene of the crucifixion is what Lacan would call "[t]he
spectacle of the world," the punctiform of "the gaze which circumscribes us," which
"appears to us as all-seeing" (Concepts 75) .. The figure on the cross in Swinburne's
poem, as "the likeness of [the] race," is the aggregate of humanity's common Platonic
fantasy "of an absolute being to whom is transferred the quality of being all-seeing"; in
the body of Christ, all unattainable or previously lost perspectives/possibilities are
allegedly (re)constituted "not from the body, but from something"-or someone, in this
case the deity-". . . call[ed] the flesh of the world, the original point of vision" (Concepts
75, 8 1-82) in which form is content, in which meaning is immediate rather than
interpreted.
However, the Christ figure fails to reconstitute lost and otherwise inaccessible
perspectives; he cannot (ful)fill /ack. "The sacred body hangs and bleeds," so the "flesh
of the world" is mutilated, incomplete, not fully (re)constituted; he has not "fed full
men's starved-out souls" (lines 84, 39). The Jesus icon is like an artwork "whose real
powerlessness and complicity with the principle of disaster becomes plainly evident"
(Adorno, Theory 234). He cannot avert the "disaster" of human suffering, just as he
cannot rescue the "original point of vision" from the "catastrophe of meaning" in which,
Adorno tells us, "appearance"-that which remains visible, attainable, comprehensible
"becomes abstract" (Theory 22). The Christ figure's failure to overcome the principle of
disaster, even by sacrificing himself to it, is revolutionary only insomuch as the symbolic
system which iconically maintains him demands an element "of heroism, of sacrifice"
of a dynamic of contestation-which is a "self-deception" concealing "the limitations of
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the content of their struggles" (Marx 596). Similarly, as an aestheticized icon to which
the people he supposedly exemplifies cannot relate-supposedly an "other" able to
complete that which each individual "self' lacks-the Christ figure characterizes a
subjectivity which is "self-alienated and concealed" (Theory 169).
Swinburne also notes that the "slain, spent, and sacrificed / People" themselves
are "the grey-grown speechless Christ" (101 -02). Paradoxically, then, each individual is
that "other" to which s/he cannot relate. So, in this move, Swinburne not only portrays
Christ as an individual other who promises (but fails) to fulfill the subject's desire for
wholeness but also as the Other Lacan says is "the locus of speech" which determines the
emergence of the subject (Concepts 1 29). Swinburne further emphasizes the
impossibility of establishing a relation to Christ by shifting his speaker's perspective
from that of a witness to the "actual" crucifixion to that of a modern agnostic in lines
1 33-35:
And mouldering now and hoar with moss
Between us and the sunlight swings
The phantom of a Christless cross . . . .
By depicting Christ as a mere trace of past mythic narratives here, Swinburne reveals the
previous, highly visualized account of the crucifixion to have been only a fantasy. It was
not Christ who was able to (re)constitute lost and otherwise inaccessible perspectives;
rather, the speaker, the artist, is the one able to offer virtual recreations of a lost
historical/mythical "original point of vision."
Punter proposes that, in this moment, Swinburne's absentee Christ, presaging
Deleuze and Guattari's notions about the face determining signification via language,
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"suggests to us that the figure of the cross is that which arises to deny facialisation, to fit
all humans" ("Cross" 3 56).42 But, Punter does not note that even in the fantasy
Swinburne's Christ was eyeless, thus having a distorted face, "destroyed, dismantled,"
arguably just as much "[o]n the road to the asignifying and asubjective" (Deleuze and
Guattari 171) as the bodiless phantom. Where eyes once were, Swinburne presents
embouchures which emit the very "purpose-lessness [/e sans-fin] which leads [one] back
inside" oneself (Derrida, "Economimesis" 279), to the inarticulable abyss or void which
is "the undecidability as to where [one's] true point is," somewhere between the '"real'
self' and one's "external mask" orface (Zizek, Plague 141 ). Just as the elements of
representation break down in the fantasy of Christ, they break down outside the fantasy,
too: The cross is "Consumed of rottenness and rust, / . . . Dead as their spirits who put
,
trust, / Round its base .. . , (1 39, 142-43). The Cristo popo/o are left "muttering" (line
1 43) what Punter calls "a trope for inarticulacy, for the silence of the powerless" ("Cross"
3 54).
Contained in this "trope for inarticulacy" is also "the seed of a reproach":
[R]eproach for a failed intercessor, one who should have been
"articulating" the connection of humankind to the divine and yet could
only find it in himself to believe himself forsaken by the very god who had
sent him to perform that function. . . . [T]he poet is calling the people's
attention to the "grey-grown speechless Christ" and thereby joining in, and
42

For Deleuze and Guattari, the face is the intersection between signifiance, the "white wall" on which the
"signs and redundancies" of the symbolic order-discourse-is inscribed. and subjectiflcation, the "black
hole" in which "consciousness. passion, and redundancies" is lodged. The face is a kind of place-holder
allowing for identification, a place-holder for the process in which the limited subject expresses him/her
"self' in discourse by "overcoding," a fantastic filling of. the "surface-holes" of his/her indeterminacy,
fluidity, the abyss of that which cannot be signified, that which cannot be related to an/other (169-70) .
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encouraging others to join in, with the mockery offered to the crucified
Christ. ("Cross" 3 54, italics in original)
On one hand, this is precisely what Punter distinguishes as Swinburne's rebuke of a
Christianity which fails to articulate the particularity of human desires ("Cross" 356) and
thus, as Margot Louis says, offers a discourse which, socio-politically, "is worse than
useless" (Gods 95). On the other hand, this is just as much a rebuke of Mazzini; despite
Mazzini' s decades-long struggle to revolutionize Italy,
. . . we seek yet if God or man
Can loosen thee as Lazarus,
Bid thee rise up republican
And save thyself and all of us . . . . ( 127-30)
The people's mockery here is the derision of Mazzini : the anti-Mazzinian demonstrations
following the revolutionary victories of 1 860, Mazzini's inability to "save" or even to
relate to his "Cristo popolo " from his jail cell during the liberation of Rome in 1 86 1 (as
well as his inability to "save" himself from incarceration), and the opportunities for
revolutionary action that Mazzini and his peers did choose were not ones in which they
could actively achieve enough distance from the existing socio-political structures they
purported to oppose.
As Swinburne himself admitted, one cannot "do good and serve others
exclusively; . . . I can't. If l tried I should lose my faculty of verse . . . " (Letters I :242)-
in other words, he would be rendered inarticulate. In several published articles in which
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he discusses aesthetics from a political perspective,43 Mazzini maintained that Romantic
and post-Romantic art was the articulation of a "socially irresponsible individualism"; to
"rise up republican," the new artist would have to speak with a "new voice capable of
giving artistic expression to [a] spirit of association" (Sarti 87), to develop a discourse of
universalizing representation which would not alienate the artist/speaker from his/her
audience. Such universalizing representations, Swinburne contends, are like religious
doctrine, always alienating one's audience as they weave "a viewless veil" over the
,
"hidden face of man" ("Crucifix" 169-70). Mazzini s insistence that "religion [was] a
necessary element of revolution and faith in God the necessary underpinning of political
conviction" (Sarti 4) is exactly what Swinburne calls "The poison of the crucifix" (line
1 86). According to Deleuze and Guattari, "It was under the sign of the cross that people
learned to steer the face and processes of facialization in all directions" (1 78-79), and
Punter uses this to make the case that Swinburne introduces a sense of play into "the
aesthetic gift of Christianity over many centuries of representation" ("Cross" 356).
Nevertheless, this poem seems to show instead that an aesthetic Christianity, as lately
represented in Mazzini, "freezes" the republican cause in a static metaphor-a metaphor
so static that it causes the very struggle of revolution to· cease altogether. 44
When the metaphor becomes static, it also becomes degenerate, ineffective, and
unable to sustain the kind of play Punter wishes it to demarcate. Whereas in "Super
43

Many of these articles appeared in L 1taliano, a publication produced by Risorgimento members and
sympathizers exiled in Paris, in the mid 1830s. Swinburne's correspondence with William Michael
Rossetti during the mid to late 1860s and early 1870s suggests that W.M. Rossetti had shared some of
Mazzini's publications with Swinburne.
44
Here I have borrowed from Kuduk' s assertion that, in poems such as "Hertha," Swinburne relies on
paganism to show how it differs from the Judeo-Christian tendency to "freez(e] spirituality in a particular
metaphor" (265).
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Flumina Babylonis" Mazzini and "Mother Italy" are allowed at least the artifice of
making a "republican marriage," here the Christ figure is faced with
The leprous likeness of a bride,
Whose kissing lips through his lips grown
Leave their God rotten to the bone. (1 78-80)
The "leprous" bride is what Zizek would call the "undead" core of the static metaphor or
fantasy that "lives" on; she signifies how Mazzini, as the metaphoric Christ, "cannot find
[his] proper place in the text" or in the discourses of either Christian tradition or
revolutionary politics (Zizek, Lacan 23). The static metaphor becomes "a disturbance . : .
in the process of symbolization" (Lacan 23), or the kind of playful representation Punter
claims Swinburne endorses. Corrupt and contagious, "Mother Italy" cannot give herself
to the supposed ''Father of the Nation" and form the kind of hermaphroditic image
suggested in "Super Flumina Babylonis"-paradoxically because the Father of the Nation
from whom she is (to be) created as well as to be reunited is mere "carrion" ("Crucifix"
line 1 92) in the same state of deterioration and disease. This more vividly reinforces
what was more subtly implicated in "Babylonis": that the political hermaphrodite, "the
symbol of the _union of the self and the non-self' (Busst 66), represents nothing but its
failure to represent such a union. However, in "Babylonis," the failure of the
. hermaphroditic trope to signify such union (because the trope exists in the context of a
prophecy of unification) at least signifies the possibil ity for such a union, though the
possibility cannot as yet be actualized; here, where the prophecy of the union is absent,
even the possibility of such seems to be precluded.
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The "bride" Mazzini/Christ looks for but does not receive in "Before a Crucifix"
is likely Hertha, the goddess of the republic, who is
the mouth that is kissed
And the breath in the kiss,
The search, and the sought, and the seeker, the soul and the body that is.
("Hertha" 28-30)
Swinburne presents Hertha, a disenchanted but still awe-inspiring Gaia figure, as the "I
AM which

began," which begat both "God and man / . . . equal and whole" ("Hertha" 1-3).

But Hertha, once "The life-tree" who offered the promise of salvation in the "sap of [her]
leaves" (1 1 8, 120), has become the crucifix itself. She declares that "Gods . . . / That take
and that give," such as Christ/Mazzini, "are worms that are bred in [her] bark that falls
off; they shall die and not live" ("Hertha" 1 2 1 -22, 126). In tum, these cast-off elements,
whose "foul foliage" is "ingraffed by priests" back onto Hertha, obscure her true form
and instead portray her as "The tree of [Christian] faith" ("Crucifix" 1 63-64); the "foul
foliage" of Christian dogma becomes a parasitic infection in the wood "Consumed of
rottenness and rust, / Worm-eaten of the worms of night" ("Crucifix" 140-41). 45 Though
she claims to be a separate deity who has become contaminated by the Judeo-Christian
God, Hertha's monologue reveals that she is (at least a part or version of) the God whose
worship commands the hierarchical ordering and the oppression of the natural world; to
put it more simply, Hertha, the "Earth Mother," has become the symbol of her own
"Hertha" immediately precedes "Before a Crucifix" in the volume, suggesting that Swinburne
pwposefully paired the poems together. As a result, I believe that Swinburne expected the tree images in
both poems to be read intertextually-especially as Swinburne told William Michael Rossetti that "Hertha"
"has the most in it of my deliberate thought and personal feeling or faith" (Letters 2:85), thus serving as
counterpoint to his lack of faith in Christianity as represented in "Crucifix."
45
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oppression.

46

Yet her monologue implies that she sti ll holds the promise of redeeming

the natural world by subsuming the version of God who represents men's "unmediated
lordship and mastery" over that world.

47

Moreover, she is "All forms of al l faces, / All works of all hands" ("Hertha" 1 5758): Hertha is "a metonym for humanity" who "collectivizes human experience,
integrating individual lives into the ongoing life of 'man "' (Kuduk 265). As such, she
seems to be the penultimate serial identifier, a personification of the mode by which
Swinburne explores the multiple possibilities allowed by subjective differentiation
withput slipping into the kind of "ego-weakness" which renders art little more than "the
attunement . . . to the most fleeting individual reactions" (Adorno, Theory 239). Because
Swinburne takes great pains to show Hertha as a multiply-positioned subject able to
identify with, and to incorporate into herself, what falls on both sides of existing
ideological dichotomies-death/life, time/infinity, man/woman, body/spirit-it is
tempting to suggest that Swinburne is consciously eluding the trap of creating nothing but
an "interiority of landscape" (Pittock, "Nineties" 1 22), a decadent landscape in which
one, individual perspective is concretized and thus cannot provide any opportunity to
entertain variant perspectives. In such a landscape, the "fleeting individual reaction" that
Adorno warns us about is upheld as a universal (and universalizing) experience, although
it is really a "fictional" experience in which "no one is actually participating" (Theory
239), an experience which cannot be engaged dialectically. However, as Margot Louis
notices, Hertha "does not really assimilate disparate elements'' (Gods 1 1 3). In her

46

"I am that which unloves me and loves; I am stricken / and I am the blow" ("Hertha" 23-24).
47 See Horkheimer and Adorno 12.
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monologue, she commands the reader to "behol[d] the fruits of me fair" while promising,
"I am with you, am in you and ofyou" (lines 192, 210, emphases mine). The equation of
Hertha and the "you" of humanity is always interrupted by a preposition; Hertha
continues to sustain the separation of herself from humanity until the very end of her
monologue, and, as a result, the majority of the poem sustains the kind of (Christian)
hierarchy Swinburne finds and maligns in "Before a Crucifix." Hertha's self-references
are meant to seem inclusive, but her monologue insists on the differentiation between her
all-inclusive "self' and the "other'' of humanity: early in the poem, Swinburne establishes
Hertha, the "Mother, not maker," as quite separate from humanity, the "children [who]
forsake her'' (lines 79, 8 1 ).
Her metonymy, then, is problematic. Swinburne applies the "logic of ' fetishistic
inversion "' to his presentation of Hertha, as Hertha demands that her audience-
collective humanity-treat her as the realization of the (im)possible Thing/God(dess),
while actually she is God(dess) only inasmuch as her audience continues to recognize her
as such.

As

soon as her audience becomes cognizant that her Goddess-hood is a

"performative effect, the effect itself is aborted" (Zizek, Lacan 33). As Zizek explains,
once "we attempt to 'subtract' the fetishistic inversion and witness the performative
effect directly"-as perfonnance as such-her "performative power will be dissipated"
(Lacan 33).

And this helps to explain Swinburne's choice to present "Hertha" as the

precursor to "Before a Crucifi�." In the latter poem, Swinburne' s speaker reveals that
godhood, and all the promises of unity, redemption, and/or transcendence detailed in
"Hertha," is absolute perfonnance. Thus, when one returns to the very last line of
Hertha's monologue--"Man, equal and one with me, man that is made of me, man that is
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f' (240)--one finds that it rings false. The witness to the crucifixion always already
knows that the "magic" of the kind of signification in which the divine signifier really
signifies collective humanity and its myriad desires "is utterly untrue" (Horkheimer and
Adorno 9).
Kuduk claims that, in the.final line, Hertha offers an intuitive apprehension of
rather than a definitive (and thus limiting) designation of human desires, "appearing to
evoke for humanity its own power and divinity," thus revisiting Blake's notion that "all
deities reside" within humanity itself, 48 and preparing the way for realizing "a vision of a
sustainable republic of love, community, and equality" (268). The crucial word here is
· "appear'': the intuitive power of"Hertha" is concretized and aestheticized as a political
concept, a concept which is both limited and limiting, and thus is not actually present in
the poem or truly accessible to humanity at large. Conceptualized, Hertha's "power'' is
precluded from perspectives and circumstances yet to be imagined. Besides, as Adorno
would caution, the kind of synthesis prescribed for this ideal republic is false because it
conceals its own "no less false, rigid polarity; the aesthetics of intuition is founded on the
model of a thing"-not an idea or intuition qua intuition-and "[in] the synthesis"
provided in the poem "the tension, its essence, gives way to a fundamental repose"
(Theory 97, emphasis mine). Hertha' s final statement evokes the vision of a static
"republic" which quells the dissonance upon which the republican struggle depends.

As

Emilie Venturi once described it, Mazzini "viewed man as a perfectible creature" (Sarti

48

In William Blake. Swinburne notes that. whereas "others" treat religious faith and devotion by
prescribing "inductive rule and law," Blake offers "assumptive preaching and intuition" (149). Also,
Swinburne sums up "Blake's Pantheistic Iliad in a nutshell": "Extra hominem nu/la salus. 'God is no more
than man; because man is no less than God "' (Blake 165nl, italics in original).
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209)49 and, likewise, Mazzini always believed that a republic was a perfectible state.
Despite Mazzini's exhortation to the Vatican's 1 870 Ecumenical Council that one must
affirm the inexhaustible "continuity of creation" instead of the stasis of concepts like
perfection (qtd. by Sarti 209), even in governance, his continua) expectation of attaining
the perfect, and arguably static, end to his political struggle demonstrates how he valued
the impossible goal much more so than the aim.
Swinburne confronts Mazzini's belief in human perfectibility and the possibility
of a perfect republic his "Hymn of Man," written on the occasion of the Ecumenical
Council's decree in papal infallibility. In this poem, Swinburne reinvokes Hertha,
attempting to-and calling attention to his failure to-re-imagine her in her "true" form,
or to see her as if his vision was not mediated by the Judea-Christian wor)dview. In other
words, he wants to see Hertha as a monadic goddess in which all the possibilities
immanent in her are immediately comprehensible, rather than subject to the conventions
and modes of interpretation. He imagines seeing Hertha before the event of the
catastrophe of meaning, before her appearance was abstract:
When her eyes new-born of the night saw yet no star out of reach;
When her maiden mouth was alight with the flam� of musical speech;
. . . [With] Eyes that had looked not on time, and ears that heard not of
death;
Lips that heard not the rhyme of change and passionate breath . . . .
(7-8, 1 1-12)

49

Venturi's assessment is applicable. As Sarti explains, Mazzini "rejected the fundamental doctrines of
original sin . . . as 'absurd'" (34).
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As in "Eve of Revolution," Swinburne considers the possibility of a prelapsarian mode of
musical communication which exists in a kind of Adornian negative dialectic to "the
impoverishment and falsity" of conventional language (Theory 1 77); here "The word of
the earth to the spheres" is the same as "the note of her song" ("Hymn" line 3). Still, by
emphasizing Hertha's mouth and eyes and then making the synaesthetic move of
presenting her lips that hear, suggesting that her speech is immediately heard and not
mediated by interpretative structures, Swinburne gestures toward the embouchure-like
image he presents in "Before a Crucifix."
But the poem then shifts; Swinburne's speaker notes that, in this "perfect" state,
Hertha does not experience "passionate breath" or "The rhythmic anguish of growth, and
the motion of mutable things" ("Hymn" 12-1 3). Hertha's/Swinburne' s failure to evoke
speech whose meaning is immediate-not dependent upon mediation via existing,
necessary interpretive structures-mirrors the untenability of the Mazzini an goal of a
utopian republic. Hertha, the Goddess of the Republic, is impoverished, mediated if not
completely eclipsed by "the God th.at ye make you [who] is grievous" because he
separates "spirit" from earth "and gives not aid" in the attempt to reconcile the two (line
4 1 ). Because the belief in the God who separates spiritual passion from earthly passion is
so pervasive, any description of Hertha's "Lovely . . . firstborn passion, and impulse of
firstborn things" seems false, especially as "Love" -desire-still "lay shut in the shell
world-shaped" (lines 24, 27). Thus Swinburne can only construct the artifice of Hertha' s
mana-like wholeness to obfuscate the otherwise-inarticulable abyss or void at the heart of

human desires. In such a "perfect" state, there would be no desire because there would
be no emptiness to conceal; in complete fullness and satiety, there would be no passion-
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no suffering, no alienation to endure--but also no longing, no aspiration, no perseverant
struggle in which to find satisfaction. Such an absence of passion is troublesome to
Swinburne because it marks the absence of the aesthetic dimension which particularizes
"the complex of physical sensations by which we move in and know the world"; without
,
such passion, the human existence is "anaesthetic, (Bruhm 123, 128). Hertha's "song"
becomes static, and the divine word becomes more like what Adorno would call a "mute
and inconsequential" conceptualization of human struggle (Theory 1 8).
Rather than simply "replac[ing] the divine word with human expression as the
source of material and poetic creation" (Kuduk 262) or attempting to "destroy [the]
symbolic system" of Judeo-Christianity by parodying it (Louis, Gods 99), Swinburne
presents "the word"-language--in its very concretizing thingishness, as one of the
· "Things" he explains "are cruel and blind" since "their strength detains and deforms"
("Hymn" line 65). One is "detained" from reaching Hertha, the ideal, because any
language used to signify her presence excludes her from realization, denoting her absence
not only from the poem but also from the formation of any republic. Like the writing
which constructs "the 'screen of the word "' (Derrida, Grammatology 3 1 ), Hertha's
"song" is "the locus of mediation" (Lacan, Concepts I 07) between the
representable/attainable and the unrepresentable/unattainable. Hertha is an imaginative
place-holder of the attainability of perfection, unity without dissonance; but that
attainability is a fantasy, only appearing "In thunders of vision and dream, and lightnings
of future and past" ("Hymn" line 68)-the future which cannot be known and the past
which is always subject to the reconstruction of trace narratives. "Man is the master of
things" (line 200, emphasis mine) because he cannot transcend them. "Ears hath he, and
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hears not; and eyes, and he sees not; and mouth, and is dumb" (1 84): Hertha' s song, once
rendered into language-the symbolic network of human expression-is so mediated that
it is inaccessible. Swinburne does not "destroy the symbolic system" because this system
still incorporates "the tongue [which is] more than the speech" (line 1 37), though the
"tongue" is obscured. Thus, he demonstrates the importance of the individualized and
individualizing struggle to create a textual space in which new possibilities of expression
can be explored by contravening and exploiting the system' s very limitations.
Overall, because Mazzinian politics values the struggle only as it is a progressive
means to an achievable, perfectible end, Swinburne's enthusiasm for those politics is
forced. Most critics dismiss these poems in a sweeping gesture, characterizing them as a
rather unfortunate result of the supposedly highly impressionable Swinburne's blind
devotion to (and perhaps misplaced faith in) a figure who liked to court controversy as
much as he did. But such readings fail to consider how the poems pointedly call attention
to the very forced quality of the politically charged language. Although it is tempting to
claim, as Kuduk does, that in these poems Swinburne finds the "potential . . . to speak for
all of humanity" as he attempts to ascribe a singular voice to the human multitude {270),
the poems themselves, exploring the fragmentations and eccentricities of subjectivity as
well as the impossibilities of achieving utopian perfection through the use of serial
identifications, suggest that the concept of perfectibility is another concept which
"detains and deforms" the possibilities for fulfilling human desires yet to be realized.
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CHAPTER SEVEN
"What strange height of saddest speech":
Revis(ion)ing the Catastrophe of Meaning in Atalanta in Calydon and Erechtheus
"I must say I always read [the GreeksJ with the most passionate sympathy and magnetic
attraction to the thought and utterance alike that any poet ever puts into me. "
-Algernon Charles Swinburne
"Tragedy is the perfect aesthetic model, both as source and explanation, of human
existence. " -Jerome McGann
"The basic tendency in tragicforms, ·in contrast to its mythical subjects, the dissolution of
the spell offate and the birth of subjectivity, bears witn_ess to ... the collision between
mythic law and subjectivity, to the antagonism betweenfateful domination and a
humanity awakening to maturity. " -Theodor Adorno
With the publication of Erechtheus in January 1 876, Swinburne marked his poetic
coming of age, as the long classical drama shows the maturation of the aesthetic brought
forth in the Poems andBallads, First Series and cultivated in the Songs before Sunrise.
Erechtheus is arguably the greatest example of the paradox at the heart of Swinburne's
poetry: he presents an exhaustive treatment of religious myth, both pagan and Christian,
in the continuous series of allusions embedded in the poem's complex imagery-imagery
which plays against the austere power of a pathos that se�ms almost deceptively simple
in its forthright, and sometimes brutal, candor. In Erechtheus, Swinburne reconsiders the
kind of tension between utopian political idealism and the failure of such idealism to
sustain the hopeful development of sustainable political practice, this time placing it in
ancient Greece rather than nineteenth-century Italy. At the same time, though,
Swinburne continues to emphasize the hopeful possibilities to be found in the failure to
achieve lofty, utopian ideals, concentrating on political and human struggle rather than
the expectation of achieving the impossible solution. Swinburne more clearly establishes
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a pattern of socially and politically productive failures in Erechtheus, represented by the
Athenian po/is, than he does in any of the Songs before Sunrise. Whereas, in the Songs,
the Mazzini figure always experiences failure in isolation, failure in polis becomes a

collective experience; moreover, the collective experience of failure, and the struggle and
suffering caused by failure, provides the polis-a construction much like art itself is a
constructiorr-what Adorno would call its "humane content." 1 I believe that exploring
the "humane content" of human failure will help better explain why some previous
critics, such as W.R. Rutland, claim that Swinburne's aesthetic achieves a kind of
"ethical intensity and spiritual elevation" in Erechtheus that does not appear in any of his
previous works (191).
One might surmise that Swinburne offered Erechtheus as a serious demonstration
of his poetic gifts in order to cuny favor with his peers and critics-especially since
Songs before Sunrise, though it did not generate the kind of vitriolic criticism that the
Poems and Ballads did, was not received favorably. The Saturday Review had dismissed
the volume as evidence that Swinburne was still "[ o]ffensive . . . as he always is," merely
trading his interest in "unnatural" love for "delight" in "blasphemy" and "in the reddest
of Red Republicanism";2 the Athenaeum 's reviewer was slightly more kind, offering mild
praise for "Hertha" but dismissing two of the poems, "Before a Crucifix" and "Hymn to
Man," that Swinburne felt were especially crucial to the volume. Many of the critics who
had responded to his previous work ignored the Songs altogether, which further added to
Swinburne's angst. Because the Songs remained a personal rather than a professional
1 I have based this on Adomo's observation, in his Aesthetic Theory. that "suffering . . . is (art's) expression
· and in which form has its substance. This suffering is the hwnane content that unfreedom counterfeits as
itivity" (260).
r>;he Saturday Review, 14 Jan. 187 1.
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milestone for Swinburne, his only taste of real critical adulation still remained the
publication of Atalanta in Calydon in March 1 865, nearly a full year before he would
come to be identified almost entirely by the fracas over Poems and Ballads' daring sexual
content and its hostile reception.
At the time of its publication, Swinburne considered Atalanta, a long poetic
drama about the mythic Calydonian boar-hunt, "the best executed and sustained of my
larger poems" (Letters 1 : 1 1 5).3 While Swinburne had worked on Atalanta, he had also
been revising fragments of Chaste/ard, a long drama about Mary Stuart, Queen of Scots,
which he had written sporadically since his days at Balliol. Chastelard was published on
the heels ofAtalanta, in hopes that Chastelard would gain favor and popularity precisely
because it was a work "by the author of Atalanta in Calydon." However, as Rikky
Rooksby notes, Chastelard is a cheerless work "celebrat[ing] a perverse and wilful death
wish" (Life 122), chaotic in form and plot, since it is a patchwork of rewrites and
rearrangements sporadically undertaken over a six-year period; as such, it not only failed
to appeal to readers, but literary critics also found it extremely disappointing. Following
the Songs, Swinburne returned to writing long poetic dramas: he composed another play
based on the life ofMary Stuart, titled Bothwell (1 874), and a retelling of the legend of
Tristram and Iseult, Tristram ofLyonesse, which he began in 1 870 but would not finish
until July 1 882. Like Tristram, Bothwell was an arduous and often unsatisfying project,
in part because Swinburne found it difficult to manag·e its overwhelming length and
scope, but perhaps more so because the poem's very length and scope alienated his
targeted readership. Even Swinburne himself commented that, with Bothwell, "It may
3

Letter to Lady Trevely� 15 Mar. 1865.
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well be that my ambition to give it such fullness of national and historical interests as the
subject seemed to me to demand has overleapt itself. . . . [T]he mark might be beyond
[my] reach" (Letters 2:301). 4 What had always seemed very much within Swinburne's
reach, though, was classical Greek drama. As popular as Atalanta had been, Swinburne
later found the poem "not Greek enough"; so, desperate to revisit and perhaps even
surpass his former success, he set out in August 1 875 to create "a companion piece to
A talanta' which would be "a more perfect original example of Greek tragedy'' 5 and thus
be "more universal (so to speak) in its relation to human thought and emotion" (Letters
2:55, 67). 6
Erechtheus was written during a three month period in which Swinburne, under
the watchful eyes ofBenjamin Jowett and Theodore Watts, experienced a calm and sober
respite from an otherwise tumultuous time in his life. Following the publication of the
Songs in 1 87 1 , Swinburne's behavior became even more erratic and dissolute. His
excessive drinking, now nearly uncontrollable, not only caused many of his friends to
shun his company but also caused prolonged periods of serious illness in whic� his
parents took him away from London to "rest" in an environment in which he had no
access to alcohol. During that year, Swinburne's perpetual alcoholic rages were
compounded by his anger over the publication of Robert Buchanan's infamous "Fleshly
,
School of Poetry" tract. Though Buchanan s real target was Dante Gabriel Rossetti-for
Swinburne merits only occasional mentions in the piece, as Buchanan more or less
Letter to John Nichol ; the specific date is missing, but Lang's research indicates that Swinburne wrote it
sometime "in the middle of July," 1 874.
5
Letter to William Michael Rossetti , 21 Aug. 1875.
6
Letter to E.C. Sted� 8 Sep. 1875. Stedman was commissioned to write an article about Swinburne for
Scribner 's Monthly; during the time Stedman was researching his article, he and Swinburne began a
friendly correspondence which they maintained for several years.
4
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dismisses him a "little mad boy letting off squibs" (890)--Swinburne took the attack
personally, especially because his friendship with Rossetti became a casualty of
Buchanan's attack. In 1 872, not long after Swinburne learned of Mazzini's death,
Rossetti abruptly severed ties with Swinburne as part of his (Rossetti's) attempt to
recuperate from a nervous breakdown and subsequent suicide attempt. 7 Within a period ·
of a few months, then, Swinburne lost the friend and mentor who had inspired the Poems
and Ballads as well as the friend and mentor who had inspired the Songs before Sunrise.
As a result, Swinburne seemed to lose all remaining direction in his life. The next few
years found him devoting an increasing amount of time to his friendships with John
Thomson, who shared his interest in London's flagellation brothels, and George Powell,
whose fascination with pornography and unconventional sexual practices rivaled his own.
Benjamin Jowett, whose antagonism to Swinburne's chosen vocation as poet lessened in
his later years, again stepped in to provide Swinburne some guidance; as did a new
acquaintance, the solicitor Theodore Watts. Both men were concerned that Swinburne
was becoming increasingly depressed, bored, and restless, having spent the greater part of
the early to mid 1 870s under his parents' watchful eyes. In August of 1 875, Jowett
invited Swinburne to accompany him on a vacation, during which, in an attempt to
distract Swinburne from seeking solace in alcohol, he re-engaged Swinburne in the study
of classical literature. Out of that study the idea for Erechtheus was born. Theodore
Watts then took Swinburne on vacation to Southwold (on the east coast of England)
during the months of September and October, where the poem was finished.

7 Buchanan, s article is generally attributed to causing Rossetti's breakdown, though Rossetti, s physical and
mental health had been shaky for some time prior to the publication ofBuchanan,s piece.

28 1
Reconsidering Atalanta: The Subject, the Animated World, and the Problem of Ate
Because Swinburne wrote Erechtheus as the companion piece to Atalanta, one
cannot appreciate its complexity without first exploring the features ofAtalanta that the
more mature Swinburne reconsidered, revised, and then embedded deep within its many
allusory layers. As several critics have already pointed out, both works can be read as
Swinburne's attempt to write his own version of Aeschylus's Oresteia. For example,
David Riede, working from _Thomas Wymer' s earlier reading, sees Atalanta 's main
characters, Althaea and her son Meleager, representing "a split between the old and new
orders"; Althaea's "submission to the will of the gods, stoic acceptance of fate, and
unquestioning obedience to law" mirrors the "old ways" explored in the first two plays of
the Oresteia, Agamemnon and The Libation Bearers (Riede, Study 93), whereas Meleager
represents the "new order'' of a "creative kind of law" flexible enough to uphold "life as
something not merely to be endured but to 'lighten and lift up higher"' (Wymer 5), the
kind of flexibility implied in the final play of the Oresteia, The Eumenides. Jerome
McGann, on the other hand, argues that Erechtheus stands alone as "a collapsed
Oresteia " because Erechtheus 's "tragedy is pure and formal," issuing "a mood of awe
and wonder," whereas Atalanta, focused on "passion . . . [which] is sapphic and
elemental," "devolve[s] into wild desires for beauty and order'' (Swinburne 1 28-29). Ian
Fletcher's reading seems to support McGann's because Fletcher finds it "difficult" "to
detect Aeschylus as a model" for Atalanta; rather, he says the model is Euripides's
Hippolytus. Fletcher detects a "mysterious moral tone" in the poem since he reads
Swinburne's characters as helplessly controlled by _divine caprice like Euripides's
Phaedra ("Atalanta" 1 80, 1 82). And Rikky Rooksby notes that Atalanta was probably
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influenced, at least in part, by the fragments of Euripides's Me/eager included in a
volume of classical literature8 given to him by friends upon his graduation from Eton
(Life 1 13).
Swinburne' s own correspondence suggests that perhaps he felt that Euripides's
influence was too great on Atalanta, as he wrote to Edmund Gosse that he resented
anyone comparing Erechtheus to the work of Euripides, "who was troubled with a
dysentery of poetic imagination and a diarrhoea of rhetorical sophistry" (Letters 3: 100). 9
Interestingly enough, this comment echoes some of the negative reviews standing out
among the sea of praise he had received for Atalanta, especially Browning's
pronouncement that the poem was "a fuzz of words" and Ruskin's more pointed
observation that the poem, while impressive, was like the "foam at the mouth" of a
"demoniac youth" (qtd. by Henderson 107), or even Lord Houghton' s opinion that it
overflows with a "bitter, angry anti�theism" which is suite4 "among the aberrations of
human nature." 10 This rather modem strain of"bitter, angry anti-theism," though, is what
Swinburne came to equate with the political and cultural idealisms he associated with
Greek culture. While working on Erechtheus, he wrote to William Michael Rossetti that
Greek culture was "the highest and most sacred possible" subject for him to write about,
because he found "the birth and redemption of Athens, i.e. of the world's supreme type of
poetry and liberty and light in all kinds" (Letters 3: 80) to be a more appropriate narrative ·
for human salvation than the birth of Christ and Christ's later redemption of

8

Poetarum Scenicorum Graecorum Fabulae Superstites (1851), ed. Karl Wilhelm Dindorf.

This letter is dated 2 Jan. 1876.
The review by Lord Houghton (Richard Monckton Milnes) appeared in the Edinburgh Review, July
1865: 202-16.

9

10
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humankind. 1 1 · In comparison, at the height of Atalanta 's popularity, he often contended
that conventional Christians were "slaves of faith and fear" who misguidedly
characterized any human attempt to assume responsibility for personal or cultural
renewal as "blasphemous rebellion against their Supreme Being" (Letters 1 : 1 14). 12 For
Swinburne, the divine caprice of the Greek gods that Swinburne explores and questions
in Atalanta represents the same divine caprice he attributes to the Judea-Christian God;
but, he arguably felt, in retrospect, that Atalanta did not critique human resignation to the
divine as much as it could have.
Atalanta in Calydon calls into question the enchanted world of Greek pantheism.
The poem embodies what Horkheimer and Adorno identify as the opposition of reason
and spirit, "the true antithesis of enlightenment and mythology":
Mythology recognizes spirit only as immersed in nature, as natural power.
Like the powers without, inward impulses appear as living powers of
divine . . . origin. Enlightenment, on the other hand, puts back coherence,
meaning and life into subjectivity, which is properly constituted only in
this process. (89)
The myth of the Calydonian boar hunt was a good testing ground for this dialectic,
especially as Swinburne could explore the opposition between divine decree and the
impulse of the human subject by recasting Meleager's death at the hands of Althaea as an
act of subjective impulse, rather than as an act resulting not from human will but from the
will of the gods, the austere realization of prophecy or divine caprice. Swinburne
II

This

Jetter is dated 19 Oct. 1875.
Letter to William Bell Scott 1 5 Mar. 1 865. In tlus letter, Swinburne reacts to the comments that Lord
Houghton and other "rampant critics" made concerning A ta/anta 's anti-theism.
12
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skillfully parallels Althaea' s act of filicide with Meleager' s act of slaying the boar, the
destruction of a symbol of the enchanted "natural" world inasmuch as the boar appears at
first to be the agent of Artemis's rather subjective and vengeful impulse; though, "as an
organism which [appears] .. . and [then] dies when it has run its course," the boar more
strongly symbolizes a "natural law" that both precedes and supercedes the rigid laws of
the gods, which are really the rigid laws of man (Prendergast 70). In short, Atalanta
becomes a story about the disenchantment of the pantheistic world of ancient Greece.
Swinburne's narrative constantly plays against the traces of the original versions
of the myth woven into his poem, versions in which the boar hunt is merely the setting
for an entire pre-ordained chain of events. Traditionally, Artemis is portrayed as the
representative of the gods' order, controlling the course of events; because Oeneus's
failure to pay tribute to her opposed that order, she must restore that order through
retribution-specifically, the death of Oeneus's son, Meleager, is the tribute she
demands. Thus, she creates the boar hunt as the occasion to enact that retribution:
Oeneus's son, Meleager, meets and falls in love with Atalanta, the only female hunter in
the party, and Meleager's love for Atalanta consequently causes a chain reaction of
retributive deaths in the poem, leading up to his own. 1 3 Initially, Artemis purports to
assert the "living powers" of her divinity over the world: she sends the boar to wreak
havoc on Calydon. However, by the end of the poem, Artemis's power over the lives of
her subjects is questionable, shaken by Althaea' s attempt to determine fate for herself
(and express her desire for recognition) rather than leaving it only to the gods' will.
13

Mark Siegchrist points out that the boar only "at first glance seems [to be] the agent of her vengeance";
rather, Artemis really seems to use the boar to bring Atalanta and Meleager together, thus providing "the
occasion for . . . destruction" so she can "stand back to watch it happen" (697).
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Swinburne also portrays the deities of the pantheon as subject to, rather than in
control of, the natural cycle that "remoulds and discreates" the world. Zeus, for example,
"hath fear and custom under foot," and though his "will" controls "Much," it cannot
control the natural cycle that determined how "each thing live its life" (Atalanta lines
457-62). The very human qualities of tyranny attributed to Zeus cannot destroy the trace
memory of an unsubjugated nature,
the grace that remains,
The fair beauty that cleaves
To the life of the rains in the grasses, the life of the dews on the leaves.
(3063-65)
By contrast, Swinburne presents Althaea as a subject actively engaging the world,
suggesting that the world is subject to human (rather than the gods') order. Meleager
stands in opposition to both Artemis and Althaea, though, suggesting that either ordering
principle is ultimately impossible: despite Meleager's romantic idealism-his belief that
the natural world will present itself like "a child born with [the] clear sound and light" to
guide him (line 365}-he fails to revive hope that one can (re)discover the mana of
enchantment. Instead, Meleager eventually submits to a death which is like an "empty
weary house," "Where no flesh is nor beauty'' (line 4095). Like Swinburne's favorite
Blake character, Thel, Meleager envisions his death as a capitulation to the natural
cycle, 14 "The source and end, the sower and the scythe" (40 I 0). And, as is the case wi_th
Thel, Meleager finds that his idealism was the "trickery which elevate[d]" him "to the
status of vehicle of divine substance" (Horkheimer and Adorno 5 1 ) or potential, for he
14

See Riede, Study 101-02.
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discovers at the end that his "flower of life / [Was] Disbranched and desecrated
miserably''; death easily "minished all that god-like muscle and might," making his
strength not only un-"godlike" but also "lesser than a man's" (4028-3 1 ). Meleager's
death demonstrates how his attempt to position himself outside of customary ideology
was merely artifice as well as demonstrates that Swinburne realizes that the aesthete's
attempt to keep alive the hope of (re)enchanting the disenchanted world is just as
artificial.
Swinburne uses Greek myth to argue that "[m]an needs a new language" in which
· one can demonstrate how relative, human, and artificial "truths have gone beyond those
of the old order" established in myth (McGann, Swinburne 1 1 2). In doing so, I think that
Swinburne is very careful to challenge his reader's knowledge Greek myth, and thus his
or her expectations about the "truths" explored in those myths. Contrary to the majority
of previous critical readings, then, I contend that Swinburne uses Althaea's speeches to
challenge the easy fatalism of the educated reader. For example, Swinburne purposefully
makes sure that Althaea's commentary on other mythic characters, such as her sister Leda
and Leda's family, does not reflect the elements of the myths already familiar to his
audience. When Althaea praises Leda's husband, Tyndareus, for his devotion to the gods
and praises the integrity of Leda's daughters, Helen and Clytemnestra, wishing them
· "good loves and lords," "a perfect life and blameless bed" (lines 423-25), Swinburne
ensures that Althaea's language carries no foreshadowing of what the educated reader
already knows happens to Leda and her hardly "blameless" family: Tyndareus, repeating
Oeneus's error, forgets to sacrifice to Aphrodite, and thus Aphrodite supposedly curses
both Helen and Clytemnestra to make marriages, wrecked by infidelity, that will bring
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deadly consequences. Because Althaea' s language does not feature double entendres
pointing to the calamities which befall her nieces, I believe he shatters the hubris of
mythic foreknowledge.
As a result, Althaea's speeches concerning prophecy, predestination, and the
powers of the gods-more specifically, the prophecy ofMeleager's death-can be read
as attempts to undermine those very concepts. Althaea questions the enchantment of her·
world; for example, she refuses to praise Artemis "for all this harried land," suggesting
that the natural occurrences of death and destruction signified by the boar are not
supernatural "things . . . to praise" (lines 1 63-69). Swinburne presents the Chorus as her
opposition, reinforcing the notion that the world is enchanted by the gods. When so
goaded by the Chorus, Althaea retreats into prophetic mode, repetitively describing the
imagery of the fire and the brand that was foretold to be Meleager' s undoing; 1 5 but, since
Althaea' s actions seems influenced by human voices rather than divine ones, Swinburne
continues to suggest that it is the Chorus, not Artemis, manipulating Althaea by the very
human power of suggestion to fulfill the "prophecy." As in classical drama, the authority
of the Chorus is not above interrogation.
It is important to note that Artemis herself never appears in the poem, even when
called upon; in Swinburne's Calydon, she does not really exist. Though most readings of
the poem, like Mark Siegchrist's, claim that Artemis is the poem's "pivotal figure"
because all the characters are subject to her "expert manipulation of her victims'
15 According to the myth, Althaea dreamed of giving birth to a burning brand instead of a human child
during her pregnancy; upon Meleager's actual birtJ� the Fates appeared to her with a burning brand and
"prophesied" (Swinburne's word) that Meleager would live only as long as the brand burned. So Althaea
extinguished the flame on the brand and tucked the brand away to save-or; as I would argue, maintain
control over-Meleager's life. (See Swinburne's prologue to Atalanta, ''The Argumen�" pp. 243-44 in
Collected Poems, vol. 4.)
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psychology" (695, 697n4), I suggest instead that Artemis is pivotal only in her failure to
display a palpable, definitive manifestation of her power. Artemis is not capable of
manifestation in Swinburne' s poem because she is present only as the "phantasy to be
found in the Platonic perspective of an absolute being to whom is transferred the quality
ofbeing all-seeing," the determinant "gaze that circumscribes us" (Lacan, Concepts 75).
And, because Artemis's gaze is only ostensible, her ability to circumscribe all the events
in the poem is questionable. Rather than portraying the gaze of Artemis as the frame
limiting the actions of the plot, Swinburne presents it as a frame the characters
themselves precariously superimpose on their actions to justify-to explain away, to give
"meaning" to-the tangled web of accidental, subjective circumstances the events which
comprise the plot. 16 The characters in the poem are manipulated by their own
psychology-their compulsions either to fulfill (Althaea, Meleager) or to sublimate
(Atalanta) their desires, to have their desires recognized by an/other-as an effect of their
discourse. Artemis exists in the poem, albeit virtually, to suggest that there is no-thing
"beyond the domain of discursive existence" (Zizek, Metastases 143).
The contentious interplay of what is "natural" versus what is "unnatural"
meaning, not only the dichotomous interplay between the "natural world" and human
domination of it, but also the dichotomy separating "natural," meaning normative, human
behavior and that behavior which falls outside the norm-is heightened by the purely
virtual existence of the goddess in the poem. Artemis is comparable to Lacanian woman,
the woman "who could fill out the lack in man, the ideal partner with whom the sexual
16

Inasmuch as "the many mythic figures can all be brought to a common denominator, and reduced to the
human subject," and myth, like magic, is "transform(edl into the pure truth and act(sJ as the very ground of
the world that has become subject to it" (Horkheimer and Adorno 6-7, 9).
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relationship would finally be possible, . . . who does not exist" (Zizek, Lacan 80).
Swinburne continually emphasizes Artemis's chastity, specifically the vow of chastity
Atalanta made to show her devotion to Artemis. Such continual references reinforce the
impossibility of the sexual relationship, in the Lacanian sense that the sexual relationship
neither fulfills human desires, nor does it allow for the unification of self and other.
Atalanta is continually described as "unnatural"; as Lacan would say, Atalanta is
"unnatural" because she allocates her desire not to human (sexual) expression but in her
aim for "the beyond of ate, " which is "beyond the limits of the human" (Seminar 263).
And, inasmuch as "[a]te concerns the Other, the field of the Other" here (Seminar 277}
in this case, the Other being Artemis and the field of the Other being the virtual authority
of her divine law, which is an illusory structure governing what is considered "natural"
Atalanta can be read both the representative of the Other as well as what Zizek calls "The
Other of the Other'' who, as I will argue below, is not deceived by the illusory structure,
although she "holds and manipulates the threads of the deception proper to the symbolic
order," maintaining the illusion of the enchanted world (Zizek, Lacan 8 1).
The Chorus proclaims Atalanta to be "holier than all holy days or things" (line
1 95). Arguably, in this description, the Chorus places Atalanta in opposition to Artemis
herself, thus establishing Atalanta as "holier," and thus other than, the goddess.
Described as having "no touch of love," as she is "Pure iron, fashioned for a sword" and
thus incapable of human feeling (lines 189, 1 99-200); 7 Atalanta is dehumanized:
paradoxically, despite the ways in which she seems to oppose Artemis, she still is little
17

Consider the rest of lines 199-200 not quoted above: " . . . and man / She loves not; what should one such
do with lover' This can be read two ways. On the surface level, this is another comment about Atalanta's
chastity, but this also questions Atalanta's very hwnanity. Her sexual inexperience seems to indicate an
inability to forge the more common bonds of empathy with others.
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more than the sword which is a metonym for Artemis's power. Yet Atalanta's
inhumanity is not an "immediate property" of her character, especially since Swinburne
devotes very little time in the poem to developing Atalanta as a character; in the entire
poem, Atalanta speaks only five times. Rather, Atalanta's inhumanity is established by
the Calydonians' behavior toward her, as they treat her with suspicious awe and anxious
consternation. This is a "performative effect of their symbolic ritual" (Zizek, Lacan 33)
of appeasing an ambivalent-and illusory-goddess._ Atalanta recognizes the limitations
ofbeing perceived as a metonymic representative of Artemis's will, admitting,
for all my forest holiness,
Fame, and this armed and iron maidenhood,
[I] Pay thus much also . . . . (964-66)
Yet, at the same time, by claiming that she is no less "godlike" in "heart" and "spirit"
than Artemis (994-96), she calls into question that which she metonymically represents.
By momentarily projecting the illusory image of herself as a goddess, Atalanta implies
that perhaps Artemis's goddesshood is just as illusory.
Identifying with such tenuous divine power causes Atalanta to lead a life she finds
"cold" and "strange" (line 971 ), though she claims a special, almost transcendent,
relationship with an enchanted, animated nature as compensation for her lack of human
expenence:
Me the utmost pine and footless frost of woods
That talk with many winds and gods, the hours
Re-risen, and white divisions of the dawn,
Springs thousand-tongued with the intermitting reed
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And streams that murmur of the mother snow
Me these allure, and know me; but no man
Knows, and my goddess only . . . . (979-86)
Atalanta makes this speech to pacify the Calydonians, to reinforce their symbolic belief
system as well as to convince them that her participation in the hunting party provides
divine assurance of the hunt' s success. Her claim rings false, though, because her
descriptions are rife with images of division and dissonance instead of images suggesting
an undifferentiated relationship between human and nature. Atalanta's speech is not the
field in which the transcendent qualities of the enchanted world are given full expression;
instead, this speech is her attempt to convince herself of an illusory transcendence.
Especially considering that she repeatedly uses the personal pronoun "me" as the locus
for every "proof' of the animate world, her speech shows only how she is "separated
from transcendence"; ultimately, despite her intentions, it implies that transcendence is
"unreal," "subjectively mediated" by Atalanta herself, not her goddess. 1 8 Atalanta seems
a transcendent figure because of her "eloquence"-an eloquence beyond "the oaths / That
bind the tongue of men . . . " (lines I 006-07)--but it is the kind of consciously scripted
eloquence Adorno says is rife "with broken or veiled meaning" (Theory 78). In other
words, her self-possession is undermined by the "thousand-tongued" voices that Atalanta
discursively represents-the voices or several layers of myth imposed upon the world in
attempts to explain the world and give it meaning.' Her monologue is like "myth turned
against itself' inasmuch as her description of transcendent immediacy becomes the

18

See Adorno, Theory 78.
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catastrophic instant that destroys immediacy. 19 As her language "undoes" itself, it
expresses the ruins and fragments of the catastrophe of meaning which speak to the
mythic quality of humanity and its differential and alienated relationship to mana As the
Chorus remarks in the commentary following Atalanta's monologue, human speech
serves only to "divide and rend" human beings from the kind of immediacy represented
by God (line 1202).
Althaea' s speeches similarly express these kinds of"ruins and fragments" of a
trace memory of wholeness and unity before the "fall" into subjective differentiation.
Specifically, Althaea questions the role of the· "fallen" subject-how that subject
perpetually intervenes in the disenchanted world in order to exercise some control over·
it-and ponders her ability to express her own will . On one hand, Althaea seems to deny
that she can exercise her own will:
But all the gods will, all they do; and we
Not all we would, yet somewhat; and one choice
We have, to live and to do just deeds and die. ( 1 759-6 1 )
The significance o fthis passage hinges on the word "choice." Is the "one choice" to be
mere agents of the gods' will, to commit deeds that are "just" only because the gods
willed them so? Or, is the "one choice" to live according to one's own will, to impose
one's will on the world and, in doing so, commit deeds that are "just" because one
subjectively determines them to be so? The Chorus interprets Althaea's statement to
imply the latter treatment of "choice/' for they admonish her for the "Terrible words she

19

I have adapted this from Adorno's contention that "the modern is myth turned against itself; the
timelessness of myth becomes the catastrophic instant that destroys temporal continuity ... " (Theory 23).
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communes with"; yet this is also the moment in which they remind her of the prophecy,
reinvoking the treatment of '.'choice" which is no one's choice but the gods', saying she
"murmurs as who talks in dreams with death" (lines 1762-64). The fragmented allusion
of the prophecy of Meleager's death appears here as if the Chorus "want[s] to prevent the
catastrophe by conjuring up its image" (Adorno, '/heory 33). Instead, though, when the
Chorus conjures the image of Meleager's death, they effect, not prevent, the catastrophe
of Meleager's death.
The choice Althaea makes is to kill her son, supposedly a "just" act of honor and
duty that avenges her brothers' deaths at the hands of Meleager. More pointedly, though,
it is an act that defies the gods themselves, an act in which she subjects the world to her
ego:
You strong gods,
Give place unto me; I am as any of you,
To give life and to take life . . . . (I 863-65)
She exerts this control by murdering Meleager to demonstrate "the might of [her] strong
desire" (line 1 963). Furthermore, Althaea resents Meleager for believing that the
world-nature-is enchanted by the gods and thus possesses "a creative and radiant
potentiality" (Prendergast 68) that was once, and could again be, actualized. In other
words, Meleager does not share in Althaea' s emerging assumption that such potentiality
would be a strictly human one that can be actualized through the individual ego.
Meleager believes that creative potential can be actualized through dedicating oneself to
the gods in order to access nature immediately; he praises Atalanta, "a light lit at the
hands of gods" (line 91 5), because he believes that she has accessed that potential
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through her pious dedication to the gods' order. He even murders his uncles because they
dishonor Atalanta and hence refuse to pay homage to the gods' emissary, to recognize
Atalanta as the symbol of the potentiality granted by divine will, when they celebrated
victory over the boar. As McGann points out, Meleager is "high-minded" and "attracted"
to the abstract, if not objective, ideal of "perfection" and perfectibility which he believes
Atalanta represents (Swinburne 96); Atalanta contrasts with the concrete� "created . . .
reality of life and value" represented by Althaea and his uncles (Coleman 1 8). By
dishonoring Atalanta, Meleager' s uncles dishonor, by failing to recognize, his desire for a
"plenipotentiary of immediacy" -or mana-amid an otherwise "mediated and objectified
world" (Adorno, Theory 62). Such plenipotential immediacy is impossible in Althaea's
world view; by dedicating himself to his desire for it, then, Meleager is just as "strange"
and "beyond the human" as Atalanta.
I believe that Althaea is at variance with Meleager because she perceives that his
desire for a plenipotentiary of immediacy has a "radically destructive character" in that it
defies the "social body'' (Lacan, Seminar 283), or the polis. Adam Roberts has argued
that the destruction of the social body of Calydon is "twofold": the polis is attacked from
the outside (by the boar) and the resulting chaos "undermines its unity from_ the inside"
(760). However, whereas Roberts reads Artemis as the force causing this destruction, I
read Artemis as the place-holder for Meleager's "radically destructive" desire.
Consequently, Althaea's act of filicide can then be read, in part, as her choice to salvage
individually what little unity is left in the polis by meting out justice: "Being just, I had
slain their slayer atoningly" (line 1 640). Yet Althaea does not perceive that, because her
act is rife with subjective differentiation in that she reifies her "fleeting individual
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reactions" (Adorno, Theory 239) into "law," she similarly defies the social body. It is
Meleager, not Althaea, who recognizes that the social body of Calydon is "foul / With the
kinship of contaminated lives" (3 082-83); the law of the polis can be "chalked up to
[each individual ' s] guilty desires" and, as a result, "[i]t suits"-or, perhaps more aptly in
this case,/osters-"domination" (Theory 239). Here, such guilt, "the context of social
delusion" (Horkheimer and Adorno 4 1 ), revolves around ate-what Lacan calls "the
relationship of the hero to the limit," or the "criminal desire" of the mother which is "the
founding desire of the whole structure" (Seminar 286, 283).
Ate, in this case, corresponds to what Zizek ca11s the "maternal superego." In the
Lacanian schema, the maternal superego opposes the paternal ego-ideal which organizes
social structure: the "primal father' symbol ically represents the authority/social order in
which an individual situates him or herself as well as organizes the repression of desires
which would otherwise undermine that social order, but the maternal superego represents
resis�ance to this authority, the very desire that is otherwise repressed. In Swinburne's
Calydon, the "primal father," Zeus, is merely a paternal metaphor ("the sole steersman of
the helm of things" [line 7 1 5)) invoked to uphold divine order; when Meleager invokes
him, though, Meleager only incites Althaea' s resistance to godly/paternalistic authority.
Likewise, Oeneus is an ineffective king who is unable to enact or enforce any law that
will influence the course of events. Because the paternal ordering principle represented
by Zeus and Oeneus is ineffective and thus "d�ficient," the law of the polis '"regress[es]'
toward a ferocious maternal superego" which "disturbs" normativity (Zizek, Lacan 99).
On one level, Artemis figures this regression because, as a chaste goddess who
demands chastity from her followers, she prevents the "normal" sexual relationship upon
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which human relationships are modeled. However, because Artemis is physicatty absent
from the poem, the maternal superego seems more fervently represented by Atalanta and
Althaea. Atalanta cannot engage in a "normal" sexual relationship with Meleager�
because she represents the impossibility of fulfilling human desire, she perpetually ,
ferociously, disruptively re-evokes those desires that the social order attempts to
repress-inasmuch as desire always perpetuates and sustains itself. Atalanta violates the
"rule" with her "perverse will" (lines 476, 469). "Unwomanlike," Atalanta disturbs
normativity, since she "treads down use and wont / And the sweet common honor that
[woman] hath" (477-78) under the paternal rule:
Not fire nor iron and the wide-mouthed wars
Are deadlier than her tips or braided hair.
For of one comes poison, and a curse
Falls from the other and burns the lives of men. (482-85)
However, because Atalanta insists that, despite the social disruption she brings to
Calydon, she still acts in accord with the "law given and clean command" (line 896)
meaning, only within the established social order and only because she wishes to
maintain that order-she represents the limit of ate that Althaea will exceed.
Ultimately, the polis is undermined because Althaea embodies the "(real)
knowledge" of subjective, differentiating "agency that perturbs and hinders t�e
[symbolic] rule of the Name-of-the-Father" upon which the polis depends (Zizek, lAcan
27, 97). Althaea constantly dismisses Atalanta for being "beyond the human," but, "[a]s
one made drunk with living" and "mad for joy" (line 1 9 1 5-16) upon committing her act
of filicide, Althaea is the one who is "beyond":
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I am severed from myself, my name is gone,
My name that was a healing, it is changed,
My name is a consuming . . . . {1 942-44)
Althaea is "severed from herself' inasmuc_h as her prior expression of "self' was as the
queen of Calydon, the representative of a whole social body; now, though, the Chorus
the collective voice of the polis-decrees that, as "Her robes" are no longer "manifold"
but too differentiated, "the days of her worship are done, / [and] Her praise is taken
away" (1 956-58). Her act of "justice" did not heal the social body; rather, the social body
was expended ("consumed") in her desire to find a "locus of truth" outside of the field of
the Other. 20 The poem ends with the Chorus asking,
Who shall contend with his lords
Or cross them or do them wrong?
Who shall bind them as with cords?
Who shall tame them as with song?
Who shall smite them as with swords? (4 1 1 1 - 1 5)
The Chorus then answers their own questions by proclaiming that there is no one who
can go beyond, no one who can exceed these limits, "for the hands of their kingdom are
strong" (4 1 1 6); but, the poem itself contradicts the Chorus' answer.
McGann has previously stated that the tragedy, though "formally" Meleager's, is
really Althaea' s (Swinburne 95). However, whereas McGann finds Althaea tragic
because her "life has been broken" by the limitations of fate (Swinburne 95), I believe
As Lacan points ou� the Other (/e grandAutre) is the symbolic ordering principle (the "Lawn) which
gives the subject its position. Here. thou� the subject-Althaea-wants to inhabit a position that is not
determined by that ordering principle. (See Lacan. Concepts 1 29.)
20
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Althaea is a tragic fi gure because she must actively renegotiate her relationship to the
limits that prevent her from achieving the goal of desire-all the while failing to achieve
that goal-rather than passively accept those limitations as what Horkheimer and Adorno
would call a "false absolute."

"The gods are overthrown by the very system by which they are honored":
The Politics of Serial Identification and Renegotiating the Limits in Erechtheus
Perhaps the most obvious difference between Atalanta in Calydon and Erechtheus
is in Swinburne's treatment of identity. As David Riede has noted, Erechtheus's
aesthetic importance "must be understood from its form, not its plot," since it is often
difficult to distinguish major differences between individual characters; the characters,
developed according to Swinburne's "system of correspondences" .in which "everything
in the play eventually suggests everything else," seem fluidly interchangeable (Study
1 1 6). Because the poetic form is of utmost importance, Swinburne chooses an extremely,
but deceptively, simple plot: the Delphic Oracle has instructed Erechtheus and Praxithea,
King and Queen of Athens, to sacrifice their daughter, Chthonia, to ensure Athens'
victory in the war against Thrace. Erechtheus is reluctant though compelled to obey, but
Chthonia obeys willingly, recasting blind obedience to the gods as a willing choice to
sacrifice herself for the greater good of Athens. Whereas Atalanta 's intensity comes
from the complications of its plot, with each individualized character offering contiguous
but distinct perspectives for Swinburne's multitudinous look into the mythopoeic,
Erechtheus is intense because it is Swinburne' s attempt to complicate conventional
modes of identification by intermixing multiple characters' perspective(s) in a mode of
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plethoric simultaneity. Every character, every image, is an ideogram, or what Martin Jay
would call a cipher of the "richly articulated surface of [the] world" it figuratively
describes rather than literally explains ("Scopic" I 3). In this way, Swinburne establishes
a negative dialectic-or amalgamation of identity and non-identity-of "likeness"
between art's immanent "spirit" and a "later, derived 'material' application" or
representation of that spirit (Mitchell, /conology 32-33). As Adorno explains in Aesthetic
Theory, the "spirit" of an artwork is that which becomes more than-exceeds-its
appearance; spirit is what is implied, what can only be gestured at, via the
"configuration" of art's signifying elements. Thus, for Swinburne, the image or symbol
is "not to be held simply identical" with what it feigns to represent; instead, the image or
symbol can resist being "fixated in immediate identity" with the unrepresentable (Theory
86-87). In Erechtheus, Swinburne comes closer to approximating the "plenipotentiary of
immediacy" denied to Meleager under the unforgiving absolutes in Atalanta.
Erechtheus's opening monologue establishes the mode of Swinburnian plethoric
simultaneity that dominates the poem. In this, the only sizeable speech he makes in the
entire poem, Erechtheus is established as the nexus of aesthetic representation and
resistance, beginning with his claim to be interchangeably the son of Gaia, the son of
Hephaestus, and the foster son of Athena. In doing so, Swinburne braids three narrative
threads of the parentage ofErechtheus into one. With his considerable knowledge of
classical literature and equally considerable translation skills, Swinburne would have
been aware that the stories ofErechtheus and his grandfather Erechthonius were typically
conflated in most of the classical accounts. According to Athenian foundation myths, the
first Athenians were half-serpentine autochthons-meaning, they were parthogenetically
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formed from the earth; Erechthonius, the second king of Athens, was one of these
autochthonic beings. Another version of the myth claims that Erechthonius was born out
of a failed union between Hephaestus and Athena: disgusted by Hephaestus's attempt to
make love to her, Athena jumped from the bed before Hephaestus could impregnate her,
and Erechthonius sprung from Hephaestus's spilled semen. Then there are the myths
delineating Erechtheus' s human parentage21 though maintaining that he was actually
raised as Athena's child. The allusions to Erechtheus being of parthenogenetic parentage
while he, paradoxically, is also the son of a "strong cunning God" (line 7) present him as
a Christ figure, though the inclusion of a simultaneous allusion to Phaeton recalls the
ineffectual Christ figure of the Songs before Sunrise. Like Phaeton losing control of the
fiery "four-yoked chariot" of his father, the sun-god Helios who both is and is not
Apollo, 22 Erechtheus feels he is losing control of his kingdom: He describes himself "the
king / Who stand[s] . : . naked" before the earth, subject to a greater power which, like a
"curse / . . . fall[s] as fire upon us" (17- 1 8, 23-24), subsuming the narrative thread of
Phaeton's disastrous end into his own, arguably to invoke the image of catastrophe to
prevent it. The law of nature, "of life and death and all men's days" represented by the
earth, is trumped by the "curse" of the imposing father figure (Hephaestus, Helios, the
Judeo-Christian God) whose symbolic law denies one access to the earth-as-"mother of
all men born" (Erechtheus I , 1 9). The tyrannical imposition of the symbolic law, "God's

21 The non-parthenogenic Erechtheus is said to be the son of Pandion (also one of the kings of Athe�
sometimes also named as the father of Procne and Philomela) and a nymph, Zeuxippe.
22
Initially, Helios was a separate deity from Apollo; however, in later incarnations of the Greek pantheon,
especially those developed under the influence of the Romans, Helios became conflated with Apollo, and
thus Apollo became the god representing the sun.
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will," is exemplified in the gods' demand that Erechtheus sacrifice his daughter, Chthonia
(line 78).
The supposed agency of the Delphic Oracle issuing this charge is incorporated in
the image of Helios. The image of Apollo/Helios, "a fire-souled king" (line 47), is
grafted onto the image of Poseidon, whose edict is the"loud brood of the Thracian foam"
imposing his will "on the sea-wind" of war"blown" toward Athens (lines 44, 56). In this
passage, Poseidon plays a similar role to that of Apollo in the Oresteia, issuing an edict
for murder to reinforce the primacy of what Lacan would call the "name of the father."
In Aeschylus's play, Apollo calls for Orestes to ki11 his mother, Clytemnestra, for
asserting a version of the maternal superego and killing her husband, Agamemnon; in

Erechtheus, Poseidon issues a similar call for the death of Chthonia to reinforce his
paternalism, punishing Erechtheus for waging war against the Thracians, led by
Poseidon's son Eumolpus. Since Poseidon's edict is "A strange growth grafted on ou�
natural soil, / A root of Thrace in Eleusinian earth" (48-49), the traces of the myths that
claim Erechtheus was punished for causing the death of Eumolpus's son, Himmarados,
during the previous war between Athens and Eleusis are evident here. Moreover, since
Eumolpus is also the son of a god-ostensibly the agent of that god's will on earth-who
is eventually killed (sacrificed). by Erechtheus as wen to "save" Athens, Eumolpus
becomes another Christ figure. He exists in a negative dialectic with Erechtheus

23
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especially because Swinburne establishes in Erechtheus's opening monologue that there
23

My reading directly opposes David Riede's analysis that "tlie division between Athens and Thrace,
between Erechtheus and Eumolpus, suggests a division between Erechtheus's mother, earth, and
Eumolpus's father, the sea," providing a static binarism that foregrounds and maintains the poem's system
of "metaphoric correspondences" (Study 1 17). Though I agree that Swinburne sustains the gender divisions
in the poe� I otherwise find Riede's reading too literal, as it dwells on the maintenance of dichotomies and
ignores the reconfigurations of identity formation so crucial to the poem.
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is no "fixed /-identity'' in the world of this poem. In the negative dialectic, Adorno tells
us, "the individual is not flatly for himself. In himself, he is his otherness and linked with
others"; the individual ego, the "self' initially formed in contrast to an/other, must
accommodate (rather than constrain) the other which opposes it and render the other as
"something beyond contradiction" (Negative 1 6 1 , 146). Identity here becomes a subtle,
fluid, constant process of relating otherwise discrete qualities. One must follow "the
accumulating ranges of pattern," the presentation of "motif and variation" (McGann,
Swinburne 1 19) in a constellative mode which allows the borders separating individual
subjects-individual egos-to bleed into one another. In this way, Swinburne allows the
"fixed-/ identity [to] dissolv[e]" between Erechtheus and Erechthonius and between the
various gods. As a result, the relationship between Erechtheus and Eumolpus, as fluid
subjects only superficially establishing the poles of conflict in this poem, remains open to
the kind of Adornian model of intersubjectivity that Gunter Gebauer and Christoph Wulf
say "is not immediately ascribable"; in this model, each subject or "self' opens itself "to
what is not identical," potentially providing access to the other subject or "self' in the
dialectic relationship (287).
By blurring the boundaries establishing Erechtheus's identity as separate from
Eumolpus' s, Swinburne also blurs the boundaries that make the gods' will dissimilar
from the sons'. Erechtheus declares that
what [the gods] will is more than our desire,
And their desire is more than what we will.
For no man's will and no desire of man's
Shall stand as doth a God's will .. . . (75-78)
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But, for Erechtheus (as well as Eumolpus, by constellative association) the struggle
between divine agency and human agency has become the struggle to establish
"sovereignty over existence." Both Erechtheus and Eumolpus, like AJthaea in Atalanta,
"pay for the increase of their power with alienation from that over which they exercise
their power'' (Horkheimer and Adorno 9). The gods' will is "the projection onto nature
of the subjective," in that these gods are "mirror images of [these] men who allow
themselves to be frightened by natural phenomena" (Horkheimer and Adorno 6}
particularly, in this case, death. Man's desire is for a "freedom-toward-death," to fulfill
desire by mastering it, by seeing one' s own death, reaching the impossible goal of
satiating desire in death's nothingness. However, the �uman expression of desire cannot
assert such frightening "pure and insatiable vacuity" (Borch-Jacobsen 1 1 ); thus, one
substitutes a desired thing-here, Chthonia, whose impending death gestures at the death
ofHimmarados palimpsestically traced in Swinburne's poem-for the real goal, and
consequently, this substitution (of seeing another's death rather than one's own)
perpetuates desire itself
As a Christ figure, Erechtheus is denied a death which is nothingness. Erechtheus
dies in battle, but he is killed by Zeus rather than by another human being, such as
Eumolpus. The battle is really Erechtheus's Calvary, where he is always already
forsaken by Zeus, whom Swinburne describes in Judeo-Christian terms as the "King of
kings, holiest of holies, and mightiest of might, / Lord of the lords . . . ,"24 who has
preordained for Erechtheus "an end for the path of the fires of the sun"-a path which the
24 Rev. 19. 16: "On [the Messiah's] robe and on his thigh he has a name inscribed, 'King of kings and Lord
of lords. "'
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Chorus acknowledges will "Take off us [humans] thy burden, and give us not wholly to
death" (780-82, 79 1 ). Not incidentally, the mention of the "holiest of holies" recalls an
earlier reference in the poem to the "shrine of Pandrosus" (line 460), the earthly,
metonymic sanctuary devoted to the martyred king incorporated into of the Temple of
Athena Polias. 25 With the phrase "holiest of holies," Swinburne plays on the biblical
language of Hebrews 9. 1-10, in which Moses's "earthly sanctuary'' to God, the
metonymic altar of God's power called the "Holy of Holies," is reinvoked to mark the
advent of "the time [which] comes to set things right," or the time of a new covenant
between God and humanity initiated b)' the death of Christ. In Erechtheus, the time to
"set things right"-to establish a new relationship between humanity and the divine, the
law of the polis and divine law-comes when the Athenians retrieve Erechtheus's body
from the battlefield, "bear[ing] him slain of no man but a God, / Godljke ... "; "through
him"-the supposed power represented in his lifeless body-they claim Athens is
"Saved[,] and the whole clear land is purged . . . " (I 5 88-9 1 ). By claiming that the gods,
and not a human agent him or herself, holds such power over the entirety of death, either
in caprice or by providential circumscription, the Athenians paradoxically wield "the
discourse of full satisfaction" (Borch-Jacobsen 1 1 ) while becoming increasingly alienated
from it. At this point, the Athenians' worship of their dead king's body as a site of power
reinforces the very sense of alienation rife in Erechtheus's initial speech questioning
divine will. Moreover, it also reinforces the importance for the human agents in the
poem to reinvent Athens as a "Dear city without [a] master or lord" (line 1 3 8)-without
either a living human lord or even the pervasive presence of a divine one.
25 See Pausanias, Description ofGreece 1.26.5.
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Consequently, most criticism on Erechtheus identifies Chthonia, not Erechtheus,
as the more criticaHy important Christ figure in Swinburne' s poem because this "city
without a master or lord" must be founded upon a feminine principle-what Roberts calls
"a sort of super-fertility'' (766)-that both corresponds to and offsets the "name of the
father" which has become counterproductive. From the "death" of Athens' paternalistic
ruler comes its rebirth: as Margot Louis argues, "All Athenians will be the children of
Chthonia" rather than Erechtheus, privileging Chthonia's proclamation of herself "for all
the world / . . . a saviour," although a savior who evokes the trace memory ofMother
Nature before she was subjected to men, a Gaia/Hertha whose "womb / . . . brought forth /
For all this people freedom" (Gods 66; Erechtheus 939-40, 930-3 1). This is not the same
disruptive feminine principle that Swinburne creates in the triangulation of Althaea/
Atalanta/Artemis in Atalanta in Calydon, though, because the extreme subjective
differentiation that causes the tension within that triad is notably muted in the plethoric
immediacy that appears in the presentation of Chthonia-who is (her mother) Praxithea
who is Athena, all of whom are Athens, in Erechtheus. 26 In Atalanta, the triangulated
female characters create the "arbitrary" and "' irrational' maternal superego" which
inhibits and denies pleasure, thus creating an "unresolved tension in intersubjective
relations" (Zizek, Lacan 99); this repudiation of pleasure is suggested by the emphasis
placed on Artemis' s and Atalanta's virginity as well as the emphasis placed on Althaea' s
desire, desire that causes her to pursue not pleasure but "the violence that [her] desire
institutes" (Guzynski 2 1 0). I contend, however, that the female characters in Erechtheus
26

This is based, in part, on McGann 's prior assertion tliat, tbe characters' "identities tend to dissolve into
other characters and contexts" so that "the characters and actions in Erechtheus seem to share [a) sort of
radical vagueness . . . : because everything is necessarily conceived and defined in tenns of something and
everything else" (Swinburne 127).
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are not forced to inhibit and deny pleasure by the same kind of maternal superego.
Instead, as I will argue below, Chthonia and her mother, Praxithea, find a pleasure
beyond the limits of either the maternal superego or the paternalistic prohibition, a
pleasure that does not originate in the alienation between human law and the law of
nature.27
This is the pleasure of intimacy between human law and the law of nature first
indicated by Erechtheus in his appeal to Gaia, describing his ideal Athens as a
girdle of gate and temple and citadel
Drawn round beneath thy bosom, and fast linked
As to thine heart's root-this dear crown of thine. (84-86)
'

.

Erechtheus cannot experience this kind of intimacy, but his desire for it is intensified in
Chthonia's acceptance of her role as a human sacrifice. Because she can regard herself as
a cipher for the possibilities of realizing a new kind of "dominion and freedom" for
Athens (line 1 095) which will not so distinctively alienate "[i]nexaustibility [and]
unending renewal," she seems able to tap into what Horkheimer and Adorno call the
"something of mana" left in the world ( 1 7). Thus Chthonia surrenders herself:
I put on me the darkness thy shadow, my mother, and symbol, 0 Earth, of
my name . .. .
In thy likeness I come to thee darkling, a daughter whose dawn and her
even are the same. (1 1 02-04)
In Erotism, Georges Bataille asserts that the Christian "wish" is "to open the door to a
completely unquestioning love" ( 1 1 8). By presenting Chthonia's death as a moment in
27 See Marcuse 227.
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which she simultaneously disco_vers and submits to a "completely unquestioning love"
,
like that between mother and daughter, Swinburne renders Chthonia s sacrifice as an
attempt to fulfill a similar kind of Christian "wish." The element of mana Chthonia
intuits here is like the hopeful Christian bel ief that the ''lost continuity" between
humanity and nature can be rediscovered through "boundless and uncalculated love"; the
boundless and uncalculated love she has for the Gaia is the same love she has for Athens,
the city which is "the fruit of [Gaia's] body" and whose citizens are Gaia's "children
true-born" (line 1 1 57). Through her self-sacrifice, Chthonia hopes to transform the
"vision of violence" of human sacrifice "into its opposite," a serene vision of unselfish
,,
love that cafl incite the "world of selfish discontinuity to become instead a "realm of
continuity afire with love" (Erotism 1 1 8).
By identifying the "dawn" of human hope with the "shadow" of mythic fear in a
negative dialectic, Chthonia seems to renegotiate the conventions, or limits, of ritual
sacrifice. The kind of Christ-like sacrifice Chthoni a makes typically requires a
selflessness; in other words, the sacrificing self is assumed to disregard her own self, her
own fears and desires, in order to alleviate the fears and capitulate to the desires of others.
However, Chthonia' s sacrifice becomes just as much about Chthonia' s desire as it is
about her heroic gesture of regard for an other or others (Athens). Her death seems a
conscious choice not to cede her desire: she fully accepts the nothingness of desire,
refusing to see herself as a victim but instead as a pure subject assuming the death drive
imposed upon her. That choice allows her a moment in which she paradoxically "seems
permeated with intense pleasure" though she also "suffers immensely" (Zizek, La.can 65).
Though in death she claims to experience a kind of "love" in which she can "Laugh
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without word, filled with sweet light, and speak / Divine dumb things of the inward spirit
and heart," she also laments that she will be left with only "dead thoughts of dead things"
in a "sterile" grave-bed "with its void sad sheets" (lines 91 6-24).
Regarding herself as the cipher of Athens' potential, she also experiences herself
as the object of the ritual, striving for her own "radical self-annihilation"-which, like
Zizek states, entails going "beyond mere physical destruction" and performing "the
effacement of the very symbolic texture of' the continuity between "generation and
corruption" her sacrifice is supposed to restore (Lacan 64). Like the promise of
redemption and eternal life signified by Christ, she is the object by which "mankind tries
to avoid the terms set to individual discontinuity, death, and invents a discontinuity
unassailable by death-that is, the immortality of discontinuous beings" (Bataille,
Erotism 1 1 9). And, because Chthonia subjectively chooses her self-annihilation while
concurrently capitulating to her status .as ritual object, she exhibits the kind of ambiguity
that Zizek attributes to thefemmefatale, in that "[w]e can never be sure if she enjoys or
suffers, if she manipulates or is herself the victim of manipulation" (Lacan 65). At the
same time, though, it is because Swinburne creates this lack of certainty regarding the
palpable limits of her sacrificial death-her limit experience, so to speak-that Chthonia
seems to achieve the dis-alienation that Erechtheus cannot.
Praxithea shares in the intensity of traversing conventional limits and
experiencing pleasure which is suffering; she engages in self-conscious manipulation of
her given situation while concurrently being manipulated by the social conditions which
place her in that very situation. There is a sense of elation in Praxithea' s willingness to
give her "gift," "This flower of this my body, this sweet life, / . . . And give it death,"
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because Chthonia's death "is more, / Much more is this than all we [are]" ( 1 032, 1 03439). On the surface, Praxithea claims that her daughter's sacrifice is hers to make but,

importantly, she does not ascribe to it the kinds of subjective reasons Althaea makes for
her sacrifice of Meleager. Because she does not dwell on such subjectively differentiated
reasons, she is able to articulate her position as a particular Athenian representing, and
not striving beyond, the collective position of the polis. In the careful inclusion of the
pronoun "we," Swinburne has Praxithea not only identify herself with Chthonia as the
"flower of . . . [her] body," but also with the entirety of Athens:
See now, friends,
My countrymen, my brothers, with what heart
I give you this that of your hands again
The Gods require for Athens; as / give
So give ye . . . . (1 069-72, emphases mine)
In this way, Swinburne presents Praxithea as manipulating the gods' edict for sacrifice as
retributive justice by making it into a call to strengthen the polis, though Praxithea-who
is ideogrammatically all of Athens here-is still manipulated by the compulsion to make
the sacrifice in the first place. Sacrificing Chthonia, whether undertaken merely to
appease the gods or to foster a new sense of "a human society ruled . . . by ethical
responsibilities" (Murfin 2 1 0), is still an attempt to barter with the gods: Praxithea
maintains, much more than she disrupts, the texture of the traditional symbolic network
by using Chthonia as what Horkheimer and Adorno call "·a device of men by which the
gods may be mastered" (49, emp�asis added).
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The gods are still present here as very separate from-beyond-men, especially
as the Athenians promise to worship Chthonia' s name after her death: "such grace / The
Gods have dealt to no man" or woman, save Chthonia, who bears a "heavy sorrow"
beyond human comprehension (I 085-86). The Chorus proclaims that Chthonia has
"godhead in [her] blood" and, as sue� her "name / Shall be . . . this city' s," worshipped
next to "hers that called it Athens"-meaning, Athena's (1 087-9 1 ). The martyred
Chthonia, then, still parallels her martyred father in that she seems more Cristo deo than
Cristo uomo. Additionally, the Chorus remarks upon Chthonia' s death:

her mouth was a fountain of song,
And her heart as a citadel strong
That guards the heart of the city. (1 1 95-97)
By choosing to have the Chorus use words similar to those spoken by Erechtheus as he
imagines the idealized, sanctified Athens in the poem's opening monologue, Swinburne
demonstrates how Chthonia, via serial identification with Praxithea as well as
Erechtheus, "sums up in herself both the female and male agents of redemption; she,
perhaps, is the perfect [Swinbumian] hermaphrodite" (Louis, Gods 66). That being said,
the presentation falls short of being utterly convincing until the figure of the divine,
Athena, is transformed into a totem for "that ideal agnostic state" (Murfin 2 1 0),
representing men striving, and sometimes suffering in their failure, to maintain
community with others rather than causing men to suffer arbitrarily and for selfish
reasons. 28

In Swinburne and His Gods, Margot Louis applies Ludwig Feuerbach 's Essence of Christianity (1854,
trans. George Eliot [New York: Harper, 1957))-particuJarly Feuerbach's statement that "he who suffers
28
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At first, Athena's appearance as the deus ex machina solidifying the nascent
"agnostic state" of Athens seems idiosyncratic-especially considering that, in Atalanta,
Artemis, who is presented much more discernibly as an instrumental artifice of
manipulative divine power, never materially manifests herself in Calydon. However,
Artemis remains a problematic presence in Calydon specifically because of her absence.
As absence-which-is-presence, Artemis' s abstract or virtual "appearance" in Atalanta is
comparable to what Adorno recognizes as the "imitation of fear"-the primal fear of the
unknown29-in that Artemis "perpetuates the mythic spell" of fear against which the
Calydonians simultaneously "rebel" yet to which they remain "subordinate". (Theory 47).
If Artemis were to appear in Calydon, she would break the spell, reveal herself as artifice,
and thus transfer her supposed control over "the incomprehensibility of death . . . to
wholly comprehensible real existence" (Horkheimer and Adorno 29). But this transfer of
control is precisely what Athena accomplishes in the final action of Erechtheus: as
McGann astutely suggests, "[t]his Pallas is no longer an Olympian, but a Republican"
(Swinburne 1 29). Like the Athena of Aeschylus's Eumenides, Swinburne's refashioned
goddess demonstrates how the human-centered republic of Athens "cannot progress by
exterminating its old order" but by "absorb[ing] and us[ing]" the old order as part of the
new (Grene and Lattimore, Aeschylus 3 1 ).
for others, who lays down his life for the� acts divinely, is as a God to men"-to her reading of

Erechtheus. 1 have loosely adapted from Louis's reading here. See Gods 68-69.
29
In the Dialectic ofEnlightenment, Horkheimer and Adorno contend that hwnans create mythic stories of

the gods because "(m]an imagines himself free from fear when there is no longer anything unknown" (16);
mythic constructs are offered to explain the unknown and thus alleviate some of the fear. Yet the arbitral)'
quality of the gods in these myths paradoxically makes human beings fear the very gods constructed to
alleviate fear. And, as Adorno notes in his Aesthetic Theory, "mythical fear diminish[es] with the
awakening of subjectivity," though the "old images of terror'' persist because the subject, unable to free
her/himself from them completely, "perpetuates the mythical spelr' of that fear "against which [ s/]he rebels
and to which [ s/]he is subordinate" (4 7).
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Though emphasizing that the transition of power occurs by her "command" and is
meant to honor what "The Gods have stablished" (sic, lines 1 666, 1 668), Athena tells the
Athenians:
thine shall be
The crown of all songs sung, of all deeds done
Thine the full flower for all time; in thine hand
Shall time be like a scepter . . .
. . . thine eyes
Shall.first in man 's flash lightning liberty,
Thy tongue shallfirst say freedom. . . . ( 1 68 1 -89, emphases added)
In his pivotal reading of Erechtheus, Ross Murfin claims this is the moment in which
republican citizenship is established: from this point forward, he argues, "[t]he only
citizenship which would have virtue after the moment of man' s spiritual and social
revolt" against the old order of divine caprice "would be man's natural citizenship within
Nature" (2 10). In this case, such "natural citizenship" suggests that humans will accept
their failure to exert control over the inevitable cycle of birth and death; the "scepter" of
time may be in human hands, but only in the sense that human will, rather than divine
circumscription, determines how women and men spend the time allotted to them. As
Athena reminds them, "time and change" will remain "masters and lords of all men" even
though time and change will seem to "be made / To thee that knowest no master and no
lord / Servants" (1 725-28}--echoing Chthonia's earlier reminder that, though she dies to
purchase freedom for Athens, still "Day to day makes answer, first to last, and life to
death," as she, like all else, was "Born for death's sake, die[s] for life's sake" (884-85).
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Swinburne, while regressing back to the mythic mode in which spirit i s recognized "only
as immersed in nature, as, natural power,>' concomitantly envisions the mythic mode
allowing for the exploration of"the sensual consciousness of the identity of the
generar'-in this case, the polis as a communal whole-"and the particular''-meaning,
each individual member comprising the communal whole-"as naturalized mediation"
(Horkheimer and Adorno 89, 101). This mediation, of course, must occur in a world that
he will always fail to re-enchant, though he finds hope in his failure nonetheless. In
failure, Swinburne realizes that the renegotiation of disenchantment allows glimpses of
the trace memories of a time in which the unalienated pleasure of unnaturalized
immediacy was possible.
Swinburne claimed that Erechtheus "is throughout . . . imbued with awe and
reverence towards the moral and religious law of nature (not of theology)" (Letters
3 : 100). 30 Notably, �e previously had made a similar claim for Atalanta, telling Lord
Houghton that the natural "theology" of Atalanta was like that of "de Sade with a
difference," as Sade "saw to the bottom of gods and men" (Letters 1 : 125).3 1 Within the
Sadean nature outlined in the Blake essay as personifying a "criminal desire" that is
indeed beyond the human, "no destruction seem[s] to her destructive enough . . . . [I]t is by
criminal things and deeds unnatural that nature works and moves and has her being, . . .
,,
labour[ing] in desire of death (Swinburne, Blake 1 57-58nl). Artemis and Althaea
personify these same qualities in Atalanta. Like Madame Durand of Sade's Juliette,
Artemis is the enchantress embodying the commanding law of nature that supposedly

30

31

Letter to Edmund Gosse, 2 Jan. I 876.
Letter to Lord Houghton; the original has no date, but Lang dates it 14 JuJy 1865.
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refuses to be subjugated to men; yet, her power and authority-like the unsubjugated
nature from which she draws that power and authority-proves to be illusory, imaginary,
artificial. And Althaea' s expressions of desire, orchestrated within the development of
the maternal superego, demonstrate how nature, always already dominated and
conceptualized under the name of the father, remains part of the paternalistic social order
that demands the "repressive organization of sexuality" and, consequently, subjugates
pleasure (Marcuse 40). Quite paradoxically, nature is dominated and repressed, but it
also can function as a virtual site for pursuing the traces of that repressed pleasure. That
pursuit, moreover, becomes destructive inasmuch as "objects of desire become agents,"
and I would add also the recipients of, "punishment" (Bersani 97). Althaea-also like
Sade's Madame Durand-remains manipulated by the "name of the father'' because she
fails to absorb the paternalistic order into any "new" order she wishes to establish. Like
Artemis, who in many myths is often caught bathing by male admirers, Althaea remains a
subject positioned within the prohibited rule of the name of the father, or the male
(paternalistic) gaze.
As the paternalistic gaze is diffused and negatively identified with the feminized
"super-fertility" that catalyzes the establishment of the "new order'' in Erechtheus,
though, I believe that Swinburne proves himself as the "Sade[an] with a difference" much
more so in that poem than he does in Atalanta. Whereas, as Horkheimer and Adorno
point out, "the individualism which Sade proclaimed in combating the laws ends in the
absolute rule of the generality" ( 1 1 7), the "generality" of the Athenian polis in
Erechtheus cannot be a universal which transcends its particulars. The plethoric

immediacy established throughout (within the form of) the poem holds traces of the
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dissonant, "excessive" condition of desire that cannot be otherwise incorporated into a
static rule of generality. The exemplary "beacon" of republican citizenship will always
remain in tension with the "darkness of change on the waters of time" (Erechtheus line
1 765). In Swinburne' s Athens, republicanism will not cease to express its struggle with
itself. And the polis, as a structure which will always have to contend with the flux of
change as well as its failure to become a perfect(ed) form of government, represents the
Swinburnian work of art. The Athenian polis becomes a site between the constant
collision of social and political representation and its powerlessness to represent every
possible facet or particularity of the human condition-every particular experience of
each member of the city-in itself. Similarly, then, the poem becomes the site of the
constant collision between art's expressive powers of representation and its
powerlessness, or failure, to salvage the immediacy of representation after the catastrophe
of meaning. In other words, even an artwork that features serial identifications, fluid
systems of perpetual correspondences, and the negative dialectic ultimately will fail to
represent thoroughly all possible meanings-though it _is compelled to strive continually
toward that fullness of immediate representation, all the same.
By comparing Atalanta and Erechtheus, one can trace the development of
Swinburne' s aesthetic and notice some perhaps subtle but nonetheless i mportant changes
in the way he negotiates the failure of fantasy to fulfill desire. Since it was written at
approximately the same time that Swinburne not only began the first draft of the Blake
essay but also began writing the poems that would later compri se Poems and Ballads,

First Series, Atalanta shares many similarities with these works. In his readings of
Blake's poetry, Swinburne finds that aesthetic experience fails to allow one to transcend
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the material world and its limitations; this failure to transcend is embodied in Meleager.
As both Thomas Wymer and Ian Fletcher have suggested previously, Meleager is an
aesthete. Wymer argues that Meleager represents an individualized "creative kind of
law'' which regards "life as something not merely to be endured but to 'lighten and lift up
higher'" or, in other words, life is the quest for transcendence (5); Fletcher contends that
Meleager, whose death marks his failure to achieve transcendence, "realize[s] the price
that a weak-bodied aesthete must pay'' (" Atalanta" 1 83) in a material world that cannot
be transcended. Meleager represents the kind-of ego-weakness-in which the subject
falsely' concludes that s/he is the same as the other, the object of desire, but suffers in
her/his separation from the desired other-that Swinburne reads into Blake's Urizen: just
as Urizen cannot enact any kind of fulfilling reconciliation between self and other in his
world, Meleager cannot find a similar kind of fulfilling reconciliation in Calydon. By
asserting a kind of ego-strength that Meleager lacks and actively renegotiating the
boundaries between self and other, Althaea attempts to provide an effective
countermeasure to this ego-weakness, but she, too, fails in that the renegotiations break
down very quickly due to her overt identification with Meleager as "other." Her failure is
productive in that it suggests a new way of considering the material world which entails
replacing divine order with a human one, but Althaea's limit experience does not seem to
inspire the Calydonians to reconsider their world and the way they assign their world
"meaning": the Calydonian Chorus has witnessed Althaea' s embrace of ate but has
largely rejected it, just as the Troezenian Chorus rejects Phaedra' s embrace of ate in
Poems and Ballads ' "Phaedra."
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Thus the potential for renegotiation of limits is introduced in both A talanta and
"Phaedra," although the audiences constructed in these poems (the Calydonians, the
Troezenians) are not very willing to recognize and to embrace the tensions. In these
earlier works, Swinburne occasionally seems to question his own process of
(re)discovering the possibilities for substantively implementing the creative tensions
generated by the ongoing dialectic between the imagination's potential for transforming
material reality and the material reality that both grounds and antagonizes the
imagination. For example, in "ltylus," though Procne's unrepresentable (beyond the
discursive) song gestures at the lost, tension-less continuity between imagination and
reality that perpetuates the tension which sparks creativity, Swinburne remains more
focused on Philomela' s discomfiting place within a discursive tension she cannot
transcend. Likewise, in "Anactoria," Swinburne valiantly struggles not only to
circumscribe Sappho within the margins of materiality but also to circumscribe Anactoria
as a completely imaginative or virtual presence antagonizing those margins, but ends his
poem by resignedly admitting that there always remains a "Thick darkness" and
"insuperable sea" (" Anactoria" line 304) that may confound the attempt to employ failure
as a key factor of aesthetic production.
However, after completing Songs before Sunrise 's exploration of how the failure
inherent in political revolution create tensions that renew and revitalize the struggle to
contend productively with the failure to fulfill human desires, Swinburne seems to have
found a way to portray failure more effectively as a mode in which one can find
satisfaction and even pleasure, rather than delaying the experience of satisfaction and
pleasure for the advent of a perfect resolution that is actually impossible to achieve. In
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Erechtheus, he portrays the Athenian polis as the site of perpetual struggle with failure,
where the tensions between the desire to realize ultin:iately unreachable goals and the
practice of perpetuating that desire can be productively and fluidly renegotiated and
utilized. Athena is no· longer the agent imposing divine order on the Athenians but the
signifier for the polis itself, a new human order which will strive to counteract ego
weakness by accommodating all possibilities for subjective differentiation; in other
words, the polis attempts to collectivize all possibilities of particularity and difference
without imposing upon itself the false expectation of successfully achieving unity without
dissonance. The polis will strive to "live / Beyond all human hap of mortal doom /
Happy," yet retain the tension of the "Plight for continual comfort" as the catalyst for
their striving (Erechtheus lines 1 744-45). Just as Swinburne' s art is a rather Adomian
site in which experimentation "takes shape as the testing of possibilities"-tests that are
undertaken not to achieve an end result but for the sake of the testing itself (Theory 37)
Swinbume' s aesthetic polis is a site in which fantasies that fail to reconcile tensions take
shape as the testing of possibilities for revaluating-for "revis(ion)ing"-and not actually
reconciling or transcending, those tensions.
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